

Culture and the politics of Third World nationalism

Dawa Norbu



London and New York

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Culture and the politics of Third World nationalism

'The objectives are clearly spelt out; the key concepts are rigorously defined ...helpful signposts guide the reader through the theoretical chapters and the case studies, leading to a cumulative and enduring knowledge of the specific and more general attributes of third world nationalism.'

Subrata K.Mitra, The Centre for Indian Studies, University of Hull

Culture and the politics of Third World Nationalism combines insights based on an understanding of specific political systems in the Third World, with a theoretical framework that seeks to draw out the universal significance of seemingly local events in terms of nationalism.

The author's personal experience of nationalism in Tibet, India and the United States together with a sociological analysis often case studies inform an argument that pays particular attention as to how and why nationalism is moulded by local cultures. Areas discussed include South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Eastern Europe with critical and comparative reference to the European forms of nationalism. The book also contains an analysis of the relationship between Marxism and nationalism. Norbu argues that the importance of nationalism as an enduring social force in international politics is especially evident from its appearance in societies that are explicitly founded upon transnational ideals.

The book is a significant contribution to the literature on Third World nationalism and will be of interest to students and scholars of politics, sociology, anthropology and international studies.

Dawa Norbu is Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He was educated in Tibet, India and the United States and received his doctorate in political sociology from the University of California at Berkeley. He is the author of *Red Star over Tibet* (1987) and has contributed to a number of scholarly journals.

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Preface: field experience and social theory

This is not yet another library work on nationalism, though I do build on the significant findings of previous scholars in the field. There is an anthropological dimension to my endeavour, which I would like to stress at the outset. In 1959 when I was a little boy, I experienced a prototype nationalism in which the Dalai Lama became the symbol of the whole movement, occasioned by the Tibetan rebellion against the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Barely three years after escaping to India, I witnessed Indian nationalism unleashed by the 1962 Sino-Indian war (women donating their jewellery to the Indian war effort, and so on). In 1979 when I was about to write my dissertation at Berkeley I witnessed a brief resurgence of American nationalism occasioned by the Iran hostages incident ('Nuke Khomeini' so the graffiti used to run). And during the academic year 1986–7, while teaching at North Bengal University (Darjeeling) I observed at first hand the rise of Gurkha ethnic nationalism, which passed through all the necessary stages of nationalism: mass mobilization, social communication and egalitarian politics. The *Kukri*, a short sword used by Gurkha soldiers, became the symbol of this movement.

The function of personal experience in academic activity is not usually acknowledged in public. Yet its crucial role in gaining insight into the subject of one's inquiry cannot be underestimated. Personal experience makes the critical difference between a work of insight and a formal academic exercise. That is why anthropology has made more contributions to social understanding than any other discipline. (In this respect Third World scholars have yet to free themselves from their traditional bias against anthropology and anthropologists.) Indeed, behind any deep understanding of any social phenomenon is some crucial insightful personal experience as the igniting spark. The Buddha's experience of sickness, ageing and death inspired him to meditate deeply upon the nature of the human condition; Marx's personal experience of the emerging industrial capitalism in nineteenth century England agitated him to think deeply about the nature of capitalist economics;

Weber's personal experience at his uncles's family factory in late-nineteenth-century Germany led him to study the role of religious ethics in economic enterprise.

Each of the exemplary thinkers mentioned above transcended the particular events that occasioned their initial thinking, expanding them into subjects of universal significance. This is the proper scope and role of personal experience in academic enterprise. As anthropology emphasizes, personal experience or field-work must not degenerate into subjectivism and impressionism; it ought to be an instrument of insight into the nature of social phenomena.

This is not to put my contribution at par with great works of insight. It is to raise a methodological issue that is often ignored in contemporary academic discourse resulting usually in wastage of effort and resources. One could, of course, doctor learned books about non-western nationalism living in New York or London, but such works appear rather divorced from Third World realities. Some form of field-work ought to be the acid test of any sociologically-grounded theory of Third World nationalism, as any sound anthropologist would insist. Field experience helps us to penetrate the intricate inner interconnections, subtly-shaded developmental stages, and the inner dynamics of this volatile subject. Moreover, since I view nationalism as a universal category *but* mediated through specific cultures, field experience of living traditions as a critical insider makes a crucial difference. For nationalism, though often initiated by the urban educated strata, must, by definition, involve masses of peasantry in the Third World context. And a first hand experience of popular cultures (little traditions) seems imperative. I found India a good laboratory for this purpose because all the world religions except Confucianism are practised here as living traditions.

Yet this is not a personal narrative account of the particular nationalisms that I was fortunate enough to observe at first hand. It claims to be at least an outline of a theory that conceptualizes and explains the social phenomenon of nationalism as such. I have moved from the particular to the general so that general theoretical prepositions are grounded firmly in empirical realities or, at any rate, observable patterns of events in the Third World. In this difficult task my field experience enabled me to gain insight into, as well as sustain my interest in, this complex subject over a long period of time. But the empirical basis of this analytic construct is not my personal experience of nationalism; my sociological analysis of ten case studies forms its basis.

This essay is an offshoot of a larger project that I undertook at the University of California, Berkeley, for my doctoral dissertation, *Marxism, Nationalism and Revolution: The Rise of Neo-nationalism in Communist Countries* (Berkeley, University of California, 1982). The dissertation sought to explore the fundamental relationship between nationalism and

Marxism that evolved in the course of communist revolutions in the twentieth century.

Since coming back to India in December 1982, I have been updating and broadening the data basis of my dissertation. I extended the same analysis of interaction between Marxism and nationalism to areas uncovered in the original dissertation, namely South Asia, the Middle East, Western Europe and Latin America. What all these case studies convinced me was the utter importance of nationalism as a great inexorable and enduring social force in international politics. Neither Marxism nor Revolution can quite match the sheer potency and mass appeal of nationalism—for that matter any other ideology or philosophy. This then led me to a single-pointed meditation on the nature of nationalism as such. My primary concern here is that ‘ism’ of the nation or nation-states felt passionately and deeply, if not violently, by almost all strata of a mobilized society at critical junctures of its history.

Finally, sometimes I cite what might appear as incongruous examples from the Communist world. The intention is not to denigrate the Marxist-Leninist regimes which continue verbally to denounce nationalism as a reactionary ideology, but to indicate the universality of nationalism under the prevailing international conditions. It is done in the Popperian tradition of proof by falsification. Nationalism is objectively produced even in socialist societies that are explicitly founded upon transnational ideals, even though it (nationalism) goes against the radical will of such societies. However, the type of nationalism emerging out of socialist structures is different from that of the typical nation-state, about which I hope to do another work in the near future.

I have tried to approach and treat the controversial subject of nationalism as objectively as humanly possible. This has proved not too difficult. I am an intellectual proletarian with nothing to lose nor anything to defend. But still this work might appear as a surprise to my colleagues in the Third World, most of whom tend to superimpose radical Marxian concepts to recalcitrant realities. Such retrospective determinism distorts the meaning of the past which naturally hinders our understanding of the present and future. The fact is that in the Third World the masses are still deeply religious; the ruling classes are partly neo-traditionalist and partly westernized; and among the intellectuals it is fashionable to pose as Marxists of varying shades.

The following essay is written under the assumption that the political economy approach alone, which the Third World scholars have raised to a level of intellectual orthodoxy, is inadequate to comprehend the complexities of Third World politics. To cite a few recent examples: What was the political economy of Khomeini’s Revolution in Iran and its fall-out in other Islamic nations? What is the political economy of Ram-

Janambhumi-Babri Masjid confrontation that caused the downfall of the V.P.Singh Government in India? What is the political economy of intratribal conflict in South Africa that obviates a united *black* struggle against apartheid? And what is the political economy of Saddam Hussain's decision to fight against the US-led allies with their most up-to-date high-tech weapons that destroyed Iraq's rich economy and military-industrial complex? Where is the economic rationality that the political economy approach assumes? Surely, non-rational elements emanating from tradition are more operative in such cases.

Such imponderables compel us to go beyond political economy. This is not to play down the importance of political economy which every thinking person considers crucial. Rather it is to suggest that there seems to be a strong dose of non-rational elements in Third World political behaviour. Whereas rational behaviour is more or less predictable, non-rational behaviour remains unpredictable. Hence, my essay aims at the demystification of non-rational elements as best exemplified by Third World nationalism, which still continue to influence the non-western world.

* * *

Jawaharlal Nehru University's school of international studies, which must be one of the biggest area study centres in the Third World, provided me with as ideal a place as one can possibly hope in a developing country for such diversified research as this essay demanded. Its various area specialists helped me in a number of ways without which there might have been more factual errors in this book. To list all their names here might be misconstrued as if my views enjoyed some sort of scholarly consensus and therefore intellectual support for my deviant pursuit. Most of them, like others in the Third World, remain wedded to the political economy approach. Hence my thanks to them are more private. Yet, I must name and thank my friends who helped me in their various ways in the course of writing this book: Giri Deshingkar, Ganganath Jha, Prem Poddar and Lobsang Tenzin Rikha.

In particular I am grateful to Subrata Mitra and the late Urmila Phadnis for their careful and critical reading of the earlier draft. I have greatly benefited from their constructive suggestions and critical comments. But I alone am responsible for whatever shortcomings there may be in the present text.

While writing this theoretical essay, I found the training in social sciences that I received at Berkeley very useful, and would like to record my gratitude to my American teachers: the late Reinhard Bendix, Lowell Dittmer, Ernest B. Haas, Chalmers A. Johnson, Leo E. Rose, Robert A. Scalapino and Kenneth N. Waltz.

My debt to the scholars in the field of nationalism should be evident from the references to their works. The purpose of quotations is not so much to lend moral backing to my views but to give due credit; they are the cases of coincidence of ideas one so often thought but never so well expressed. Sometimes, however, I did not agree with what some of them had written; even then their writings stimulated me to think along new lines. In this respect I would like to thank even those whose works I have critiqued such as Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Frederick Hertz, and so on, for their writings on nationalism which I have enjoyed.

I would also like to thank the library staff of The National Library, Calcutta, The Ratan Tata Library, Delhi School of Economics and Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, New Delhi, for their kind help in locating the various books and journals needed for this research.

My brother Kesang Tenzin not only typed the first draft of my untidy manuscript, but also made several useful suggestions which improved the text. The final typescript was ably word-processed by T.Kameswari Vishwanathan. I am also grateful to my publishers, especially Gordon Smith, Robert Tarling and Caroline Wintersgill for their painstaking interest in this project.

Lastly, but not in the least I would like to express my grateful thanks to my wife Rinchen Lhamo for enabling me to devote time to thinking and writing while she quietly looks after me and our son, Jamyang.

D.N.
JNU, New Delhi
July 1991

1 Introduction: western concepts and non-western realities

This introductory chapter initiates a theoretical discussion of some of the fundamental questions concerning the nature and concept of Third World nationalism. What are the structural components of Third World nationalism? Have the existing theories of nationalism done justice to such a structure of Third World nationalism? If not, what are the methodological considerations for an alternative theory of non-western nationalism?

THE STRUCTURE OF THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM

This essay attempts to conceptualize non-western nationalism in terms of widely accepted social science propositions so as to construct a general theory in outline. It commences with a sociological definition of nationalism and nationhood, then traces the various developmental stages of proto-nationalism and the emergence of national identity under a set of modern conditions, and finally it demonstrates the process of production of mass nationalism as a direct result of the politicization of society, especially its value system by means of social communication and mass mobilization. This complex process, I argue, tends to produce social and psychological levelling effects upon a whole class structure which engenders a society-wide 'mechanical solidarity' (Durkheim 1964:79) during a nationalist movement.

In the context of such a conceptualization, the structure of nationalism consists of two equally powerful components: traditional data (such as race, language, literature, tradition, territoriality), and egalitarian ideology (such as freedom, equality and fraternity). The predominance of traditional data characterizes the early Third World nationalism, and that of western nationalism by egalitarian politics. However, in practice the essence of any contemporary nationalism in the Third World is the fusion of modern and traditional components which typically manifest as: (a) societal consciousness about national identity that provides the necessary dynamics of national unity; (b) an all-encompassing value system to guide and motivate

political action; (c) a pan-ethnic movement to generate social power that is utilized to achieve national unity and independence; (d) a foreign policy centred upon the concept of national interest.

Nationalism is conceived in this study more as politicized societal consciousness than as neatly-formulated ideology. Proto- and generic nationalism with which this essay is basically concerned cannot by itself functionally be considered an ideology because it cannot define situations or propose rational solutions unless it degenerates into Fascism, whereby racism becomes the essential reference point and working framework. Otherwise, nationalism is a fusion of traditional culture and modern ideology capable of generating great social power.

The post-French Revolution nationalism, however, usually has an ideological dimension: egalitarianism to be worked first of all *vis-à-vis* the absolute monarch or colonial power, and after independence within the nation-state itself among its various classes. Egalitarian ideology forms the modern component of nationalism which not only defines the present situation but also proposes rational solutions to social problems and thus points the way towards a new future. The social potency and mass appeal of nationalism resides in this unique combination of two contrasting idea-systems: traditional culture provides the emotional power that mystifies the rational mind; egalitarian ideology a rational framework for the resolution of social problems.

This dual structure of Third World nationalism enables us to conceptualize this baffling socio-political force in terms of Marxian and Weberian sociological categories: social consciousness and social action. We know Marx and Lukacs used the adjective 'class' rather than 'social' to qualify their concept of consciousness; still we can take a cue from their concept, especially from its social etiology. According to Marx, consciousness as such is a function of human existence: 'Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life process' (Marx and Engels 1942:13). This may apply to those educated classes whose social cognition and intersubjective sensitivity are sharpened by modern rationalist education and who are therefore more conscious of their life-process. But peasant masses who become the major target of Third World nationalism are 'conscious' to the extent that they are alive, possessing habitual, not rational, consciousness. Ploughing the field or herding animals or hawking in the street is certainly activity but not prone to social consciousness. When we speak of nationalism as a social consciousness, we refer to that intensified state of social cognition directed towards purposeful action. Thus, Georg Lukacs reformulates Marx's materialist proposition in this way: 'The question of consciousness may make its appearance in terms of the objectives chosen or in terms of action' (1971:59).

Nationalism tends to amplify social consciousness and articulate group interest.

In the light of our findings about the dynamics of Third World nationalism, we can further qualify Lukacs's concept of action that brings about social consciousness. It is usually social/political activity that engenders optimal social consciousness because politics begins with the realization that group interest can be best achieved by group action. This is the normative assumption and beginning of politics in the Aristotelian sense. To that extent most world religions have the *potential* for mass politics. The caliphate was supposed not only to maintain law and order but also create material conditions for an ideal Islamic society, the *Dharmaraja*, an ideal Hindu society; the *Bodhisattva*, an ideal Buddhist society. This worldly political dimension of religion brings it in indirect but effective contact with politics. That is why the transition from religious activity to mass politics has been easy in Third World historical societies. Modern mass politics makes such social goals more explicit and above all shows the rational means of achieving them.

In this essay we describe mass mobilization and social communication as the typical instruments of arousing social consciousness which is potentially present in the form of collective conscience derived ultimately from a religious tradition. This implies that at least the most inclusive form of social consciousness of a society can seldom materialize naturally or spontaneously without provocation or intervention; it has to be amplified by a voluntaristic process of mass politics and/or a catalytic event that makes masses think beyond their habitual existence and propose an alternative course of action to remedy a desperate situation. That political process inevitably politicizes social consciousness, thereby making it ripe for social action.

While a definite linkage exists between consciousness and action, it is difficult to specify whether action precedes consciousness as materialists maintain, or consciousness precedes action as psychologists postulate. To those of us interested in an interactionist approach, this dichotomic question might sound like the chicken-or-egg parable. Marx was apparently overreacting to German idealism when he dogmatically wrote, 'Life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness by life' (Marx and Engels 1942:14). However, our study suggests that the beginning of social consciousness is traceable to the literate strata of a given society which usually, though not always, precedes any rational course of social action. But once mass mobilization commences, there is undoubtedly a close interaction between social consciousness and public activity, reinforcing each other, at which stage it is practically impossible to separate the two domains. More specifically nationalism as a form of politicized social consciousness begins with the politically literate classes' conscious discovery of society as an entity in and for itself in contradistinction to generalized others, which refers to

familiar but not intimate group members that facilitate the differentiation of 'we' from 'they'. And this in simple terms is the beginning of Third World nationalism.

Nationalism is not only a most inclusive form of social consciousness; it is also an all-encompassing social action that includes both non-rational and rational elements. This explains nationalism's transclass, societal appeal to the majority in a mobilized society. Weber's sociological definition of action is apt for our purpose. He says,

We shall speak of 'action' in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behaviour—be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence. Action is 'social' in so far as its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course.
(1978:4)

As evident throughout this essay, nationalists, both leaders and the masses, indeed attach enormous subjective meanings to their action and behaviour. Emile Durkheim makes this point clear: 'Surely the soldier who falls while defending his flag does not believe that he sacrifices himself for a bit of cloth' (1954:228). We must pay particular attention to the symbolism of that 'bit of cloth' which is a key to the subjective meanings attached to nationalist action. For instance, national identity is psychologically nothing but an other-induced reference point which indeed 'takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course'. Similarly, the nation as a cultural community that is politicized in relation to other similar units within the international system, is overloaded with subjective meanings that derive in one way or the other, depending upon a given situation, from national tradition and popular culture, language and literature, racial descent and homeland, culture heroes and political institutions, and so on.

In short, the traditional data component of nationalism—imparts nationalism with glorified subjective meanings which somehow make nationalists' sacrifices meaningfully worthwhile and their hardships bearable.

Weber's typology of social action consists of four ideal-types of which three are found in the structure and function of Third World nationalism. He states that traditional action is determined by long-formed habits; affectual action by powerful feelings; principled action (*wertrational*), by conscious belief in the intrinsic value of acting in a certain way, regardless of consequences; and rational action, by calculating appropriate means to achieve desired ends (Weber 1978:4–8). These are of course ideal-types; in practice they overlap each other. For instance, habitual action may be reinforced by principled action such as in religious fundamentalist behaviour; affectual action by principled action such as in traditional learned classes'

early behaviour towards European powers; and rational action may converge with those actions performed out of principle and conviction. The sheer complexity of human motives compel us to agree with what even physical scientists call ‘the principle of uncertainty.’

Indeed, what makes nationalism such a powerful socio-political force in the modern epoch is precisely the strange convergence of complex motives: affectual, *wertrational* and rational actions. Nationalism has the objective tendency to transform habitual or traditional modes of behaviour and action of peasant masses into affectual and *wertrational* actions, if not into rational action. Sacrifices at the altar of nationalism were made possible by a combination of affectual and *wertrational* actions which flow directly from the traditional component of nationalism. We also discern a progressive tendency among the nationalist vanguard to rationalize their action. This is due partly to the influence of modern ideology and the demonstration effects of modernity in general. Thus, we often refer in the course of this study to the non-rational core and rational elements of nationalism that determine its behaviour and action.

Nationalism is a classic case of social action both in ordinary language and the Weberian sense. It is social action in the ordinary language sense because the majority of a mobilized society are emotionally and practically involved in this co-operative activity, and exhibit similar collective behaviour. The goals of such a social action include national independence, unity and national interest of a nationality. At the same time it is social action in the sociological sense because its structural centrality constitutes a national identity and functions are largely determined by the behaviour and action of the dominating other.

A CRITIQUE OF THE EUROCENTRIC THEORY OF NATIONALISM

This analytic construct grew out of my dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs in the study of nationalism as such and Third World nationalism in particular. Although there are numerous works on country-specific nationalisms by various Third World scholars, there is not a single book that conceptualizes non-western nationalism as different from the European predecessor. Instead the European paradigm is often uncritically used as the standard measurement for the study of Third World nationalism. But, the latter differs from the former in several critical respects: the salience of culture in national identity formation, the voluntaristic process of mass mobilization as a means for a nation-in-the making, and such a nationality struggling to create or seize state power structure as the basic goal of any non-western nationalism.

There is also a methodological shortcoming in the existing literature on various nationalisms in the non-western world. Most Third World scholars tend to view their nationalisms in ideological terms which equate non-western nationalism as a natural reaction to western imperialism or colonialism (Amin 1976, 1983; Chandra 1972, 1979; Fanon 1967, 1970; Sithole 1959; Hu 1981, and so on). This is highly simplistic, for the social phenomenon of nationalism is much more complex and deep rooted than nationalist historians think. Nor do I subscribe to the 'imitation theory' of non-western nationalism as ably advocated by a number of western scholars. Although a certain amount of learning process is involved, there is a serious limit to imitation unless supported by favourable *objective* conditions. I shall show later how the shared culture, cohesive social structure and common communication system of any historical society provided the necessary conditions for the rise of nationalism in the Third World.

None of the above-mentioned lacunae has so far been filled by western scholars either. They have confined themselves to editing anthologies of nationalistic writings by various nationalist leaders and ideologues. Sylvia Haim's *Arab Nationalism* (1962) and Elie Kedourie's *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (1970) are classic examples. These anthologies might perhaps suggest that to the western mind Third World nationalism is so bafflingly different from the familiar European experience that it is beyond conceptualization. The only way, such scholars might have felt, was to let the Asian, Arab and African nationalists speak themselves out through anthologies. But the problem is that words seldom speak for themselves; they have to be arranged in such a way so that their underlying meaning, general pattern and internal logic are made intelligible both to the specialist and public. This is the major task of this work.

But the fact is that like most academic disciplines we study in the Third World universities, the study of nationalism was pioneered and still remains largely a domain of the western scholars who have almost exclusively focused upon western or more precisely European historical experience of nationalism. This state of affairs has bred Eurocentric theories of nationalism that have little relevance to the non-western world. In 1983 Anthony Smith acknowledged that 'We are still not free of the Eurocentrism common to most studies of nationalism'. He adds that there

has been a marked tendency to judge, and explain, non-western nationalisms by reference to this western criterion. So, for example, African nationalisms are sometimes adjudged to be genuine or not, according to whether they display the same features as their European counterparts.

(1983:xi-xiv)

This Eurocentric tendency in the study of nationalism perhaps started with

Ernest Renan in the early 1880s and continued right up to the 1950s by a host of western historians, notably Hans Kohn. Renan argued that nations were a peculiarity of Europe as it developed after Charlemagne. His study sought to explain why nationalism prevailed in western Europe, and not yet (at the time he wrote) in Eastern Europe and the non-western world. He describes how Teutonic conquerors arrived without sufficient number of women, and intermarried with the local women, and adopted the religion of the conquered. Next, the absolutist monarchies imposed the unity of large societies. However, Switzerland, Holland, America and Belgium were formed by voluntary union of provinces. Finally the French Revolution changed everything: it taught humankind the principle of nationalism, 'the idea that a nation exists through itself and not by grace of a dynasty' (Gellner 1987:6–28).

Ever since then the term nationalism came to be equated with the modern political doctrine of popular sovereignty, and any nationalism that does not have this pronounced democratic bias is called 'culturalism' or 'traditionalism', as is often described in the case of early Chinese, Indian or Arab nationalism. This Eurocentric school of thought seems to underestimate the considerable role of Christian sects and the Church in the production of nationalism in most of the leading European nations since the sixteenth or seventeenth century, as documented by several discerning western scholars at the turn of this century (Church 1873; Mathew 1918; Cecil 1919). For national culture reflects the general will in society.

A very general distinction has been made between the western and eastern nationalism, but such variations in character flow more from their different historical situations which compelled nationalist leaders to emphasize one aspect of nationalism at the expense of others to suit their respective situational requirements. Now it depends upon the prevailing situation whether the traditional or modern data base should be emphasized in order to enhance mass mobilization and social communication.

In the west the social basis of religious ideas and institutions had been systematically undermined and eroded by a series of revolutionary changes since the sixteenth century: the Renaissance, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, scientific and rationalistic education. There the ground was much better prepared for the rise of egalitarian politics, which defined the main characteristic of western nationalism. Moreover, there were far fewer cases of imperialism, a foreign political system controlling various nationalities or even nations in the west than in the Third World where imperialism or colonialism became the major target of nationalism. In the west the main issue before nationalism was how to replace royal authority or monarchical rule by various forms of popular mandate, whereas in the Third World colonies it was how to overthrow foreign colonial domination.

The relative absence of religion-eroding revolutionary changes in the

recent history of most Third World countries meant that tradition was—still is—a live social force that moved the hearts and minds of millions which could be effectively manipulated for mobilization purposes. That is why religion-induced culture has given the basic orientation to Third World nationalism. But this does not mean that non-western nationalism was without any egalitarian element. For example, Bal Gangadhar Tilak whom Ernst Haas classifies as a tradition-bound restorationist (1986:733) among the pantheon of Hindu nationalism in fact was the first to raise the battle cry of Indian nationalism: ‘Swaraj (freedom) is my birthright’ (Gopal 1956:271–5). Similarly ‘Mr Science’ and ‘Mr. Democracy’ became the major themes of post-1911 Chinese nationalism (Chow 1969:59). The Arab Ba’ath Party ‘believes that socialism is a necessity which emanates from the depth of Arab nationalism itself (Haim 1976:235). Even Khomeini’s theocracy is called the Islamic *Republic* of Iran.

Thus, while we can delineate the defining characteristics of western or eastern nationalism for analytic purposes, we should never forget the social fact that the essence of post-French Revolution nationalism anywhere is the syncretic fusion of traditional culture and modern egalitarian ideology. The fusion gives modern nationalism, whatever its principal characteristic, that peculiar potency and appeal that no rival ideology or philosophy can match in practice. Religion-induced culture embellishes and substantiates national identity; egalitarian politics renders unprecedented motivations for nationalism and visions of a new political order.

Perhaps the influence of Renan and his followers, who are mostly armchair historians, might have, it may be expected, diminished with the application of social sciences to the study of nationalism. However, the first few attempts made by western social scientists are not encouraging; they continue to exhibit Eurocentric tendencies in subtly disguised forms. The idiom and intellectual apparatus have certainly become more sophisticated but in essence Eurocentricism still persists. Frederick Hertz, whose book purports to analyse the ‘psychology and sociology’ of nationalism, writes:

Modern nationality [nationalism] primarily developed on the soil of western Christianity and then spread farther and farther to the East. India, China and the Islamic peoples brought forth great and comparatively homogeneous civilizations but the idea of modern nationality was alien to them before they were permeated by European ideas. Many pioneers of modern nationality in Asia have frankly confessed that their peoples could not yet be regarded as nations (Sun 1931:64) and that their national aspirations were imitating European models.

(1966:24–5)

Our brief study does not confirm the ‘imitation theory’ of Third World

nationalism. Our analysis suggests that nationalism as such is more a function of certain objective conditions which are by no means peculiar to western Europe, nor can they be imported from West to East. These conditions are discussed in some detail in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, but may be stated in a summary fashion here: (a) social unity inherent in complex, literate, unsegmented society; (b) political centralization brought about by a regime, government or state that not only reinforces latent social unity but represents implicit general will and inculcates historical consciousness; (c) a certain degree of economic integration that reinforces the processes a and b; (d) a great tradition that creates mechanical solidarity and forms the kernel of national identity.

With the possible exception of economic integration, none of those conditions are unique to western Europe; they have existed for centuries prior to the western penetration and are still present in all the traditionally literate or historical societies of the Third World. Even economic integration may be discernible in some centralized political units such as China and the Arab world in the form of inter-provincial trade. However, these nationalism-producing conditions are virtually absent in almost all simple, tribal, preliterate societies.

An anomaly still remains. How can we explain the fact that while most of the social-cultural prerequisites for national consciousness predate the modern era, full-scale production of nationalism becomes possible only under certain modern conditions? The fact that western nationalism in general preceded the Third World one by almost a century makes the 'imitation theory' of Third World nationalism plausible. In this connection we should recall the basic structure of nationalism as traditional and modern components. We must concede that the latter component is characteristically a by-product of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in western Europe. The legacy of the French Revolution is freedom, equality and fraternity which added an ideological dimension to nationalism; and that of the Industrial Revolution new techniques of social communication and mass mobilization, which politicized social conditions and made mass production of nationalism possible.

A closer scrutiny of historical evidence would indicate that neither of these two sets of modern conditions are in essence alien to most parts of the Third World. Anthropology shows that neither freedom nor equality is foreign to simple, tribal societies. The only practical difference is that freedom and equality are not institutionalized properly in primitive societies, which made political life precarious. The modern techniques of social communication and mass mobilization may be considered revolutionary, but we must remember that even with new techniques, messages of social communication and mass mobilization tend to travel along grooves paved by salvationist

religions which have determined previously the structure of social consciousness. The manipulation of religious symbols and myths by nationalist leaders confirms this.

While Frederick Hertz at least subscribes to the imitation thesis, Ernest Gellner's latest theory denies the very existence of any Third World nationalism altogether. This is surprising because Gellner is not only a distinguished anthropologist, but has considerable field experience in the Middle East. Nevertheless, he concludes that 'agrarian civilizations do not engender nationalism but industrial and only industrial societies do' (1987:18).

We move from Eurocentrism to technocentrism and its implication to the Third World still remains basically the same, since characteristically the west is industrialized and the east, with the exception of Japan, largely agrarian. What then was the force, if not nationalism, that overthrew the western colonial empires from various parts of the Third World where industrial social structure existed only in small urban pockets? Such a historical fact flies in the face of Gellner's theory. It is in such a context that I feel a voluntaristic theory of nationalism is more applicable than a structuralist one in the case of Third World nationalism.

Gellner's theory is attractive because it is premised upon structural determinism. He reasons that growth-oriented industrial society is strongly impelled towards cultural homogeneity within each political unit, and cultural homogeneity, according to him, is what we call nationalism, which is gross simplification of a complex matter. On the other hand, in traditional society, 'there are no factors making for linguistic and cultural homogeneity'. It lacks 'a system of a serious and sustained drive for linguistic and cultural homogeneity, sustained by universal literacy in a single linguistic medium' (Gellner 1987:14).

First, Gellner's association of nationalism with industrial society is not novel; it began with Marxist writers since the nineteenth century. For example, a Russian Marxist writer Ber Barochov (1881–1917) wrote, 'Nationalism is a product of the bourgeois society—it was born simultaneously with it, its reign is as old as that of the bourgeois society' (1972:146). Our account indicates that the central idea and substance of nationalism can be traced to kinship politics in simple tribal society which has been subsequently extended to and enlarged in the context of modern nation-states through horizontal comradeship and mobilization. However, it is true that modern industrial civilization has made some significant contributions in the form of new techniques of social communication and mass mobilization which accentuated the full-scale production of nationalism in the modern epoch. Those who vaguely associate nationalism with industrial society should distinguish the material substance of nationalism (that is, culture, territoriality, freedom,

equality, and so on) from its agents which facilitate its more efficient production, but not its creation as such.

Second, Gellner's equating of popular culture with nationalism is correlationally correct, but we differ fundamentally on the concept of culture. His conception is strangely enough a most unanthropological one; it is tantamount to functional literacy that industrial society necessitates.

The capacity to move between diverse jobs, and incidentally to communicate and co-operate with numerous individuals in other social positions, requires the members of such a society be able to communicate in speech and writing in a formal, precise, context-free manner—in other words they must be educated, literate and capable of orderly, standardized presentation of messages.

(Gellner 1987:15)

This is not culture, as generally understood in sociology or anthropology (Tylor 1958:1); it is primarily a functional literacy which, though undoubtedly enhances and facilitates social communication, including that of nationalism, is not culture itself.

For the purpose of this essay, we have considered only those nationalism-producing aspects of culture which include national tradition, culture-heroes, language and literature, select history, and so on. These are hallowed objects of a national culture with which even the members of an industrial society can easily and proudly identify, but not so much with functional literacy, which is a means of communication. In other words, our concept of culture compels us to consider it as essentially a value system which influences behaviour patterns (message); while that of Gellner appears as functional literacy which facilitates the communication of such messages. And between the substance of a message and its mode of communication, there is a vast difference. For example, during the Falkland War, the emotional idea of *Pax Britannica* could arouse deep-rooted public emotions, and it is true that a nation-wide functional literacy that Gellner talks about would facilitate the social communication of such a national culture. But functional literacy is not a substitute for culture; it would be like an empty microphone without the speaker.

Third, Gellner's contention that only industrial social structure—with its tendency towards linguistic and cultural homogeneity—can generate nationalism, is not empirically tenable. A sociological theory must explain an observable pattern of events in the world, and as such it must be grounded in sufficient empirical cases which accord in a high level of generality. At best Gellner's theory might apply to the post-industrial west but certainly not to the Third World. Even in the case of pre-industrial Europe, Tipton's anthology on nationalism in the Middle Ages (1972) questions Gellner's

theory. The volume documents a number of incidences of national consciousness much before the Industrial Revolution. Even in the case of Japan, the large-scale production of nationalism does not follow a straight curve with industrial development. The Japanese exhibited full-throated nationalism before Japan became a great industrial power. The post-War period does not on the whole show tendencies towards nationalism; it is marked by anti-war peace movements—internationalism.¹

Finally, our generalizations based on a number of empirical cases directly contradict Gellner's corollary that agrarian societies do not engender nationalism because they lack linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Such a sweeping conclusion ignores the very dynamics of Third World nationalism—the systematic politicization of tradition which creates system-wide cultural homogeneity. Indeed, common culture is the minimum creation of a world religion contained in any traditional, yet complex society.

As for linguistic homogeneity in any agrarian society undergoing a nationalist movement, Gellner overlooks a significant linguistic development during the era of active nationalism: the rise of vernacular. It is *Baihua* in Chinese, *Hindustani* in India, *Darijah* in Arabic which facilitated social communication across all classes and castes. Like religion-induced culture, the rise of vernacular does not mark a mutation. The spread of world religions necessitated written languages for their propagation which usually created common idiom and linguistic unity. In the Third World the vernacular means only a duly modified version of existing written (classical) languages, not like Latin or Greek which was replaced by modern European languages.

In a nutshell, we have tried to deconstruct Gellner's theory of nationalism and briefly demonstrate that its various constituent parts, however logically ordered, do not apply to the Third World. It is not industrial economy that produces nationalism in the Third World; it is the other way round. As Harry Johnson writes,

Equally, to the economist, nationalism appears on the one hand as a driving force responsible for the urge of less developed countries (of which the majority are new states) to accelerate their economic development by economic planning.

(1968:1)

In general, works on nationalism may be classified by two criteria: the academic training of the scholar in question and the empirical case under investigation. The training enables a scholar to view nationalism from a decided angle, and the case study might exhibit special characteristics peculiar to a particular nationalism. However, given the sheer complexity of the subject, no single discipline seems fully adequate to deal with the various

conceptual problems posed by nationalism. The study of nationalism indeed stands at the junction of our academic disciplines.

We hope to transcend such limitations as imposed by area specialization and academic boundary, with the help of a multi-disciplinary approach that will delve into the sociology as well as psychology, politics as well as economics of nationalism. History will provide the data basis of our discourse as well as a perspective on the ontogeny of nationalism. Though theoretically conceived, it is grounded on ten historical case studies, covering almost all the significant aspects of modern nationalism in the Third World (Norbu 1982).

METHODOLOGY FOR VOLUNTARISTIC THEORY

Conceptualization is one thing, and management of data another. If I were to follow the conventional scholarly examples, this essay would become a voluminous documentation from various secondary sources. Heavy documentation, I felt, is to be avoided in this age of information explosion. My central concern is not with historical details but with *certain* ideas from both culture and ideology which have action consequences to the production of nationalism, and above all with their intricate interconnections which go to constitute a systemic and dynamic whole.

Since the Third World is so vast and variegated, I draw most of my illustrative evidences primarily from certain well-known regional cases such as China, India, Egypt, Iran and Mexico. Such leading Third World nations represent not only distinctive civilizational categories but also rival contemporary models of development in the Third World. This, however, does not mean I ignore small nations or even nationalities in the non-western world; Chapter 10 analyses current ethnic conflicts in terms of our general theory. However, a critical criterion for selection and management of data is what I call religion-induced specific culture areas; and most of my generalizations are based upon illustrative examples drawn from various world religions as they operate in specific culture areas of the Third World.

My theoretical apparatus for this essay is thus fairly simple. Religion is the most comprehensive idea-system ever imagined and thought by ancient mankind, which still continues to have action consequences and influence, either consciously or subconsciously. I delve into this idea-system's relation to modern nationalism as a pervasive religion-induced culture. I am interested in religion because of its potential for complex culture formation which is critical to my conception of Third World nationalism. This leads me to focus on the particularistic national or regional manifestations of a world religion, and not on its universal, metaphysical postulates which are usually studied by theologians and intellectual historians. Such an area-specific national

tradition of a world religion appears to have played unintended but effective functions in the early formation of national identity, social communication systems, structural cohesion, and so on, which laid the foundation for national development in the Third World.

The history of nationalism as such has provided me with a certain general pattern as well as illustrative evidences. However, throughout this analysis my attempt has been to reduce its empirical content by illustrative evidences and schematic charts, and yet enhance a theoretical understanding of the subject. Therefore, I take much world history and current international affairs for granted. My business is not with the history of nationalism. I focus on finding a pattern, establishing connections and viewing things in a new light.

The word theory or theoretical, as used in this essay, is intended to apply to those comprehensive analytic constructs which possess extraordinary explanatory power. The heuristic means of such understanding is increasingly supplied nowadays by social sciences which include, as far as this essay is concerned, anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science and economics. The approach is not so much inter-disciplinary in the sense of different disciplines intersecting or inter-mixed because they are so different in their own rights (each discipline has a relative autonomy as indicated by its specific idiom and subject of concern). It is multi-disciplinary in the sense that each relevant discipline has a specific function to explain a particular aspect of nationalism. So I turn to several disciplines in order to explain all the significant aspects of nationalism turn by turn in chronological or logical relational order as the case may be.

In short, social sciences helped me to conceptualize the mass of data in four fundamental ways by: (a) identifying the issue areas, (b) providing an organizing principle, (c) sources of scientific explanation, (d) a conceptual framework for objective analysis. In this sense social sciences are the only analytic means of theory-building which is necessary in our age of information explosion.

The fact that we have begun this essay with certain abstract concepts—and also the way the whole project is arranged in its finished form—might give a wrong impression that we have proceeded from a set of preconceived notions. This is not the method we have followed here. Throughout the gestation period, I carried on my inquiry with an open but discontented mind by first analysing the specific, yet significant cases of Third World nationalism before theorizing. Such case studies later became the foundation on which the present model is built. Our generalizations, which have become the building-blocks of our theory, are based upon certain historical trends as indicated by a number of illustrative evidences; and our assumptions which are necessary for any theoretical enterprise, are based upon a decade-long

study and observation of Third World nationalism. In short, we have made no attempt to put select data into a ready-made theoretical baggage. Whatever theoretical level we have achieved, it emerged out of objective analysis and close observation of significant cases of Third World nationalism over a long period of time. However, in order to explain certain problems of nationalism, we have used certain widely-accepted social science concepts which raise the level of our understanding. This entailed constant cross-reference between concepts and data.

Although post-modern intellectual development in the west is characterized by theory-building, even the very idea of theory—let alone theory-building—is not popular among Third World academics. They prefer much milder terms as ‘perspective’, ‘conceptual framework’ and ‘model’ in place of theory. This apparent intellectual humility has largely to do with their common comprehension of theory as some ivory-tower abstraction divorced from practice, which is exactly what is not needed in developing countries. But this (theory divorced from reality) is not what I mean by theory. Theory is that analytic construct which succinctly captures the inner logic of social action and the systemic essence of the social structure of a given social phenomenon through necessary simplification for clarity sake. This kind of theory might serve as an analytic computer that not merely memorizes data but hermeneutically interprets it for a higher level of rational discourse. Thus, the logic of even such irrationality as nationalism may be penetrated and demonstrated in a systematic way.

Since the modern world, one of whose inevitable by-products is nationalism, began in Western Europe I begin my analysis from Europe as a starting-point; then go into the Third World cases. This means methodologically most of our scholarly concepts are derived from western historical experience. But this does not mean we uncritically accept them for blanket application. Nor should we reject them outright as bourgeois concepts. We have to exercise our critical judgement in each significant case; we must not make the mistake of superimposing our pet theories and concepts, however venerated in the west, into recalcitrant realities. Nor should we fancy engineering attractive ‘models’ with little or no practical application and relation to the universe of rational discourse. Theory—at least a medium range one—emerges as an inevitable and unmistakable pattern out of the mass of data which a social scientist dissects and analyses for an uninterrupted period of time. What I have done in this analysis is first to isolate the important properties of nationalism, and then find out their patterning under a given set of conditions in the Third World.

Since Asian and Arab nationalism marks the beginning of Third World nationalism, I have naturally concentrated on Asia and the Middle East in particular, and Latin America and Africa in general. These two sets provide

contrasting examples. A fruitful use of comparative analysis is not so much to compare and find parallels, as to contrast so that a higher degree of differentiation and therefore precision may be achieved in our studies. To bring this point home we may reiterate here one of the main contentions of this study. Nationalism is comprised of two major components. In Africa the traditional component is rather thin and may be said to have been primarily reduced to counterracialism *negritude*. In view of the useful functions performed by great tradition in terms of national unity and nation-building, this lack of great tradition has serious implications for African and Latin American nationalisms. I explain the systemic problems in these two continents in terms of absence or lack of great tradition.

If, therefore, the traditional data component of African nationalism consists of *negritude* as a pan-ethnic symbol system, its modern component comprises egalitarianism—freedom and equality or equality and freedom—as the case may be. In Latin America, because of the orthodox nature of Catholicism as argued in the essay, no distinct national identities have managed to emerge. This leads Latin American nationalists to accentuate the modern component and a continental identity. Hence, Latin American nationalism has assumed primarily an economic and political character directed against ‘Yankee imperialism’. This, we suggest, is not only due to the situation in the ‘backyard’ dominated by American multinational corporations but also due to the accentuation of the modern data component in the absence or lack of national identities shaped by particular religious traditions. Otherwise, the agents of nationalism are universal—state and party which singly or concertedly bring about mass mobilization, social communication and egalitarian politics, thereby producing nationalism.

The working-out of any world religions in Africa (or Latin America) is therefore rather shallow, which results in systemic problems. The history of transmission and diffusion of world religions might shed some light on the current systemic problems in Africa and Latin America. It suggests the following: the selection of an appropriate system is usually, though not *always*, done by certain foresighted leaders who understand the local temperament and special needs of their region(s) better than most; once the selection is done (but this does not mean the original decision is unalterable) the people in question put that system into practice for an uninterrupted period of time so that the system gets time to season, mature and mellow. Imitation of the latest fads and trends from the west cause malfunctioning in the system. This has been the tragic story of Latin America, which remains an unfulfilled version of European nationalism.

Finally adaption, modification and syncreticism in accordance with the given local conditions should mark the complex process of implanting an appropriate imported prototype system in a responsive region. All these points

become clear when we recall some historical examples: East Asia's meditation on and praxis of Confucianism and Buddhism, Middle East's on Islam, South East Asia's on Buddhism, and so on. But unfortunately unlike the ancient and medieval times, the modern era is characterized by frequent big power interference and intervention in internal developments. Yet the need to put a chosen system to practice for a long time in order to produce concrete results remains strong. This does not rule out changes in the system as it gradually evolves under changing conditions, locally and globally.

Our positive view of tradition in the production of nationalism and the nation-building process calls for a radical re-examination of the role of tradition or culture in the modernization process. So far modernity and tradition have been conceived in dichotomic terms; for it has been argued often that successful modernization entails the replacement of tradition by modernity. I, for one, do not see this happening in any part of the Third World. As the historical cases mentioned in the essay indicate, usually the *initial* response of any great tradition to modernity has been, to be sure, hostile or fearful rejection. But that was only a first stage reaction which may be overcome by demonstrating the sheer utility or necessity of modernization as happened in Hindu India, Confucian China, Islamic Turkey. But once the initial reaction is over, tradition has a positive role to play in the process of modernization.

So far the intellectual tendency among most Third World scholars has been to project what *ought* to be according to their preferred personal beliefs rather than objectifying what is really happening in their countries. Such scholars may indeed be as secularized as young Turks, Nehru or Castro, but the subject of their popular inquiry, namely the masses of peasantry, are incorrigibly religious. Here we cannot ignore the religious factor in social life if we are to remain faithful to value-neutral research. In such a traditional universe as represented by most parts of Asia, Africa or Latin America, it is primarily cultural symbols, not so much Marxist-Leninist radicalism, that moves lethargic and disorganized peasants into political action. The secret of Third World nationalism resides in this paradox: the politicization of the non-political (namely, culture) but primarily for political ends—the creation of the nation-state, as the most efficacious instrument of defending and promoting socially shared interests. In such a context objectivity resides not necessarily in a habitual adoption of the political economy approach. Rather it may reside in an empathetic entering into the very subjectivity of others whom we are trying to study so as to analyse the non-national elements that determine their behaviour and action.

Finally, following Max Weber's example (1958), we make certain assumptions necessary for any verifiable voluntaristic theory: (a) not all ideas but certain behaviour-orienting ideas have action consequences in terms of influencing behaviour pattern and social action; (b) not any man but certain

charismatic leaders with organizational ability can influence the course of historical development.

Central to these assumptions is the primacy of behaviour-orienting ideas. Man as a social animal acts under the influence or impulse of certain ideas as his motivational matrix, and the only time he is not doing so is when his orderly ideas go out of order—insanity. But even then he is acting under *fantastic* ideas operating outside his familiar social orbit.

Therefore, the critical question before the behavioural scientist is to specify those ideas and values that actually or sociologically influence the behaviour pattern and the structure of social action in a given society and situation. In this essay we make every attempt to spot those behaviour-orienting ideas operative in the course of Third World nationalism. Such emotive ideas include cultural symbols and myths that enhance the sense of national or ethnic identity; certain aspects of modern ideology (freedom and equality) that easily serve to promote or defend socially shared interests such as national independence and unity, territoriality and tradition, and so on.

SOME CORRELATES OF THE THIRD WORLD CONCEPT

The term 'Third World' is a question-begging one, because there is little homogeneity to justify such a single entity (Hensman 1975:17–72; Muni 1979:119–28). For instance, is Japan a part of the Third World? Or are not Sweden, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union part of the Third World? Unfortunately the term has recently gained so much currency that it has come to stay. As used in this book, I have two specific meanings in mind: economically less-developed and developing parts of the world; ideologically, those areas championing egalitarian ideology which perhaps includes the socialist nations as well. Geographically, it includes Asia, the Arab world, Africa, the South Pacific and Latin America.

The concept of a Third World found its clearest expression yet in its demand for a 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO) at the special session of the UN General Assembly in 1974. It continues, though slightly diluted, in the form of 'North-South Dialogue' which discusses the outstanding economic problems that divide the developed and developing nations.

As the Chinese Marxist theoreticians rightly diagnosed, the basis of the Third World unity owes itself to the similar stages of economic development which differentiate the developing world from the developed bloc with its own economic interests in conflict with that of the latter. It is the meeting-ground of similar nationalisms directed against the same target—the west. The Third World opinion on various international issues has a distinctly anti-western flavour as indicated by their stand on the Suez crisis, Vietnam, the Middle East wars. Central America and South Africa.

Several charismatic leaders from Nehru to Nasser dreamt of pan-movements along continental lines such as Pan-Asianism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism, but did not progress much because of lack of organization infrastructure. The political origins of Third World solidarity may be traced to the Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations in 1955. There they 'proclaimed a common identity distinct from the two advanced industrial worlds, namely the capitalist world on the one hand, and the socialist world on the other; they were a *Third World*' (Hoogvelt 1982:74). Although they touched some economic issues, their central concern was political. They discussed anti-colonialism, the establishment of a non-aligned movement and its right to a greater role in international affairs and the solidarity of the Third World. Their characteristic preoccupation with political issues was continued by subsequent non-aligned conferences in Belgrade (1961), Cairo (1964) and Lusaka (1970). Latin American nations were not involved in the non-aligned movement until 1973 when Peru and Argentina became members.

If the political origins of Third World solidarity may be traced to the non-aligned movement (Willetts 1978), its economic origins may be traced to Raoul Prebisch and his institution, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Prebisch published his revolutionary theory of international trade in 1950 which critiqued the leading orthodoxy, the theory of comparative advantage. He argued that it is in the larger interest of each nation to maximize production of those commodities which it produces most cheaply and import what it cannot produce efficiently (Prebisch 1964). Throughout the 1950s the ECLA scholars elaborated trade-generated inequality and its consequences—underdevelopment.

In 1962, at the request of the non-aligned nations, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution calling for a world-wide Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), held two years later at Geneva. There the Third World nations confronted the developed nations, as a unified group, demanding certain economic reforms in the world economic order: price stabilization and better prices for primary products, market access for manufactured goods from developing nations and greater financial flows from the rich to the poor nations. At the conference a caucus was formed of 77 underdeveloped nations, subsequently called the Group of 77. Throughout the 1960s the Group of 77 formulated and expanded a distinct Third World perspective on the global economic situation, calling for a unified response from the Third World on development and trade.

Perhaps, its greatest success was that the Group managed to institutionalize UNCTAD as a special body of the United Nations. In this way the historically disadvantaged position of the underdeveloped and developing nations in international economic relations became an ongoing concern of the United

Nations. Moreover, it was Third World pressure that made UNCTAD directly responsible to the General Assembly rather than to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in which the Third World nations did not yet have a voting majority.

UNCTAD-II held in New Delhi (1968) echoed the themes of UNCTAD-I but made concrete proposals for the implementation of UNCTAD-I recommendations. UNCTAD-III held in Santiago (1972) made two new demands: (a) the international monetary order; (b) control of the multinational corporations. Perhaps more important than these was the fact the UNCTAD-III decided to adopt a new strategy *vis-à-vis* the developed nations. The Group of 77 realized its institution (UNCTAD) would remain a debating club if it lacked the necessary bargaining power to extract concessions from the industrial nations. They felt that it would be better to place crucial Third World issues directly on the agenda of the UN where they enjoy a comfortable two-thirds majority. The UN General Assembly's passage of a 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States', in 1974 moved by Mexico, is an indication of the success of this new Third World strategy.

Meanwhile the non-aligned movement too began to move in the direction of Third World unity. It changed its focus of discussion from political to economic issues, from anti-colonialism to confrontation between developed and developing nations (Misra 1987:117–81). The resolutions passed at Algiers in 1973 recognized that, unless the old world economic order changed in their favour, the developing world could not achieve 'self-reliance' as envisaged at Lusaka (1970). The Algiers resolutions were entitled 'Economic Declaration' and 'Action Program for Economic Co-operation' which 'graduated to become, often line by line, the *Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order*' (Hoogvelt 1982:79). Both were adopted without a vote at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974.

This session and the 29th Annual General Assembly witnessed the *de facto* merger of the Group of 77 and the non-aligned movement, united by common economic interest. What completed Third World solidarity was the success with which the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Nations (OPEC) (whose members were themselves members of the Group of 77) raised the price of their export commodity, oil, in late 1973. The whole movement signified, as the Algerian Foreign Minister put it, that the Third World nations 'do not need to depend on the charity of others but have the means to take their destinies and their resources into their own hands' (Hoogvelt 1982:80). It is a clear manifestation of Third World economic nationalism, its demand for NIEO, touching a whole gamut of world economic issues affecting the Third World as a whole.

We have gone into some details of the history of Third World solidarity in order to indicate that although the concept may be controversial because of sheer heterogeneity, yet it is not without its empirical content. We do have some factual foundations for the concept of Third World as an observable entity. It is true that the Third World does not yet have a unified organization but the Group of 77—whose members increased to 120 nations, and the non-aligned movement whose members now count over 102 nations—have practically become Third World institutions, acting, more often than not, in concert on Third World issues.

The Third World solidarity we have surveyed is a manifestation of a deeper underlying common situation in which Third World nations find themselves in the contemporary world, namely underdevelopment and similar historical experience in modern times, namely, western dominance. This has direct implications to our concept of Third World nationalism as distinct from the western one. The similar stages of underdevelopment mean that the secularization of the religious belief system in most Third World nations has not progressed to the extent it has in the west, and that tradition still continues to be a core of their national identities. The similar historical experience of colonialism and imperialism until recently means that the target of Third World nationalism continues to be, sustained by growing economic interest conflict, the west. It is on these grounds we feel we are justified to refer to a special phenomenon called Third World nationalism. Although we don't deny variations within it, yet we are entitled to treat the subject as a distinct one in relation to western nationalism.

In short, the Third World economic base is characterized by underdevelopment which engenders common economic interests *vis-à-vis* the west, and its superstructure by a kind of nationalism in which tradition and anti-western orientation have played significant roles. While Third World economic problems have rightly received adequate scholarly treatment, resulting in the establishment of a subdiscipline within economics (development economics), the sociology of Third World nationalism has remained neglected. This essay is a small contribution to the latter cause in the belief that nationalism continues to be a key to understanding the Third World.

NOTES

- 1 In a survey comparing levels of national pride in ten countries conducted by Dentsu Institute for Human Studies in 1991, Japan came last. Only 10 per cent of the Japanese adults polled said they would be willing to fight for their country. (Cf. *Newsweek*, 1 July, 1991, p. 15).

2 Towards a new definition of Third World nationalism

This chapter examines critically some of the influential definitions of nationalism around which the conventional scholarship on nationalism is built. It classifies the various definitions into the following categories: psychological, legal, ideological and anthropological. While doing so, we briefly point out the shortcomings in each as applied to the Third World cases. Lastly, I propose a new definition of Third World nationalism that is sociologically conceived and empirically congruent with non-western realities.

AN EXAMINATION OF EXISTING CONCEPTS

Even the serious literature on nationalism can be classified according to the chosen discipline within whose framework it is analysed. Thus, a psychologist at the turn of our century defined it as *conditioned obedience to authority* (Allport 1927:291–301). This psychological definition seemed to have greatly influenced several historians' conception of nationalism. Carlton Hayes defined nationalism as a

condition of mind in which loyalty to the ideal or to the fact of one's national state is superior to all other loyalties and of which pride in one's nationality and belief in its intrinsic excellence and its mission are integral parts.

(1937:6)

Hans Kohn defined it in similar terms: 'Nationalism is a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state' (1955:9).

Such state-centric definitions may not apply to most of the Third World cases because here nationalism has risen directly out of the social domain in opposition to the state power structure usurped by an alien ruling class. Here nationalism was precisely directed against the existing state power structures and authority relations—the very reverse of 'loyalty to the state'. As Lenin

rightly recognized, Third World nationalism assumed an anti-imperialist/anti-colonial character whose avowed aim was to replace foreign rule by native governance. This fact sensitizes us to shift the emphasis in our definition from 'loyalty to the state', which might have been the case in Western Europe to popular commitment to nation formation. It manifests itself as group loyalty and group solidarity in confrontation with the generalized other, and the term 'group' refers to a whole complex literate society out of which nationalism arises as the collective conscience. Indeed, the rise of Third World nationalism signified the conscious emergence of whole societal collectivities as autonomous actors in the stage of world history, demanding self-determination. Here the gravity of political activity is not within the state-centric political domain but in civil society in revolt against the *status quo*. The state has no role in the production of Third World nationalism during the colonial period.

If the above definitions apply to nation-states already in existence, what would be their equivalent to the nationalist movements that seek to create such nation-states? To answer this burning question, most scholars have concentrated on the egalitarian ideology¹ of nationalism bequeathed by the French Revolution, especially national self-determination. It is defined as the popular assertion that each aspiring people or nation has 'the right to constitute an independent state and determine its own government' (Cobban 1944:4). Within such a political framework Rupert Emerson and many others interpreted the rise of anti-colonial nationalism in Asia and Africa (Emerson 1962:295–359).

Central to this definition is the assumption of will attributed to a people. 'The ideal of nationalism meant the nucleus of a nationality based on will (*nation de volonte*)' (Kedourie 1970:190). In a later work Elie Kedourie traced the philosophical genesis of self-determination to the Kantian philosophical postulate that man is 'free when he obeys the laws of morality which he finds within himself, and not in the external world' (1971:23). A more technical rendering of this ideological definition has recently been achieved: 'Nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1983:1). That is, if a nation or people were given the right to self-determination, they would automatically opt for a common state, thereby forming a nation-state. Its other implication is that nationalism by definition is anti-imperialism since imperialism seeks to control different nationalities or nations under a single political system. This ideological conception of nationalism is at the heart of the most contemporary works on Third World nationalism. It is a case in which the scholar and the ideologue unwittingly reach consensus. But ideology should not become the conceptual framework for the study of nationalism; it ought to be the subject of critical analysis.

For self-determination, being a legal concept, is more concerned with pronouncements and conclusions rather than processes and structures of nationalism. As we know plebiscite, which self-determination requires, is seldom conducted; the successful outcome of any nationalism is determined by the quality of nationalist struggles. If this is so, then we need to know motivations, processes and forms of nationalism. In other words, the culture and structure of nationalism rather than its legalities.

Others mostly social scientists, have focused upon the social anthropology of nationalism. According to this intellectual tradition, to which I partly subscribe, the development of nationality which we shall shortly define, is 'dependent upon the operation of the same principle, the formation of a common tradition and its continuous modification by the operation of common change of environment' (Oakesmith 1919:135). Sir Ernest Barker equated the essence of nationalism with the Marxian concept of superstructure which he defined as a 'mental organization connecting the minds of all the members of a national community as fine as silk and as firm as steel' (1948:3-4). The nation in this sense 'is not the physical fact of one blood but mental fact of one tradition' (Barker 1948:13). MacIver is even more emphatic. 'Nations are neither linguistic nor political nor biological but spiritual unities' (1955:123). A recent work, though based on the Deutschian model, gives a similar definition: 'nationality, nation-ness as well as nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind' (Anderson 1983:13). This school makes nationalism tantamount to neo-traditionalism which is, to be sure, an aspect of modern nationalism as we shall demonstrate. But it ignores the post-French Revolution ideological dimension of modern nationalism.

There are many more definitions by area specialists which we have not considered. We have examined only the most influential definitions, namely the psychological, national self-determination and cultural ones. But it is the first definition, popularized by historians, whose field the subject has been for a long time, that dominates the popular conception of nationalism. It is surprising that the psychological definitions should miss the very psychology of nationalism, which is more than a legalistic insistence upon the loyalty of an individual to the nation-state. They ignore the social character and instinctual² basis of nationalism which together makes it almost a natural and spontaneous overflow rather than a loyalty demanded under the threat of treason. It is incorrect in this sense to suggest that nationalism is a state or condition of the mind, especially in the singular, because it is always a set of primordial but socialized group sentiments associated invariably with key symbols, such as Buddhist wheel, Christian cross, Confucian yin-yang, Hindu swastika, Islamic crescent. It is this social character which makes nationalism amenable to a sociological inquiry. Nationalism is by definition a mass

phenomenon not confined to an individual or even to class. As a movement it signifies the temporary breakdown of any class system, and the emergence of societal solidarity.

A SOCIOLOGICAL DEFINITION OF NATIONALISM

We will begin our definition of nationalism with the etymology of the basic terminology from which it is derived. The nation, from which nationalism is directly derived, is Latin in origin—*natio* was used in medieval times without ‘most often any political connotation’. It means, like the Greek term *ethnos*, people, nation, country. Only towards the end of the Middle Ages *natio* ‘outstrips its rivals, gains wider circulation and acquires a political meaning’ (Akzin 1964:32). Its political meaning became conspicuously clear in Germany and France. There the term nation was used during the same period for designating the ruling classes in opposition to the *volk* which corresponded to the English terms like populace, common people. Implicit in this elitist conception of the nation are two points, both of which appear to be pertinent to the politics of pre-mass mobilization: that ‘the word nation and the idea of nationality became associated with power and sovereignty’ (Montague 1963:50) that the concept of the nation as such existed only among the ruling classes who were usually literate.

It is then evident that during the Middle Ages the word *natio* no longer referred to the people who actually constituted it. The nation became associated with that aristocratic class which usually had greater say over the state affairs and who owned the means of production. During the absolute monarchy the nation became synonymous with the monarch’s centralized state. If therefore the nation is where political power resides, modern nationalism since the French Revolution represents a popular revolt against the power elite and its legitimacy. Nationalism has in essence sought to restore the original Latin meaning of *natio*, people or country. With the rise of egalitarian politics, increased social communication and mass mobilization, the concept of the nation was no longer confined to the literate strata; it reached the masses of people as well.

It was Rousseau (1770–1850) who first rejected this elitist equation of the nation with the ruling class, and instead equated the nation with the people.³ He did so not only on political ground which the rise of egalitarian politics and the principle of self-determination in particular would imply, but also out of conviction about shared common culture that his theory of general will necessitated. His rejection would have remained a mere political protest without action consequences had it not been for the French Revolution which, through its excessive mass politics, mass mobilization and increased social communication, translated to an extent the egalitarian ideal into reality.

Thus, the word nation, since the 1780s, has become coterminous with people, a definition now accepted by all shades of political opinion in the world (Kardelj 1981:5, 43; Deutsch 1953:143, 164).

And the word *nationalism* was first used by a French anti-Jacobean priest in 1798 in a derogatory sense. It signified a popular protest against the *status quo* of state power structure. It was a populist, transclass concept that embraced the whole nation.

Nationalism is not simply populism, which the definition of the nation as the emergence of a particular people would imply, though it has that great populist quality too. Nor is it solely popular sovereignty, though it forms the core of the nationalist ideology in confrontation with imperialism. The fact is, most nationalist movements do not begin as an act of popular will, though most end up with such a populist acclamation. They usually begin as a value-oriented movement in the name of some sacred tradition, concerned with the identity and destiny of the nation as a whole. What characterizes the whole process is mass politics which seems to defend, modify or create the locus of nationalism. Third World nationalism may then be defined as a 'politicized social consciousness centred upon a common national identity rooted in a shared tradition, and the ideological belief in the structure of the modern nation-state as the most efficacious instrument of national unity, national independence and national interest'.

Central to this definition is the notion of national identity which is a function of tradition, and egalitarian ideology both of which point towards a new future which is embodied by a charismatic leaders' vision. In other words, we see the essence of Third World nationalism as fusion of tradition and ideology in a crisis situation that activates the interaction between the two vital elements, resulting in a new scheme of things transforming in various degrees polity, economy and society.

Our attempt at a dynamic analysis marks a clear departure from the earlier emphasis on 'national character' or 'allegiance', will or spirit. The national character thesis presupposes a stable evolutionary development in which several significant factors shaped a particular people's behaviour pattern (for example, England, Sweden, the Netherlands, and so on), whereas the other thesis assumes the role of the state to solidify spirit or will into an easy obedience (Germany, Italy, France). Both of these models can be found in Asia, and we don't repudiate these insights. We shift the emphasis from character to identity, from allegiance to spontaneity. That is, from 'What sort of character are we?' to 'Who are we?' This shift is warranted by the colonial system which questioned or even denied any native identity and a world historical development in the twentieth century. The latter acknowledges the primacy of international politics in the world-wide quest for national identity. The ever increasing pattern of interaction, co-operation,

rivalry, competition or confrontation among nations constantly brings the soul-searching question to the forefront. The question is both a metaphysical and material one. It is an incongruous set of traditional symbols and modern egalitarian doctrines about 'who are we' and how best 'we' might pursue our collective interest in competition or confrontation with 'others'. With the twofold increase in the number of internationally recognized actors in the international political system since the Second World War, the cause and consequence of nationalism (generalized others) has greatly increased. This justifies our shift to identity from other loci of nationalism. Nationalism thrives on relativity. Without 'they' there cannot be 'we' as an acutely conscious and politically-assertive entity.

Nationalism by itself, especially in its traditional mould before the French Revolution, is too incoherent and far too amorphous to be a neat ideology without an ideological or political framework. Liberty, equality and fraternity provide the necessary framework to modern nationalism. In the case of Fascism the necessary framework was provided by racism. Nationalism is too arbitrary to be a philosophical system without borrowing a more logical framework as modern nationalists have done since the French Revolution.

Nationalism has three dimensions or components. Tradition connects a nation with its past which provides inspiration and a sense of continuity. Interest, ranging from economic to cultural, connects the nation with its present situation and provides incentive to tackle social problems. And ideals, mostly political, connect the nation with its future which is yet to be shaped in accordance with political ideals, economic interests and tradition. But it is a movement in crisis which brings the three components together as a potent complex compound (see Figure 1). It is really a fusion of tradition and ideology under a crisis situation, manifesting itself as a fully-politicized social consciousness about a common identity and destiny.

Being a complex transclass *social* phenomenon, it is not confined to a particular social group or class; the very notion of nationalism indicates that it is at least the ideological expression and velleity of the majority of a nation. It is societal both in its scale and appeal. It usually begins as an elite awareness about traditional symbols and sectorial interest, extends to the public domain where it is transformed into a social consciousness, and finally enters the political arena where that vague social consciousness is translated into political consciousness about common identity and destiny.

Politically, nationalism is society's claim to political participation in the state's affairs. Culturally nationalism is the concretization of collective conscience embedded in a given tradition. Its diffusion in the lower levels of society is accompanied by corresponding demand for power distribution. Thus national consciousness spreads fairly rapidly from sector to sector,




Figure 1 The formation of national consciousness

Note: There are no organized agents of politicization such as the state or political party.

from class to class until the entire society is engulfed with its complex and composite political consciousness, at which stage we may appropriately employ the terms nation and nationalism.

We shall define two more related terms: *nation* and *nationality*. We have already discussed the relationship between the nation and nationalism, as one of the *root* and derivative. We have also observed the changing conception of the nation during the last 400 years or so, which suggests two possible meanings: (a) nation synonymous with power and sovereignty which usually reside in the ruling class; (b) nation as an aggregation of individuals united by complementarity of social communication and common value system. With the emergence of popular sovereignty, the first meaning has lost much of its theoretical validity; nation is now progressively equated with people, societal collectivity. It is the second meaning that interests us now. In that sense the nation is an abstraction for people like the state is for governmental organs (army, police, law, bureaucracy, and so on). 'Thus the state is linked with the people in the notion of the nation' (Kardelj 1981:36).

In Chapter 4 I discuss the social structure of the nation and come out with a definition more applicable to the Third World cases. There the nation formation is defined as the extension and continuation of a complex, literate society by means of mass politics. To that extent I equate nationality or nationhood with a fully-politicized society with the following characteristics: (a) societal consciousness of collective identity and common interest; (b) high degrees of unity as manifested in a pan-ethnic organization; (c) social power emanating from a nationalist movement; (d) popular aspiration for popular sovereignty either in fact (democratic) or in theory (communist). It follows from the above indicators of nation formation that the seeds of nationality reside in the undeniable social unity inherent in any complex, literate societies undergoing mass mobilization. This is the social basis of any potential nationhood.

A *nation-state* is not merely a people's state in the populist political sense which the ruling communist parties have over-emphasized; it has come to mean the summation of the highest social thought and most mature historical experience peculiar to a particular nation in the Hegelian sense. It is the incarnation of national *rationality*. Hence, the state formation is the most sought-after goal of every nationalist movement. Its success is determined by whether it has managed to form an independent state or not. A 'Volk has to found a state since the very existence of body politics is an expression of its actuality and its ability to function in the objective world' (Avineri 1972:222).

Finally, nationality has a set of ambiguous meanings which we shall dispense with. It generally denotes membership of a nation, attributed to a

person or group of persons. By extension it has been used sometimes in the past as an equivalent to nationalism (Chatham House 1963:xix). We have relinquished this extended meaning and preferred the term nationalism as it is more commonly used now. Nationality also connotes a people potentially but not actually a nation, 'nationalities are nations in germ' (Ginsberg 1956:244) Ginsberg's definition of nationality is close to the distinction that Marxist-Leninist writers in the Soviet Union and China make between the terms *nation* and *nationalities*. We shall retain this meaning.

The preceding discussion of western conceptions of nationalism as such, and our attempt at an alternative definition of Third World nationalism, should not be misconstrued as an abstract model within whose mould the subsequent discourse might be cast. We insist upon a working definition because we must know what we are talking about. A certain level of abstraction is necessary in any theoretical enterprise but we have tried to keep it to a minimum level by emphasizing conceptualization rather than jargonization.

NOTES

- 1 Egalitarian ideology in relation to nationalism includes freedom, equality and fraternity all of which will be discussed in Chapter 6. The adjective 'egalitarian' as used in the present essay refers to the popular doctrine favouring equal rights, benefits and opportunities to all citizens. It necessarily involves mass politics as the efficacious instrument of struggle for the allocation of rights and resources.
- 2 Instinct may be defined as a 'natural tendency to behave in a certain way without reasoning or training' (Cf. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*, p. 442).
- 3 The word 'people' is nowadays over-used jargon especially in connection with egalitarian politics. Historically the term people gained prominent usage in France during the Revolution. People signified the rise of the third and fourth estates. In the twentieth century, Leninist-Maoist leaders such as Mao Zedong popularized the concept of people (*renmin*) as inclusive of peasantry, working class and intelligentsia. In short, the nation. Even in the United Nation's usage the term people is used interchangeably with nation. We also follow this usage. It is particularly appropriate in contexts where a collective will is attributed to the nation which has in fact become a people.

3 The stages of proto-nationalism: tribalism, ethnicity and patriotism

We have defined nationalism in the previous chapter, not as popular loyalty to the state which is legalistic and Eurocentric, but as a special type of politicized social consciousness that obtains from and within society. If this is so, then our task in this chapter is to find out the social basis of consciousness. What makes social consciousness as such possible? Are there historical antecedents of national consciousness? If so, what have been the typical conditions conducive to the rise of such consciousness? Is national consciousness different from other forms of group consciousness, both historical and contemporary? And what are the specific conditions necessary for the rise of different categories of social consciousness?

We have raised more questions than we can answer in this chapter. However, our focus will be on finding a pattern in the underlying conditions that favoured the emergence of group consciousness which preceded the rise of nationalism. This might enable us to view nationalism from a historical perspective.

INTEGRATION, INVOLVEMENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Nationalism, as defined in this essay, is not an abstraction spun out of the head of a political philosopher. It is a specific historical phenomenon arising out of a particular configuration of material conditions especially higher levels of integration in the political and economic spheres typically associated with the emergence of an industrial state. Such an all-rounded integration cannot help but increase social communication among the members of a given society which is already a cultural and social entity. But our contention is that tradition provided the psychological substance for nationalism, and industrial capitalism more effective agents for the transmission of that substance into nationalism in the Third World. Psychologically, the emergence of consciousness as such owes itself to the objective existence of generalized others who have increased in modern times.

The concept of social consciousness gets its articulation from the Marxian concept of class consciousness that is believed to arise under the conditions of class conflict in a class society created by the capitalist mode of production. As Georg Lukacs observed, 'With capitalism, with the abolition of the feudal estates and the creation of society with a purely economic articulation, class consciousness arrived at the point where it could become conscious' (Lukacs 1971:50). That this class consciousness is unique to only capitalist society and not to traditional ones is made clear by Lukacs:

The outlook of the other classes (petty bourgeois or peasants) is ambiguous or sterile because their existence is not based exclusively on their role in the capitalist system of production but is indissolubly linked with the vestiges of feudal society.

(1971:59)

Thus, class consciousness is a function of the capitalist mode of production which inevitably engenders polarized class formations. This Marxian insight can have three implications to our inquiry into the phenomena of social consciousness as such: (a) That social consciousness is a function of new social formations; (b) that such group consciousness is best aroused by shared common interest; (c) that the capitalist mode of production tends to facilitate class consciousness more than any other mode of production.

While accepting this general insight for creative application in the non-western world, we may question two aspects of the Marxist orthodoxy which spring from their Eurocentric and technocentric biases, namely, only *classes* in the Marxist sense (for example, proletariat) can possess class consciousness and that class consciousness is unique to capitalist society. In this chapter we shall try to demonstrate that social consciousness is not confined to a particular class in the capitalist epoch. Wherever there are distinct social groups such as tribes, *ethnos*, castes, chiefdoms, formed and organized along definable social structures, they tend to exhibit social consciousness under the conditions of conflict or competition. Levels of social consciousness are directly proportional to structural cohesiveness of social organizations. Nor is social consciousness aroused by economic interest alone. History records how salvationist religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam) aroused tremendous social consciousness wherever they spread, transforming simple tribal social structures into complex literate societies.

We may therefore generalize tentatively as follows: (a) social consciousness is indication of new social formations; (b) it is engendered in most cases by the spread of behaviour-orienting ideas; (c) it is most manifest during collective struggles for common interest. All the three cases are

generally accompanied by conflict situations, and assume the existence of leadership and organization as the necessary prerequisites.

Unlike any other philosophy or ideology, nationalism has never produced a single prominent philosopher of its own. Its core is the nameless folk tradition that is politicized. Yet the 'most powerful force over the mind of this age is the ideal of nationalism' (Kedourie 1970:191; Deutsch 1966:164). Neither deep thinking nor persistent preaching is required to arouse national consciousness; it seems to arise quite naturally out of a particular configuration of specific socio-economic conditions associated with the rise of the nation-state. A slight manipulation of an integrated community's key symbols is enough to arouse widespread national consciousness. It manifests itself as a societal response to a situation of competition or confrontation with the generalized others. Nationalism is the resultant ideological expression of a highly organized and politicized society, with its both rational and non-rational foundations. Its non-rational aspects which provide the protein of nationalism predates the modern nation-state and without such a psychic core, nationalism would be practically inconceivable in the modern era. In short, nationalism cannot be invented by a minority; it has to be passionately felt by the majority under certain conditions. And the majority in the pre-industrial age meant peasantry.

We must then study the changing historical conditions leading to the formation of nation-states, which give rise to full-throated nationalism. This entails a nation-wide integration of various vital spheres of group life, especially political and economic ones.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION AND CONCOMITANT TYPES OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

It is tempting to reconstruct a historical schema within which the various stages of proto-nationalism may be placed, but such an attempt may be fraught with the danger of retrospective determinism. While it may assist us in conceptualizing an amorphous phenomenon that resists any systematization, it might also distort the open-ended nature of history. Our primary objective is not schematism *per se*; it is to discover the underlying conditions of different types of group consciousness, of which nationalism is a specific kind.

Social consciousness consists in the actualization of a similarity in attitude and outlook among the members of a given community, based on a similar world view, similar economic interests and a similar life-style. What transforms such shared outlooks and common sentiments into a social consciousness is an objective condition: rivalry and conflict.

The possession of common interests by members of a particular class is indeed first brought into consciousness by the need of defence against the common enemy, imaginary or real, and especially by being pitted against a class already conscious of itself as such.

(Ginsberg 1934:164)

To trace the earlier phases of proto-nationalism is to focus upon the evolution of society, and intra-group conflicts that accompanied it. In the fashion of Marx's formulation of class formation, Sir Ernest Barker says that 'the family begets the clan, the clan the tribe, and the tribe the nation-state' (1948:13). The jump from the tribe to the nation, though many in Africa are trying to achieve it today, seems to be a metamorphosis inconceivable in historical evolutionary terms. In most complex, literate societies, there is usually a long period of feudalism, which may be further subdivided into two distinct phases, decentralized and centralized feudalism. Japan, for example, passed through both the phases. Both phases are critical because with the former the prehistory of nationalism ends, and the latter in the form of absolutist monarchy sows the necessary seeds of nationalism.

Although we can't engage in 'a neat schematism in which tribalism always precedes localism and in which localism always precedes national consciousness' (Kamenka 1973:6), because of the non-determinant nature of history, we may nevertheless postulate the following developmental stages for the sake of lending a historical perspective on the ontogeny of nationalism: (a) tribe (tribalism), (b) ethnic confederation (ethnocentrism), (c) county/feudal estate or city-state (patriotism), (d) absolute monarchy (national consciousness) and finally (e) nation/nation-state (nationalism).

Despite obvious differences in the size and structure of these social organizations and their accompanying social consciousness, there are certain features common to them all.

First, social consciousness as such is a function of shared commonalities which make similar outlooks possible. But neither shared commonalities nor similar outlooks are sufficient conditions for the rise of social consciousness without a conflictual situation that accentuates the feeling of we/they differentiation. The latter is a critical variable without which consciousness is more dormant than manifest. As Coser has pointed out, the existence of a negative reference group is important for the formation of new groups (1956:34, 90). 'A sense of rivalry is the essence of nationalism; no man trumpets "my country" unless he realizes that other countries exist with loyal populations of their own and a dangerous capacity to threaten' (Levenson 1967:110).

Thus we may say that the more an ethnic group has engaged in conflict with generalized others in its early history, the stronger has its identity

emerged in modern times. Jews suffered persecution at the hands of Egypt, Syria, Babylonia, Persia and Rome. Arabs engaged in numerous *jihads* which sharpened their sense of identity. Vietnamese faced several invasions from Imperial China throughout their pre-modern history. For conflict occasions popular involvement which stimulates social consciousness.

Second, the shared commonalities consist of a social organization, a common value system and similar life-style due to the common economic conditions prevalent in a compact territory where a particular tribe, ethnos, patria, absolutist monarchy or a nation 'happens' to reside. The emphasis indeed ought to be on 'happens' because of lack of human mastery over the forces of nature before the Industrial Revolution.

We can now envisage typical conflictual situations that tend to arouse different types of social consciousness depending on the nature and number of commonalities shared by the parties concerned. The earliest extant group consciousness is *tribalism* in the form of ethnic fragmentation which still continues to bedevil the nation-building process in Africa (Vail 1989:390). It manifests itself in tattooing as the accepted means of identification and as the mark of group consciousness. What usually differentiates one tribe from others is quasi-kinship, religio-magical practice, language, hunting and gathering habits. Given such marked differences, it is not difficult, as anthropology shows, to visualize frequent intertribal warfare that accentuated tribalism as proto-nationalism (see Figure 2), leading to supra-village integration which is the necessary condition for the formation of primitive states.

One of the main structural consequences of intertribal warfare is the historical tendency for the stronger tribes to assimilate the weaker ones, thereby forming a confederation of tribes or chiefdom. This was the general contour of social development in North-east Asia during the 'warring states' period, in South Asia during the Early Vedic period and pre-Islamic Arabia. Over time, such a social development must go beyond a mere confederation of tribes; it may evolve into a post-tribal society, a transitional stage between tribalism and feudalism, during which *ethnos*, the precursor of the modern nation is formed. The critical differences between the two notions is political; *ethnos* is typically a pre-civic entity, and people as is popularly understood now is a purely populist political conception. Like nation, *ethnos* can have any number of shared commonalities, like, race, language, religion, and so on, but not typically common political ties which the former possess. Ethnic politics is politics either in the absence of the state or extra-constitutional politics dominated by 'demographic ascriptive category' (Stein and Hill 1983:192).

This does not mean that ethnicity is unimportant for our inquiry; most nationalist movements 'began as ethnic aspirations of a group, whose bonds




Figure 2 The process of production of proto-nationalism or traditional nationalism
Note: There are no organized agents of politicization involved; compactness and the small size of a society brings about partial mobilization

were racial, linguistic and cultural' (Gibbons 1930:4). In this sense potentially 'a nation means an ethnic unity' which may be defined as racial and linguistic because the 'speakers of the same language are usually descendants of the same stock' (Kedourie 1970:202). But no ethnic group becomes a nationality until and unless it 'begins to loom either as an active factor in an existing political structure or as a challenge to such a structure' (Akzin 1964:29). The dividing line between ethnicity and nationality is politics which imparts the latter a sense of direction and purpose in social life.

Historically speaking, the contributions of *ethnos* to our conceptualization are enormous. In the womb of *ethnos* germinated the primordial sentiments which constitute the instinctual foundations of modern nationalism, which give it its peculiar potency, passion and power that no ideology or philosophy can match. The predominant consciousness is not one of localism which is too vague but of common racial origins and related primitive culture. In its extreme expression, it manifests itself as ethnocentrism, communal consciousness that glorifies one's own race and its associated achievements, at the expense of others. The super civilization syndrome in ancient China *vis-à-vis* barbarians outside the Middle Kingdom, the Aryan-Dravidian superiority complex in India; *jachupin/criollo/mestizo* distinctions in Latin America, and so on, are some of the examples of ethnocentrism.

There is a subtle but significant difference between ethnocentrism and pure racialism which we must note. Ethnic consciousness is not centred upon racism *per se*. In an ontological sense it takes the physical concept of race as the starting point of its consciousness which may include other common attributes like language, religion, locality, and so on. It is symptomatic of the evolution of tribal quasi-kinship into a racial group with its accompanying consciousness. Its contributions to the growth of nationalism are primarily two: (a) the traditional component of modern nationalism; (b) we/they differentiation as the dynamics of nationalism.

PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM DIFFERENTIATED

Like ethnicity, the term patriotism in its current usage contains profound misconceptions. The misconceptions spring from the extended meaning of patriotism, which makes it a desirable civic sentiment, as opposed to nationalism, which is condemned as an undesirable, dangerous menace. This invidious contrast is not too far from Hans Kohn's dichotomy which views western nationalism, with the exception of Eastern Europe, as indigenous and liberal while that of the non-western world as artificial, aggressive and authoritarian (Snyder 1968:65-6; Kohn 1929:3-4). As Munro Chadwick

wrote, it is difficult if not impossible 'to distinguish the feelings for nationality from patriotism—especially in countries where all or nearly all the population is of one nationality or language'. Patriotism 'seems to spring from love of home and the desire to preserve and protect it' (1945:3).

Perhaps the main reason for the popular preference for patriotism instead of nationalism is largely written in the history of each. Patriotism arose under the feudal conditions characterized by isolated little communities as an attachment to one's *patria* (county/native place) and, of course, there is nothing wrong in such a sentiment. Nationalism, on the other hand, came to be more and more associated with devastating wars which have occasioned mass involvement since the Napoleonic campaigns. In particular, the tragic experience of the last two world wars left nationalism more discredited than ever before; Fascism made any aggressive form of nationalism suspect. But this is a misnomer; aggressive nationalism is more of an imperialism. As Hayes demonstrates in his essays, social imperialism did begin at home as nationalism but manifested abroad in the colonies as imperialism (1937:23).

It is perhaps for this reason that the contemporary Marxists as a rule advocate patriotism but condemn nationalism in no uncertain terms (Norbu 1982:497–502). But by far it is the Marxist-Leninist ideologues who have deliberately sought to confuse the meaning of patriotism with that of nationalism. They have done so in order to overcome an ideological dilemma posed by the twentieth-century revolutionary situations. Orthodox Marxism, to which they try to adhere to as an article of faith, taboos and forbids nationalism as a dangerous ideological contamination. Yet to their dismay Marxists have faced nationalism at almost every stage of their revolution. During the revolutionary movement, class categorization proved too narrow to unite what Mao Zedong used to call the 99 per cent of the population. Once state power is seized, the reason of the state and the dialectics of international politics dictate nationalism even against the radical will of the Communist Party.

Yet that is not called nationalism; it is mildly termed patriotism. The reason again is the communist desire to resolve the ideological dilemma posed by the emergence of Marxist regimes in an era of nationalism. The ideological justification for the propagation of 'patriotism' instead of nationalism is provided by Stalin's doctrine of 'socialism in one country' (Carr 1960). As a prominent Chinese Marxist-Leninist leader justified patriotism, 'Genuine patriotism means fervent love of one's own country and its people, language, culture, literature and best traditions behind which lie thousands of years and generations of historical development' (Liu 1953:50). Thus, in the Marxist-Leninist usage of the term, patriotism simply means the love of one's country, not county as it was understood during

the feudal era. The focus of patriotism shifted from scattered, isolated, little autonomous communities, to the centralized and integrated nation as a whole.

When such a shift in meaning occurs, it is not strictly patriotism but nationalism. We shall, therefore, trace the original meaning of patriotism in the feudal context from which it arose as a civic sentiment, and restrict its definition to that phase only for analytical purpose, because the twentieth century conditions, with nation-states in existence in most cases, make a mockery of patriotism in its original sense.

The word patriotism is derived from the Greek *patriota*, meaning fellow-countrymen. Its entry into modern usage came through French. The transformation of *patriota* into an ism took place primarily during the feudal era. Patriotism arose essentially in the absence of state intervention during the feudal era resulting in the formation of autonomous and autarkic little local communities. It has a romantic, natural and spontaneous quality which most nationalists cherish.

With the fall of Rome (354–430 A.D.), the city-state disappeared from western Europe, and the church provided cultural unity and degrees of dominion. However, the disintegration of the state continued. Counts, marquises and dukes ruled the land under the form of a grant jurisdiction from the king. 'Hence, for the ordinary free man the government which mattered to him was not of some distant king but of some locally powerful lord' (Keen 1969:103). Such descriptions of political feudalism resemble the conditions under maharajadoms in pre-1947 India and the sultanates, sheikhdoms and khanates in the pre-1922 Islamic world. It is precisely under such feudal conditions that patriotism arose as a natural attachment to one's county. As Henri Pirenne observed, in the Latin of the Middle Ages 'people were beginning to apply this beautiful word (*patria*) to these little local counties. In them was formed, for the first time, the patriotism which in modern society has replaced the civic sentiment of antiquity' (1958:103).

The major differences between patriotism and nationalism are as follows: (a) patriotism precedes the growth of nationalism; (b) the former is a limited social phenomenon whereas the latter is a societal force; (c) patriotism means the love of one's natal county, whereas nationalism is a supralocal consciousness. In historical perspective, nationalism seems 'the inevitable culmination of patriotism' (Doob 1964:1). But to equate the two, as is often done, is to confuse plural with singular, general with particular. The difference is not so much in conception as it is in the scope of application from isolated local communities to society as a whole. It presupposes increased social communication, mass politics and mass mobilization as well as the diffusion of egalitarian ideas, which transformed the feudal loyalty to a particular lord,

into a generalized one to the nation-state. Such developments took place much later as we shall see shortly.

Compared with tribalism or ethnicity, patriotism signified considerable integration of human communities culturally, socially, economically and, above all, politically, which even in the absence of a centralized state is the most significant departure. It means human society has transcended the pre-civic phase of its evolution, dominated by kinship and race consciousness. But the most striking feature of the feudal development which distinguishes it from earlier phases is the emergence of private property, especially landed property owned by the prince. Landed property must be seen as the moving spirit behind the beginning of territorial organization and more organized conflict, both of which would imply relatively increased social communication and therefore a more complex form of social consciousness among the members of the localized community called *patria*. Patriotism is its natural expression.

Patriotism began to acquire another meaning when absolutist monarchy created the centralized state. It came to mean not only the devotion to one's little local county (localism), but also 'the attachment to the state' (Akzin 1964:44). We observe a shift in the locus of allegiance and loyalty. This was primarily due to the machinations of the absolutist state. When the king began to consolidate his power at the expense of feudal magnates and the church, he tactically allied himself with the emerging middle class. In the process, the monarch became 'the necessary symbol and core of nationality because he was the state and because the state was the maker of the nation' (Barker 1948:244). This lack of separation among the sovereign, the state and the nation was the fundamental feature of any traditional polity which Weber called patrimonialism. But the logic of absolutism remained unambiguous: The sovereignty of the state had found its visible embodiment in the prince whose will was the state' (Kohn 1929:21).

Since the state was the most systematic and dynamic actor among the three entities, it naturally dominated the political consciousness of the emerging nation. This was by no means unique to western Europe. Wherever the necessary conditions of absolutist monarchy approximated, the semblance of the nation-state conjugation appeared (for example, China, Japan, Persia). It signified a fairly high level of political centralization across the nation. In Slovene, 'the meaning of the word "state" refers to rounded off territory, similar to the notion of *dezala* (province)' (Kardelj 1981:36). In the Chinese language there is no notion of nation but of the state, *guo*. Originally it meant a kingdom with 10,000 chariots. Later it came to mean a dynasty. Now it interchangeably means a state. In Hindi too there is no notion of nation but of the state, *rajya* or *sarkar*. The modern Hindi usage of *rashtrya* as the equivalent of nation predates the modern era. In the Vedic literature it refers

to a kingdom. Thus, in most parts of Asia and the west nation-states emerged out of the pre-modern kingdoms. Only the concept of who controls the state, the king or the people (nation) changed.

This tendency to equate the state with the nation has immediate consequences for the contemporary conception of nation-state; it is a matter of reversing the priority, while maintaining the same equation. It forms the core of one of the nationalist doctrines that the political (the state) and the cultural (nation) units ought to coincide and be coextensive. Apart from political convenience, this demand has implications to legitimacy. The state ought to enjoy the mandate of the nation. Hence, nation-state.

Other contributions from the Middle Ages to the content and concept of nationalism include the following: (a) feudal conditions fostered the notion of loyalty be it to the lord or the county as an answer to political fragmentation; (b) absolutist monarchy created the necessary infrastructure for the modern nation-state; (c) national consciousness began to emerge as a result of the political centralization and national unification brought about by absolutism.

These factors, particularly the reappearance of the state 'caused' a crisis of feudalism and the emergence of capitalist elements in western Europe.

The 'true' starting point is long-distance trade, a result of geographical location of goods, and of the 'division of labor' given by location. Long distance trade often engenders markets, an institution which involves acts of barter, and if money is used, of buying and selling. Thus eventually but by no means necessarily, offering to some individuals an occasion to indulge in the alleged propensity for bargaining and haggling.

(Polanyi 1957:50)

We should note that long distance trade was not unique to Europe, though the continental nature of geography tended to favour it; there are evidences of such trade in pre-modern South Asia (Raychaudhuri and Habib 1982), East Asia (Morse 1908) and the Middle East (O'Leary 1927:110-22).

The implications of such a commercial process cannot be underestimated; it brought about face to face multiple generalized others, the very condition for the emergence of social self-hood. Gradually market economy and machine industry began which could not tolerate fetters to generalized production (old feudal, local boundaries), and necessitated larger national communities. Here we must concede to the Marxist analyst that the national idea as such could not assume the shape of a common idea of all existing social classes. At first it caught the imagination of the class that

raised this idea as its banner in the struggle against feudalism and particularism inherent in it, the class able to rally around this banner all

other social forces which entered the battle against the feudal system, in the first place the peasant serf. That class was the bourgeoisie which became the chief agent of broader economic integration of peoples, of a higher level of the social division of labour, thus becoming also the enemy of the feudal economy, political and cultural particularism.

(Kardelj 1981:16)

A bilingually-educated new class emerged in the leading Third World countries such as the 'babus' in colonial India, the so-called treaty port intellectuals in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China and the 'mestizos' in Latin American countries who were the vanguard of nationalistic ideas.

Politically, the centralized state that the absolutist monarchy almost perfected was 'a new creation called forth by the Commercial Revolution which had shifted the centre of gravity of the western world from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic sea board' (Polanyi 1957:65). In external politics the setting up of statecraft involved the marshalling of the resources of the whole national territory to the purpose of power in favour of foreign affairs. It was largely the state intervention which destroyed the feudal conception of allegiance. By the time of the French Revolution, the dynastic conception of allegiance was easily transformed and transferred to the nation-state as we know it today.

POLITICAL FEUDALISM AND STATE FORMATION IN THE THIRD WORLD

Our sketchy reconstruction of the probable political evolution and its concomitant types of social consciousness might appear rather Eurocentric and far removed from Third World realities. It is a matter of debate, for instance, whether the European type of feudalism prevailed even in the leading Asian nations (Byres and Mukhia 1985), leave alone Africa. Perhaps no archetype of feudal system operated in China and India. Marx, with his scanty second-hand knowledge called it the 'Asiatic mode of production' characterized by hydraulic regimes and the absence of private property in land ownership.

There is little consensus on what constitutes feudalism. However, there is little doubt that the conditions in leading Asian countries before the western capitalist/imperialist penetration are feudal in the following political sense: (a) multiple centres of power and authority within one country; (b) lack of political centralization and economic integration of the said unit. In other words we see the determining characteristic of feudalism, not only as a particular mode of production, but essentially as the conspicuous absence of

a centralized state and its intervention in various spheres of social life, especially politics and economics.

While we can observe that the essential feudal conditions approximated in Asia, nowhere in the Third World do we discover the equivalent of European absolute monarchy with the possible exception of Meiji Japan. This missing link in the historical and national development as such has serious practical implications for the timing and trajectory of nationalism in the Third World. For we have hinted that in Europe it was the absolute monarchy, who almost unwittingly sowed the seeds of modern nationalism by performing two important tasks of centralization and partial mobilization. The Absolute monarchies introduced standing armies, a permanent bureaucracy, national taxation, a codified law, and the beginnings of a unified market' (Anderson 1979:17). Second, the absolute monarchs partially mobilized or more accurately awakened their subjects, especially the townsmen, and to a less extent peasantry, in their political struggles against various feudal lords who represented particularism, and in their military conflicts which constantly opposed the various monarchs of western Europe to one another. Thus, the process by which such monarchs laid the foundation for the rise of modern nationalism was a case of unintended consequence because their primary motivation behind absolutism was not the production of nationalism *per se* but to consolidate royal power.

The fact that the historical agent of absolutism was virtually absent in the pre-modern historical development in the Third World meant two things. First, the rise of nationalism was delayed by three or four centuries. It surfaced when rudimentary networks of social communication and a certain amount of economic integration took place in the early twentieth century, either under native initiative such as Japan, Thailand, Turkey, or under the colonial auspices as in most colonies.

Though definitely delayed, the phenomenon of absolutism in a functional sense is perhaps not altogether absent in the non-western world. Certainly it was not the case of a wilful monarch as in western Europe but oligarchy, or the Leninist political party, which set in motion the process of centralization of political power and mobilization of resources. Meiji Japan (1868–1912), Russia under Stalin (1924–52), China under Mao (1949–76), Mongolia (1922–64), and Turkey under Kemal Ataturk (1919–38) may be considered as the functional equivalents of Asian absolutism in the process of nation-building. This is not to condone the Stalinist terror in the Soviet Union but to note how different agents performed essentially similar tasks: political centralization and economic integration. The average period of absolutism for the five preceding cases is thirty-two years. For Europe too, absolutism was achieved by 'monarchs who asserted the supremacy of their rule by force by dissolving monasteries, by consolidating territory,

by enforcing taxes, by defeating separatists and baronial challenges' (Tivey 1981:63).

Although absolutism was a revolutionary stage in the evolution of nationalism, there were other factors which preceded it and which were perhaps equally important. Among these conditions the state-building is a necessary but not probably sufficient condition for the growth of national consciousness. As Hegel would have said, 'It is the very ability to create a state that is the necessary condition for a Volkgeist' (Avineri 1972:223). Weber also echoed this view: 'It is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity' (1978:389). The so-called primordial sentiments are inconceivable without state intervention and the socialization of such sentiments in society which ensure their existence beyond a generation or an individual's lifetime. That is partly why primordial sentiments are not felt so much by successfully acculturated groups far removed from the basic conditioning factors of one's state and society such as the Chinese, the Japanese, or the Koreans in the USA. Now the origins of the state, unlike other aspects of modernity, are not confined to western Europe alone, although Joseph Strayer's account (1970) implies that it was primarily a European phenomenon, originating as it did from legal institutions. But political anthropologists, with their comparative perspective and theoretical penetration, know better. Robert Carneiro makes a cogent argument: the state-formation was not the product of genius, or the result of chance, nor enlightened self-interest, but force is the typical mechanism by which political evolution has led step by step from autonomous villages to states.

Historical or archaeological evidence of war is found in the early stages of state-formation in Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Greece, Rome, northern Europe, Central Africa, Polynesia, Middle America, Peru and Columbia. It was therefore, the 'outcome of a regular and determinant cultural process' (Carneiro 1970:733). Where the appropriate conditions exist, the state emerges.

What are the appropriate conditions? The really fundamental step in the political evolution that had triggered the entire train of events leading to empires, was the revolutionary change from village autonomy to supra-village integration. This crucial integration was largely facilitated in the initial stages by certain ecological factors. Resource concentration and environmental circumscription together increased the possibilities of protracted intertribal warfare over land, and thus to political integration beyond the village level. Whenever such conditions approximated, the state emerged. This theory shows the state to be a predictable response to certain specific cultural, demographic and ecological conditions in a given human habitat (Carneiro 1970:736-7).

If the early stages of state formation are dependent upon certain objective conditions rather than subjective ethnocentric claims, the state-induced national consciousness or even nationalism cannot be something that can be imitated from the west. It arises out of certain objective conditions such as the existence of state no matter how 'soft', and society no matter how backward by machine-industry standards as long as it is literate. Where such conditions existed, nationalism tends to be stronger. It is, therefore, no wonder that India, Egypt and China emerged in the post-colonial period as the regional models of successful nationalism. Conversely, this is why African nation-building process is so problematic because of tribal fragmentation, due to the relative absence of a binding force embedded in a great tradition.

The analytic construction of political evolution is necessitated by our hypothetical contention that social consciousness is a function of a complex socio-political organization by virtue of membership and other shared commonalities such as culture, language, race, and so on. We emphasize that it is not presumed or implied that each and every historical society or nation must pass through all the stages of political evolution; they are only ideal types meant to help us conceptualize nationalism. But we have no doubt that the various types of social consciousness accompanying the various evolutionary stages can be found in various parts of the contemporary Third World.

Tribalism is rampant in most parts of Africa. Ethnicity among minority groups in both post-colonial and post-industrial societies has challenged our popular theories of modernization and nation-building. Patriotism in the classical sense exists in China where it is called 'provincialism' or 'local nationalism', and also in India where it goes under the rubric of 'regionalism' centred upon the concept of *des*, one's natal place. And it is the rise of dominant or majority ethnic groups' nationalism that overthrew western colonial empires in the Third World.

To sum up, we suggest that the various manifestations of proto-nationalism such as tribalism, ethnocentrism and patriotism are made possible by the following factors: (a) a number of shared commonalities which create a certain degree of social unity or mechanical solidarity; (b) the small compact size in terms of community and habitat which makes small-scale communication and partial mobilization possible; (c) a bilateral conflict involving such a small community against a similar unit which occasions popular involvement and hence stimulates social consciousness. We emphasize that such types of natural, not politicized, social consciousness is a more-or-less spontaneous expression of a small-size community such as the tribe, the county or province under feudal or decentralized conditions. In short, proto-nationalism is a function of ethnic segmentations.

Under the above circumstances nationalism does not occur because of the relative absence of organized agents of nationalism, such as the centralized state or the political party, both of which are the most effective agents of nationalism. What, therefore, differentiates proto-nationalism is the characteristic lack of politicization in terms of social communication and mass mobilization so necessary for the production of mass nationalism. As we shall see later, the state is the instrument of national integration *par excellence*, and both the state and political party have proved to be most effective agents of politicization so vital to the full-scale production of nationalism. In the absence of modern organized agents of nationalism and national integration, the social consciousness of little, local, isolated communities will be necessarily limited to tribalism and ethnocentrism. Such limited small-scale consciousness confined as it is to segmented social structure and subculture fails to encompass and embrace the whole nationality.

4 Social structure of the nation: the ordering principle of national attributes

In the previous chapters we have tried to answer the following questions: What is nationalism? How did it evolve historically? And how can we conceptualize it? In trying to answer them we have discussed only the manifestations of a complex political phenomenon whose social roots are yet to be unearthed.

Since we have suggested earlier that nationalism, at least etymologically, is an almost spontaneous ‘ism’ of the nation as a whole, usually manipulated by the state and/or the party, we may pose a conventional question: What is a nation? What is the substratum of nationalism? These questions are answered invariably in terms of the nation’s cohesive properties. Semantics differ but there is consensus on the national unity as an essence of nationality or nationhood.

COHESIVE PROPERTIES OF NATIONHOOD

Since the seventeenth century ‘nation’ has been employed by jurists and publicists to designate the population of a sovereign national state presuming varying degrees of social, linguistic and cultural unity as its social basis. In the contemporary political usage as popularized by the United Nations Organization (UNO) ‘nation’ is interchangeably used with ‘people’; indeed the two terms have become almost coterminous. This is what the Third World understands by the term, ‘nation’. However, since ‘people’ is populist political jargon rather than an academic concept, we shall argue that culture and structure of a complex society, especially when they are politicized, is what is meant by ‘nation’. We can observe that, despite the changing usages of the term over the centuries, the underlying conception of a common culture as the basis of a political organization remains fairly constant.

The Jacobins who were perhaps the first to popularize the notion of nation glorified it as fraternity *par excellence*, like holy communion (Michelet 1880:382–403). Lord Acton and his followers saw the essence of nationality

in its paradigm of *unity* which they fear as a definite danger to liberty (1948:166–95). Frederick Hertz, on the other hand, praises the spirit of solidarity inherent in any nationality as a means to achieve collective freedom (1966:56). Benedict Anderson aptly says that ‘the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship’ (1983:16) which the Marxist critics would dismiss as incompatible with their conception of class interest. Rudolf Rucker describes the nation as a community of interests (1937:159–299). However, the textbook description of the nation continues to be a political collectivity sharing a number of common social, political, economic and territorial attributes.

While there is considerable consensus on its cohesive properties, opinions vastly differ on the critical question of what precisely makes the nation an ideal unit which adheres. MacIver thinks none of the social possessions of mankind is inseparable from it, ‘whether language or distinctive custom or religion or territory or race-consciousness or economic interest, nor even the tradition of political life’. He alters the order of his list with regard to national loyalty which ‘is not “race”, but the felt community of place, custom, tradition, and authority, and the common lot and fortune’ (MacIver 1955:123, 128). Sir Ernest Barker defines the nation in terms of tradition which in turn consists of ‘the threads of language and literature, the threads of laws and government, the threads of religious belief and educational policy’ (1948:259). Louis Snyder lists the factors in the structure of nationalism as common language, race, religion and tradition (1968:41). In another place his list reads somewhat differently: language, culture, tradition, heroes (1968:31). Edvard Kardelj traces the origins of the modern nation to ‘feudal peoples, who were formerly, rather loosely linked by language, ethnic kinship, common history, culture and ideological similarities’, and so on (1981:43).

If we are to read any meaning in the hierarchy of the above lists, we note that the authors consider language as the most critical variable. Those who top their lists with race include the following samples. Hans Kohn thinks the constituent elements of nationalism are the ‘common descent, language, territorially, political entity, customs and traditions or religion’ (1955:9). David Apter is more explicit. ‘Race, ethnicity, religion and language are the means whereby people identify themselves, organize their beliefs’ (1971:80). While maintaining the same priority, Clifford Geertz adds more items when he defines people’s sense of self which ‘remains bound up in the gross actualities of blood, race, language, locality, religion or tradition’. Elsewhere he changes the list as ‘the “givens” of place, tongue, blood, looks and way of life’ (1971:128).

Between the two extremes of language and race priorities, there is a group of recent generalists who seem to be more cautious about their

listing. But whether it is due to lack of insight or educated guess is hard to say. Rupert Emerson's conception of the nation consists of (a) people, territory and state; (b) language; (c) culture and religion; (d) economics (1962:89–170). Anthony Smith considers nationhood as constitutive of the following items: (a) autonomy and self-government for the group, often but not always in a sovereign state; (b) solidarity and fraternity of the group in a recognized territory or homeland; (c) distinctive and preferably unique culture and history peculiar to the group in question (1976:2). Elie Kedourie summarizes the three dimensions as 'nationality, religion and modernity', but also lays great emphasis on national language as the basis of nationalism (1970:202–6).

There are many more works, especially area studies most of which contain attribute lists supposedly constituting each author's conception of nationality, nation or nationhood. However, our point is sufficiently clear. The list of national attributes is indeterminate and subjective. They fail to find any logical pattern in their ordering. Even some of our best authorities (That is, MacIver, Geertz, Snyder) are not sure of their lists as suggested by two different lists by the same author. Nevertheless, the ordering of such lists reflects an individual scholar's understanding of the defining characteristics of nationalism in question. The only theoretical conclusion one can reach is the typology of nationalism as some scholars have done (Snyder 1968:43–52; Breuilly 1982:65–107). Our intention, however, is to go beyond typology. Before we do so, let me give some explanations for the nature of ordering of attribute lists as best exemplified by the above-mentioned samples.

RACE AND LANGUAGE AS MEANS OF CULTURAL DIFFERENTIATION

Judging by the manner of their ordering, we can observe that almost all the writers on western nationalism agree that language is the most critical variable, while those who write on Third World nationalism single out race. This, we believe, is fairly representative of the conventional scholarship on the subject. It was perhaps the former generalization which provided the basis for one of the most powerful theories of nationalism most commonly associated with Karl Deutsch. We do acknowledge the value of his theory, and will later show its proper use. But its implications that medium is the message does not seem to be congruent with our findings. Our findings suggest that nationalism centres, not solely on language *per se*, but on what written literature contains: values and culture heroes. If language were the critical variable, then nationalism in multilingual societies becomes problematic. This might be so not only in the Third World but even in some western

countries such as Switzerland, the Soviet Union, Canada. Surely the essence of Jewish or Irish nationalism does not reside in their desire to speak Hebrew or Gaelic, though they might do so out of national pride. But even that very pride is connected with their overall determination to assert a historically-evolved collective personality and to shape their future accordingly. Nor can we doubt the intensity of nationalism exhibited during the independence movement in India whose linguistic diversity is legendary.

The main reason for that conventional overemphasis on language is simple. It is perhaps the only outstanding characteristic which could distinguish the one European nation from the other. European nations, unlike their Asian counterparts, are alike in several respects. First, the national boundaries are more legal marks rather than natural barriers that separate, for example, the countries on the Asian continent. These mythical boundaries have rendered the European countries until recently so open to each other that demonstration effects worked much more effectively here than anywhere else.

Second, despite various ethnic groups there has existed in Europe only one predominant race—Caucasian. It was this common Caucasian racial background which led the early Third World nationalists to identify modern imperialism with white man's domination.

Third, Christianity provided a common cultural background to the whole of Europe. Again the distinction between Catholicism and Protestantism is culturally minor—more political than theological.

Given such commonalities, it was not surprising that rulers and ruling classes across medieval Europe developed common interest that transcended the notion of national interest. I refer to the numerous matrimonial alliances that closely knit most of the European royalties as if to suggest they constituted one universal class.

For a continent, the unity of Europe is indeed remarkable, especially when compared with Asia. Traditional Asia contained four major civilizations: Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu and Islamic; all the great world religions; at least three different races; and numerous languages. We bring this contrast in order to pose the question: What else was there in Europe to distinguish one nation from the other, except language and literature? This is not to question Europe's rich heritage; it is to point out the essential unity of Europe as one civilizational matrix. For no matter which way we may define nationalism, the dialectics of we/they differentiation cannot be excluded.

As for the race factor in Third World nationalism, it is largely, but by no means entirely, due to the colonial situation in which most non-western nationalists found themselves. Western colonialism inevitably entailed racial domination because it was white man's rule, direct or indirect, over black,

brown and yellow races. This might sound grossly simplified, but that is how modern imperialism appeared not only to the Africans but even to the Chinese at the turn of the century. Sun Yatsen, in his lectures on nationalism, declared, 'Of the billion and half people in the world, the most powerful are the four hundred million whites of European and American continents; from this base the white races have started out to swallow up other races' (Kedourie 1970:310). In Africa 'white supremacy is a stubborn rejection of the African by white man' and African nationalism is a 'reaction to that rejection' (Sithole 1959:38).

However, the race factor has not gained the same salience in other parts of the Third World as it does in Africa. The reason has to do with the continent's lack of history and tradition: All are 'artificial' nations born of the European scramble for colonies. The time depth of their cultures and societies' engagement with world religion 'is shallow and its working-out very incomplete' (Fallers 1974:154).

Under the extreme conditions of ethnic fragmentation and cultural particularism inherent in the tribal stage of social development, race is the only pan-ethnic factor that could unite the various tribes of an administered unit together. Indeed, what else is there in Africa in its pre-modern cultural heritage that could be pooled together to create a modicum of national unity and collective purpose so vital to the process of nation-building? That is why Malawi's state-controlled mass media constantly propagates like the gospel 'Unity, Loyalty, Obedience and Discipline.' (Vail 1989:ix). Except Islamic North Africa, the continent unfortunately lacks cultural prerequisites of nationhood; for the African political evolution did not go beyond chiefdom characterized by the absence of differentiated political structures. Their history, to use the term in a rather loose sense, has been until recently one of tribal feuds that divided one tribe from the other and of hunting feats. Their belief system, of course, consisted of gods, myths, symbols and rituals, but their significance and influence are circumscribed within a particular tribe or at the most, a few tribes in a given locality. In the absence of unifying written languages, their linguistic development diversified into numerous tribal dialects. And every African state-nation has several hundred tribes to contend with. With such unfavourable conditions for nation-building, the African leaders deserve our admiration and empathy.

Africa and, to a less extent, Latin America defy a Marxist scholar's contention that 'nations cannot be artificially created; they exist whenever the essential elements characterizing them exist' (Kardelj 1981:30-47). This, of course, does not mean the African nations do not have the right to exist. It is a dilemma that any culture theory of nationalism faces. But its essential message won't be lost to any critical observer. After Nkrumah's death, the process of nation-building lost its momentum and popular enthusiasm fizzled

out. On the other hand a Nasser may be dead but Egypt continues its national reconstruction. The critical difference is made by inherited cultural resources, not race *per se*, for example, Ethiopia.¹

From our perspective, with the exception of Ethiopia and South Africa the developmental stages in Africa have been straight from tribalism to a modern nationalism, and a few years after independence back to tribalism (Papstein 1989:390). This partly explains the peculiarly African nationalist's preoccupation with the reaffirmation of their *race-negritude*. It is not only a reflection of the colonial conditions; it is the only emotive situational facility to unite a people faced with fragmentation of all kinds. Any African state's national attribute list runs short, compared with others in Asia. In the Middle East the 'community of language, of tradition and of historical experiences have all been stressed as common denominators of an Arab-nation' (Nuseibeh 1956:66), besides of course race and religion. For South Asia an Indian author makes the following list: 'common culture, a common language, a common social origin, common social habits, a common administrative organization and system of transport and communication' (Mathai 1958:1).

We have considered only the first item in the national attribute list as of some import. The rest seems random. At this level of explanation, the nation may be conceived as a most complex but somehow composite compound consisting of a number of elements. Now which elements become predominant in the making of the compound depends on a number of conditions. It may depend on the availability of elements, such as in the African case. It may depend on the situation as to which elements should be emphasized as the most effective means of mass mobilization, given the choice of several alternatives as in the case of India or China. Or it may just depend on the trained bias of the observer. If an Arab scholar (Nuseibeh) is trained to think language is the most important factor in the growth of nationalism, he may do so quite unconsciously in a preconceived way regardless of the evidence on the contrary, because the typical Arab case suggests religion as the critical variable, as we shall discuss in Chapter 8, pp. 130–56.

SOCIETY AND NATION

In any case with the listing of national attributes we are still left at the common sense level of description. Can we make any conceptual sense out of this empirical anarchy? Most historians agree that the nation as a historical phenomenon did not exist up to the end of the fifteenth century in Europe. Where did it come from since the sixteenth century? Certainly not out of the blue. We suggest that the nation as we know it today emerged out of the latent social unity inherent in any complex society through the process of

progressive politicization and integration. The more complex a society the greater the prospect for national unity. This paradox in the sense of a complex not simple society arises from this often observed fact: the greater the number of fundamental commonalities rooted in social life, the greater are the chances of a successful outcome for a nationalist movement or the unity of an existing nation. Behind any great contemporary nation is a complex society with the history of a great tradition. A complex society and all that it implies in anthropology is the social basis of a nation-state.

What do we understand by a complex society that is considered as the necessary prerequisite for the foundation of nationhood and production of nationalism? The terms 'complex' and 'historical' are interchangeably used in this essay to mean 'literate' because any literate society tends to be historical in the sense of having written records and more complex than a simply illiterate one. We conceive of a complex or historical society as possessing the following essential characteristics: (a) socially-binding force emanating from the existence of a great tradition; (b) unified means of pan-ethnic communication system invariably propagated by a written language; (c) fairly stratified social structure which produces adequate leadership for a nationalist movement and/or nation-building; (d) a nation-wide authority, usually, though not always, in the form of a state which creates necessary conditions for co-operation and regulates conflict in society. Some obvious examples include China, India, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and so on. It is the progressive politicization of such complex societies, facilitated undoubtedly by the above-mentioned properties, which produces nationhood and nationalism.

Should we doubt the validity of this simple proposition, we should remind ourselves of the sequence in the evolution of social organization as such. There was society in its most elementary form when social animals appeared as illustrated by simple, stateless tribal societies in Australia, Africa and the Americas, and it was society which created the state for social protection.

When the state in its fullest pride of power claimed to be everything, society still said to it, 'this far and no further', at first implicitly, at length in a clear consciousness of its right over its own instrument.

(MacIver 1955:446)

Society's answer, I suggest, is the assertion of social unity and demand for social participation in the state's affairs. In short the nation. This applies particularly to all cases in which the state precedes the formation of nations; in the reverse case the question does not yet arise. Seen from this perspective, the nation is the abstract medium through which society makes its political demands and claims. With its emergence as an intermediate actor positioned between state and society, the classical dichotomy between state and society


is progressively minimized. Society is no longer a sack of potatoes but appears as a cohesive, collective and purposeful actor under the name of the nation or nationality. It is in this sense that nationality appears as a politicized social unity inherent in any complex society.

The resultant national community is almost a new creature (see Figure 3). It is different from the traditional conception of civic society as an autonomous social domain to be sharply distinguished from the political domain, the state. The notion of nation partakes of both; it may be called a socio-political system. It is not only founded upon the latent social unity inherent in any complex society but is in itself a complex product of the increasing interaction between society and the state under greatly changed and changing circumstances. A nation-state is different from a traditional society which is largely apolitical, whereas the former is a highly-politicized community. Recent sociological research has taken cognizance of this significant change in social structure, especially the Parsonian conception of social system: 'A relatively established, *politically organized community* is clearly a "moral community" to some degree, its members sharing common norms, values and culture' (Parsons 1964:34). That is, politics, a definition and discussion of which is delayed until later, has led to some form of reorganization of traditional society which at the same time continues to contain some of the fundamental attributes of society, that is, common values, social structures, communication system, and so on. Like the nation, 'a social system can meaningfully be described as a unity—a unity within which every element can shed light on every other because they are all organically or, as it is usually expressed, functionally-related' (Stark 1962:76). What are the constituent elements of a social system? The elements are listed rather exhaustively in the national attribute list samples already surveyed. It should be noted that we do not question the constituent elements themselves but the principle of ordering them which does not make any theoretical sense. We shall, instead, classify the various elements and feed them into respective sociological categories that go to constitute a society.

The Parsonian definition of society as the pattern of relations is too abstractly high-pitched and leaves much to be desired; it reduces society to a set of interpersonal relations. A more comprehensive definition of society perhaps more applicable to the Third World is given by Radhakamal Mukerjee:

Ecologically, society is Region—a physical, spatial aggregation of population for the biological values of sustenance and continuity. Economically, society is Class, a pattern of resources, technology and standard of living for the choice and satisfaction of divisible, limited values. Sociologically, society is Institution for the satisfaction of social

Figure 3 The formation of a nation-state



goals and values of communication, control and status. Ethnically, society is Communion for the creation and maintenance of ideal values, i.e. character.

(1955:25)

Mukerjee's list of salient features of a complex society is not too different from Leon H. Mayhew's summary of analytical definitions of society as presented in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Mayhew writes, 'Analytical definitions usually treat society as a relatively independent or self-sufficient population characterized by internal organization, territoriality, cultural distinctiveness and sexual recruitment'. He adds specific

definitions 'vary considerably in regard to which of these elements is emphasized' (1968:577). We have argued in this essay that the accent on a particular element out of several choices is a function of differentiation in order to maintain ethnic boundaries or situational exigencies.

Under the value system we include religion, culture, tradition, morals, literature, religious beliefs, ideology in the order of frequency. Division of labour includes occupation, life-style, way of life, economic interest, economic ties, interest, and so on. Socialization may include language as a communication means, education, social habits, custom. Finally, if the 'ultimate integrative organ of a social system is the state' (Johnson 1982:53), then we may include political institution, administrative organization, political entity, autonomy, self-government, state.

These sociological categories facilitate national integration because each one is functionally related to the other, and all to each other thereby forming a natural functioning whole. For example, the value system justifies and legitimizes the prevailing division of labour. The socialization process socializes people to play different roles in the system, which is 'the core phenomenon of the dynamics of social systems' (Parsons 1964:42).

Although we have fed most of the data from the national attribute lists into well-known sociological categories, there are some elements which do not seem to fit into any of them readily. They include the following categories: (a) territory, locality, region, place; (b) race, ethnicity, blood, looks, ethnic kinship, common descent, racial origin; (c) history, historical experiences, historical background, heroes; (d) modernity, industrialism. But a close scrutiny would show that three out of the four categories are already implicit in any complex society, namely, race, territory and history as Mukerjee's and Mayhew's definitions indicate. For if society is a 'a term meant simply to refer to the concrete fact that a number of people are somehow together, with as little analytic suggestion as possible as to how they are grouped together' (Emmet 1958:23), then such a people are coming from some common descent (race), occupying a definite space (territory) and having most likely a common history. This is true of all the major historical cases we have studied. But what made such implicit aspects into issues is due to the politics of nationalism. Race and history consciousness is part of the overall quest for national identity so much propelled by the dynamics of international politics. The immensely increased sense of territoriality is also a function of increased frequency in international conflict or resource competition and the emergence of the nation as the people who occupy a limited territory. And lastly, 'modernity' and 'industrialism' are the goals of a politicized society (nation) which seeks to improve its material conditions through varying degrees of industrial revolution. The last category from the national

attribute list reflects new visions of society and economy emanating from modern ideology which is absent in the traditional conceptions of nationalism.

This means that the members of a given society when mobilized for political action demonstrate unity because of certain shared sociological imperatives. They share the same set of beliefs, values and ideas which basically govern their behaviour pattern and the structure of social action; they are all socialized into different roles but work within the same division of labour; they are all affected by the same social structure. The idea suggested is not so much homogeneity, but congruence, so that the members click with each other; not unanimity but mutual understanding, so that social communication becomes possible; not certainty but knowingness, so that social living becomes possible.

In other words long before the emergence of a nation-state, the members of a complex society have already learned how to participate in community life. They have a clear idea of a larger collectivity to which they belong and from which they derive their meaning of and purpose in social life. Their value system ceaselessly inculcates by means of socialization the unity of purpose and self-discipline so vital for any nation-building endeavour.

Our conceptualization does not suggest that the nation is society. We may put it this way then: the nation is an extension and continuation of society by means of mass politics. Out of society emerges a nation (people) through the crucible of mass politics that is the political essence of nationalism. It follows from this that the basis of nationalism is necessarily and logically social. Where it lacks this deeply-rooted social basis, nationalism tends to be an artificial expression as in large parts of Africa or purely economic nationalism as in Latin America. Both continents lack the functional prerequisites of a complex society with great tradition.

We may also mention the two other levels at which the national attribute list has been conceptualized in order to make some theoretical sense out of that often subjective and confusing listing. First, we have viewed any national attribute list as a complex of cohesive properties of nationhood, which together constitute the substance of what Emile Durkheim called mechanical solidarity (1964:105–6). The more numerous are such commonalities or social ties which are so fundamental to the functioning of community life, the greater are the chances of solidarity.

Next, we have discussed briefly the national attribute list as a significant aspect of national identity. At this level of conceptualization, national identity may be defined as an aggregation of ethnic variables by which an ingroup differentiates itself from outgroups so as to maintain its ethnic or national boundary. As examples, we have singled out language as the differentiating principle in Europe and colour or race in the case of black Africa. Our

conception of national identity may sound conditional and *contingent*, which is the reality in fact, but the logic of identity formation is unmistakable: differentiation. And whichever common value can achieve the maximum amount of differentiation from others is emphasized, if not singled out of the national attribute list or national symbols.

THE PATTERN OF NATION FORMATION IN THE THIRD WORLD

Finally, the preceding discussion on the social structure of nationhood and—to anticipate—the politics of nationalism (Chapter 7) might question the empirical and theoretical validity of a popular western view that equates Third World nations as ‘state-nations’. Mostafa Rejori and Cynthia Enloe have given the clearest expression to this view in their joint article. They declared, ‘Europe produced—nation-states, whereas Asia and Africa have produced state-nations’ (1977:30). Like Ernest Gellner, Rejori and Enloe rule out the existence of Third World nationalism prior to the creation of ‘state-nations’ in Asia and Africa. This is to ignore the history of nationalist movements in the former colonies. Unless one believes in the ‘great man’ theory of history, it would be difficult to explain how few individuals like Gandhi, Mao or Nasser managed to force great western powers out of their countries, without popular involvement, which entails nationalism.

Rejori and Enloe simply differentiate state and nation as follows: “‘State’ is primarily a political-legal concept, whereas “nation” is primarily psycho-cultural’ (ibid.: 31). Now this psycho-cultural unity, we have demonstrated in this chapter, is a function of social unity inherent in any complex society of which there are a number of cases in Asia and the Middle East. However, what interests us most is the implication of the Rejori-Enloe thesis to the continuing debate about the typical patterns of nation-state formation in the Third World.

Let us examine the meaning of nation and nationality as understood in this essay. In common sense sociology terms, the rise of a nation signifies the emergence, under modern conditions of mass politics, of a politically conscious *people* from a common background including descent, culture, language, history, and so on, and such a conscious collectivity exhibits relatively high levels of unity in spirit and action. The emergence of a nation out of a traditional society is analogous to the growth of a personality (people) with its individual character traits (national identity), popular will (national self-determination or popular sovereignty) and with its own goals (independence, nation-building). The source of nationality is the traditional society which at once conjures up Marx’s image of the peasant universe as a sack of potatoes. This sack of potatoes becomes solidified in the course of a

nationalist movement as a relatively corporate actor fully conscious of its collective identity, interest and destiny. The whole process is characterized by the rising consciousness that hitherto segmented society lacked. This transformation of old societies into new nations include the following transformative processes: society's implicit value systems become explicit ones; its underlying unity becomes active unity; its assumed commonalities become overt national batches; its history, which had hitherto remained in the hands of court historians, gets ransacked by the public in search of national heroes and glory; its class or caste structure subsides and a horizontal comradeship emerges; all above a social conception of territoriality gains popular currency.

We have therefore, conceptualized the process of nation formation as an extension and continuation of a complex society by means of mass politics. And mass politics of nationalism tends to politicize tradition and territoriality, the nerve centres of any social collectivity. In this sense nation or nationality is a politicized society usually undergoing mass mobilization, and the boundaries of such a society run primarily along ethnic lines in the sense of group with common descent, language and culture. This means that complex, literate societies are well-established social organizations which have taken several centuries in their evolution and therefore function on the assumed but solid basis of clear-cut ethnic distinctions. Here I am closer to Frederick Barth's conception of an ethnic group (1969) than to Talcott Parson's social system (1964) whenever I use the term society.

What are the typical indicators of a society becoming a nationality or nation? The first signs are the intellectuals' discovery of society as an entity in and for itself. Their conscious activity underlines and reaffirms ethnic boundaries thereby asserting social self-hood and national identity. That is why this initial phase is often associated with what now might sound as academic debates about tradition and modernity among the literate strata of any complex society in confrontation with the generalized others who in the colonial context were westerners. Next, it would be too early to say whether a rough sense of national interest emerges but definitely a strong sense of territoriality emerges as a direct result of we/they differentiation which identity consciousness brings about. This territoriality manifests itself as the burning issue of who has the 'natural' right to live in the inherited space (sons of the soil) and who has not (foreign colonists).

By this time the initial elite awareness about national identity has extended to the society as a whole, and has assumed the proportions of a nation-wide consciousness, involving masses of peasants. This inevitably entails mass politics based on common cultural identity and territoriality. Around this stage the popular will of a people gets embodied in a charismatic leader and his political party that concertedly politicize tradition and

territoriality for the production of social power through mass mobilization. In the ultimate analysis the nation-in-the-making is attested by the unity of spirit and action (will) that a people attain in the course of their nationalist movement.

I underline the term 'popular will' and not necessarily 'popular sovereignty', however desirable that may be. For popular will may incline towards democratic reforms as happened in western Europe or towards national independence as happened in the colonial world. It depends on the popularly perceived basic tasks at hand and the specific historical situations.

The essence of nation formation resides in the escalating social consciousness that is partly a function of existing objective conditions and partly objectified by certain instrumental agents such as charismatic leaders and party organizations. This politicized social consciousness revolves around certain need-and-interest oriented ideas such as self-identity, self-hood, self-interest, self-determination and self-rule within a socially-inherited space. The word 'self' is no longer identified with peasant particularism but with the whole social collectivity. The most significant change in an old society becoming a nation is that the former, through its increasing consciousness, gains a *social* conception of things such as identity, interest, territoriality.

As several writers have noted in the context of Asia, the Middle East and Africa (Antonius 1938; Emerson and Wilson 1965; Wilson 1970), the process of nation formation in the Third World is akin to 'awakening' after centuries of slumber in which the pre-industrial societies had existed. We substitute the metaphor with a more technical term—social consciousness. It may be argued that consciousness is a subjective phenomenon and may be attributed to any society with claims to nationhood. This is not so. We have suggested in Chapter 3 that the quality of social consciousness in terms of intensity and duration may be directly related to the structural cohesiveness of a complex society. How functionally binding are the moral forces emanating from religion? How well integrated are the structural components of that society? How widespread and deep rooted are the collective memories of common descent and national history? Do all these, among other things and particularly the shared value-system, amount to *a priori* creation of collective conscience wherein resides the seed of social consciousness and potentiality for nationhood when the material conditions are ripe? These are the critical questions we should pose in order to attempt a measurement of nation formation.

In what follows I take some samples from the Third World to demonstrate that the above-mentioned indicators of nation formation are present: China, 1895–1949; Egypt, 1918–1956; India, 1919–1947; Vietnam, 1945–1975.

Examples may be multiplied from Asia, the Middle East and Islamic North Africa, but the point is clear.

We have dared to be precise even though conventional wisdom warns against any periodization in the historical process. Our sociologically-biased analysis indicates that each of the ignition points represents a dramatic turning point in the evolution of nationalism in the sense of mass involvement in a multifaceted nationalist cause. Prior to each period, national consciousness had been largely confined to the literate strata of a given society, which included in the first place the traditional learned classes and subsequently a new hybrid of bilingually-educated but socially-floating intellectuals. The transition from an intellectual mobilization to mass mobilization is practically problematic. It takes a dramatic situation that draws mass attention and dramatizes public concerns. In so doing, it ignites mass nationalism. Each of the specified periods has been characterized by dramatic events that ignited the people's sense of nationalism whose momentum would be continued or intensified accordingly by the leader's manipulation of key symbols, but not before the dramatic entry of the people to mass politics.

In China it was the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 and the subsequent western imperialist expansion which aroused the peasant's sense of territoriality and cultural identity. A series of secret societies in the southern and central provinces attacked the most visible symbols of western power and foreign culture, culminating in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. It was 'a nationalist reaction' (Chesneaux *et al.* 1976:324). In Egypt the British war measures so badly affected the peasants whose anti-British feelings paved the way 'for that union of the intelligentsia and the peasants, which emerged in 1918 in startling and unmistakable a form and thus the success of the Revolution was assured' (Kohn 1929:202). In India the Rowlatt Act of 1919 struck fear in the hearts of millions of peasants throughout India because the Act empowered every district commissioner to arrest any suspected nationalist without trial. Gandhi's 'non-cooperation movement' caught the imagination of the Indian peasants (Sarkar 1983:187-95). In Indo-China, the French and Japanese armies struggle for supremacy in the region so thoroughly dislocated the peasants and unintentionally mobilized them ready for Ho Chi Minh's declaration of Vietnam's independence in 1945 which 'was a significant turning point in the recent history of Vietnam' (Huynh 1982:337).

In each case the specified periods witnessed an unprecedented era of nation-in-the-making—a qualitative transformation of societies into nations or at any rate nationalities through progressive politicization. This transformation was characterized by the gradual emergence, out of the old society, of a distinct political collectivity and popular will conscious of its identity and interest as a group in and for itself. The Chinese, Egyptians, Indians or Vietnamese were able to establish their national identity, articulate

their common interest and envisage new visions of their future political community—the nation-state, even though it turned out to be multinational.

There is, therefore, sufficient evidence to indicate that nation formation, which was simultaneously taking shape during a nationalist movement, may be said to have preceded state formation in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa by roughly half a century. The rest of Africa, however, appears to be a different category because of its extreme ethnic fragmentation, cultural and linguistic particularism, and general lack of structural differentiation. Even in such cases, groups of Africans were able to hold together, at least during their nationalist movements, by appealing to black counter racialism and anti-colonialism, territoriality under western-educated leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Leopold Senghor, Patrice Lumumba, and so on. Now whether they in particular and others in general have degenerated into state-nations after independence is a complicated question. There are domestic and international compulsions which reinforce state-directed nation-building projects which make great demands upon an unwilling society. Leninist regimes in particular have tended to force revolutionary changes, using the state machinery, which evidently have not enjoyed popular support. Such regimes may be termed state-nations in the sense that popular will or sovereignty, which is usually attributed to a nation, is lacking because a charismatic leader or party once in power imposes his/its will upon a reluctant society in the name of revolution or nation-building.

To relate this rather long-winded discussion to the patterns of nation formation in the Third World, we may tentatively generalize as follows. If we sociologically view state formation in general as a reflection of social instinct for organized protection as happened in 'primitive state' systems in Africa, then social formation—the precursor of nation—precedes state formation almost anywhere in the world wherever sufficient degrees of structural differentiation occurs. For it has always been the apex and/or upper strata of society that, using varying degrees of force, created a state structure. They tended to validate and legitimate their domination by certain religious ideas which were deeply embedded in society. Thus, not only social formation preceded state formation but the minority-created state also more often than not—enjoyed the *implicit* social acceptance by the majority in society because most pre-modern states invariably sought religious sanctions to which the majority adhered.

But what is revolutionary in the concept of nation-state is the popular will or sovereignty attributed to a nation so that the hitherto powerless society is automatically empowered in relation to the state which has otherwise monopolized power. In this way the state becomes the declared instrument of the nation, or at least the state must enjoy the explicit support of the

majority. As we have argued before, the pre-modern state tended to enjoy amazing degrees of legitimacy through religious mediation or sanction but what is new in the concept of the nation-state is that (a) the sources of legitimacy have changed; (b) mandate-seeking mechanism has been publicly institutionalized. A nation-state seeks its popular mandate from the public or people themselves though one cannot deny that even such exercises may be manipulated. The mechanism for the establishment of popular mandate is election, either free and fair as in multiparty competitions or stage-managed as in dictatorial single party systems. But they must hold some form of *election* because that is the way by which the modern nation-state is legitimated as the standard measurement of popular mandate. This means that the majority in society are either symbolically involved or actually participated in the creation or restructuring of the state system and have a say in its decision-making process. It is supposed to be the government of, by and for the people either through acclamation or election. Thus, in a nation-state the egalitarian ideology invades the very heart of power, the state power structure, and makes it responsible to the public either in theory (Leninist systems) or in practice (multiparty democracy).

Since such a state must necessarily be broad based, and since most of the so-called nation-states are in fact multinational, the state under such circumstances tends to base itself on the majority ethnic community for both expedient and affective reasons. This monoethnic character of state power structure inevitably marginalizes the minority ethnic groups. Hence, the ubiquitous occurrence of ethnic conflicts in the Third World. It might be such incidents which lead some scholars like Rejori and Enloe to conclude that there are only state-nations in Asia and Africa. It will undoubtedly take decades if not centuries for the Third World multinational states to reach the level of national integration that European nations have achieved. But even some of the oldest European nation-states such as Britain, France, Spain are not free from ethnic conflict. It is therefore not surprising that nation-state formation in the Third World is more a process than a finished product.

NOTES

- 1 I regret what might appear as derogatory remarks on Africa and Latin America in the essay. Such remarks might smack of cultural chauvinism. In fact they go against the grain of my personal philosophy. Unfortunately they flow from the logic of my analysis. However, thinkers in Latin America and Africa would be consoled by the fact that my analysis suggests that it is not race *per se*, that is colour of the skin or the shape of the nose. That is why I often cite the case of Ethiopia. It is culture that makes the critical difference in terms of national unity and nation-building.

5 The evolution of religious sects and the emergence of national identities

In the previous chapter we have analysed the various components of a nation. In so doing, we have demonstrated that the usual textbook random listing of national attributes may be logically related to the whole structure of a complex society. When or if such a society becomes politicized, it trans-figures into a nation or, at any rate, a nationality. In this chapter we single out one of the core components of any complex social organization, namely culture, and draw its various implications to the formation of national identity and the non-economic infrastructure for national development.

RELIGION'S POTENTIAL FOR COMPLEX CULTURE FORMATION

National development is popularly understood to be of an economic and political nature. We argue that neither economic nor political development on a national scale is successful without reasonable degrees of cultural and linguistic homogeneity, including a high literacy rate. The presence of such favourable cultural conditions in a society may be traced, historically, to the invention or introduction of a world religion, which unintentionally but necessarily leads to an encompassing social development resulting in the gradual creation of the non-economic infrastructure for national development. Such an infrastructure includes high literate culture and national identity, national unity and political stability, national language and literature, and so on, all of which owe their origins and formative development to one of the world religions.

When we use the term culture in this essay, its meaning differs from those of anthropologists who have concentrated on preliterate cultures of simple tribal societies which, as shown in Chapter 10, lack social propensity to nationalism. We mean by culture any world religion-induced cultural system which is invariably literate, usually complex and characteristically allpervasive, but incurably traditional. It is the net social result of the diffusion

and propagation of a world religion in a particular socio-cultural milieu which mediates that religion's adaptation to specific local conditions. The result is a distinct local version of a world religion which we have called 'national tradition'.

As a complex literate culture, it constitutes the great tradition maintained by the literate strata of a traditional yet complex society and sometimes even patronized by the state as in Confucian and Islamic societies. As an all-pervasive popular culture, it naturally forms the little tradition of peasant masses. What binds the two versions of tradition together is their common dual function that provides the common denominator to all classes or castes in society. Any world religion-induced culture imparts and inculcates more or less the same set of basic social values. In so doing, it internalizes, among other things, a strong sense of cultural identity across society, regardless of social distinctions. As a literate culture which is perhaps the hallmark of any world religion, its writing system provides a pan-ethnic communication system that minimizes linguistic fragmentation into numerous mutually unintelligible dialects as in preliterate cultures. It is a great unifying force.

Central then to our concept of a world religion-induced culture is its literacy which makes in the first place its articulation, then recording and transmission possible. This centrality of literacy is underlined by Oriental conceptions of culture. The Hindi word for culture (*sanskriti*) is derived from Sanskrit; the Chinese word for culture (*wenhua*) from *wen* meaning 'word', the root of literature which is called *wenxue*. Similarly in Persian there is an idiomatic phrase for culture and literature (*farhang-o-adab*), suggesting that the two can hardly be divorced from each other.

Our concept of culture, therefore, consists of the following essential components: (a) popular religious texts which constitute the core of national tradition; (b) a pantheon of culture heroes who signify one's cultural and social lineage; (c) a national writing system which is made not only into a unifying national communication system, but also sometimes symbolizes nationality as in Europe; (d) social history which collectively differentiates its subject as a whole from generalized others. Neither national tradition nor social history could be recorded without a written language. The systematic attempt at articulation and commitment to writing seems to be the dawn of any literate culture. Such a complex culture, when or if politicized, is prone to nationalism. And the nucleus of that complex culture is invariably a world religion in typically historical societies.

Religion is not only the most profound belief-system but also one of the most complex idea-systems ever created (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam) or evolved (Confucianism, Hinduism). However, its continuing interest to the social scientist lies not so much in its complexity; we now know far more complex ideas. But even in the modern era none has so far succeeded in

inventing an idea-system with the same potency and mass appeal. It is in this respect we must agree with Marx that religion has been for millions of years, and still continues to be, the opium of the people. The question before the social scientist is to dispassionately understand this universal spiritual phenomenon in relation to social problems, and not just throw it away in the dustbin of history. Being the only source of ideas and inspiration for millions of years, religion has definitely influenced society. As Durkheim noted, 'Originally it [religion] pervades everything; everything social is religious; the two words are synonymous' (1964:169).

Why does religion continue to be such a powerful social force especially in the Third World? My guess is that it answers some fundamental human needs for which no substitute has yet been found. It is true that some intellectuals with exceptional willpower and intellect may be able to exist without religion but let us face the fact that there are few Marxes, Russells, Sartres or Krishnamurtis in the world. For the vast majority of humankind the fear of death is so immense that to reject religion means to die many deaths in life. Moreover, man's sense of identity, as we shall explain, is so much tied up with one religious tradition or the other that any wilful rejection of religion is tantamount to self-negation. The central meaning of life and the universe as provided by religion seems so meaningful to large sections of humanity that a world without religion would be a huge lunatic asylum.

The fundamental human needs which only religion on a societal scale has managed to satisfy may be summarized as follows: (a) the structural framework of identity; (b) psychological security; and (c) value-system. First, the value-system refers to a set of ready-made definitions of significant situations which no ordinary human beings can work out on their own every time they face unusual events or situations such as birth, sickness, death. It broadly defines the relation of its believers to each other and to the universe in which they live. By value-system we also mean those values, beliefs and ideas that govern the structure of social action and behaviour pattern.

Although it performs all of these vital functions, the value-system is perhaps the least indispensable of the three fundamental roles of religion in human existence. Marxism, for example, has offered an alternative secular ideology that defines situations and envisions a new blueprint for the future. Indeed Marxism may be considered the only functional equivalent of religion with considerable mass appeal. However, its record of seventy or eighty years is nothing in comparison with that of the world religions; it has yet to stand the test of time. The undying religious belief as surfaced in Poland, some parts of the Soviet Union, and China, might suggest that Marxism has not been able to satisfy the fundamental spiritual human needs that traditionally religion had provided for centuries. Marxist leaders might not acknowledge this social fact, but they are coming to recognize religion as a

great social force to reckon with. Thus, the recent Marxist revolutions in Nicaragua and Afghanistan grant religious freedom.

Closely related to the question of meaning is psychological security which softens and eases human suffering; for there is a limit to what a definition or explanation of a sad fact can achieve if not accompanied by an assurance of transcendental hope. The most dreaded fact of life which needs security most is the mystery of death. The doctrine of immortality or rebirth preaches that death is not the end of life but the beginning of another. Its laxative effect to ease and minimize the fear and anxiety accompanying the process of death cannot be underestimated. No amount of modern psychotherapy can relieve this most intense of all human sufferings.

Some values may change and a more positive sense of psychological security may prevail with the achievement of education and personal self-cultivation, but this does not alter the state of national identity which is rooted in a particular national tradition. Thus, even secularized Muslim intelligentsia in the Soviet Central Asia, India or Indonesia, psychologically continue to cling to their Islamic culture because that is their identity. In fact many people in the modern world become religious by default because it defines their ultimate identity.

National identity could neither be replaced by modernization nor erased by revolution. It is the irreducible and undeniable psychomatrix of what makes a particular social group different from generalized others. Indeed differentiation is the logic of identity assertion and identity maintenance. Gandhi and Nehru had good English-medium education in India, and then went on to England for higher studies. But this thorough English education could not make them evolve into Englishmen. On the contrary, their education enabled them to sharpen their sense of identity and assert it more effectively.

Similarly Leopold Senghor and Aime Cesaire. They received excellent French education in France itself but this could not make them evolve into Frenchmen. Instead, their French education enabled them to discover their African identity and arouse black consciousness everywhere.

Similarly, transnational ideology like Marxism failed to make Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh into 'internationalists' because their deep-rooted national identities conflicted with rootless cosmopolitanism represented by Marxism. They remained nationalists at heart.

Since the formation of national identity is critical to our definition of nationalism, we shall elucidate the historical process by which such a formation takes place. A world religion by definition has tended to spread to lands other than its birthplace. There, if conversion and adoption were successful, a distinct national tradition emerges out of the original world religion. In due course, a tradition that is more in tune with the local

temperament and special needs emerges. That is why Buddhism in Burma, Japan, Thailand, Sri Lanka or in Tibet differs. Similarly with the Greek Orthodox Church, Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church within Catholicism itself even though the Catholic Church resists such tendencies.

The criteria for judging whether a particular people has succeeded in creating a national tradition out of a world religion are the following. A world religion generally necessitates: (a) a written language for its propagation which is invented if none exists;¹ (b) writing in turn, inspired by that world religion, creates a distinct religious literature; (c) soon local (national) saints, prophets (culture heroes) appear on the scene who interpret the 'relevant' aspects of the world religion through a process of elective affinity usually in the local idiom and who subsequently become the cult objects; (d) finally, as a cumulative impact of the preceding acts on life and society, a social history emerges which increasingly differentiates the people from the generalized others around.

The notion of social history presupposes that whenever the conversion and adoption is successful, the world religion in question brings about a gradualist but great social transformation. That transformation may have taken many centuries in contrast to the twentieth century revolutions, but the magnitude of social transformation brought by the former is comparable with the latter. We mention this to indicate how a certain national identity is slowly moulded in the crucible of culture for centuries, and this explains the tenacity with which people desperately and subconsciously cling to their identity, as Arabs, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, English, French, Hindus, Japanese, Russians, and so on.

The above-mentioned evolutionary stages are necessary and logical steps in the formation of a particular national culture in any Third World historical society; they suggest that the invention and introduction of a world religion into a given social milieu is more of a social event than any other worldly act. The whole process expanding over several centuries has immense cumulative socio-cultural impact on subsequent national development. For instance, the national tradition that emerges out of a world religion comes to perform two vital functions in the production of nationalism. It constitutes the cultural core of a national identity that is non-rational and powerfully emotive as demonstrated in Chapter 8. At the same time it is the basic source of social values that generate social consensus on fundamental issues affecting social life, thus making national unity and political stability possible.

In most cases religion not only legitimates existing social structures; it also creates new ones such as traditional learned classes who would provide necessary leadership to nationalist movements. Written language and

literature express not only the 'national genius' but also serve a useful purpose in the production of nationalism: a unifying social communication system across the nation. In due course the written language of the majority or dominant ethnic group is projected as the 'national language'. Culture heroes are ostentatiously projected as the towering and inspiring demigods of the nationalist pantheon with which mobilized masses can easily and proudly identify, thereby concretizing their sense of national identity. History is glorified as the veritable and venerable record of national achievement through time and space which inspires historical consciousness of a nationality to aspire for the creation of an independent modern state. Last, but not least, when any world religion is introduced into an area, it brings with it not merely religious doctrines but also a host of non-religious customs that have great practical impact on social life, such as personal names, dietary restrictions, marriage institutions, birth and death rituals, public festivals, even greeting styles and costumes, all of which become additional means of social identification.

Although it is yet far too early to evaluate, I would argue that the same technical process (steps a-d) is involved in the case of Marxism also. Wherever the general Marxian theory consummates with concrete particular praxis, we can observe a similar process: (a) Marxism necessitates a certain amount of mass literacy for its propagation and organization; (b) systematic attempts are made to create 'socialist literature' which reflects the local national version of Marxism as interpreted by the Party and its leaders; (c) each successful revolution has produced its own charismatic leaders who have now become the equivalent of culture heroes such as Lenin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevera, and so on; (d) social history ensues more easily as a direct result of social revolution and Party intervention.

The same steps were involved when Buddhism spread from India to different parts of Asia; when Christianity spread from ancient Palestine to Europe and from there to Latin America; when Confucianism spread to all over East Asia and some parts of South-East Asia; when Hinduism spread to Nepal; and to a less extent when Islam spread from Mecca to all over the Middle East, parts of South and South-East Asia and beyond.

Not all world religions have exhibited the same creative capacity to lend themselves to the creation of different national traditions. This can be measured in terms of the scope for interpretation and translation. Institutionalized orthodoxy minimizes the possibilities of creating national traditions other than the original version. If Islam insists on Arabic as the only authentic medium of worship and religious instruction, then the chances of creating native literature inspired by Islam, the role of local/national culture heroes and the dimensions of societal history are necessarily curtailed. That is why while Islam has proved the ideal-type of national identity for the

Arabs, it poses problems of national identity crisis for the non-Arab Muslims because there is a strong Arab component to Islam. Similarly, if the Roman Catholic Church insists on Latin mass, Catholicism might not prove itself as effective a social force in generating different national traditions. That is partly why no nations emerged in Europe until after the Reformation. It also explains the cultural poverty of Latin America, where no distinct religious traditions have emerged in each of the states. The twenty-six odd republics are collectively known as 'Latin American' rather than by their individual names.

What is tradition which constitutes a national identity? It is a literate culture based on world religion. As used here, it is the shorthand for the four stages involving language, literature, culture heroes and social history. Tradition marks a critical transition from pure religion to concrete culture; it involves the social act of translating religious values into social practice. Hence we have used more often than not the term tradition rather than religion in our discourse, as being not only a value-neutral but, epistemologically, a more accurate term.

Since tradition is literature and culture, we have also sometimes used the term culture. It specifically refers to the superstructural aspects of tradition such as religious, literary, artistic, philosophical and similar intellectual products of society. Culture presupposes written language and literature without which its transmission from one generation to the next would be impossible. It may be conceived analogous to the Marxian notion of superstructure as opposed to the economic base. Since all the pre-capitalist civilizations tended to emphasize superstructure at the expense of economic base, we are entitled to pay more attention to culture whose functional role in the past has been equivalent to that of ideology before the eighteenth century (see Table 1).

Culture predates the notion of ideology which is purely a modern concept dating probably from the eighteenth century. Functionally, culture is the forerunner of ideology, meaning a body of popular values, symbols and ideas that embody a particular people's outlook on life and society. It may be classified into two categories: popular culture and elite culture. The former is acquired primarily through socialization and the latter through education as well. The difference between the two is more in degrees of cultural sophistication than in kind; both contain common beliefs, symbols, values and ideas that promote mutual understanding and social consensus. This is what makes patterned relationships in society possible.

Table 1 Differences between culture and ideology

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Culture</i>	<i>Ideology</i>
Origins	Religion	Political and economic doctrine dating from the French Revolution
Evolution	Evolved	Created consciously
Definition	Pattern of values and ideas	A set of new ideas and values
Influence	Unconsciously felt	Consciously enforced
Enforcement	Socialization	Indoctrination
Carrier	Culture heroes	Charismatic leaders
Functions	Symbolic meaning and legitimacy	Guide to political action and creating new social order
Status	Living/declining	Coming into being

NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

By far the most pertinent religious idea to our inquiry is identity. A national identity may be defined as a reference point, by means of which one societal group relates to another societal group, the generalized other(s). We argue that the logical structure of that reference point or identity system in multi-religious societies is supplied by a world religion, and that identity in general is characterized by psychological similitude and cultural continuity.

Religion contributes to identity formation in two fundamental ways. First, as symbolic anthropology teaches us, man in society is not only a tool-making animal but also a meaning-seeking and symbol-creating social creature. To that extent the symbols that man weaves around him and his universe are mostly religion-inspired, whose symbolic meanings could be understood in a religious context. Symbols are the cultural tags of identification and meaning, which lend that cultural continuity so vital to identity formation and maintenance. Second, the primary social values by which socialization takes place in any traditional but complex society are basically derived from a world religion. Such religion-derived social values tend to give relatively the same psychological orientation and same moral standards of behaviour and action. This creates adequate society-wide psychological conditions for consensus on the nature of social order and expected behaviour in society, thereby creating the collective conscience so vital to the functioning and maintenance of social identity.

Thus, social self-hood is symbolically and psychologically stuffed with material from religion. This social fact may be felt subconsciously by secularized intellectuals but consciously and ardently upheld by the masses of believers in most Third World countries. Indeed, religion is the reference point *par excellence* in any traditional society with a great tradition as a morally-binding force. There are specific formal terms in almost all the world religions conventionally used to designate the non-believers or what we have called 'generalized others'. It is heathen as opposed to Christian, *ye* as opposed to Confucianist; *maleksha* as opposed to Hindu; *kafir* as opposed to Muslim.

However, such religious identities become operative in the context of interreligious conflict such as crusades and *jihad* or pan-religious movements such as Pan-Islam. Here we are talking about religious identities in their universal dimension. But the point of departure for this essay is that a world religion merely provides only the logical structure of a particular national identity, and that structure or skeleton has inevitably been fleshed with local genes which include prior culture patterns, language, popular disposition (local psyche) and economic base. In other words, any world religion (except Islam) as an abstract universal category when introduced into any society tends to be mediated by a particular set of local genes which render over time national orientation and colouring to that world religion. Since world religions in their universal abstractions are more-or-less known quantities, we must pay attention to specificities of local culture which shape a particular national tradition and consequently national identity. We must, therefore, as a research strategy focus our analysis on the sociological interaction between religion and local genius which together produce a unique national tradition, from which national identity is ultimately derived under the conditions of mass politics.

In some multinational states it is possible for ethnic, provincial or regional identities to coexist beside the over-arching national identity. Usually in confrontation with a generalized other, the national identity subsumes other identities which automatically minimize their variance with the national identity. This variance can become dormant during a national crisis and manifest as sub-identities during peacetimes only under two conditions: If the general and particular identities are not contradictory in any logical or psychological sense; or if the national identity is well established and maintained by the state. Hindu India is a classic example of the first category and socialist states are of the second category.

We are dealing here with the problem of national identity in a context of multiple identities, which either contradict or complement each other. When and under what conditions do they conflict or reinforce each other? Multiple identities are generally characteristic of a complex society which possesses

Table 2 Salience of national and ethnic identities

<i>National Identity</i>	<i>Ethnic identities</i>	<i>Situation</i>
British	English Irish Scot Welsh	(a) In case of international conflict, national identity may prevail.
Yugoslavian	Serbians Yugoslavs Croats Slovens Montenegrians Macedonians	(b) In case of inter-ethnic conflict, ethnic identities may prevail.
Indian	Assamese Bengalis Punjabis Keralites Tamils Maharashtrins, and so on	(c) At home, ethnic identities may assert.
Pakistani	Baluchis Pathans Punjabis Sindhhis	(d) Abroad, national identity may prevail.
Vietnamese	Viets Chams Khmer Thai Hoas Nung Nhang Yaos Meos Lalos Muong	

either mechanical or organic solidarity. The members of a simple society will have fewer identities. This does not mean we equate multiple identities with social roles, personal traits or conscious self-images that are in vogue in post-industrial societies as a result of the cult of individualism. We have in mind the larger or socially-shared traits of a collectivity rather than individual traits. More specifically we mean by multiple identities those collective or social reference points based usually on the local variations of a larger tradition which forms the over-arching national identity. Such local variations are due to certain parochial differences in dialect, locality, local customs, and so on (see Table 2).

To that extent multiple identities are a function of subculture and since the core culture or great tradition provides the overall binding force right across society, multiple identities do not conflict with the larger national identity as long as the members share two fundamental features of any society: (a) they must share the same value-system which organizes and defines the basic structure of self-hood; (b) they must function within the same social structure which draws the basic contours of social interaction.

We may take some examples from Confucian China and Hindu India to illustrate the preceding discussion. Chinese differentiate among themselves as 'northerners' and 'southerners' or even on the basis of provinces from which they hail. Such modes of differentiation are based on different dialects and localities. Otherwise they all share the same Confucian culture and operate within the same principles of Confucian social organization. Hence, there is hardly any contradiction between parochial, multiple identities and national identity among those functioning within the confines of Confucian society.

Even more strikingly so is Hindu society. As we know, Indians differentiate among themselves as Assamese, Bengalis, Marathis, Tamils, and so on, based on different languages and localities but they all (Hindus) share the same Hindu value-system and function within the same social structure, the caste system. Hence there is no contradiction between their parochial, multiple identities and the over-arching national identity at least among the Hindus, no matter which parts of India they might be from.

But what about some contrary cases like the Nagas in India or Tibetans in China? In such cases we face a problem of a fundamentally different nature because such minorities do not form a subculture or subsociety of their respective dominant ethnic groups. They constitute altogether a different social category with their own value-system and social organizations, which have no mechanical or organic relations with the dominant society. That is to say the Nagas do not share the Hindu value-system nor do they operate within the caste structure. Similarly, the Tibetans do not share the Confucian culture with the Hans nor do they function within the Confucian social structure. In such and similar cases where fundamentally different social categories not subcultures operate in a multinational social system, then the problem of national identity arises. A minority ethnic group, which does not share the value-system and social structure of the dominant ethnic group, is more likely to have its own social, if not political, identity which competes and even conflicts with the official national identity.

We should honestly make explicit our underlying assumption about identity formation as such. We have suggested that identity formation in polyethnic societies takes place as a direct result of belonging to a certain category of society. Identity is a function of membership of a given society,

by which one social group relates to, or differentiates itself from, another social group belonging to a different category of social organization. In particular we pay special attention to two fundamental features of any society in relation to identity formation: (a) value system which largely defines and substantiates social self-hood and identity; (b) social structure which provides on a regular basis the praxis of crystallization of that identity through constant interaction among the ingroup. In short, society orders its members, not only how to behave among themselves, but also how to relate to outgroups as well. This then is social identity at its simplest form: differentiation on the basis of social membership.

Our conception of identity, social or national, differs from that of psychoanalysts from whom the term originally gained its currency. Erik Erikson, for example, defines identity as 'personal sameness and historical continuity' (1968:17). He argues that 'psychological identity is necessary as the anchoring of man's transient existence in the here and the now' (1968:42). Though psychology may be related to culture, we lay greater emphasis on culture as the critical factor in identity formation. Second, if psychoanalysts focus on the identity of *homo* species as such, we concentrate on culture specific identities of different social groups, and demonstrate in the role of religion in specific culture formations which in turn form the building blocks for foregoing differing national identities. In fact the structural framework and necessary seeds for national identities were already formed long before the modern era which added a few more new elements from political ideology and, of course, politicized them almost beyond recognition. We measure the extent of such religion-induced culture formations by three criteria: (a) the emergence of national culture heroes; (b) the national canon of sacred literature; (c) religious institutions ('Church') or pilgrim sites located within the national territory.

National identity is tacitly shaped by tradition and culture, both of which originate from religion in most complex societies. A world religion *per se* (except Islam) does not directly or substantially constitute social identity; it may give only a membership in a certain transnational, religious or ideological community and manifest itself as mechanical solidarity, for example, the Pan-Islamic Movement, and the International Communist Movement. If a world religion directly forms the basis of national identity we have to explain frequent wars among nations following the same religion or ideology such as the Iran-Iraq war, intracommunist conflicts, most of the European wars, and so on. The fact is, man's identity is not tied up with a world religion *sui generis* but with the native version of religion (tradition). This is largely a function of syncretic adaptation and socialization process. Confucianism, for example, spread all over East and South-East Asia but only the Korean version, the Japanese version, the Vietnamese version of

Confucianism constituted their respective national identities, not the original Chinese version. The reasons for this autochthonous development are rooted in specific national histories as well as in the predisposition of the peoples concerned.

THE DOMESTICATION OF WORLD RELIGIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES

Let us take an example from each world religion to illustrate how its introduction into a specific society necessarily entails the growth of a national religious sect or tradition which forms the kernel of a national identity.

Confucianism spread to Korea from China but over the centuries the Koreans have developed their own Confucian culture heroes (Yul Kok Lee, Toe Ge Lee, Chung Yak Yong, and so on); their own version of Confucian literature such as *Sung Hak Sip Sa Do*, *Yulkokjeon Seo*, and *Mok Min Sim Soe*; and their own national Confucian temple at Seoul called Seong Kyun Kwan.

Hinduism spread to Nepal from India, but over the centuries Nepalis have developed their own national version of Hinduism that may be called Nepali Hinduism. It has its own Nepali culture-heroes such as Bhanu Bhakta, Moti Ram Bhatta, Lekhanath Poudyal, Laxmi Prashad Devkota, and so on. Hindu classics become popular and authoritative only through Nepali translation and version; for example, Bhanu Bhakta's translation of *Ramayana* is one of the most sacred Nepali religious texts. For Hindus in India most of the pilgrim sites are located within India itself, whereas the Nepali Hindus have their sacred places or famous temples located within Nepal itself. They include the following most holy temples: Pashupatinath, Dakshinkali, Guheswari, Barahakshetra, and so on, and the King of Nepal is regarded as the reincarnation of Vishnu, a Hindu deity whose sect is the most popular tradition in the kingdom.

Buddhism spread to Bhutan from Tibet, but since the sixteenth century Bhutanese have developed their own version of Buddhism that is today called the Drugpa Kargyud sect. Its national culture heroes include Pema Lingpa, Drugpa Kunley, Jigme Lingpa, Phajo Drugom Shigpo, Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal, and so on, Bhutan has its own sacred literature also such as *Sung-bum* of Jigme Lingpa, *Termas* of Pema Lingpa; Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal's *Tsa-yiq*, and so on. Its most holy monasteries include Kyuchu Lhakang, Jampe Lhakhang, Taktsang, and so on.²

The process of nationalization of a world religion applies to even a monotheistic religion like Christianity. We might take the example of England as the most evolved case. As we know Christianity was introduced into England from the Mediterranean area in the sixth century A.D., but over the

centuries the English have developed their own version of the Bible, the King James version, not in Latin, but in its own vernacular, English; they have established their own national church, the Anglican Church; and they have their own patron saints and others like Sir Thomas More.

The only exceptions to an otherwise almost universal process of nationalization of world religions are Islam and Roman Catholicism. These two world religions, and particularly the former, do not give any scope for interpretation and translation of their original revelation texts; they insist on preaching in Arabic or Latin. As we have seen, the scope and sanction for interpretation and translation of 'Bibles' in particular national idioms is the necessary condition for the nationalization of world religions, a process involving the emergence of national culture heroes, the creation of sacred national literature and the establishment of national 'churches'.

However, Turkey is an exceptional case in the entire Islamic world, but an instructive one in that it, under the revolutionary leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), underwent a series of cultural changes covering roughly all the four stages of religious development (Turkification of Islam) necessary for the emergence of Turkish national identity. Turkey was the first Islamic nation to fully confront the national identity crisis that any non-Arab Muslim faces. While not rejecting the metaphysical and ethical teachings of Islam, Mustafa Kemal discarded almost all the Arab components of Islam. In so doing he Turanized Islam which was a prerequisite for the formation of a Turkish national identity. The Koran was read in Turkish, so was *namaz*, the Muslim prayer which has to be performed five times daily. The weekly day of rest (Friday) was changed to Sunday. Ramadan fasts were abolished. All the Islamic monasteries (*tekkes*) in Turkey were closed, and Islamic titles were abolished. Only state-authorized *mullahs* could lead in prayers. A Viennese sculptor was commissioned to make a statue of Mustafa Kemal to be erected in Constantinople, an act which was unthinkable in an anti-idolatory Islamic orthodoxy. These revolutionary changes were preceded by a renaissance in Turkish literature in the nineteenth century which, under the leadership of Şinasi Effendi, sought to create a Turkish vernacular literature, stripped of Arab and Persian influences.

The impact of all these revolutionary changes on the Turkish people was to de-Arabicize themselves and forge their national identity rooted in Turkish history and culture. As Hans Kohn commented,

The word 'Turk' now rang with a different tone. People were proud of the name. They no longer felt the Mohammedan faith as a bond with other non-Turkish sunnite peoples, but began to recall Turkey's past and derived from it the proud consciousness of a warlike, sovereign race.

(1929:236)

Sia Geuk Alp Bey, one of the founders of the Turanian movements, captured that excitement and emotions which accompanied the discovery of Turkish national identity in his poems.

The feelings pulsing in my blood are the echoes of my past. I do not record of the glorious deeds of my ancestors in withered, yellow, dusty pages of history, but in the blood flowing in my veins, in my heart. My Attila, my Jingis, heroic figures, the pride and glory of my race, are no less in stature than Alexander and Caesar. Still more familiar to my heart is Oghus Khan, an obscure and mysterious figure to historic inquiry. He still lives in my heart and pulses in my veins in all his greatness and glory. Oghus, it is that delights my heart, that inspires me to shout exultantly. The Turkish people's fatherland is not Turkey, it is not Turkistan, it is a far-flung land, and eternal Turan.

(Kohn 1929:239)

Then what is the function of the original world religion? It provides a logical framework within which national religious tradition may later develop, which in turn moulds the national identity. This is not only an Asian phenomenon. An English author vividly describes the same process with regard to England:

Christianity in England is English Christianity, with a national history behind, a national ideal in front of it. Socialism in England is English Socialism coloured by English culture and aiming at the solution of English problems by English methods.

(Oakesmith 1919:247)

Mao's sinofication of Marxism or Tibetanization of Buddhism should be seen in this perspective.

We repeat: a pure world religion neither directly nor substantially constitutes a national identity; it only provides the logical framework within which national tradition is formed. Why only the local/national version of religion becomes the substance of national identity is not far to seek. First, being more familiar, the local version facilitates easier identification, and that in a simple sense is to define identity—how a group of people identify each other and demarcate themselves from the generalized other(s).

Second, being more or less their own creation, the native version of religion becomes increasingly a significant source of national pride. It is projected in the course of the nationalist movement or nation-building process as that people's glorious past. The necessity of a worthy past is so immense that it has led some African leaders to search for the negritude. If none or little exists, the necessity leads to invention of a worthy past. Without a worthy past, which provides inspiration and a sense of continuity, national

Table 3 Terms used to locate the locus of nationalism

<i>Author</i>	<i>Term</i>	<i>Discipline</i>
August Comte	consensus	Sociology
Rousseau	general will	Political Philosophy
Hegel	World-soul	Political Philosophy
Marx	ideology	Social Science
Durkheim	conscience collective	Sociology
Lazarus Steinthal	folk psychology	Anthropology and Psychology
Freud	national ego	Psychology
Sebastian de Grazia	belief-system	Social Science
Parsons	value-system	Sociology
Sir Ernest Barker	national character	Political Science

unity based purely on a revolutionary vision of the future would be highly precarious.

Having pointed out the factors in the making of it, we like to claim national identity is our answer to various writers' attempt to locate the locus of nationalism (see Table 3). This is in accord with the findings of social psychology. As Kimball Young says: 'Any in-group from family to nation-state may serve, in terms of identification and participation, as an anchorage point for the self, but most significant perhaps are those intimately associated with the name, the body, and the personal belongings' (1969:128). Just as the personal name is a shorthand for self-conception, national identity is the symbol of social self. We shall spell the substance of the name, the body and the personal belongings. They are the local religious tradition, sacralized race and sanctified territory. These are the deeply-rooted reference points by means of which the members of one nation relate to the generalized other(s). This is the meaning of national identity as used here.

For the vast majority of mankind the most precious possession intimately connected with the social self has been religious tradition, the very substance of their psychic existence. Hence the ferocity of religious wars in history such as crusades and *jihad*. That is also why the first reaction of the Arabs, Chinese, Indians, Vietnamese, and so on, was how to save their sacred tradition and culture from western encroachment in the nineteenth century.

The earthly possession minimally common to all the countrymen is territory, the extended house where every citizen or subject has to live. The sense of territoriality is particularly strong in cultures with ancestor worship which sanctifies and deepens the attachment to land. The obvious examples include Confucian culture areas in East and South-East Asia, and to a lesser extent, Christian and Islamic culture areas where the dead are not cremated but buried in graveyards. In this way the myth of fatherland or motherland is

kept alive. The emotional attachment to land tends to be comparatively weaker in Hindu and Buddhist culture areas, where the dead are cremated. The notion of fatherland is connected with the myth of common origin (race), which in turn is rooted in kinship relations. However, on the whole 'sedentary cultivation promotes, as one would expect, a strong emphasis on tenitoriality' (Lewis 1976:174).

If the history of nationalism can be described as the emergence of a particular nation or people, then what matters most psychologically is national identity of that people. As a matter of fact, what actually goes on in the process of any nationalist movement or resurgence of unofficial nationalism (separatism) is a people identifying themselves in contradistinction to generalized other(s) on the basis of religious tradition and culture, language and literature, race and territory, political membership and life style etc. It is a process of siding on a societal scale. Whether they reach the point of general will in Rousseau's sense is hard to say, though they definitely achieve unity and consensus. They exhibit several properties of national character or what is in social psychology called model/basic/ representative personality. But our present purpose is slightly different. When we talk about the national identity of a people, we are dealing with an abnormal psychology in which committed members ransack history to bring out the best to substantiate their claims. The concept of national identity is more congruent with dynamics of nationalism than most other terms.

Above all we prefer the concept of national identity in place of others because of the continuing relevance of it. The quest for national identity does not end with the consummation of independence; it continues to be an on-going concern for any nation. It is dictated by the dialectics of international politics. If anything it is intensified by the increased volume and velocity of international relations. Whether in the United Nations, the Olympic Games or the International Trade Fair, the struggle is essentially the same: Name. For the 'positive valuation accorded to the general "we" is conferred to each of the individual "I's", who would not experience such valuation in the absence of membership in the group' (Sarbin and Scheibe 1983:95).

As Erich Fromm (1941) has argued, man has a fundamental need for belonging to a larger group which can give him emotional support. The growth of economic and political freedom in modern society has tended to isolate the individual and deprive him of the older social and emotional ties and support system. The national identity, propagated by the state, increasingly fills that psychological vacuum and need for security, meaning and larger purpose previously provided by world religion.

The substance of national identity may be modified from religious preoccupation to nation-building as happened in the west, but this would not

alter the instinctual roots of nationalist psychology rooted in the collective name, the body and the 'personal' possessions in an endless competition or occasional conflict with others.

THE SACRALIZATION OF RACE AND TERRITORY: CLUES TO EMOTIONALISM IN NATIONALISM

In what follows we shall now try to demonstrate how such a religion-induced cultural development entails the sacralization of the race and the country in question. Consider the implications of the following facts about Islamic faith to Arab nationalism: that the Prophet was an Arab; that he insisted upon Arabic as the medium of Islam; that his followers should make pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*); that they should pray five times a day facing the Arab world, *namaz*. Religion, race and the country are inextricably linked as a national possession. The first phase of Arab nationalism involved precisely making this implicit linkage into an explicit claim. Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–91) charged that the Turks had corrupted Islam and only the Arabs could purify it. Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849–1902) put forward in his book *The Excellences of the Arabs* (1901), twenty-six reasons why the Arabs are superior to any nation, especially the Turks (Haim 1976:76–80). Arabism as the exclusive Arab claim to Islam is the beginning of Arab national consciousness.

Consider the implications of the following facts about Hinduism to Indian nationalism: that all its saints are Indians; that most of its myths and legends are localized within the Indian subcontinent; that almost all of its numerous gods and goddesses are dressed in costumes and look like Indians except *Hanuman* and *Ganesh*; that Sanskrit is the classical *lingua franca* of Hinduism. Hindus, Hindustan and Hinduism are once again inextricably linked together. The Hindu nationalist movement from its beginning to the end was sustained by the discovery and revival of that sacred unity. Almost all the Hindu nationalist leaders dwelt on the unity of Hinduism and the Hindustan and the Hindus; they all lamented the damage done by Islam and the British to that primordial unity. Sri Aurobindo Ghosh (1872–1950) was typical but more poetic than the rest. He conceptualized India as the Goddess Shakti incarnate, and Indians as the incarnates of countless number of gods and goddesses of the Hindu pantheon welded into holy communion (Norbu 1988:325–45). In so doing he invested the race and the land with all the divinity and sacrality of Hindu religion.

Consider the following facts about Confucianism: (a) that Confucius and his prominent expounders were all Han; (b) that Confucianism is nothing but a collection of ancient Chinese literature, Chinese history and social philosophy; (c) that the Chinese state from ancient times patronized

Confucianism as its official state religion; (d) that the pre-1905 Chinese education system was based on Confucian classics; (e) that all Chinese literature, Confucian or Taoist, is written in that unmistakable ideogram (Chinese) which has become the epitomized expression of Chineseness; (f) that all the holy places associated with Confucius and Confucianism are geographically localized within China proper (Han areas) (Fairbank *et al.* 1973:17–54). Once again race, religion and region are inextricably welded.

Thus, Mao's first political consciousness was occasioned by a nationalist event in 1906, as he told Edgar Snow:

I began to have a certain amount of political consciousness, especially after I read a pamphlet telling of the dismemberment of China. I remember even now that this pamphlet opened with the sentence: 'Alas, China will be subjugated.' It told of Japan's occupation of Korea and Formosa, of the loss of suzerainty in Indo-China, Burma and elsewhere. After I read this I felt depressed about the future of my country and began to realize that it was the duty of all the people to help save it.

(Snow 1961:131)

Similarly Ho Chi Minh was attracted to Marxism because of his intense nationalism. As he confessed later: 'In the beginning it was patriotism and not communism which induced me to believe in Lenin and the Third International' (Hoang 1964:40). We mention the Marxist examples because Marxists are supposed to be internationalist rather than nationalist, whereas the non-communist leaders' nationalist credentials are fairly obvious in the Third World.

Among the world religions Buddhism and Christianity are more universal in their outlook and more abstract in their teachings so that they are less localized and not confined to particular races or regions where religion originated. But even in their cases the development of national traditions of Buddhism or Christianity in countries where it has spread inevitably involves a certain degree of sacralization of the race and the country in question because the emergence of local culture heroes and religious history takes place within the same territory and among the same race.

It is this sacralization of territory and race by religion that imparts the deep emotions and sentiments which render nationalism so potent a social force. A French nationalist described the scenes during the Revolution in vivid religious imagery:

How great and happy are the generation born amidst such things, and whose first gaze was gladdened by that sublime spectacle: Children brought and blessed at the altar of their native land, devoted by their weeping, but resigned and heroic mothers, and bestowed by them on

France. Oh! those who are thus born can never die. You received that day the cup of immortality.

(Kohn 1955:101)

It is a religious conversion that the Kenyan nationalist underwent at the 'Mau Mau' oath. Tribal rituals such as goat sacrifices were performed at the oath ceremony that sought to unite all the participants as in a tribal marriage. The whole movement was deified by calling itself 'One God'. A Christian participant in the movement recalled later that 'Since that time of my first oath, my belief in the God of Christ had been fading, and I no longer went to Church services without an ulterior reason' (Kedourie 1970:469).

Or read carefully Che Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare*. It is studded with religious imagery. The guerrilla is described as 'the Jesuit of warfare' (Che Guevara 1967:18) who ought to be 'a complete ascetic' (ibid.: 123). He must also be 'a true priest of the reform to which he aspires' (ibid.: 45). Such a guerrilla will be 'a sort of guiding angel who has fallen into the zone' (ibid.: 46). When in battle, his 'economy and utilization of an ammunition down to the last bullet should be almost like religious tenets', and so on (ibid.: 125). Seen from such a perspective the 'liberation theology' in Latin America ceases to be an anomaly.

What we are trying to portray is the non-rational foundation of nationalism that makes it more powerful and appealing than any other 'ism' of which we know. At the same time we are trying to suggest the difficulties of singling out any one factor as the essence of that conjugation of emotions. However, we have suggested some logical ordering of such non-rational behaviour.

Although we have laid more emphasis on religion, yet it is not religion *per se*, but the local/national tradition of that religion. In so doing we have not neglected language and literature, especially ones sanctified by religious history. This brings us to the question of who creates literature and for whom and about what. To answer these related questions is to demonstrate how the development of a national tradition necessarily entails the sacralization of race and country. The national tradition may dwell on certain universal themes, as most religions do, but in so doing it also specially refers to and relates to the people and the universe in which they live, which together become the audience and to an extent the subject matter. Above all it is written in a national language. The fact that religious prophets spring from the same racial group and that their religious acts take place within a compact territory which they all inhabit has deep religious significance. It is by this intricate process that religion sacralizes race and country. It is not race or territory *per se* but sacralized race and sanctified territory by a particular religious tradition that becomes the emotive substratum of nationalism.

Given the complexity of the issues involved, the best we can do at present is to show the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of the essential factors involved: religion, tradition, country and race. However, the connecting threads of the myriad factors remains religion. It shows some sort of system in operation where the one phase (introduction of religion) leads to the next (creation of written language as the vehicle of propagation), which in turn creates a socialized audience, the race and so on. Where religion, language, race and country coalesce and are coextensive, they mould the most cohesive and most enduring type of national identity. This is the case with the Arabs, the Han, the Jews, the Hindus. These may be termed as *primary* civilizational categories in which world religions originated. In the derivative cases of Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism, national identities, though not as complete as in primary cases, are nevertheless fairly strong as illustrated earlier. However, in the derivative cases of Islam and Catholicism, national identity formation seldom takes place as evident in the non-Arab Muslim countries and Latin America unless, of course, socially engineered like Turkey.

We then agree with modern social psychologists that nationalism too as a collective behaviour may be acquired or learned (socialized) but not all the aspects of it. There is an immensely emotive element bordering on instinct that belies any suggestion that nationalism is a conditioned behaviour to authority. If this was so, then the state or the political party in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would have found it impossible to generate nationalism on a mass scale. They would have had to face war on two fronts simultaneously: the enemy and the 'reluctant' masses at home on whom nationalism had to be 'enforced'. We know this is not the case. In fact, slight provocation on the key national symbols is enough to unleash massive nationalism. Mahatma Gandhi had to call off the civil disobedience movement six or seven times when the peasants were getting too active and violent; Chiang Kai-shek tried hard to keep the nationalistic student population, who expressed their determination to fight the Japanese invading army, at school in the 1930s.

There is a limit to socialization as far as nationalism is concerned. You can condition the behaviour of children to react positively to some of the nation's symbols like the flag, the anthem, the leaders and the like. But this does not explain the instinctual fact why such deep emotions, associated with nationalism, cannot be taught. The purpose of this section has been to make an attempt to explain the irrational foundations of modern nationalism. The only demonstrable analogies we can think of are religious symbols with which elemental emotions are associated; such as native religious tradition, its culture heroes, its sacred history, one's sacralized race and sanctified territory. Most nationalists could immediately and passionately identify

themselves with such symbols, especially in times of national crisis, as the essential means of solidifying the 'we' identity.

What makes the set of basic emotions associated with nationalism even more powerful is the fact they all exist in conflicting dichotomies: love and hate, attraction and revulsion, attachment and detachment, aggression and submission, glory and defeat, and so on. The dichotomy is dictated by the we/they differentiation which achieves perfect clarity when nationalism is at a boiling point. Love for the ingroup means hate for the outgroup. The logic is an emotional zero-sum game in which no compromise at the emotional level is conceivable during international conflicts when collective emotions are most heated. At such moments the whole collective ego is at stake, and social self's existence is in jeopardy.

In greater part of the Third World religious identity expressed in terms of national sectarianism continues to be an active faith as the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world, Muslim-Christian clashes in Lebanon and Hindu-Muslim riots in India demonstrate. However, in western countries religion might be a haunting ghost because there certain developments such as the Reformation, Renaissance, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, and scientific and rational education, has tended to undermine religious foundations since the Middle Ages. That is why we have refrained from discussing European cases of national identity because the matter in Europe appears more complex than any religion-moulded oriental civilizations. Thus, in this respect it is possible to speak of a European exception. For example, it is difficult to say whether Sir Thomas More or Shakespeare is a more emotive culture-hero in England; similarly in Germany Martin Luther or Goethe, in France Joan of Arc or Rousseau. The critical difference seems to be the emergence of a secular literature independent of the orthodox religious tradition. Gradually, in the principal European nations, most of the modern disciplines that we study in any university or college today grew and developed. Such secular and scientific developments since the Middle Ages tended rather rapidly to overshadow the religious identity. But prior to such development, it is possible to speak of a similar four-stage cultural development in Europe also.

Religion's invisible hand in shaping a particular national identity and creating a comprehensive cultural infrastructure for national development is an outstanding example of unintended social consequences of an other-worldly action performed over a long period of time. Prophets and saints appeared to deliver the message of God but became national culture heroes in the hand of nationalists. Most written scripts were invented or introduced in order to propagate the 'gospel' but became in the era of nationalism and modernity the nation-wide medium of social communication. Sacred texts were written by pious men in order to show the way to religious salvation

but became in the hand of nationalists the glorious cultural heritage of the nation, a veritable source of national pride. Missionaries built up religious fellowship and organizations (church, mosque, temple) for holy purposes but became in the hand of nationalists handy cultural resources and communication networks for forging national unity and political organizations to serve the cause of nationalism. In short, most world religions were revealed and propagated in order to prepare human beings for heaven but they landed up on earth creating the necessary cultural infrastructures for national communities. Whether such salvationist religions had achieved their other-worldly goals or not is beyond scientific measurement but their earthly (social) results are both visible and substantial in all societies where they had penetrated.

From the perspective of our culture theory of nationalism, in the ultimate analysis whether a social collectivity has the potential for nation formation or not depends on a historical accident, whether that group has been affected by any world religion for 500 to 1,000 years or not. The diffusion of world religions depended historically on the following factors: (a) the geographical *proximity* of world religion centres to surrounding areas, for example, the diffusion of Buddhism into Central and South-East Asia; Islam into North Africa; (b) whether certain countries are *well-known* entities from ancient times such as India and China which became favourite Muslim and Christian missionary destinations; (c) the discovery of certain continents by adventurers, such as South and North America where Christian missionaries soon followed. Africa and other tribal areas in Asia, even though some of them were not too far off from the world religion centres, have to be explained by sheer physical barriers, which in the pre-modern era had proved insurmountable, and local hostility (for example, head-hunting which prevented missionaries from penetrating such dangerous areas).

While we do acknowledge the invisible yet crucial role played by world religions in laying down the cultural foundation for national development and nationalism much before the modern era, we find no evidence that those ethnic groups who invented such world religions have been necessarily doing the best in the modern world even in terms of nation-building, for example, India (where most polytheistic religions originated) and the Middle East (where three monotheistic religions originated). Although it is true that South Asian and Middle Eastern nation-states are faring better than African state-nations where no world religion touched until the mid-nineteenth century, they cannot be compared with Japan which is a derivative category in three senses; Confucianism from China, Buddhism from India, science and technology from the west. The Japanese case is similar to that of England in several significant respects which might suggest that there are certain objective internal conditions, besides the diffusion of a world religion: (a) relative

insulation so that idea-systems once introduced can develop internally without frequent external intervention but not complete isolation which would prevent culture-contacts; (b) an optimal size because too big an area constitutes control and organizational problems; (c) high literacy rate; (d) rich cultural resources for forging new organizations and leadership, both of which appear to be a function of frequent conflict; (e) relatively fertile area for sufficient agricultural surplus necessary to support a literate class.

NOTES

- 1 That most of the written languages were invented to propagate 'gospels' appears quite evident. We do not have to go to antiquity in search of evidence but only observe how modern missionaries in Africa and Asian tribal areas introduced Roman scripts to enable the tribal folks to read the Bible.
- 2 I have selected these three samples because Sinologists (Fairbank *et al.* 1973), Indologists (Mookerjee 1970 and Walker 1983) and Tibetologists (Snellgrove and Richardson 1968) consider Korea as an extension of Confucian China, Nepal an extension of Hindu India and Bhutan an extension of Buddhist Tibet respectively, ignoring autochthonous developments in each case.

6 Modern nationalism and egalitarian ideology

We observe fairly advanced levels of national integration brought about by the centralized state, absolutist monarchy and the Commercial Revolution in western Europe, all of which might suggest that perhaps we can date the rise of national consciousness during the eighteenth century in Europe and in the Third World the late nineteenth century. We shall pause and reflect upon the various findings of the other scholars. We shall also differentiate two types of nationalism—traditional and modern. Finally we shall specify the new conditions and modern demonstration effects that jointly facilitated the critical take-off stage of Third World nationalism.

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Eugene Kamenka generalizes that for most of recorded history, from 500 BC to about 1700 A.D., ‘the nation and the tribe did not command the supreme loyalty and patriotism of civilized men’. However, ‘the rise of national consciousness and of a feeling that nations are the basic social and cultural units of society’ gained force in Europe, from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries (Kamenka 1973:5, 7). Sir Ernest Barker observes that modern history begins at the end of the fifteenth century, ‘and it is a history of nations’. But ‘nationality’ (that is, political doctrine) dates from Rousseau (1770–1850) and nationalism from Mazzini (1805–72) (Barker 1948:246–7). Hans Kohn concludes,

A deep attachment to one’s native soil, to local traditions and to established territorial authority has existed in varying strength throughout history. But it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that nationalism in the modern sense of the word became a generally recognized sentiment. (1929:9)

If modern nationalism in Europe can be dated roughly from the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the Third World it dates from the early twentieth

century. There is then at least a century difference in timing. There is considerable evidence of national consciousness recorded in the history of most historical societies, but not that 'ism' of the nation felt so passionately by almost all strata of society, which is purely a modern phenomenon. By 'modern'¹ in relation to nationalism is meant three things: (a) mass politics as a result of extension of citizenship to lower classes; (b) mass mobilization as a result of the Industrial Revolution and electoral politics; (c) increased social communication as a result of the revolution in communication and transport systems. These three agents revolutionized a set of ancient ideas and primordial sentiments. Nationalism is not a single brand new idea; it is an aggregate of sentiments and ideas coalesced as a powerful social force under an unprecedented set of circumstances and conditions. What is new is the manner and means of reorganization and politicization.

It might be analytically possible to differentiate national consciousness from nationalism on grounds of scale rather than conception. National consciousness is a heightened state of collective conscience which is the prelude to political action. It is usually felt in the first place by the literate strata of a complex but traditional society such as the mandarin and gentry classes in Confucian societies, Brahmins and other upper castes in Hindu societies, mullahs and imams in Islamic societies. Such traditional learned classes are not only literate but are the religion-sanctioned guardians of their respective traditions, and are closely tied with traditional authority structures as the sources of legitimacy or/and recruitment of officials.

Their perceptions of external threat to national tradition, authority symbols and territory (empires/kingdoms/country) are reflected in the initial phases of nationalism as national consciousness that is limited to the literate strata of society. It manifests itself as an elite awareness of and concern with cultural identity, social unity and territoriality, which together constitute, according to their perceptions, the political entity called kingdom or country over which they preside as the natural leaders of society. Since they represent the assumed collective conscience of their respective societies, the traditional learned classes mentioned earlier are usually the first to feel a vague but intense sense of national consciousness. It is akin to, as we shall shortly see, traditional nationalism except it lacks partial mobilization which traditional nationalism involves. It may manifest at the most as a public awareness of the existence of a political entity controlled by the elite but united and legitimated by common culture and language. Usually, though not always, perceived external threats to such a political entity occasion national consciousness on the part of the ruling class.

National consciousness is not only rooted in the traditional data component of nationalism; even the political action it contemplates is cast in a purely traditional framework, for example, negotiations with and warfare

against European powers in nineteenth century China and Vietnam. It is characterized by the relative absence of modern ideological features of nationalism. Nationalism on the other hand presupposes a mass movement in the Third World context which in turn necessitates three prerequisites: (a) quasi-ideology (b) leadership and (c) political organization. These three powerful agents tend to modernize traditional conceptions of nationalism, making it a real political force that could be utilized to gain political power and achieve nationalist goals. National consciousness may have tradition as its ideology, king as its symbolic leader and may even use pre-modern bureaucratic networks to expel foreign invaders, but it hardly makes an attempt to mobilize the masses of subjects, because mass mobilization in a traditional setting could prove to be a double-edged sword, unless mass demands are met.

In a theoretical sense national consciousness is that process of objectification and articulation of collective conscience as represented by the literate strata of society in the context of a national crisis. Since premodern collective conscience of any traditional society consists of traditional symbolic data, it naturally expresses itself as traditionalism centred upon traditional authority symbols and common culture. It takes a charismatic leader and his earnest attempts at mass mobilization and extensive social communication—to extend that limited national consciousness to the masses at large, thereby producing nationalism on a mass scale. All these require new ideas and rational techniques to revolutionize the minds of masses.

In other words nationalism has acquired more ideological features and clearer articulation whereas national consciousness is public consciousness about certain national attributes which draw public attention at that critical juncture when the nation begins to emerge out of the old social structure as a newly-discovered entity. But like nationalism, national consciousness is also based on two sets of factors; (a) shared commonalities, usually premodern symbolic data which provides the basis for common identity and unity; (b) a certain degree of common interest most dramatically manifested as a sense of territoriality so conspicuous in most of the pre-modern resistance movements. Moreover, like nationalism, national consciousness is also occasioned by intergroup conflict which performs two functions. It brings about partial mass mobilization and accentuates we/they differentiation.

We have attempted earlier to differentiate certain typical stages of proto-nationalism. We have emphasized that they are ideal-types in the Weberian tradition meant to help us to conceptualize certain historical processes. It is, therefore, not necessary that every nationalist movement will pass through all the stages described. What is more important are the concrete socio-economic conditions which virtually produce different types of consciousness

in certain social groups. As long as the conditions described for the rise of national consciousness approximate anywhere and any time, that particular consciousness would prevail.

The ancient Jews and Greeks, as recorded in the Old Testament and Greek sources, showed intense national consciousness because they possessed most of the traditional national attributes, and achieved relatively high levels of national integration. Similarly, the Hundred Years War (1337–1453) between France and England undoubtedly aroused French national consciousness which contributed to their unification. The Spaniards united under a common religious banner in their struggle against the Arab Muslims. The Balkan people were strengthened by their religion in their struggle against the Turks. The Rajputs and Marathas in India offered nationalistic resistance against the Muslim invaders. There is also plenty of evidence recorded in Chinese history how certain sections of the Han population revolted against the Mongol and Manchu invaders. Vietnam's nationalistic resistance against imperial China for almost 2,000 years, then against French colonialism, Japanese occupation and American intervention—a history which repudiates the popular contention that nationalism was learned from the west by the east. 'In Vietnam's case all this hypothesizing is sheer fantasy. The country had a collective identity before the arrival of the French' (Lamb 1972:7). Similarly with the Arabs: 'The origins of modern Arab national consciousness are in the period between the seventh and tenth centuries when the Middle East was culturally transformed by Islamization and Arabization' (Abu-ghazaleh 1973:1). All these suggest that the stress should be on conditions, not on periodization or ethnocentrism.

To sum up, the necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for the production of national consciousness are threefold: (a) literate class or caste conscious of itself as guardians of tradition; (b) structural cohesiveness nurtured more by social than political organization; (c) a conflict situation that induces threat perceptions in the mind of the ruling class.

TRADITIONAL AND MODERN NATIONALISMS DIFFERENTIATED

At the same time we must acknowledge the fact that certain momentous events are unique to the history of western Europe which modernized and transformed the ideas of nationalism. These events include the Reformation, Renaissance, Enlightenment and the French Revolution. National consciousness and perhaps in a loose sense occasional outbursts of traditional nationalism are recorded in ancient and medieval history of several countries in the west and east. But such traditional nationalism is typically concerned with a sense of territoriality and traditional symbols of authority and

legitimacy. The critical problem this type of nationalism attempts to address is how to repel the foreign invaders. It has no idea about what to do after the invaders/aggressors are repelled, except to restore the traditional authority structure. It lacks a revolutionary ideology and a futuristic vision bequeathed by the French Revolution. Modern nationalism typically goes beyond the repulsion of foreign invaders. It seeks to reconstitute a new scheme of national life involving polity, economy and society. This revolutionary vision is absent in traditional nationalism.

Thus, the post-1789 developments concerning nationalism marked a radically new epoch for which we have no parallel in the history of nationalism. It is a revolution in nationalism just as in other spheres. It affects China more but it also affects India just as well though to a less extent. It affects Algeria more but it affects Egypt just as well though to a less extent. From then on nationalism means more than a sense of territoriality and cohesion centred upon common tradition; it also means reconstruction of the nation as a minimum national programme. This explains why nationalism is often associated with liberal, democratic or egalitarian aspirations again both in the west and east.

Revolutionary ideology performs three functions. It defines situations, provides a guide to social action and a new vision of the future. Liberty implied that government was 'henceforth to be exercised not autocratically by divine right, but constitutionally by the sovereign will of the governed'. Equality meant the 'abolition of the privilege, the end of serfdom, the destruction of the feudal system'. Fraternity was 'the symbol of the brotherhood of those who sought to make the world better and happier and more just' (Hayes 1929:518).

In other words, the prevailing situation was defined as one of unfreedom and inequality but a bright future of fraternity (nation-state), within whose framework freedom and equality would be realized, was envisioned. Such a new community would be ruled, in the words of Jean Paul Marat, by a 'dictatorship of virtuous men, devoted exclusively to the interest of the whole nation' (Kohn 1955:29). Here we have perhaps the earliest formulation of a most powerful but ambiguous doctrine of modern nationalism: the nation and its inseparable national interest. What constitutes a nation and who defines national interest are the perennial questions which continue to be debated, especially in multinational states. However, its appeal as one of the modern symbols of nationalism to the masses at large cannot be underestimated. It gives them a definite stake in the state and its various goals; for nation means 'people' in common parlance and national interest means the greatest interest of the greatest number.

When the egalitarian ideology is translated into a social movement, its implications to nationalism and nation-building become apparent. Since

liberty and equality are also associated with democracy and since not all nationalists are democrats, we need to discern the minimal implications of these two ideals to nationalism, because they produced a synergistic effect on nationalism. Liberty has come to mean, as far as nationalism is concerned, the freedom of a nation or people. Equality means the legal equality of all sovereign nations in the eyes of International Law. These two ideas are summed up in the doctrine of popular or national sovereignty and self-determination. This in the past has been the legal rendering of nationalism.

We have hesitated to use the term democracy with which nationalism is conventionally associated by other writers. Being a loaded term it means different things to different people. We have attempted to describe and define it in the sense it should be understood in relation to nationalism. For nationalism can be, and has been, 'democratic or authoritarian, forward-looking or backward-looking, socialist or reactionary' (Kamenka 1973:3). However, no one denies the appeals of democracy as an ideology to nationalists of any persuasion. That is why we have used the term egalitarian ideology rather than democracy. It is not only conceptually apt but historically also true; for large sections of the Third World democracy is more widely used now as an ideology than translated as a participatory political structure, especially during the nationalist movement, with which we are most concerned in this essay.

The second legacy of the French Revolution to nationalism is mass mobilization, without which no nationalism on a mass scale is conceivable in practice. Mass mobilization brings ideology into play and its merger with nationalism. Both the egalitarian ideology and nationalism are the necessary instruments of mass mobilization because their combination tends to produce a synergistic effect and optimal appeal to the masses. Conversely mass mobilization is the most effective agent of nationalism. Without mass mobilization no nationalism in the modern sense is produced; it may remain only at the level of national consciousness, as differentiated earlier.

Historically, mass mobilization in France was achieved in two primary ways, which have become commonplace in the twentieth century: mass politics in urban areas and war campaigns. Mass politics 'involves claims for participation and/or benefits' and reflects 'an aspiration to belong to the national society as a going concern' (Bendix 1974:xxxiii). The rise of the Third Estate in France during the revolution and its tendency to equate itself with the nation or people (Fletcher 1967:12) should be viewed in this context. Most nationalism, however, was produced by war campaigns, both Napoleonic and Jacobin, during which the 'symbol of unity became not the monarch but much more vague, and for many the mystical concept of nation' (ibid.: 41). It means power and sovereignty associated with the nation which,

during the feudal era, belonged to the ruling class, had now been extended to the people. This is the contention behind the equation of nation with people.

In the leading Third World nations, too, the concept of people as a new political symbol of legitimation gained popular currency. It is signified by the frequency with which the equivalent of 'people' is used in the vernacular media such as *shab* in Arabic, *janta* and *lok* in Hindi, *renmin* and *qunzhong* in Chinese. This popularism symbolized the emblematic elevation of masses of rural people, who were previously excluded from the political process, whether feudal or colonial, to the arena of mass politics as new legitimation symbols or real actors in the historical process, or a combination of the two roles as often happens in practice. This more precisely means the symbolic inclusion and emotional involvement of peasantry in mass politics as indicated by the frequency with which the equivalent of 'peasant' such as *fallaheen* in Arabic, *nongmin* in Chinese, *kisan* in Hindi and *campesino* in Spanish occurs in the Third World vernacular media.

We can imagine the scale of mass mobilization: Twenty-one campaigns in eleven countries involving a total of 4,767,000 people (see Table 4). The scale of mass mobilization involved during the French Revolution was probably greater than that of the Russian or Chinese Revolution. However, its historical significance lay in the new concept of war it introduced: ideologically-committed conscripts who, 'fired with nationalist fervour defeat the professional troops of other countries' (Fletcher 1967:42-3). This is the prototype of twentieth century guerrilla warfare waged successfully in China, Vietnam and some parts of Latin America. Before the French Revolution most wars were fought by mercenaries. In the Peloponnesian War Greeks bitterly fought Greeks. In the religious and dynastic wars of early modern times Germans fought against Germans, and Italians against Italians. Even as late as the eighteenth century soldiers and civilians in Europe entered the service of foreign rulers and served them with 'loyalty and faithfulness which proved the absence of any national sentiment' (Kohn 1955:10). This was not the case with Asia, the only exception may be the Gurkhas of Nepal.

We do not suggest that the egalitarian ideology originated with the French Revolution. Throughout the eighteenth century the bourgeoisie and *philosophes* in France criticized the *ancien regime* 'in the name of values that were later encapsulated in the revolutionary motto: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity' (Anchor 1967:xi). There was then this 100-year-old cultural revolution in Western Europe (1688-1789) called the Enlightenment, dedicated to reason, science and education. It was 'inherently suspicious of religion, hostile to tradition and resentful of any authority based on custom or faith alone' (ibid.: xi). This description reminds us how strikingly similar

Table 4 Mass mobilization during the French Revolution

<i>Date</i>	<i>Name of campaign</i>	<i>Number of troops</i>	<i>Country/ theatre</i>
1788	Second Coalition	French 160,000 Coalition 120,000	Netherlands, Rhine Switzerland Egypt
1 July 1789	Egyptian expedition		
20 April 1792	War against Austria	French 180,000	Austria
1793	Netherlands campaign	French 180,000 Allies 87,000	Netherlands
1793–7	War in Italy (seven battles)	French 18,000 Allies 82,000	Italy
1794	Campaign of 1794	French 203,000 Allies 139,000	Turcoing
10 April 1795	Italian campaign		Italy
Autumn 1795	Insurrection	Majority of people in Paris	France
1796	Campaign of 1796	French 76,000 Allies 56,000	Germany
1799	Egyptian campaign	French 40,000 Egyptians and Turks 84,000 people in Paris	Egypt
1799–1800	Marengo and Hohenlinden	French 227,000 Melas 50,000	Austria
2 December 1805	Austerlitz	French 86,000 Prussians and Austrians 80,000	Austria
14 October 1806	Jena	French 60,000 Prussians 110,000	Prussia
5 July 1809	Wagram	French 63,000	Prussia
May–June 1812	Russian campaign	French 363,000 Russian 223,000	Russia
27 August 1813	Dresden	French 127,000 Prussian 200,000	Germany
16–19 October 1813	Leipzig	French 100,000 Germans 280,000	Germany
1 January 1814	Campaign of France	French 200,000 Allies 370,000	France
18 June 1815	Waterloo	French 360,000 Allies 393,000	Belgium
Totals	21 campaigns	4,767,000	11 countries

Source: *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1954) 9, 805–29.

were the aims and objectives of the Bengal Renaissance in India, and May 4th Movement in China to those of the European Enlightenment periods. Renaissance both in western Europe and Asia was ignited and inspired by extraneous sources. In Europe it was the Greco-Roman ideals; in the east, western scientific civilization. In Asian societies, the renaissance began with great debates about the validity of received tradition in the light of modernity.

However, the degrees of attack on tradition by modernists or, more accurately, semi-modernists varied from one culture area to another. In China most intellectuals and intelligentsia who were *infatuated* with modern ideas and values, almost completely rejected the Confucian tradition by the time of the May 4th Movement (1919). They hastily concluded, in the light of western imperialist aggression and aggrandisement, that Confucianism was incapable of defending the Chinese nation and national interest in an age of active imperialism and power politics (Chow 1967:288–313). This rejection indirectly prepared the way for the rise of Marxism-Leninism in China, whose advocates stressed the Chinese inner sense of tenitoriality in the form of anti-imperialism. The Confucian tradition since the 1920s began to take a back seat in the Chinese Marxist Revolution. However, it was far from dead; in 1973–4 Mao Zedong had to launch an anti-Confucius campaign throughout China.

In India Hindu tradition was neither completely rejected nor fully accepted. A number of Hindu nationalist intellectuals in the guise of social reformers, from Raja Rammohun Roy (1772–1833) to the Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), sought to reform the social evils of Hindu tradition (for example, child marriage, untouchability), while retaining the spiritual essence of Hinduism such as the *Vedic* values. Therefore, throughout the Indian nationalist movement the ideological debate between tradition and modernity centred upon an ideal of ‘synthesis’ and ‘composite culture’, though there was a minor current that thought even modern ideas and techniques could be found in Hindu tradition itself (Majumdar *et al.* 1965:31–294). This synthetic approach to the tradition vs modernity debate may have considerably facilitated India’s transition to a mixed-economy model since 1947.

While most sensible Hindu nationalist intellectuals sought a synthesis of tradition and modernity in South Asia, this was less successful in the Middle East. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97) and his pupil Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) were prepared to accept those elements of European civilization which might strengthen the chances of Islamic culture’s survival in the modern world. It was ‘an intellectual movement in which [Islamic] civilization was not to be attacked but to be considered an element of the renaissance which was being sought’ (Tibi 1981:64). In other words, the intellectual debate between tradition and modernity in the Middle East did not go beyond the

initial phases of the same debate in China called 'restoration' or 'self-strengthening' (1860–70). Even Rifa'a al-Tahtawi, who was the first imam most receptive to western ideas, refrained from criticizing Islam and its clergy. Thus, neither Arab intellectuals critiqued Islamic tradition, unlike their counterparts in China, nor objective forces like industrialization (which in the Arab case is more often bought and imported than developed), could effectively undermine the social basis of tradition. Tradition reinforced by Arab nationalism and strengthened by the use of modern techniques, emerged in the post-colonial period unscathed and alive. The result is the current rise of Islamic fundamentalism.

We have sketched these central issues of oriental renaissance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under western impact, and their consequences to post-colonial developments in China, India and the Middle East as illustrative examples. The issues are far from resolved even today; the question of what and how much to borrow from the west without damaging the national dignity, pride and sensitivity continues to haunt the decision-makers in the Third World countries. The dilemma was particularly acute during the nationalist movement when one's cultural identity was rather inflated by the exigencies of mass mobilization and confidence-building. At such times to borrow heavily from the west was indirectly to acknowledge the superiority and values of one's antagonist which the logic of nationalism forbids. Yet not to borrow at all was to reduce the efficiency and power of the nationalist struggle and nation-building, and be condemned as ineffectual traditionalists.

However, after independence or revolution, the debate has produced more light and less heat. As such in most Third World nations a practical consensus seems to emerge: adopt science and technology from the west but preserve one's cultural identity and values. This is the Confucian formula first thought by the mandarin Chang Chih-tung (1837–90) in nineteenth-century China, who argued that 'utilitarian' knowledge from the west ought to be embraced in order to enhance Chinese power but Confucian 'essence' (values) must be cultivated (Teng and Fairbank 1970:50–5, 164–74). This formula has great attraction to the Third World nations because it permits industrialization (utility) while retaining one's cultural heritage (values). The sociological implication is that modernization is generally mediated by a given culture. Thus, even the Marxists, who fully embrace not only science and technology but also political values from the west, have propounded the doctrine of specific national roads to socialism (China, Yugoslavia) in opposition to the Stalinist monolith. It is clear then that universal doctrines or even sciences have to be mediated through local cultures, resulting in neither universal categories nor local products, but in a local variation of the universal as illustrated by the diffusion patterns of world religions.

As the term implies, utility includes not only science and technology, but also managerial skills in the reorganization of army, economy, bureaucracy, and so on, which are progressively modernized along western lines. Nor could we totally exclude western 'essence'. 'Democracy' or egalitarian ideology has had by far the greatest appeal to, and impact on, the Third World. However, even on this general issue of political values, we may observe local variations because democracy has to adapt to a set of local givens such as culture, history, economy, and so on. But as the Confucian mandarin predicted, most Third World nations tend to tenaciously cling to their cultural identities and values; they appear to be rather reluctant, by and large, to adopt western cultural values. In this respect it is interesting to note that western Christian missionaries succeeded only in tribal areas of the Third World where no great tradition existed. Otherwise they found themselves as unintended agents of modernization through their educational institutions in India, the Middle East and China.

The other major event with direct consequences to the state formation which preceded both the Enlightenment and the French Revolution was the Protestant Reformation led by Martin Luther (1483–1546). Indeed, the concept of nation and that of nation-state is conceivable only after the breakdown of the universal Church, which ruled culturally unified Christendom over most of Europe. The Reformation influenced nation-building in three ways. The universal Church gave way to national churches subject not to the authority of the Pope but to their respective kings. The Protestant's appeal to individual conscience facilitated the growth of numerous local sects. In particular its emphasis more on understanding the Bible than a ritual exercise led to its translation into vernacular languages, which contributed to the development of national language and literature so critical to the growth of nationalism.

Many people were puritans mostly because it was the symbol of national independence of Rome, and of fierce antagonism to the Catholic powers of Spain and France which were both national enemies and rivals in the struggle for maritime and colonial domination.

(Chadwick 1945:321)

Neither the Reformation nor the French Revolution immediately or directly affected the non-European society except Egypt. Since their impact on nationalism is considerable, what would be the implications of their absence? We suggest that western imperialism and colonialism, coming as they did with the benefits of the Industrial Revolution, introduced a process of revolutionary change in the Third World, so that it is possible to find functional equivalents of the uniquely European events. Kang Yu-wei (1858–1927) was known as the Martin Luther of Confucianism. In India his equivalent would

be Raja Rammohan Roy (1772–1833). The so-called May 4th Movement in early twentieth century China and Bengal Renaissance in nineteenth century India were protracted cultural revolutions, in which revealed or received tradition was put to the test of reason, and ‘new’ forms of learning competed with the ‘old’ ones. This renaissance encouraged oriental intellectuals to learn ‘new’ knowledge and enabled them to rediscover their past in a new light, which was crucial to identity formation. This was true of the Middle East also, especially Turkey and Egypt where a new genre of literature (*watanuyya*) emerged.

As for social revolutions, the Third World has more than the west. However, it is much more fruitful, instead of drawing parallels, to conceptualize the role of Renaissance and Reformation in terms of nationalism. The role is one of intellectual mobilization which gives rise to social consciousness as one of the prerequisites for the rise of nationalism. When social consciousness is politicized by mass politics and mass mobilization, nationalism is produced.

INTELLECTUAL MOBILIZATION AND THE DIFFUSION OF POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOCIETY

Social consciousness is ‘a system which contains both intellectual and emotional elements’. It is not a specific emotion but rather a sentiment or set of sentiments containing within it numerous emotional tendencies or dispositions,

‘such as calm, joy in fulfilment, sorrow in failures, fear, remorse, shame, anger; but also respect, reverence, honour and loyalty’. It is this organized body of impulses and the judgements of approval and disapproval embedded within it, which is expressed in consciousness as the sense of obligations.

(Ginsberg 1934:198–9)

The same set of complex sentiments, critical reappraisal and deep sense of obligation characterized most of the religious and social movements that preceded the nationalist movements in most historical societies of the Third World. We may expect social conscience or what Durkheim called collective conscience wherever a great tradition exists in confrontation with the reality of another tradition of a different order. The transformation of that conscience into consciousness is a complicated process. Causes in the west and east slightly differ, but basically both may be linked with the social crisis engendered by the Industrial Revolution. In most of the industrializing nineteenth-century western societies, especially England, it was paradoxically pauperism and political economy which led to the discovery of society, thereby producing intense social consciousness (Thompson 1950:87).

The western case illustrates that mobilization *per se* is not enough for the production of nationalism. The Industrial Revolution mobilized masses of people but it was mostly a case of high mobility and social dislocation. The rise of social consciousness that focuses upon certain common problems which in turn leads to the discovery of collective identity must have preceded the rise of nationalism. This was the case with most of the leading nations of western Europe so that when they began their great power rivalry in the late nineteenth century, that social consciousness was easily transformed into nationalism. The state plays no small role in that transformatory process.

In the east the encounter between western modernity and oriental tradition precipitated a cultural crisis in most historical societies. That cultural crisis occasioned both intellectual mobilization and the rise of social consciousness among the literate strata of society as the necessary prelude to nationalism. As the natural leaders of society and guardians of their tradition, the literate strata develops acute and conscious sense of moral obligation to their community in crisis. But it was not just the unprecedented problems of societal magnitude which alone aroused their collective interest. As we know, societies in the pre-modern age faced such problems: earthquake, drought, invasion, and so on. It was more the bright prospects of solving such problems rationally that modernity kindled the collective interest of the literate strata in the first place. Their consciousness is necessarily social in that the issues raised by the confrontation between tradition and modernity transcend class boundaries and appeal to almost all classes in society. For example, the typical issues faced by any proto-nationalist in the former colonies were how to save their sacred tradition and country (territory) in the face of western imperialist powers. Such issues concern and interest all classes in society, regardless of wealth, status and power.

To give a few examples, we refer to the nineteenth-century cultural crisis in East and South Asia and the Middle East, all of which show amazing similarity in response to the same challenge. The early Indian intellectual response to British imperialism was expressed in overtly religious (therefore social) terms because Hindu national identity is so much embedded in religion (Norbu 1988:325–43). Hence, the religious (and social) movements such as Arya Samaj founded by Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824–83), Brahma Samaj founded in 1828 by Raja Rammohan Roy, Prarthana Samaj in 1867 and the Ramakrishna Mission founded by Ramakrishna Paramahansa (1836–86). With the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885, the intellectual mobilization went beyond the discovery of society. It marked the beginning of politicization of social consciousness.

In China intellectual mobilization began with the Opium War of 1839 and continued with the series of Anglo-French expeditions culminating with the unequal treaties. Its landmarks include social reform movements such as

the Tung-chih Restoration (1862–74), the Hundred Days Reform (1898), the May 4th Movement (1915–20), and so on (Li 1967:95–350). As in India, the founding of political parties during the period 1901–04 marked the beginning of mobilization of social consciousness in China.

In the Middle East the picture is slightly different mainly because of Islam's orthodoxy. But even there certain trends of intellectual mobilization were discernible such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's (1839–97) revivalist movement leading to the formation of Pan-Islamic movement; Muhammad Ibu Abd al-Wahhab's (1703–91) attempt to demonstrate the Arab nature of Islam (Arabism); the Young Turk Movement in Turkey at the turn of the century, and so on (Tibi 1981:55–68). Again the politicization of social consciousness in most Arab societies did not begin until the emergence of secret societies and the Ba'th Party in 1940. The only possible exception is Turkey.

All these pre-nationalist social movements were essentially different modes of discovering society. To discover society means to become conscious of the latent social unity inherent in any complex or historical societies, and to pool common cultural and intellectual resources to tackle problems faced by such a society in crisis. Consciousness in the west or east is basically the same; it typically tries to address issues of national magnitude. The nature and scope of such issues transcend class considerations and appeal directly to the national community. The unprecedented problems that aroused public conscience differed, from west to east, and even from nation to nation. But the original source is machine industry which also promised so much power and plenty. Differences are largely to do with timing. Although the Industrial Revolution caused an economic earthquake in the west, its impact was felt gradually expanding over several centuries, whereas in the east its terrifying impact appeared suddenly as a finished product—an entirely new scientific civilization. The western challenge was, therefore, undoubtedly multidimensional but the fact the eastern response expressed itself essentially in cultural categories indicates that neither Renaissance nor Reformation had yet occurred in oriental societies to undermine the social basis of tradition. Religion is still the most dominant aspect of social life as it was in medieval Europe.

One of the primary functions of the religio-social movements in Asia and the Middle East was to make compromises and build bridges so that the critical transition from tradition to modernity, from feudal province to nation, from the extended civilizational realm to the territorially-bound nation-state may be possible.

For nationalism is one of the political by-products of modernity. The primary function of such a movement was intellectual mobilization, producing a typical quasi-ideology whose essential characteristics appear

to be the same: neo-traditionalism. Neo-traditionalism emerges out of the sudden confrontation between tradition and modernity. It begins as nervous overreaction, leads to reaffirmation of traditional values and ends as a short-lived revivalist movement. The next stage is a more serious attempt at re-evaluation and reinterpretation of tradition in the light of the western scientific civilization. Since the latter proves to be the ascendant system in almost all respects, neo-traditionalists try to bring their tradition in line or at par with the western civilization. Their conclusion leads them to concede the power and utility of modern science and technology but deny any role to western values. They still cling tenaciously to their traditional symbols and values.

Such debates might sound now archaic, but we must remember empathetically that the issues they raised and debated were of great concern and interest to all strata of a pre-industrial society. They touched the heart and soul of every believing member of traditional society. In their own ways, they were fundamentally concerned with the destiny of their nation as they saw it. Their consciousness is necessarily social in character and directly prepares the ground for nationalism.

Neo-traditionalism is a peculiar characteristic of oriental nationalism. It presupposes (a) the existence of a great tradition (b) group of bi-lingual intellectuals (c) unprecedented external challenge. However, the critical variable is tradition. Where no great tradition exists, there would not be neo-traditionalism as an enduring intellectual current in any nationalist movement. This is the case in African and Latin American nationalist movements which are primarily political or economic in character. Otherwise, neo-traditionalism marks a significant stage in most Third World nationalist movements, usually the second, the first being a defence of sacred symbols of the nation. It is in this context that we should view neo-traditionalism as politically motivated, and therefore, a nationalist phenomenon. But its main function lies in the fact that by its popular and emotive nature, neo-traditionalism aroused public consciousness as a prelude to mass nationalism in the Third World. It is an excellent exercise in intellectual mobilization.

IMPERIALISM AND THE OBJECTIFICATION OF SOCIAL SELF-HOOD

Generally speaking it is difficult to say who 'causes' nationalism because both parties are imbued with the same self-differentiating social force—nationalism. But on the whole, it is the wronged party that feels more nationalistic. Otherwise we/they differentiation is mutually dependent for antagonistic relations. The concept "we", that is, people's idea of themselves as of a social community, was secondary to the concept "They". "We" ideas

originate from an apprehension of the difference from “other” (Rudenko *et al.* 1975:106).

This other-induced self-consciousness is observable in a child. As a person (object), the child is encouraged to treat himself or herself as an object. This is the objectification of self modelled on others around him. But prior to using the attitude of others to think about himself, the child is not self-conscious. It is by thinking about himself in the light of others that he becomes self-conscious and begins to acquire social self.

Then gradually the child learns to relate first to what George Mead called the significant other (that is, parents, elder brothers and sisters, and so on) and then to the generalized other (that is, society, familiar but not intimate community). This is the beginning of his identity with ingroup positively and with outgroup negatively.

After a self has risen, it in a certain sense provides for itself its social experiences, and so we can conceive of an absolutely solitary self. But it is not possible to conceive of a self arising outside of social experience.

(Mead 1934:140)

When he is a fully-socialized adult, and participates in social life, the ingroup-outgroup dichotomy easily translates itself into nationalism when and if the objective conditions are ripe. The rise of nationalism with the Third World is marked by a similar psychological process in the context of colonialism and imperialism.

With regard to the rise of self-consciousness as such, history and psychology are in basic agreement. We have observed both in the western and eastern cases that nationalism seldom arose in a state of isolation; it always arises in a relative situation of competition or confrontation with the generalized other(s), real or imagined, for example, the Hundred Years’ Anglo-French War; Napoleonic campaigns; Italy’s struggle against Austria; Ireland’s struggle against Britain; the first and Second World Wars which occasioned nationalism on a mass scale all over Europe; Chinese struggle against Japanese aggression; Indian struggle against British imperialism; Vietnamese struggle against American intervention; Arab-Israeli conflict; Algerian struggle against French colonialism, and so on.

Thus the national identity crystallizes and concretizes itself best in the alarming presence of an enemy image in a conflict situation:

A woman cannot be a mother without a child. She needs a child to give her the identity of a mother. A man needs a wife for him to be a husband. A lover without a beloved is only a would-be lover. All ‘identities’ require an other; some in and through a relationship with whom self-identity is

actualized. The other by his or her actions may impose on self an unwanted identity.

(Laing 1969:66)

Conflict or competition is the mother of national identity.

There is, therefore, in each active nationalism a target enemy which accords an antagonistic dimension to nationalism. Accurately each active nationalism must be superseded by an adjective, anti-. To mention some contemporary examples, American nationalism has been anti-Soviet; conversely Soviet neo-nationalism anti-American during the cold war; Indian nationalism has been anti-Chinese and anti-Pakistani during the wars; conversely Chinese neo-nationalism has been anti-Soviet and anti-Indian during the 1960s' tension; Arab nationalism is anti-Israeli; conversely, Israeli nationalism is anti-Arab, especially during the Arab-Israeli conflicts. That is why left (Norbu 1982:18–49), right (Acton 1948:166–95), and centrist (Tagore 1950) thinkers have unanimously condemned nationalism as menace to peace and humanity.

We can classify two types of nationalism, as often hinted in this essay: active and dormant. Active nationalism is typically associated with a conflict situation and has invariably an enemy image as its target. Otherwise nationalism is dormant during non-conflictual situations. In the absence of a conflict situation, dormant nationalism's only manifestation may be a popular desire to differentiate the social self from the generalized other(s) around it. But a conflict situation transforms the generalized other into an enemy image, thereby activating dormant nationalism.

Then is it possible to conceive of a nationalism devoid of this antagonistic dimension? The Marxist-Leninist neo-nationalism in particular has cherished such a dream, and has opted for patriotism instead of nationalism. The differences between the two terms have already been noted. Here we emphasize a sad fact that the international conditions in the modern world (to be explained later) make mockery of such a pious distinction. The structure of the international political system is more conducive to nationalism than patriotism. Patriotism is a romantic relic of the bygone feudal era.

Our attempt at the reconstruction of the stages by which nationalism in its historical sweep might have progressed has been rather tentative, an exercise in pre-history. We can now end this chapter with a more positive note on the phases immediately preceding the formation of nationalism on a mass scale. The rise of social consciousness and the accompanying intellectual mobilization is the definite beginning of nationalism almost anywhere, east or west. When that social consciousness is politicized by the political party and/or the state, it is invariably transformed into national consciousness.

The introduction of the word 'national' indicates the extent to which society is politicized. One indication of this fact is how increasingly the nation takes the place of society and it becomes progressively coterminous with the people as a collective political actor on the stage of history in name if not in practice. And with the mass mobilization in full swing, the sporadic national consciousness is gradually transformed into nationalism. In this respect, the role of the leader or leadership who manipulates the key symbols and thus sets in motion the process of nationalism, should not be underestimated. Nor that of the state in the case of a nation-state.

Finally, we have conceptualized the objective function of western imperialism and colonialism in the Third World as one of the psychological objectifications of social self-hood of the colonized. Ethnic boundary maintenance is a universal feature found even in simple tribal societies, but what made western colonialism perhaps the most powerful agent of arousing social consciousness about social self-hood and identity in the minds of the colonized was the fact that the capitalist imperialists differed, so radically from any previous invaders in history, racially, culturally, politically and above all technologically. Such deep-rooted and overwhelming differences naturally tended to accentuate the we/they differentiation and demarcation lines much more than in earlier historical cases.

Prior to the western conquest, most conquerors tended to be absorbed, if not assimilated, in due course by the indigenous cultures concerned. Such was the case with the Mongol and Manchu conquerors in China, Aryan and Moghul conquerors in India, and the Turk conquerors in the Middle East. But not the western capitalist imperialists. They not only refused to be assimilated by the native cultures but actively undermined the indigenous social systems by their capitalist tendency to revolutionize the means of production. Thus, western colonialism and imperialism became not economic and political questions which are obvious but more subtly a psychological question of survival associated with autonomous cultures. That is why the native charismatic leaders kept on manipulating indigenous cultural symbols in their mass mobilization and also why the masses responded to such manipulation with passion and enthusiasm. In short, the active existence of a so radically different generalized other in the form of western colonialism and imperialism led to the conscious discovery of national identity on the part of the colonized in the Third World.

There are three other sets of modern conditions created unintentionally by capitalist penetration of the Third World which together more effectively than ever before facilitated the production of nationalism on an unprecedented scale. First, the nature of capitalist imperialism necessitated varying degrees of political centralization and economic integration of status-based, loose social structures. This primarily economic development, even though

undoubtedly along colonial lines, resulted in considerable degrees of national integration of often segmentary social structures. Second, the establishment of communication networks and transport systems, which the colonial economy necessitated, increased the channels of social communication so essential for the mass production of nationalism. Third, with the overall western presence came certain egalitarian ideals, especially freedom and equality which gradually filtered to the upper strata of native societies. The diffusion of such revolutionary ideas resulted in the native demand for the right to national self-determination.

Now none of the pre-modern conquerors like the Moghuls, Arabs or even the Vikings created any of the three revolutionary conditions we have mentioned here. They hardly bothered to bring about political and economic integration of the countries they came to rule on the scale the western capitalists did. Nor did they have the necessary technological means to establish new systems of social communication and public transportation throughout their empires. Lastly, egalitarian ideals were alien to them, as indeed such political ideals were to medieval Europe. The absence of such revolutionary conditions under pre-modern conquerors explain why their presence did not produce nationalism and conversely, why western capitalist imperialism with its tendency to revolutionize the means of production created the necessary conditions for nationalism.

Psychologically pertinent to the production of national consciousness in the form of national identity are two factors characteristically associated with the modern epoch: (a) the appearance of more generalized others than ever before, as a combined result of the Commercial and Industrial Revolutions; (b) the most unfamiliar nature of such generalized others to the social self-concerned. To be sure the distinction between an ingroup and outgroup as mentioned before is as old as any society, no matter how simple or complex it might be. The Arabs had known the Turks since the eleventh and twelfth centuries; the Hindus, the Muslims from Iran and Afghanistan since the ninth to tenth centuries; the Han, the 'barbarians' for millions of years. But none of these 'outsiders' brought about an identity crisis to the host population to the extent the European capitalist imperialists did to the Third World. The western generalized others appeared not only more aggressive but so fundamentally different from the Asian or African social selves in terms of value-system, social organization, communication system, and above all in terms of coercive power generated by science and technology. Such fundamentally differentiating generalized others never before appeared in the history of any Third World country. The more they challenged the cultural identities of the host countries, the more the latter asserted their social self-hood and national identity. What made the 'white devils' as the Chinese called them so invincible in relation to the natives was the Industrial

Revolution that originated in western Europe. That revolution made the critical and unprecedented difference.

NOTES

- 1 The word 'modern' in this essay is used in two specific contexts. In the west it is used to denote the period since 1600; in the Third World the period since the mid-nineteenth century. What characterizes the modern period is the complex and over-arching process of modernization defined broadly as the rationalization of means to given ends.

7 The politics of nationalism: mass mobilization, linguistic transformation and nationalist movements

We have defined nationalism as politicized social consciousness; noted that the turning point in the evolution of proto-nationalism is when *ethnos* begins to engage in politics; defined the nation as an extension and continuation of society by means of politics. We have also implied that national identity is politicized cultural identity. So what is politics as used in this context?

MASS POLITICS

Politics may be defined as concerted, if not systematic, group action to achieve certain group ends within certain procedures and rules instituted by a society to govern political action. Politics then in the ordinary sense of the term refers to that fairly regular political process of various political parties based on ideology or social classes, interest groups, minorities based on ethnicity or factions based on personalities etc of trying to achieve their respective goals within certain constitutional limits. The emphasis in this sense ought to be on the latter phrase, constitutional limits.

But mass politics or politics of nationalism may sometimes transcend the stipulated constitutional limits. 'Mass politics occurs when large numbers of people engage in political activity outside of the procedures and rules instituted by a society to govern political action' (Kornhauser 1959:227). This was the case with the politics of nationalism in the Indian subcontinent, China, Vietnam, Algeria, and so on. We may therefore generalize and say that the politics of nationalism, especially when it is involved in the creation of an independent state, tends to go beyond the constitutional limits set by an empire or multinational state. It is in this context that we can observe the relationship between nationalism and revolution. Any nationalism by which a nation or nationality is seeking to achieve autonomous statehood is necessarily a political revolution because it involves nothing less than a national struggle for state power. At the same time the politics of nationalism is necessarily and logically mass politics because it seeks to mobilize almost

the entire strata of a society by breaking class barriers and by appealing to larger interests and concerns that are minimally common to all, such as territoriality and tradition, freedom and equality.

Mass politics then differs significantly in scope from conventional forms of politics. It is no longer an aristocratic privilege and pastime as practised in traditional status-bound societies, nor does it mean the operation of the state, as is conventionally understood. Mass politics characteristically involves mass mobilization which is its defining characteristic, and mass mobilization in turn implies popular symbolic political participation in, and emotional involvement with, the pursuit of certain nation-wide goals. It necessarily involves mobilization of a social group, be it an electoral constituency, interest group, the public or the masses, as the most efficient means of political action. Some notable examples of mass politics that induced nationalism in the Third World include China (1895–1949), Egypt (1918–56), India (1919–47), Vietnam (1945–75).

Politics introduces a new dynamic dimension to social life, purposeful social activity. It is not that social life did not possess a purpose before; religion provided one which has made life meaningful, but it was a transcendental purpose. Politics provides a temporal purpose that directs political action and gives a concrete incentive for the pursuit of political activity. The signal example of political action is mass mobilization, to whose theory and practice the Leninist parties have contributed more than any other party.

Mass mobilization was preceded by other forms of political action that had action consequences to nation-building and the rise of nationalism in Europe. The great struggle between the papacy and the empire in the thirteenth century was fought most bitterly in Italy and Germany. The struggle ended in the triumph of territorial dynasty all over Europe, which sowed the seeds of nationalism. Absolutism was especially strong in Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV and England under the Stuarts. The royal action was largely motivated by self-interest, but its consequences were probably unintended. The absolute monarch in his attempt at the consolidation of power, introduced varying degrees of political centralization and national unification in the context of feudal fragmentation. This involved a partial mobilization of peasants and thus awakened the sleeping society, nation. Nationality which first manifested as awakened unity sided with the power that represented unity, the king. When the king and feudal lords conflicted most sharply in Denmark and France, citizens sided with the king. In fact most of the contemporaneous philosophers from Boussnet to Hobbes supported the power of absolutism. It was only Rousseau who sought to reverse the power equation; he equated the nation with people, not the monarch.

The pattern of pre-modern peasant rebellions in some historical Asian societies tends to suggest that partially-mobilized peasants revolted periodically against the *status quo* (king). Such revolts expressed spontaneous populism, perhaps in Rousseau's sense, demanding implicitly that the nation as a power system be congruent with the peasantry who constituted the overwhelming majority. Chinese Marxist historians mention five significant 'peasant uprisings' that attacked dynasties when the latter were in decline (Bai 1982:127-442). Indian historians document a number of peasant rebellions against the British Raj much before Gandhi appeared on the political scene (Desai 1979:129-207; Guha 1983). The history of early medieval Arabia (7-10 A.D.) offers an instructive illustration of considerable mass mobilization under the banner of *jihad* that overthrew tribal social structures and created a new social order (Glubb 1963). The fact that it was theocratic in nature seems academically immaterial as long as we view it functionally as something congruent with the general will of the believers.

However, systematic mass mobilization assumes three necessary agents: the state, the party, and industrialization. In the west all the three agents were operative in bringing about various levels of mass mobilization. In the Third World, especially in the former colonies, the political party has been the primary agent of mass mobilization. Its development in the west where it originated seems bound up with the extension of popular suffrage and parliamentary prerogatives. This, however, does not exclude the use of the party for nationalist ends such as in Italy, Germany, and Russia. In the Third World, especially during the nationalist movement the party has been chiefly an instrument of mass mobilization of peasantry and other classes for the pursuit of national unity, independence and national interest.

Without mass mobilization any movement, nationalist or social, would be ineffectual. Vinoba Bhave's Bhoodan movement in India, Chiang Kai-shek's 'New Life Movement' (1934) in China, the contemporary New Left groups in the west lack mass mobilization, and relevant social concerns. In order for any mass mobilization to be successful, mass politics must appeal to larger issues that concern or interest the majority in society. In this respect the situation plays a crucial role; it dramatizes the message and meaning of the social concerns issued and addressed by a political party.

The history of nationalism in the Third World indicates that the most effective way to represent social concerns and to organize mass mobilization, to translate such concerns into goal-oriented action is the political party.¹ It is the most efficacious instrument of a group to achieve group ends next probably only to the state.

But neither national consciousness nor nationalism begins without the emergence of the state or political party as the instrument of mass mobilization. In the Indian subcontinent the Indian National Congress,

founded in 1885, was active from the early 1920s; in China the Kuomintang (KMT) founded in 1905 was active from 1924; in Latin American states, leftist parties emerged from 1919 but were active only in the 1930s; in the Middle East various societies, secret or otherwise, such as the 'Arab Learned Society' (1857) and the 'Young Arab Society' (1911) were founded but it was not until the emergence of mass-mobilizing political parties like the Ba'ath party in 1940 and the Arab Nationalist Movement in the 1950s that Arab nationalism could reach a take-off stage.

The founding date and the active phase of each major party can roughly be correlated to the rise of national consciousness and nationalism respectively. All of them in the former colonies were what may be called mass mobilizing political parties whose primary goal was national sovereignty and the reconstitution of society, economy and polity on a new or modified basis.

SOCIAL CARRIERS OF NATIONALIST IDEAS

The political party is an instrumental organization manned by the vanguard of a nationalist movement. It raises the question of leadership and the masses of followers. Although nationalism is a horizontal comradeship transcending class distinctions, we might discuss the shape of social structure assumed during an interstate conflict in the case of a state already in existence or a nationalist movement. At such moments social strata consists of charismatic leaders, intelligentsia as the carriers of nationalism, and the masses who follow and participate in the movement. The role of a western-educated elite in the nationalist movements in the former colonies has often been treated as a matter of ironic surprise (Emerson 1962:197-9; Seton-Watson 1977:425-41). But the role of intelligentsia broadly defined as the literate stratum of a given society appears to be a fairly universal feature, wherever nationalism occurs as its social carriers. Their role was prominent in the so-called German Vormar, the Italian Risorgimento and the east European nationalist movements against the Austrian monarchy in the nineteenth century.

In the east where the disjunction between tradition and modernity is rather sharp, two groups of intelligentsia appear: the traditional learned class and western-educated elite. We have already referred to the former's role in intellectual mobilization in traditional society. If nationalism is divided broadly into traditional and modern components, the traditional learned classes are the typical carriers of the former, and the modern educated elite that of the latter. The line between the two types of carriers is analytically sharp but need not be so in practice; for the essence of nationalism is in most cases the fusion of the two.

Having made that qualification, we can still maintain on the whole that the function of modern education in the process of nationalism cannot be underestimated. In the Chinese Revolution the students and intelligentsia played a crucial role as the typical carriers of new ideas and values from the early days of treaty port intellectuals in the nineteenth century to the May 4th Movement (1919) in China (Israel 1960).

In the Indian subcontinent the rise of national consciousness can be traced to the introduction of English medium education in Bengal, Bombay and Madras between the years 1857 and 1888 (Seal 1968). Here English education became a major stimulant and the medium of early Hindu nationalism, but which continued to be anchored in Indic tradition right up to 1947.

The role of students in Arab nationalist movements is particularly prominent. The Young Arab Society was founded by Arab students studying in Paris; the Ba'ath party by Syrian students studying at the Sorbonne; the Arab Nationalist Movement by Arab students studying at the American university of Beirut (Binder 1964). In the fluid Latin American context characterized by ideological heterogeneity and political fragmentation, university students form one of the more cohesive political bodies (Forrin and Martz 1970). In Africa (except Ethiopia) no traditional learned class such as the Brahmins, mandarins, scholastics, mullahs, lamas or rabbis existed, and nationalism was initiated and led almost entirely by the western-educated elite.

While the role of the intelligentsia in any nationalist movement is a universal phenomenon, why student's participation has been prominent in the Third World nationalism must be explained. It is largely to do with the fact that they, like workers in a factory, are more readily organizable and mobilizable. Moreover, being mostly bilingual and living in a transitional period, they become the critical conscience of society in travail to give birth to a new national community. They are more active where neither political parties nor alternative institutional frameworks for mass politics exist.

Why students in particular and intelligentsia in general become involved with the politics of nationalism may also be explained both economically and ideologically. The vast majority tend to come from the middle and upper classes, and very rarely from the lower classes.² They generally have a bigger stake in the future of the country than the masses. However, their sense of social obligation as the natural leaders of society cannot be ignored. Where economic self-interest enters into conflict with nationalism as such, nationalism has usually proved the stronger (Akzin 1964:68-9; Norbu 1982:344-54) because nationalism encompasses both the superstructure and economic base.

We have often employed the unfortunate term 'masses' to designate the overwhelming majority social group in a traditional society. The notion of

masses differs from both audience or public in that it is 'more heterogeneous, more anonymous, less organized, and less intimately engaged in interaction' (Smelser 1962:7). Such a conception of masses is apt, especially at the early stages of nationalism in which we are primarily interested. That means mostly peasantry which constitutes about 85 to 90 per cent of the total population in most Third World countries or for that matter in any pre-industrial society. For example, over 95 per cent of the French population at the time of the Revolution were peasants. Similarly, England on the eve of the Industrial Revolution.

Our chief interest in the peasantry, like several other disparate topics we have unavoidably to touch here, is in its relation to nationalism. The masses are the major target of mass mobilization and one of the central problems to be explained is how they close the rank with the elite since the usual differences between the two social universes in terms of economics and cultures are extremely wide.

Peasant land hunger is often exploited. But the typical relationship between the charismatic leader and masses during the nationalist movement or international conflict, defies economic explanations. What connects the various isolated villages among themselves as well as the whole with elite strata is the great tradition based on a world religion. The difference between the great tradition and little tradition is written language and literature. It is more in cultural sophistication than in kind. Hence religious symbols are often used as the most effective means of social communication and mass mobilization. The learned bearers of the great tradition become the leaders mobilizing the rustic peasants belonging to the little tradition, like recharging an unused battery whose live but disconnected wire gets connected with the threads of common tradition and culture under the pressure of mass mobilization. The village isolation is broken and latent social unity asserts itself as the basis of mass mobilization and social communication.

Mass mobilization is impossible to conceive in the absence of leadership. The type of leadership associated with nationalism has always been charismatic. Examples include Napoleon Bonaparte, Metternich, Louis-Philippe, Bismarck, Napoleon III, Disraeli, Kossuth, Garibaldi, Churchill, and so on, in recent western history; in the Third World the Mahatma Gandhi in India, Mao Zedong in China, Sukarno in Indonesia, Nkrumah in Ghana, Kenyatta in Kenya, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, and so on. This long list is intended to indicate the universality of this strange phenomenon.

Charismatic leaders are as much a product of their own leadership qualities as of crisis-situations and successful mass mobilization. They respond to such situations not necessarily in any original but imaginatively-representative ways that attract mass following. Le Bon explained the functions of a charismatic leader as follows:

To bring some conviction to a crowd, it is necessary first of all to comprehend thoroughly the sentiments by which they are animated, to pretend to share these sentiments, then to endeavour to modify them by calling up, by means of suggestive notions, to be capable, if need be, of going back to the point of view from which a start was made, and above all, to divine from instant to instant the sentiments to which one's discourse is giving 'birth'.

(1952:111–13)

Our notion of national identity is directly relevant to the charismatic leader-mass relationship. Identification in the Freudian sense means the psychological clinging of a social group to a model personality. This concept may be modified for our purpose because the reasons for identification vary between the two cases. The charismatic leader is viewed as not only admirable but necessary. He performs two basic functions which are of critical importance in achieving identification between the leader and the led. First, he invokes and manipulates symbols which at once strike sympathetic chords in the mass mind. These symbols are condensed and epitomized expressions of values. In this sense the leader subjects the mass to the emotionally-potent sources of their socialization rooted in religious beliefs, so that they not only all respond to his signs and signals, but achieve a powerful psychological communion characterized by deep emotions and tremendous energy release. Second, the charismatic leader is the embodiment of popular ideas, values and sentiments current in the mind of given people passing through a movement in crisis. He interprets and conveys those which are very much in the popular mind, yet which the masses cannot articulate or express as well as their leader could.

In other words, the charismatic leader in relation to nationalism, which always accompanies an international conflict or nationalist movement is the medium through which the masses express their aspirations and sentiments at a critical juncture of their history. If a leader attempts to superimpose his personal ideals upon the people as Chiang Kai-shek tried in the 1930s, M.N. Roy in pre-1947 India, or Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam (1954–63), he builds a social distance between himself and the mainstream of the movement. The charismatic leader is a sort of priest who invokes and interprets tradition, as well as a political leader who analyses the common situation faced by the masses and formulates rational solutions to common problems. The problems could include, as far as nationalism is concerned, independence or nation-building, national unification or secession.

LINGUISTIC TRANSFORMATION AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION

It is difficult to conceive any mass mobilization without a common medium of social communication. The nationalist intelligentsia, unlike the old scholastics, must make themselves be understood by the masses to whom they aim as the target of their mass mobilization. The relationship between the charismatic leader and the masses also presupposes a common language by which they can communicate with each other. Therefore, the development of nationalism in general, and mass mobilization in particular, necessitates the use of language, a particular type of language appropriate for social communication, namely, the vernacular. In most historical societies this involved a revolution in communication because the great tradition is written and usually transmitted in a language that the masses could not easily understand. In most traditionally literate societies the linguistic transformation is usually from superstate to creole; and in traditionally illiterate societies, especially where colonization occurred, from superstate to pidgin to creole.

The rise of the vernacular as a recognized, if not respected, medium of expression and popular literature can be traced to post-Reformation Europe when Latin was replaced by the various vernacular languages, such as French, German, Italian. This process, as we have already pointed out, was associated with the emergence of territorial states that laid the foundation for the modern nation-state. 'The fall of Latin exemplified a larger process in which the sacred languages were gradually fragmented, pluralized and territorialized' (Anderson 1983:25).

But what really caused revolution in social communication was print capitalism, cheap popular editions. Before 1500, 77 per cent of books were printed in Latin. From then on Protestantism began to use print capitalism as the medium of its proselytization and soon created large new reading publics who did not know Latin or French. Such publics were mobilized for various religio-political purposes. In this way, the disparate parts of society were connected with each other and thereby with the whole through social communication. Along with print capitalism we must include other developments such as transport revolution and the massive increase in education, all of which greatly increased the facilities for social communication and mass mobilization. Viewed from this perspective, the students' role in nationalist movements ceases to be an anomaly; they are the ones most directly exposed to the new facilities of social communication.

In Asia the transition from the scholastic language to the vernacular was less drastic because the great tradition was not written in one altogether different language like Latin but only in a more polished and erudite (classical) language of the one spoken by the masses, for example, Arabic, Mandarin,

Persian, Sanskrit. This might partly explain the speed with which the Arabs, the Chinese, the Indian masses communicated with their respective educated elites during their nationalist movements. Nevertheless, it involved a considerable modification of the classical language in order to close the communication gap between the educated elite and the masses. In India this task was tackled largely by the British Government in order to introduce a common (official) medium of administration in the subcontinent, English, which became the accepted lingua franca of the nationalist intelligentsia throughout the independence movement. The British also popularized a mixture of Hindi and Urdu called Hindustani which became the medium of mass communication and subsequently mass mobilization from the early 1920s. In the Middle East the role of western missionaries is so great that their role may be called the unintended father of Arab national consciousness (Tibi 1981:74). The American missionaries created a vernacular Arabic (*darjah*) which increased communication capacity and brought about 'Arab literary renaissance'. It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the early Arab nationalists were Christians. In China western-educated intelligentsia carved a vernacular Chinese out of the scholastic mandarin during the first quarter of this century, *Baihua*. Without this quiet revolution in communication, the mobilization of Chinese peasantry would have been difficult.

Language has many uses for the nationalists. It is used often as the emblem of nationhood. Gaelic, Hebrew, Sanskrit, are classic cases in point. It is also used as a status symbol such as English in the Third World and French in the west. And many western writers, as noted earlier, have commented on language as the most important factor without, however, much understanding of its true function in the production of nationalism. It is its social communicative function.

Then is one national language necessary for effective social communication? That may be ideal but neither necessary nor sufficient condition for social communication if we conceive language functionally. That is, languages must become vernacular so that linguistic publics or masses can understand. The Indian Constitution recognizes *fifteen* languages, Switzerland has four and South Africa has two official languages and several African ones. What happens in a multilingual nation-state is this. Since all the languages have by now become more-or-less vernacular, the government feeds through them the same data that promotes official nationalism so that social communication between the state and linguistic publics, as well as among the various language groups themselves, is operative. Social communication does not mean speaking the same language; it means how information is transmitted quickly with least effort and with least distortion (Deutsch 1953:64-5). In short, mutual comprehension. Such a mutual

understanding can be achieved by a people used to a certain pattern of relationship in a complex society through a common idiom.

Scholasticism has built through the ages a reified wall between the great tradition and the little tradition. That wall is to a large extent bulldozed by print capitalism. It would, however, be fallacious to view the vernacular as an entirely new creation. As Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy shows, language and culture are intimately connected with each other. Language is not only the transmitter but also the depository of culture. Each word especially the basic terms are charged with associations that evoke feelings and thoughts. Such generic terms remain common to both the classical and vernacular languages in most cases. The vernacular is only a modified version of the classical language, be it Arabic, Chinese or Hindi, by means of simplification and creation of new terms to meet scientific requirements. National language is formulated and propagated by the state.

THE STATE AND NATIONAL ECONOMY

Nationalism is optimally produced under three typical situations: nationalist movement or separatist (unofficial nationalist) movement and international conflict in the case of a state already in existence. With the former situation we associated the political party, and with the latter the state and parties as the most effective agents of mass mobilization. Our interest in the state is therefore twofold: to point out its function in the production of official nationalism and to explain why the state has been the most sought-after goal of every nationalist movement since the French Revolution.

Historically the state precedes the nation as defined in the modern sense. This is especially true of Spain, England, France, and so on, where an absolutist monarchy established state machinery and then went on to make the nation. A much clearer case of the rise of nationality is the revolt against empires such as the east European Slavs in the nineteenth century.

In its essence the Asian pattern is not very different from the European precedence. Centralized states of varying strength existed throughout Chinese history, Egypt, Persia, and India during the Maurya, Gupta and the Muslim periods. However, in the Third World as a whole the general pattern has been that of nationalities seeking to make their own states. It would imply not only the colonial situation but also a less-evolved political history as Hegel would have said.

Why create a state that has become the case of a servant-turned-master? Under modern political conditions it has become the necessary evil which will continue not only to exist but greatly expand its role as long as no nation is willing to surrender its sovereignty to constitute a world government which is most unlikely given the tenacity of nationalism. Like nationalism the idea

of the state is implicit in 'the universal tendency to leadership and subordination' (MacIver 1955:42). But why this institutionalized power has become more pervasive and more powerful than any type of leadership is because of its ever-expanding role in every important sphere of activity: political, economic, social, educational, even cultural (Hunter 1988:33-69), and so on. No significant social activity is left untouched by the state today. As Karl Polanyi shows the very notion of a free enterprise market economy is a myth when the state intervention (or co-ordination) is ever present to regulate the very market mechanism (1957:3).

The state, from a simple royal patrimonial instrument was transformed into a complex political instrument of the nation. During the Renaissance when the term 'state' was employed for the first time to mean 'powers that be for the time being' its functions were few. They were to keep law and order, and to collect revenues. Since then the scope of its political action and the number of its functions have enormously expanded and increased all over the world. Its ever-expanding role in domestic and international affairs is indicative of its organizational capacity which partly explains why the state could serve so many masters: from feudal monarch to the democratic nation.

Perhaps other complex organizations could be created as organizational theory would suggest, to perform the various functions of the state, but none could claim 'the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (Weber 1958:78). The modern state is not only coercive but also legitimate; it is not only finely *differentiated* and centralized bureaucracy but also functionally co-ordinated and responsive to popular aspirations and pressures. The main creation is always whether the state has been able to develop an administration that combines the purposes of power and welfare' (Hintz 1973:165). It is this unique combination of an extensive service wing backed by a nation-wide armed authority that makes the state an indispensable instrument of collective interests everywhere. Nationalism is not xenophobia; its primary purpose is to realize national interest. 'The national interest of all states are broadly similar. They are broadly centred upon the welfare of the nation and the preservation of its political doctrine and national style of life' (Frankel 1970:19). The state does all these.

The state defines national interest, and represents and acts on behalf of the nation as the only legitimate actor in international politics. It protects national unity, and produces and promotes official nationalism. The last two functions call for some explanation since we have emphasized throughout this essay the near-spontaneous nature of nationalism. The nationalism we have analysed as an active social force is a function of a conflict situation. Otherwise nationalism is more dormant than manifest. It is in such a context that the state's role as the propagator and sustainer of nationalism is paramount. Official nationalism is constantly and systematically fed as

carefully designed inputs into compulsory state-controlled education, state-organized propaganda, official rewriting of history, the state officials' endless affirmation of the nation, and so on.

The state's expanding role is dictated by modern economic rationality. The state is increasingly coming to decide, almost everywhere, ends as well as scarce means which have alternative uses. No matter what type of economic system it is—capitalist, socialist or mixed economy—a nationalist corporate conception of economy has come into being which views that the economic benefits or profits must be accrued to the nation or segments of that nation; any economic losses or exploitation by the 'outsiders' must be prevented by state protection. Protectionism in this sense is implicit in any type of economy including the capitalist system which thrives on international trade but on terms and conditions more favourable to itself.

Historically mercantilism is the beginning of the idea of national economy; it made those in commerce aware of one's national economy in relation to other like-units as natural competitors. The transformation of a simple patrimonial government into a complex state machinery largely owed the enormously increased economic activity in western Europe since the Industrial Revolution. Now the state intervenes in the economy as a matter of routine in the Third World and west. In this connection it is instructive to recall the massive role of the American state in the early stages of its economy because the USA now prides itself as the high priest of free enterprise. As an American historian observes,

Indeed by 1826 the government was the largest single economic entrepreneur in the country. It handled more funds, employed more people, purchased more goods and borrowed more operating and investment capital than any other enterprise. For generations that are reputed to have believed in weak and minimal government the founding fathers and their first offspring created rather large and active institutions... And the principle of government assistance to private companies was to know no greater application than in the pattern of land grants to railroads unless, perhaps, it was the direct and indirect subsidies to corporation enterprise during World War I and World War II.

(Williams 1961:211)

The notion of national economy, the dream of so many foresighted nationalist leaders, can become a living reality only in the context of a sufficiently high level of industrial development. Only machine-industry can create enough wealth to be justly called national economy; only such an industrial development gives the economy a truly national character; only such an industrial economy, organized and operated along national if not international lines, could effectively compete with other economies in terms of international

trade or commerce. The idea of national economy, therefore, has come to stay and popular pressure to develop it along socially profitable lines remains strong in most nation-states. The most critically economic question facing any nation is basically the same, though strategies for development differ: how to tap the ultimate scarce sources of wealth to the advantage of the members of the nation? The function of the state in this respect is to make sure that the economic advantages are accrued within the nation, and not without it to the 'outsiders'.

Thus, an economist defines nationalism as 'a state of social psychology or political sentiment that attaches value to having property in this broad sense owned by members of the national group' (Johnson 1968:7). The ownership of property by any members of a national group implies that the resulting profit or benefit must not go outside the nation. There is then an element of tribal possessiveness or territoriality and a strong dose of medieval mercantilism that are at the root of nationalist economic thinking. This thinking 'has always been used to imply discrimination in favour of nationals or national interest as against foreigners or the community of nations as a whole' (Weis 1968:49). Purely from an economic point of view, especially that of free trade and market economy, such nationalistic policies need not advance the economic well-being of the nation such as high defence expenditure, limitation of economic activity within a nation when conducted by foreign enterprises, limitation of investment in foreign workers, and so on. Economic efficiency and tribal possessiveness are clearly in conflict. In several Third World countries nationalism gains the upper hand in economic decision-making. It tends to direct economic policy toward the production of psychic income in the form of nationalistic satisfaction at the expense of material income. There are two reasons, both rooted in nationalist psychology: credit for whatever economic performance must go to the nationals; foreigners cannot be trusted. In short, nationalist economic thinking is an extended kinship sentiment applied to the nation as a whole.

Perhaps one of the greatest attractions of industrialism to nationalists is the fact that it is not only an ideal source of power; industrial development to a large extent can be carried out under any political set-up ranging from the Meiji Restoration oligarchy to the Marxist-Leninist party rule in the Soviet Union. Like nationalism, industrialism is not only powerful; it operates almost independently of any political system, though to be sure some may be more conducive to economic development than others. Both are universal phenomena but operative within the national framework, nation-state, and sometimes beyond.

Industrial development forms such an important goal of modern nationalism that it is treated as an 'ism'—industrialism. Like democracy, industrialism was not an integral part of traditional nationalism before the

French Revolution. But they all belonged to the same epoch which tended to foster close relations between them. For the tendency of nationalism has been to include all ideas and innovations that enhance the attainment of collective interest. The most important implication of the Industrial Revolution to nationalism is the enormous capacity of machine-industry to generate unprecedented and unheard of wealth and power. Though traditionalism tended to entertain either ambiguous or negative attitudes towards modernity as happened during the early phases of the nationalist movements in South Asia, North-east Asia and the Middle East, ultimately industrialism triumphed everywhere. Modernization is an inexorable drive and a universal process from which no society can escape, no matter how remote. It is the logic of national interest. Even Bhutan, perhaps the most traditional UN member, is attempting to modernize in its own ways.

Why modern industry has become one of the essential goals of modern nationalism is not so much as to improve the living standards of masses, which might come later on a low priority basis; it is more urgently to produce military technology that would strengthen the coercive organs of the nascent state. This is not only a Third World phenomenon; it was so in the early stages of nation formation in the west. Alexander Hamilton argued in nineteenth century America that 'not only the wealth but the independence and security of a country appear to be materially connected to the prosperity of manufactures' (Gilpin 1987:33). In nineteenth century Europe too,

it was chiefly the development of new military technology requiring an elaborate and modern industrial base that demanded a forced pace of industrialization and thus elevated economic growth to prominence among the objectives of nationalism. In other words the emergence of industrialization as a major goal of nationalism was the consequence of national states, not any belief in the desirability of industrialization *per se*.

(Kahan 1968:19)

Thus, China, India, Iraq and Pakistan would first concentrate on developing nuclear technology for defence purposes rather than on need-based industrial programmes to fight poverty, disease and illiteracy of millions of peasants. For industry 'is desired as the foundation of military power' (Johnson 1968:129). This apparent misuse of industry in the Third World should not be viewed, as often done, from the perspective of contemporary western post-industrial welfare states but from that of the early phases of national state-building in the west when early industry was designed in the first place to increase the coercive power of the state. The sense of insecurity is particularly strong in post-colonial societies because of their historical experience of colonialism and imperialism, whose secret of success they perceive to be superior military power.³

Where industrial development preceded or accompanied a nationalist movement, industrialism by its very scientific nature has imparted a degree of rationality to the critical aspects of the nationalist movement, especially in the sphere of ideology and organization. Modernity is indeed evident in most of the nationalist movements we have analysed. Recall the improvement in strategy and tactics of the Italian Unification Movement from Carbonism to that of Young Italy; of the Indian National Congress from its early days of prayers and petitions to Gandhi's *satyagrah*; China and Vietnam from the futile traditional warfare of the nineteenth century to the Maoist tactics and strategy of guerrilla warfare in the twentieth century. If modernization is defined as rationalization of means to given ends, it is evident not only in the means of production but more so in the means of struggle for independence.

The impact of industrialism on nationality in Europe was less dramatic but by no means less effective. In the west nationalism meant in practice two simultaneous processes: political centralization and national unification. Industrial development contributed to both processes. The modern tendency to centralize is common to both industrial development and state formation. For political centralization is also achieved through progressive bureaucratization. This is where and how two supposedly separate movements converge. In so doing industrial development indirectly contributed to national unification and mass mobilization. It necessitates the development of transport and communication system because it involves the movement of raw material from the places of origin to factories, from where finished products are transported to different markets. Not only mobility but the scale of social communication is greatly increased as evident in all modern set-ups: schools, colleges, universities, factories, mines, plantations, offices, armies, markets where thousands of people interact on a daily basis.

To sum up, the state in relation to the nation corresponds to two primary limiting and defining factors or correlates, namely, political and economic. The state in the first category of state-making-the-nation is co-extensive and, congruent with and correlated to the nation (for example, England, France, Spain, and so on). In the second category of the nation-making-the-state which is more applicable to the colonial world, the state increasingly seeks as a matter of policy to be co-extensive and congruent with the nation, even though the latter may be multinational. The state in this sense represents the pannaion political institution, effective across a given national society limited only by the national boundaries. It is the political optima of a given nation.

Economically, a given territory (or region) within which the state is effective represents a typical resource pattern for the population. This is particularly true of ecological units or regions where well-known ancient civilizations evolved such as the Mediterranean region, the Middle East, North-east Asia,

the Indian subcontinent, and so on. It suggests for the pre-industrial world certain economic boundaries of a given geographical region carved by nature within which limited but optimal levels of economic activity may be carried but under nature-dominated circumstances. In such a region not only economic activity in general but trade also was limited by ecology. Even long distance tended to be intraregional rather than international, at least before the Industrial Revolution. Man had yet to master the forces of nature.

The emergence of the state in such a situation as described above, signified in an economic sense a higher level of rationalization of an ecologically-determined resource pattern. It proved to be a more effective corporate instrument for marshalling, allocation and even of distribution of scarce resources. The state intervenes to exploit the existing resources to the advantage of a class and/or the nation. Economics at this stage is 'the choice and satisfaction of divisible and competitive values by region and institution' (Mukerjee 1955:43).

The historical relationship therefore among ecology, the state and economy is clear. However, we do not suggest that the state is the creator of economy as such, though it may be that of national economy (Tivey 1981:75). But its role in organizing, regulating and encouraging all sorts of co-operative or competitive economic activity cannot be ruled out. We must remember now that the various European monarchs licensed, encouraged and financed private chartered companies during the mercantile era. Similarly tribute-cum-trade in Confucian China was a state concern.

At any rate we observe a high degree of correlation between the emergence of modern state structure and the growth of national industrial economy. Of course, elementary forms of the state preceded any modern industrial economy both in the west and east. However, industrial imperatives of modern economy have a lot to do with the expansion of power and increased role of the state as we know it today. A cautious statement of this intricate process would be that there is a continuous interaction between the state and industrial economy, enhancing each other's power or growth. Any strong economy must have an equally powerful state behind it just as any powerful state without a strong industrial base is almost inconceivable.⁴ Obviously the two domains, though conventionally considered separate and autonomous especially in a free market economy, are in fact closely interrelated. The only tentative generalization we may make at this stage is as follows: the growth of industrial economy in the west was greatly activated by the emergency needs of weapons technology required in frequent interstate conflicts, and later for welfare programmes; in the Third World, perceived defence needs to protect the newly-won independence, and later in some countries, by egalitarian politics which insists upon mass production of cheap goods for mass consumption.

With the Industrial Revolution whose demonstration effect is now being felt all over the world, man has crossed, if not broken, the economic optima, unlike its political counterpart. For one thing international trade and commerce in many parts of the world has become a transnational feature. But even then the idea of national economy corresponding roughly to the economic optima of a given nation-state remains strong. By international trade and commerce, the state either on its own or on behalf of private concerns of the nation-state, seeks to augment and enhance the national economy as a whole. In other words, we have tried to point out the nationalist logic of economic planning (socialist) or co-ordination (capitalist). And national economy as such may be conceived as the aggregate of scarce resources industrialized or otherwise but all extant within the territory of a given nation or nation-state. As a universal recognition of this fact, in December 1974 the United Nations adopted a 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States' which recognized 'the full permanent sovereignty of a state over its natural resources in its territory and its rights to nationalize foreign owned property'.

It was Friedrich List who in his *National System of Political Economy* (1841 cited in Kahan 1968) came out with a full-blown conception of a national economy. List argued that Adam Smith had ignored the division of human race into nations which ought to form the basis of a national economy. His objective was the prosperity, independence and power of the nation-state which has great appeal to the Third World nations. List critiqued classical economics on three grounds which sheds light on the nationalist conception of economy. First, it suffers from a rootless cosmopolitanism that ignores the existence of the nation and national interest. Second, it emphasizes the exchange value of commodities, which is 'gross materialism', ignoring spiritual and political interests as well as the productive forces of the nation. Third, as an expression of extreme individualism, it denies the social nature of labour and the possibilities of co-operation, and treats economy as a purely private activity (exchange) in a transnational world. All these are, List argues, incorrect from the perspective of national economy. In his own words:

Between the individual and humanity there is the nation... it is only through the nation and within the nation that the individual can receive spiritual training, achieve productive forces, security and welfare; and therefore the civilization of humanity is possible and can be understood only through the civilization and development of nations.

(Kahan 1968:21)

In our age of international capitalism, with even the socialist countries undergoing liberal economic reforms, Adam Smith, not Friedrich List, might

appear to be in vogue. But it is important to remember that the central logic of any national economy as such has not changed a bit. It is to increase the gross national product (GNP) which is regarded not only as the key to national prosperity but as a basis of military power. On the international trade front, it is to have an advantageous balance of trade—more exports than imports—in order to enrich the nation itself. Now what goes on with the equitable distribution of goods and services within a national society is primarily a social or class question which does not seem to enter a purely nationalist economic thinking. All that a nationalist conception of a national economy is concerned with is that the overall domestic productivity should increase and that foreign trade should be to the advantage of the nation as a whole as opposed to foreign nations. And ‘only a nation, not its political subdivisions, can pursue independent foreign trade and exchange policies’ (Krunin 1971:182). Therefore, the state in most parts of the Third World has become the custodian of GNP as well as of the nation.

In retrospect, the gradual emergence of a social *conception* of economy appears to be a radical departure from traditional economic thinking. It implies collective welfare as the goal and basis of economic activity within a nation. The concept emerged in most Third World countries under the impetus of nationalism because nationalists tend to view things of collective significance from the corporate perspective of a social collectivity that is a potential nation. To defend and advance the economic interest of a national group is one of the rational goals of nationalism; and the educated and politically conscious fought colonialism explicitly in such economic terms.

But prior to that only *householding* conceptions of economy prevailed in traditional societies. Householding economy means production for one’s own consumption as best characterized by subsistence farming. For example, peasants do not have any conception of a national economy beyond their immediate village or bazaar, where their economic exchange takes place. The social conception of economy, like the discovery of society, comes through popular engagement in egalitarian politics which entails a social approach to economic issues. This in turn entails some democratization of the state structure so that the state becomes not only the keeper of law and order in society but, more importantly, as the planner of national economy and the authoritative yet legal allocator of resources, goods and services in the national community as a whole. In short, state interventionism is the father of national economy—more so in the Third World and to a less extent in the west. ‘Neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions was there, as we have shown, a separate economic system in society’ (Polanyi 1957:70). It emerged only under the modern conditions of nation-building.

NATIONALIST AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DIFFERENTIATED

So far we have taken certain basic terms for granted such as egalitarian politics, social communication and mass mobilization. We should define them and indicate their functional relationship to each other. Egalitarian politics, electoral or otherwise, is the struggle for equitable distribution or allocation of power and scarce resources. Mass mobilization is the art of organizing a social collectivity for macro-political action. And social communication is the medium of communicative symbols effective among the members of a given national society. Information concerning egalitarian politics and mass mobilization is transmitted with ease through those structurally predetermined channels of social communication. The ease with which information is transmitted is structurally predetermined to a large extent by the structure of consciousness. That is, there is a definite limit to inputting any type of information into the channels of social communication. Its structure has already been predetermined by previous usage through the ages for communicating values, symbols and ideas by religion. Specifically in the context of nationalism the type of information fed into the channels of social communication has already been described. It essentially consists of cultural symbols that evoke inspiration; a charismatic leader who is the embodiment of popular aspirations; a set of new ideas and values (ideology) that not only point towards a new direction(s) but define the protagonists' burning problems and propose their rational solution.

The function of social communication is to act as the mass media through which new-born social awareness about one's national identity and national interest is transmitted and articulated. Egalitarian politics provides not only an unprecedented incentive for social action brought about by increased social awareness, but also a futuristic ideological direction, if not a working framework, within which socio-political aspirations may be actualized. But neither increased social communication nor egalitarian politics result in any purposeful goal achievement until and unless mass mobilization takes place. Mass mobilization then may be conceived as the organization and articulation of a nation for political action. Political action in the context of our study means mass mobilization for nationalist goals—struggle for independence or separate state, nation-building, defence against external threat or aggression, and so on. (see Figure 4).

In this study we have focused on that 'ism' of the nation or nation-state which more easily facilitates mass mobilization and social communication more than any other type of ideology. The conditions we have specified for the rise of nationalism are not exclusive to nationalism. This is where a distinction between a purely social movement and a nationalist movement




Figure 4 The process of production of mass nationalism

may be in order. Such a distinction, it must be noted, is necessarily more analytical than practical because in practice several characteristics of the two types of movement tend to overlap and coalesce. Despite such practical difficulties, it is still possible and useful to draw an analytic distinction between a social and nationalist movement. In essence a social movement has a distinct class character such as bourgeois, working-class and peasant movement. It indicates the predominance of a particular social class in a particular social movement, though not necessarily exclusive of other classes or social elements. It entails sectorial, not societal mobilization. Thus, a proletarian movement mobilizes mostly the working class; a peasant movement, the peasantry.

A nationalist movement, on the other hand includes almost all the social classes of a national society; it excludes only traitors, a political criterion which cannot be expressed in class category. This is what we mean when we say that nationalism is a transclass societal force, transcending class barriers and appealing psychologically to almost all the classes in a national society. This does not rule out the possibility of the predominance of a particular social class in a nationalist movement, either in terms of leadership or following. For if a society is predominantly a peasant one, the movement in question will naturally assume peasant characteristics. But the critical dividing line is whether a movement attempts to include and mobilize all segments of society or a particular social class. That makes the critical difference between a purely social movement and a nationalist one.

Second, a nationalist movement may be differentiated from a social one in terms of goal orientation. A nationalist movement aims at national unification and state formation. A social movement, on the other hand, seeks to alter or transform social order, economic system, power distribution and the basis of legitimacy.

The difference between the two types of movement is brought into sharp focus when we contrast the differences between classical Marxism and nationalism. Marx opposed nationalism and proposed instead internationalism on the following grounds. Whereas Marxism thinks in terms of class, nationalism feels in terms of the nation or nation-state; whereas Marxism operates in terms of class interest, nationalism acts in terms of national interest; whereas Marxism seeks to unite on the basis of class solidarity, nationalism unites on the basis of national unity transcending class division; whereas Marxism conducts class struggle, nationalism engages in a nationalist movement; whereas Marxism dreams of creating a transnational, classless, stateless global community, nationalism seeks to create or/and defend the nation-state. In short, nationalism violates Marx's law on class categorization, because its psychological appeal and ideological expression embraces almost all the social strata of a mobilized society. Nationalism is exactly in theory

the opposite of classical Marxism though not of Marxism-Leninism, which facilitated the objective coalescence between Marxism and nationalism. This is a different story.

NOTES

- 1 We use the term 'party' in the abstract singular as a political institution in the following discussion. We know in fact several parties exist in capitalist and mixed economies. This is so even during the nationalist movement, although usually one dominant party emerges due to its ability in mass mobilization and social communication. For some examples of successful political parties in the Third World, see the following: Devlin (1976); Guillermaz (1972); Mookerjee (1974); Walshe (1971).
- 2 In China, children from Confucian literate gentry and middle peasant classes who went to school; in India, upper castes; in Arab countries, sheikhs' sons.
- 3 Such were the perceptions shared by the early Egyptians and Chinese alike when they encountered the French and the British forces in the nineteenth century (see Blunt 1907:482; and Teng and Fairbank 1970:28–30).
- 4 The only possible exceptions were West Germany and Japan in the period 1945–69 but their national security was protected by the US nuclear umbrella.

8 The mechanism of mass mobilization: symbol manipulation and identity assertion

Given the essential prerequisites for mass mobilization such as the establishment of a political party, the emergence of a charismatic leader out of the revolutionary situation and the vernacularization of languages suitable for social communication, how does a charismatic leader mobilize the masses? How does he motivate apolitical peasants to engage in mass politics?

The inner mechanism of mass mobilization operates by the sensitive manipulation of cultural symbols and myths which embody the psychic core of a social group. Symbols are the encapsulated collective emotions and sentiments nurtured by culture to which the masses react and respond with passion and without hesitation. Symbols are the epitomization of the most cherished values rooted in society as well as the most deeply-held ideas about social self. The manipulation of key symbols (Ottner 1973:1338–46), therefore, focuses on the most sensitive parts of a collective personality that nationalism crystallizes, thereby instigating popular emotional involvement as well as providing an emotive rationale for political activity.

In many instances certain aspects of the symbolic data also constitute a national identity; and the differences among various national identities so as to maintain their respective uniqueness are made possible by the emphasis each social group makes on a specific ethnic variable, which in turn becomes the key symbol during a mass mobilization. Thus when a leader seeks to mobilize the masses, he consciously or subconsciously manipulates certain symbols that effectively penetrate the heart and soul of social self-hood, self-identity and self-interest. He is instigating the collective ego to assert its general will so that common interest, both cultural and material, may be protected or advanced by means of mass mobilization which is a mode of production of social power in the Third World.

Since the symbolic mechanism of mass mobilization is intricate, we furnish some Third World examples that demonstrate the focal function of key symbols in nationalist movements. The critical question of which aspect

of the traditional component of nationalism may be emphasized most so as to constitute a key symbol depends on a set of given factors: the availability of cultural resources, major political tasks at hand and above all the exigencies of mass mobilization. Therefore, the key symbol varies from case to case but invariably in the Third World it is one of the ethnic variables, not modern ideological categories. Still it is possible to find a focal centrality in each case so that the underlying connecting thread is apparent—the key symbol.

BRAHMINIC SYMBOLS AND HINDU NATIONALISM

Hindu social consciousness under the British impact begins with a symbolic note both at the mass and elite levels. The so-called Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 was actually sparked off by the British army officers' ignorance or careless disregard of the sepoys' religious beliefs: the soldiers were ordered to polish their rifles with animal fat which outraged their religious sentiments.

Similarly the upper caste consciousness which commenced half a century earlier again symbolically enough was occasioned by a spiritual crisis within Hinduism as perceived by the Brahmins. The Hindu self-image as spiritually great seems so deeply rooted in their historical consciousness that it coloured their early reactions to the British rule. The biggest psychological blow to this self-image seemed to have come from the Christian monotheistic challenge to the bewildering Hindu pantheon which consists of 320 million gods and goddesses. Christianity was not the only foreign religion which posed this challenge; Islam did and in sociological terms Guru Nanak (1469–1530) was the first Indian who made a successful attempt at a monotheistic synthesis, Sikhism.

When the British first penetrated Bengal, Raja Rammohan Roy (1772–1833) was the first Indian intellectual to be extremely concerned with the contradiction between monotheism and polytheism. He wrote in Arabic a treatise on monotheism called *Tohfatul Mowahhedin* and another tract on Christianity. While not accepting the Christian conception of one God, he sought from the most ancient and authoritative Hindu religious text, the *Vedas*, the Indic equivalent of a creator, Brahma and so named his sect Brahma Samaj. Following Roy, almost all the Hindu nationalist writers fell back on the defensive argument that claimed 'we too have a monotheistic tradition'. Thus, even the most orthodox Hindu nationalist leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920) planned to write a book on Hindu monotheism to be called *Shankara Darshana*. The Hindu nationalist leader's capitulation to monotheism was also reinforced by the need for Hindu-Muslim unity during the freedom struggle and culminated explicitly in Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) who acknowledged 'no other God but one God of truth and

righteousness' (1931:126). Gandhi's voluminous writings include commentaries on Hinduism, the Koran and the Bible.

The theological controversy between monotheism and polytheism waged during the first hundred years of British rule, arousing Hindu social consciousness. The debate might now sound trite and archaic, but it reveals much about the devastating psychological damage indirectly inflicted upon the Hindu self-image rooted in spiritual greatness by the British who symbolized monotheism. For Hinduism signified not only a faith but also the Hindu national identity and a stable social order based on caste which that religion sanctions, all of which were threatened by the monotheistic attack on polytheism.

I am not suggesting that Hindus were or are religious in the puritan sense of the term, namely the pursuit of other-worldly goals. Rather they appear to be more interested in invoking their numerous deities to help them to better achieve this-worldly ambitions. What I am suggesting is this: Hindu tradition is an all-encompassing cultural system through whose idiom and format the Hindus think, behave and act. Above all their sense of high self-esteem or ethnocentric superiority entirely rests on the myth of spiritual greatness. Viewed from such a psychological perspective early Hindu nationalists might have attributed the secret of British supremacy to Christian monotheism, just as they viewed Hinduism as the ultimate source of their greatness.

If the early nationalistic intellectuals were primarily concerned with the fate of their great tradition in the emerging modern world, their successors became interested in religion as an effective means of mass mobilization and assertion of national identity. Throughout the nationalist movement the eminent leaders made it a point to write something on or about the Hindu tradition. Raja Rammohan Roy wrote six books on the various aspects of the *Vedanta* philosophy; Bal Gangadhar Tilak four books on the *Vedas* and *Gita*; Sri Aurobindo, three on the *Upanishad*, *Gita* and *Yoga*; Gandhi, on the *Bhagavad Gita*, and so on. S. Radhakrishnan (1888–1975), who became a sophisticated and respected ideologue of Hindu nationalism, wrote more than ten books on the various aspects of Hinduism and Buddhism.

Those writings and, particularly, speeches by nationalist leaders and ideologues sought to construct a Hindu nationalist myth that would mesmerize the masses into political action. The myth consisted of three interrelated 'symbolic truths': (a) India's cultural heritage is one of the greatest treasure-houses of wisdom; (b) the richness of Sanskrit language and literature is unparalleled in the world; (c) Indians are of no mean race—they are Aryan (Norbu 1988:327).

Although each of these claims was a powerful symbol in itself, the key symbol most frequently deployed in mass mobilization was the Hindu tradition itself which includes Sanskrit also.

The first Indian nationalist leader to discover the application of religious symbols in mass mobilization was Tilak canonized by the public as *Lokmanya*—people's hero. He revived many *Ganesh* festivals and the cult of *Shivaji* in Maharashtra from where he operated. *Ganesh* is a Hindu deity symbolizing luck and auspiciousness, and *Ganesh pujas* (worship/ritual) are usually performed as a prelude to any significant undertaking so as to invoke divine blessings for a successful outcome. Apart from its symbolic significance to the institution of the Indian nationalist movement for which the British called Tilak 'the father of Indian unrest' (de Bary *et al.* 1959:719), *Ganesh* was and still is the most popular Hindu deity in Maharashtra. It was this popular cult which Tilak sought to politicize and bring about mass mobilization in Maharashtra. The cult of *Shivaji* was equally emotive. He was the popular hero of the Marathas who fought against the Moghul Emperor, Aurangzeb. The politicization of these two symbols inaugurated the era of mass politics and Hindu nationalism in modern Indian history.

In Bengal Sri Aurobindo Ghose (1872–1950) followed the same method of politicizing tradition to mobilize masses with some regional variation, the cult of *Shakti*. *Shakti* is the divine energy aspect of *Mahakali*, a goddess cult most prevalent in Bengal. Why Aurobindo invoked the *Shakti* manifestation of *Mahakali* for the nationalist cause is pertinent. He explained, 'We have all things else, but we are empty of strength, void of energy. We have abandoned Shakti and are therefore abandoned by Shakti' (Johnson 1974:33). The choice of apt symbols for motivating mass mobilization in Maharashtra and Bengal was determined by two criteria pertinent to the production of Hindu nationalism: that the symbols must be a popular cult in the region and that symbolic meanings must possess emotive significance to nationalism.

Tilak and Aurobindo operated in their home provinces, manipulating regional symbols: *Ganesh* and *Mahakali*. From 1919 it was Mahatma Gandhi who effected a transition from limited regional symbolism to pan-Indic symbol. We refer to his inseparable *dharma charkha* (wheel) with which he always commenced his public meetings and which subsequently adorned the Indian National Congress flag. As any student of Indology knows, the wheel symbolizes the propagation of *Dharma* (religion) so native to the heart and soul of Indic civilization. Thus, when the Mahatma in his native attire began a public meeting by turning the wheel, he was religiously propagating nationalism in the manner of *Dharma*, because *charkha* at once evoked in the Hindu psyche a galaxy of emotions and sentiments associated with the historical memory of glory that was India. At the same time his symbolic act signified the authenticity and righteousness of the Hindu nationalist movement, which was to flow directly from the inner recesses of the Hindu civilization transcending caste and regionalism.

A religious symbol acts as a shorthand for a series of interconnected 'symbolic truths' associated with the deepest and most fundamental human emotions pregnant in a particular culture. These symbols are not only potent but by their very symbolic nature possess universal appeal to the people belonging to that value system. When they are manipulated with sensitivity and skill, as done by the Hindu nationalist leaders, symbols at once arouse such public passions and emotions that no amount of economic interest appeal can motivate. It is in this affective way that the manipulation of religious symbols for political ends has become the most effective instrument of social communication and mass mobilization in all the tradition-bound societies in the Third World. For mass mobilization means in essence to galvanize masses of people for the purpose of mass politics so that the leader-directed goals may be realized with the help of social power. Cultural symbols have proved to be the most efficacious means of mass mobilization because the structure of collective conscience in traditional yet literate societies has invariably been imbued by a given world religion.

Bipin Chandra Pal captured the spirit of Hindu nationalism when he wrote in 1910:

A fervent religious spirit breathes through every poem and hymn in which the new nationalist sentiments have found expression during the last five or six years. It has been the inspiration of every nationalist leader who has drawn in their thousands and tens of thousands, to the nationalist platforms. It has created new symbols—a new form of idolatry, as some perhaps would call it—representing the apotheosis of the geographical habitat of the race. And it is this intensely religious note which constitutes the reality and the gravity of the present situation.

(1910:22)

The politicization of the supposedly non-political domain, namely tradition for political ends, has not ended with the achievement of independence in 1947; it continues to be a critical factor that can even cause the downfall of government. The caste war of 1990 which brought about the downfall of V.P.Singh's government is the latest example. Singh's caste politics which sought to create his independent political constituency among the lower castes and the Bharatiya Janata Party's '*rath yatra*' which enacted the Hindu equivalent of symbolic *jihad* from the *Mahabharat* in an attempt to mobilize the Hindu majority for the 'purpose' of building a Ram Temple in an area claimed by Muslims and where a mosque stands—clearly demonstrate that the logic of Indian politics continues to be the manipulation of key symbols. As we shall see, the Shah's downfall in Iran (1979) may also be viewed from a similar perspective. This is not obviously true of the west. Ruling Labour parties had to quit office in Austria in 1923, in Belgium and France in 1926

and in Germany in 1931, in order to 'save the currency', not tradition. This marks one of the fundamental differences between the basic nature of European and Third World nationalisms.

'THE TRUE MUSLIM' MYTH AND JIHAD IN ARAB NATIONALISM

The Islamic case as exemplified by the Arab states is functionally similar to the Hindu case in the sense of the pivotal role played by tradition in the production of Arab nationalism. However, there is some difference too. Being an extremely polytheistic religion, Hinduism is rich in symbolism which, as we have seen, the Hindu nationalist leaders skilfully manipulated for mass mobilization. On the other hand, Islam being an exceedingly orthodox monotheistic religion inherently lacks cultural symbols. Even then most nationalist Arab leaders created necessary symbols out of the limited Islamic cultural resources as they attempted to mobilize the masses.

The genesis of modern Arab social consciousness with the overtones of Arab nationalism directed against the Ottoman Empire may be traced to Wahhabism which stemmed from the Arabcentric teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–91). This Islamic scholastic contended that the Ottoman rule in the Arab world, where he extensively travelled, had regrettably resulted in the degeneration of Islamic culture and corruption of Islam. He equated 'true Islam' with the generation of the Prophet which meant 'the *Arabs alone* were the true bearers of the tradition of Islam' (Tibi 1981:63).

On the surface Wahhabism appears to be a religious revivalist movement, but its unintended consequences for the emergence of Arab national consciousness need to be appreciated. To claim that only the Arabs are the authentic Muslims is to identify the emotive locus of Arab nationalism: Islam. Thus, even Iranians who have their own long recorded history different from the Arabs would claim that 'The national identity of Iran is, in fact, identical to its Islamic identity' (Muhajeri 1982:11). To blame the Turks for Islamic degeneration is to identify the target of Arab nationalism, and to draw the sharpest possible ethnic boundaries that would differentiate the Arabs from the generalized other, namely, the Turks.

Thus, even Napoleon in 1798 endeavoured to appeal to the Arab sense of nationalism. He emphasized the Arab cultural differences from the Turks and glorified the Arab past. He brought with him an Arabic press for printing his declarations and tried to revive the use of Arabic in place of Turkish (Izzedin 1953:65).

If al-Wahhab was the initiator and the principal ideologue of anti-Ottoman Arab nationalism, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97) and his pupil Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905) performed a similar function in the

production of latter day anti-European Arab nationalism. However, unlike al-Wahhab who was purely an Islam scholastic-cum-priest, al-Afghani had been exposed to western learning which introduced a modernist dimension to Arab national consciousness. This was clearly reflected in his rationalist approach to tradition; he considered Islam more of a civilization than a religion. That civilization signified to him an all-embracing cultural system which must be protected, if not improved by adopting western rational knowledge. This rationalist approach to tradition necessarily entailed certain degrees of intellectualization and politicization of Islam which produced neo-traditionalism. For his main concern was the question of how to ensure the future of Islamic culture in the modern world which posed unprecedented challenges. He adopted a dual strategy: selective modernization and 'to awaken the Islamic peoples to resistance against Europe'. He could

conjure up the glorious past, appeal for renewal and awaken passions for a great vision of the future, the unity of all Muslims...It was certainly directed against European imperialism but no less against those representatives of Islam who held their peoples in thrall.

(Tibi 1981:65)

The implications of al-Afghani's neo-traditionalist ideas to Arab nationalism are less obtuse than those of Wahhabism. First, he was one of the first and perhaps the most influential Arab renaissance man to obliquely discuss the role of tradition and modernity in the process of nationalism. The objective role of oriental renaissance under western impact was to increase intellectual mobilization as a prelude to mass nationalism. And al-Afghani and his followers exercised great influence among the Islamic literati in Arab countries in particular and the Islamic world in general. Second, he identified the central target of Arab nationalism as European imperialism. Thus, he drew an ethnic boundary that would differentiate the Muslims from the generalized other (European) so necessary to create social consciousness about national identity. In the pursuit of these two goals, he deployed Islamic tradition as a means of intellectual mobilization and mass involvement.

The centrality of both al-Wahhab's and al-Afghani's preaching and political activity had been the preservation of Islamic tradition in the changing modern world. However, the line of drawing ethnic boundaries so as to differentiate the Arabs from the generalized other differed due to different historical situations. The former differentiated the 'true Muslims' (Arabs) from 'the degenerated ones' (Turks), and the latter Muslims from European imperialists. If applied to the then Arab situation, al-Afghani's preaching had implications to anti-European Arab nationalism; if extended to the whole Islamic world, it implied a Pan-Islamic movement. Both 'were revitalizing movement directed against foreign domination, whether

Ottoman or European, and both emphasized the Arab origins of Islam' (Tibi 1981:68).

These two intellectual pioneers constitute the Islamic lineages of Arab nationalism in the modern epoch, and their nationalistic traditions are continued up to the present by their followers. Contemporary followers, of course, change the emphasis and idiom according to their particular understanding and changing situations such as Ba'ath socialism which is a strange mixture of Arabism and Leninism or Khomeini's Revolution, which is another strange mixture of Islamic fundamentalism and Leninism in its use of Leninist categories of imperialism, revolution, and so on. But the core anchorage of Arab nationalism remains the Islamic tradition in whatever manner it is interpreted either along Wahhabian or al-Afghanian lines.

Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz echoed Wahhabism when he wrote an article entitled 'Islam and Arab Nationalism' in 1952 that Islam is

a religion revealed first to the Arabs themselves. In this sense, it is their own special religion. The Prophet is from them, the Koran is in their language; Islam retained many of their previous customs, adopting and polishing the best of them.

(Haim 1976:176)

It is not only Arab Muslim leaders but also Arab Christians who emphatically reiterate the inseparable relation between Islam and Arab nationalism. Qustantin Zuraiq writes, 'When the Arabs today look back on the past, they find that the origin of their union and the seed of their amity was the work of the Arab leader Muhammad b. Abdullah' (Haim 1976:170). Edmond Rabbath, a Syrian Christian, made the same observation: 'Islam is the Arab national religion which has served to make the Arabs into a cohesive group' (Chalala 1987:33). He also observes that

Islam shows itself to be Arab in the first degree; take some of its fundamental ordinances such as the prohibition against reading the Koran in any but its Arab text (now, however, becoming weaker), or the numerous political institutions (the caliphate, for example, which according to a hadith must fall to a descendant of Quraish), or the religious institutions (such as the pilgrimage to Mecca, the heart of Islam).

(Haim 1976:109)

Thus, Najm Bezirgan concludes,

As is clear from this survey of the literature on the relation between Arab nationalism and Islam, religion has always been the idiom in which the overwhelming majority of the nationalist intellectuals have expressed themselves. Recent Arabic thought has not known any militant attack on

religion, although religious institutions and the clergy have been attacked, particularly by the Arab Marxists and the leftists.

(1978-9:43)

Having described the behaviour-orienting ideas and pan-ethnic symbols of Arab nationalism, we shall now briefly demonstrate how these symbols become operative in the context of a mass mobilization. Now there are two fundamental reasons why Islam becomes intimately involved with Arab nationalism in particular. Muhammad 'Abduh, the pupil of al-Afghani, explained the first rationale in the context of Egyptian education which equally applies to the use of Islamic symbols in Arab mass mobilization. He commented,

The Egyptian soul is completely consumed by religion in such a way that it can no longer be severed from it. If one seeks to educate and improve the Egyptian nation without religion, it is as if a farmer would try to sow seed in unsuitable soil...his effort will be in vain.

(Tibi 1981:67)

The second rationale is clear from Rashid Rida's answer to an Indonesian journalist's question about the meaning of *Asabiyya* (tribal feeling):

The Prophet made this clear in his saying 'Asabiyya consists in a man helping his kin group (qaum) in oppression' quoted by the Imam Ahmad. It is also well known that Islam necessarily imposes on its people hostility toward foreign aggression and the duty to fight them. Indeed, all doctors have declared that the Holy War should become an obligation incumbent on every individual if the enemy should attack the Muslims or occupy some of their regions.

(Haim 1976:176)

Unlike other world religions, Islam sanctions holy war to protect Muslim interest. Such a religious sanction cannot help but promote Islamic nationalism; for Islam directly involves itself with this worldly group activity and social concern. In this sense Islam becomes the political soul of Arab nationalism. What makes this holy writ a reality is the unwavering faith of Muslims who literally follow what the Koran says. The collective conscience of any Muslim group is so deeply spirited and structured by Islam that the religion pre-determines the apt symbol that would be an effective means of mass mobilization; non-Islamic or non-Arabic symbols would simply fall on deaf ears.

Hence, throughout the modern period, Islam has been used by various Muslim nations to achieve their political ends. Abdul Hamid

regarded Islam as a uniting force hallowed by custom and faith and dear to the hearts of the masses and capable, therefore, of consolidating the

Empire and enhancing his own prestige alike with the European powers and beyond the confines of Turkey in the Orient.

(Kohn 1929:228)

We might recall that the Arabs under the influence of al-Afghani were doing exactly the same: using 'true Islam' as the basis of anti-Ottoman Arab nationalism. In Egypt, too, at the turn of this century, 'French influence had taught the leaders of the new nationalist movement a rationalist and indifferent attitude towards religion, but they were prepared to *make use of Islam and the Pan-Islamic movement for their nationalist aims*' (ibid.: 191). Contemporary Egypt may be one of the less fundamentalist Islamic nations in the world but still it continues to use Islamic tradition to legitimate and reinforce state policies. Mohamed Heikal writes, 'In Egypt the religious authorities were called upon first to say that the war against Israel was a holy one, and later that it was a sacred duty to make peace with Israel' (1981:128).

We have mentioned Turkey and Egypt because they have a longer history of modernization than most Islamic nations and are relatively more secularized; other Islamic states are obvious examples. In particular we may illustrate with the Iranian Revolution (1963–79) in which Khomeini applied Islamic tenets and symbols for mass mobilization. The politicization of tradition was the key to the Islamic Revolution in Iran. During that decade-long mass movement Ayatollah Khomeini was projected as the symbol of 'true Islam' (Muhajeri 1982:25) who carried out 'all revolutionary orders in the same manner as a religious imperative' (ibid.: 24). The USA was projected as the 'Great Satan' (ibid.: 139), and the Shah as a western agent dedicated to the tasks of 'de-Islamization of Iran' and 'annihilation of Islam'—in short, a symbol of 'Great destroyer of Islamic culture' (ibid.: 4, 12, 15). The objective of the Islamic Revolution was to 'destroy the heads of treason, the idols, the human images and false gods who disseminate injustice and corruption on earth' (Hussain 1985:76). In short *jihad*.

Khomeini preached not 'the Islam of the Caliphate, of the palace and of the ruler but Islam of the people, of the exploited and of the poor' (Hussain 1985:80). He defined Islam as 'the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism' (ibid.: 66). In other words, Khomeini politicized tradition but primarily for political ends. This is what makes religion an explosive political force that can 'overthrow a regime which was armed to the teeth' (Muhajeri 1982:59).

The organizational structure of the Iranian mass mobilization ran along religious networks, especially *haiyats* and mosques. In Tehran alone in 1974 there were 12,300 such religious organizations involved in Khomeini's movement. We do not have further reliable statistics but a recent American

study concludes: 'The most striking aspect of the Iranian Revolution was the nature and magnitude of participation in it. Millions of Iranians were mobilized into non-violent anti-regime demonstrations throughout the country's major centres' (Green 1982:xi). We emphasize that all this level of mass mobilization was made possible by Khomeini's adroit application of Islamic symbols in order to politicize and mobilize a people whose soul has been constantly 'consumed' by Islam. They know no other symbols.

UNCERTAIN COUNTERRACIALISM IN AFRICAN NATIONALISM

Black Africa, with the exception of Ethiopia, qualitatively differs from China, India or the Middle East in that no world religion touched the 'dark continent' until the nineteenth century. This means Africa lacks a unifying literate culture, unlike Asia. This relative absence of a great tradition prior to the western penetration has far-reaching consequences for national unity, identity and nation-building in contemporary Africa. These problems plagued the African nationalist movements and continue to do so even after independence. How to build a larger unity that transcends the clan or tribe? How to create pan-ethnic symbols that could be used for mass mobilization? How to define African identity?

'Pluralism' (Kuper and Smith 1971) is a mild term to describe the extreme state of tribal particularism and ethnic fragmentation that divides and characterizes African societies and cultures. African anthropology has considerable intellectual tradition behind it but even that has not succeeded in reaching any consensus on how to classify the teeming African communities on the biological, linguistic and cultural basis (Hiernaux 1974:91-7). Africa lives in a precarious state of extreme tribal particularism which even the authoritarian states created since decolonization have not yet managed to unify because each state is not congruent with a corresponding cultural unit. Nor can we say that dominant or major ethnic groups have managed to establish cultural and political hegemony which can maintain the integrity and unity of multinational states, like China or India. In Africa almost all are artificial administrative units based neither on common culture, nor on common language but are the political products of colonial struggles and consequent division of Africa into European colonies. The only uniting factor is the colour of the skin (black) or race which, as we shall demonstrate, becomes the key symbol of anti-colonial nationalism in black Africa.

But it takes high quality French education for Leopold Senghor and Aime Cesaire to transform the negative image of being black into a positive identity. We need to understand empathetically what it means to be 'black' in white-

dominated societies. Almost all black leaders bemoan that low self-esteem shared by all blacks. Marcus Garvey described the blacks as 'an obscure, despised race' (Kedourie 1970:283). The secretary of the African Congress Youth League echoed a similar negative self-image when he wrote, in 1944. 'We are alarmed and startled by the bitter and painful realization that these 150,000,000 African blacks have for centuries slumbered or lain dormant in this dark continent' (Walshe 1971:336). Huey Newton narrates that the 'unenlightened black people defined the white man by calling him "the Man", which carried the implication that the black man did not even define himself as man' (Kuper 1974:83). In 1981 the Black Theology seminar in South Africa reached a similar conclusion: They (blacks) experience themselves as black, and this experience makes it hard for them at all times to experience themselves as men' (ibid.: 97).

In this way the black identity was reduced both subjectively and objectively to a subhuman level and their heritage to a 'cultural wasteland' which had neither improved the black lot nor contributed anything worthwhile to world civilization. Unfortunately, the comparison has usually been drawn not with the orient but with Europe. Black has been projected as the opposite of white. The low self-esteemed self-image has been formed by the comparative cognition of simple African culture with other complex cultures, particularly that of the whites; and the negative black identity was created and perpetuated by the black historical experience under white domination such as the apartheid in South Africa, the slavery and segregation in the USA and the colonial rule in the rest of Africa. As Tom Mboya recalls, 'To foster this spirit of inferiority among Africans, the administration had identified everything good with the European and everything bad or inferior with the African' (Kedourie 1970:480).

Hence the early phase of African nationalism such as advocated by the Congress Youth League attempted to 'eradicate any sense of African inferiority, encourage mass action and associate the South African struggle with the wider movement for African emancipation throughout the continent' (Walshe 1971:418). Pan-Africanism was 'essentially an indigenous phenomenon thrown up from the struggle against white privilege on a predominantly black continent' (ibid.: 339). As an African nationalist leader recalls, 'In the days of KAU [Kenyan African Union] independence was referred to but the main emphasis was on the struggle against the colour bar and the reservation of land for white farmers' (Kedourie 1970:481). The African National Congress also felt similarly: 'The majority would have to liberate themselves from the pattern of racial repression by mass organization and probably extensive passive resistance' (Walshe 1971:332).

Given the unenviable objective situation in which the whites dominated the blacks in all spheres of life, the early African nationalists conceived their

struggle, not so much in a positive sense of independence, but essentially in counterracialism: blacks versus whites, and not so much nationalists versus colonists. For apartheid and colour-bar automatically differentiated blacks from whites, thereby drawing their mutually exclusive and antagonistic ethnic boundaries strictly on racial lines. The black identity had to centre around black race itself; for there were no other binding forces on a pan-ethnic basis. Even colonialism was subjectively experienced by Africans as white domination which is a racial category.

But black identity was (and still is?) problematic. The identity of any ethnic group is a positive self-image that is projected in the world as worthy of public notice. This was not the case with the black identity which contained negativities of all sorts, partly true and partly exaggerated. In order to make it serviceable as a key symbol around which mass mobilization might take place, the negative black identity has to be transformed to a positive one with which blacks can easily if not proudly identify themselves. This was the function of *negritude*, made first not in Africa, but in France, and then imported to Africa and around the globe where blacks are found.

Leo Kuper says that *negritude* initially 'developed as a reaction to white racism, as dialectical opposition to the cultural values imposed by whites' (1974:92). However, Senghor later refined it as the African cultural heritage in a positive civilizational category of the universal. It includes African culture, civilization and value system, all of which make the blacks proud to be negroes as encapsulated in the slogan, 'Black is Beautiful'. It positively emphasizes all African elements, especially the cult of black womanhood and the glorification of the wild African landscape.

Negritude is an attempt to transform the negative negro identity into a positive one by emphasizing the best in African man, culture and nature.

The quintessence of *Negritude* is the unlimited positive evaluation given to the fact of being Black in the New World as in Africa. Thus, the lyrical Pan-Africanism of Senghor and Césaire turns out to be just a new way of compensating psychologically for the inferiority complex induced by historical experience.

(Geiss 1974:319)

Since *negritude* is an abstraction rationalized by a few educated Africans, it has to be translated into native African symbolic terms in order to make it serviceable for mass mobilization. Africanism is symbolized by the 'Big Black Man' who would lead the masses to 'black salvation', and this popular image of a black nationalist leader, educated either in France or England, has emotional resonance in the traditional African symbol of a chieftain who used to lead his tribe or clan to victory. It worked. As Tom Mboya writes,

The people have to be organized so that they are like an army: they must have a general, they must have discipline, they must have a symbol. In many cases the symbol is the national leader himself and it is necessary to have this kind of symbol of an heroic father-figure if you are to have unquestioning discipline among the different groups and personalities who should rally their followers behind him.

(Kedourie 1970:478)

We have briefly described the process of politicization of African identity whose essence was believed to be embodied in the person of a popular nationalist leader who would lead the black masses to 'black salvation'. This popular yearning for a 'black saviour' was evident in the early African response to Christianity which actually preceded *negritude* consciousness by half a century. We find two types of black response to the Christian encounter: (1) select application of Christianity, especially its egalitarian tenets to the black situation; (2) the Africanization of Christianity in order to create symbols of black saviour and salvation both in this and other worldly terms.

Marcus Garvey, President of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, is an outstanding example of the first category. He applied the Christian doctrine of equality of all human beings before the eyes of God to the black situation. God, he argued,

never created an inferior man...All that you see in creation, all that you see in the world, was created by God for the use of man, and you four hundred million black souls have as much right to your possession in this world as any other race

(Kedourie 1970:290)

The early African leader's statements 'provide numerous instances of Christian values as the source of political ideas' (Walshe 1971:8, 10). In fact, Peter Walshe traces the origins of African political consciousness in Southern Africa 'to the impact of the Christian missions and to the development of a non-racial constitution in the Cape' (1971:1). Similarly, Imanuel Geiss traces the beginnings of anti-colonial nationalism in the Gold Coast to the spread of Methodism there (1974:58-76). In other words, the world religion provided for the first time in African history certain general cultural categories through which African nationalism can be expressed.

The classic example of the second category is the phenomenon of Messianic Simon Kimbangu in the Congo. In many parts of black Africa where Christianity had spread, 'one of the most characteristic phenomena of changes that occurred during the colonial period was the spread of Messianic

movements leading to the emergence of ephemeral Negro churches' (Balandier 1970:410) opposed to the official white established churches. This Africanization of Christianity was particularly widespread in South Africa. It opposed the Christianity imported by the colonists in the same way that it rejected the colonial domination, and it was in this sense that the Messianic movements implied religious emancipation, and nationalist awakening (ibid.: 418).

Simon Kimbangu is a case in point which is well documented (Anderson 1958:134–6). He is believed to be a black prophet to whom God revealed twelve commandments that would lead the 'black race' to religious salvation and political freedom. The catechism refers to Kimbangu as Jehovah's Witness and King, King and Saviour of the black people, alternately. 'He is the Leader and Saviour of the Black people in the same way as saviours of other races, Moses, Jesus Christ, Mahomet and Buddha' (Balandier 1970:418). Georges Balandier remarks that the Belgian government 'was right not to make any distinction between his aspiration to found a "Congolese religion" and his aspiration to create an independent Congolese state' (ibid.: 418).

Thus, when they first encountered a world religion, blacks saw in Christianity some possible answers to the political problems that plagued them under colonialism and white racism. The Messianic movements were the mechanisms, undoubtedly inspired and influenced by Christianity, to create some basis for unity and identity that transcends the restricted limits of the clan or tribe, and means of mobilizing the blacks for their political salvation. Religio-political Messianism was the sad reflection of the desperate yearnings of the fragmented African tribes for all that they lacked in comparison with the generalized other (white): unity, pan-ethnic identity, leadership and organization. This is an African way of using a world religion to 'solve' African problems, and it was not limited to Christianity either. When Islam was introduced in some parts of black Africa in the nineteenth century, Mahdis appeared in the upper valley of the Nile who put Islam to political use. The so-called Mad Mullah in Somaliland sought to overcome tribal particularism by imposing religious unity and led the Somali armed struggle against the British for twenty years.

The 'natural' African leaders in the sense of not educated enough but politically conscious, often conceived of answers to white-racism and colonial domination in Messianic or salvationist terms. Even Marcus Garvey talked about the 'redemption' and 'resurrection' of black Africa (1923:87–97). This yearning for 'Black Saviour' and 'Black Salvation' reflected the depth to which the blacks had fallen, mainly due to cultural poverty and the desperate feeling that only a miracle—that Christianity or Islam promises—could 'save' them both politically and spiritually. Hence the

recurrence of the Messianic movement in search of instant salvation, both political and spiritual. For no world religion had sufficient time in Africa to unintentionally lay down the cultural foundations for national unity and identity. National culture-formation is a long historical process as shown in Chapter 5.

TERRITORIALITY AND POWER IN HAN NATIONALISM

The Confucian case differs considerably from those of India and the Middle East in the virtual absence of religious symbols. The relatively this-worldly and semi-empirical orientation of the Confucian culture has a lot to do with the shaping of the Chinese diathesis similar to the European paradigm. For instance, substantive issues like territoriality, power and modernity appear to have played a more decisive role than cultural symbols in the long process of Chinese nationalism.

Yet symbols, either in abstract cultural or tangible forms, are imperative in any mass mobilization as motivating factors, and they occur in Chinese nationalism. We can classify them into three distinct periods during which three different symbols alternated, motivating three corresponding classes. The first phase (1839–1911) might be considered a traditional form of nationalism in which the Confucian tradition played a predominant role among the Confucian literati; the next phase (1895–1919) may be considered a brief transitional period in which ‘Mr Science’ and ‘Mr Democracy’ as modern symbols captured the imagination of the youth educated along western lines in treaty ports or abroad, arousing their national consciousness in the modern sense; and the last phase (1931–1945), especially since 1937, witnessed the politicization of perhaps the most powerful Confucian symbol, which is closely connected with ancestor worship, forming the core of the little tradition in Confucian China.

China proper, populated by the Han people, had from early times adequate potential for nation formation and national consciousness dating perhaps from the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644): (a) a centralized bureaucratic state; (b) a nation-wide legal system; (c) a highly-educated ruling class which includes the scholar-officials and gentry with considerable social mobility for a traditional society; (d) a homogeneous population that identifies with the centralized state; (e) a common written language whose unifying impact cannot be underestimated; (f) a national ideology expressed in terms of Chinese history, literature and social philosophy (Confucian Classics), which was transmitted through the state-run examination system up to 1905.

Given such high potentiality for nation formation, it is not surprising that the Han people, particularly the literate classes, exhibited throughout their

recorded history a marked social consciousness centred upon Sino-centric cultural identity in contradistinction to the 'barbarians'. However, it was hardly politicized before 1839 on any significant scale.

When Joseph Levenson called it 'culturalism' (1967:131) he was evidently viewing this politico-cultural phenomenon from the perspective of post-French Revolution European nationalism, but that could hardly be the universal paradigm of nationalism. In the context of our study, the so-called culturalism appears to be a classic example of traditional nationalism as defined earlier (see pp. 88–91). It does not consist of metaphysical doctrines like Islam or Hinduism but of concrete elements found in the traditional component of any western nationalism.

Such favourable conditions, especially the high degrees of cultural and linguistic homogeneity, would suggest that the compact Han areas *sans* Empire constituted a nation even prior to the western penetration. This means that the Han people had already reached a higher level of political maturity than most parts of the orient, and their sense of national consciousness predates others in the Third World. We shall cite some illustrative evidences of Han nationalist reaction to the Manchu takeover of China (1644–1911). Wang Fu-chih (1619–1692) wrote:

Since the forming of groups is inherent in human nature and the establishment of a ruler is for the purpose of protecting the group, it is logical and necessary for the group to govern itself. Each race should be controlled by its own ruler, and *should never allow any encroachment by an alien race.*

(Teng and Fairbank 1970:10)

Chu Chih-yu (1600–1682) was another Han nationalist thinker and activist. He fled to Annam and Japan to seek aid against the Manchu invaders. Before his death in Japan, he made his will that his body should not be returned to China so long as the Manchus rule (ibid.: 10–11). Lu Liu-liang (1629–1683) and Tseng Ching (1679–1736) also attempted with their followers to overthrow the nascent Manchu dynasty. Lu, 'deplored the plight into which China had fallen and the inability of the Chinese people to check the disaster of the Manchu invasion' (ibid.: 11). His anti-Manchu Han nationalism influenced a whole generation during the Yung-cheng period (1723–35). This Han nationalist movement was reflected in various secret societies 'which sought to overthrow the Manchus' (ibid.: 12).

Here we see some clear evidences of traditional nationalism including the nationalist doctrine that the ruler and the ruled must be of the same racial stock and culture. However, it was not modern nationalism due to the absence of explicit doctrines of popular sovereignty and mass mobilization which alone can arouse societal consciousness, resulting in mass nationalism. At

least there was one modernist thinker, Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–1695), who anticipated the modern ideological dimension of nationalism: ‘In ancient times the people of the empire were the primary interest, the ruler was secondary, and what the ruler planned and did was for the empire’. He has this to say regarding law in governance: ‘Some commentators even say, there is government by man, no government by law; I should say, government by law should come before government by man’ (Teng and Fairbank 1970:8). Huang’s contemporary Ku Yen-wu (1613–1682) advocated that ‘The power of each magistrate should be again divided among the heads of small political divisions, where the people should have considerable right of self-government’ (ibid.: 9).

The Chinese officials and literati before the 1911 revolution often used to describe their country both as a ‘nation’ (*minzu*) and as an empire (*diguo*). This imperial idea, not the traditional Han nationalism, faced an unprecedented crisis when the western powers began to penetrate China. The Chinese mode of exercising or, more appropriately, demonstrating imperial power was the ostentatious display of presumed superior Confucian culture to the ‘barbarian’ subordinate groups, rather than a systematic political domination. For the virtues of the Han civilization were so superior and beneficial that the ‘barbarians’ would be automatically attracted to the superior Chinese civilization. In practice what was required of the non-Han nations was symbolic submission to the Son of Heaven as personified by the Emperor, and before the western encounter this was symbolized by the occasional tribute-paying system of relations between China and peripheral states in Central, East and South-East Asia.

Implicit in the Confucian notion of universalistic rule by moral virtue is the Han sense of cultural superiority complex that shapes the Chinese behaviour to the non-Han groups, and this made it particularly problematic when dealing with westerners imbued with egalitarian ideas. Thus, the Opium War is seen as ‘a clash between two different cultures’ (Chang 1964: ix). A majority of the Chinese still thought of

the foreigners with blue eyes and red beards whom they were now encountering as identical with the Hsiungnu, Khitan, Turfan or Uighur of the past. They were confident that, even though the Chinese were currently being oppressed by western military power, *eventually the foreigners would yield to the influence of their sages.*

(Li 1967:164, emphasis mine)

The Opium War of 1839 and the series of Anglo-French expeditions culminating in the unequal treaties of Nanking (1842) and of Peking (1860) proved beyond doubt the western barbarian supremacy over the assumed Confucian superiority. This created among the Confucian literati a complex

politico-cultural crisis, shaking the very foundations of Chinese self-image and world order. The old assumptions like culture as a symbol of imperial power, cultural hegemony as a civilized mode of exercising power, and even culture as a value system, were all seriously questioned. More sensible among the scholar-officials, however, reasoned that while the Confucian culture as a value system continued to be valid even under the trying circumstances, culture as a mode of exercising power was inadequate. China must learn from the west the new method of creating a strong army.

After peace, it is proper for us to learn the superior techniques of the barbarians in order to control them. The superior techniques of the barbarians are three: (1) warships, (2) firearms, and (3) methods of maintaining and training soldiers.

(Fairbank 1969:182)

Liang Chih-chao went a step further when he wrote,

In the world there is only power—there is no other force. That the strong always rule the weak is in truth the first universal rule of nature. Hence, if we wish to attain liberty, there is no other road; we can only seek first to be strong.

(Levenson 1967:117)

A couple of decades later Mao would formulate how that power was to be achieved: 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun' (Schram 1969:290), for 'foreigners treat a weak nation like a piece of meat to be eaten or like prey to be swallowed by whales' (Li 1967:165). (The current Chinese ambition to make China a great military power has its roots in their nineteenth-century dealing with western imperial powers.)

During the first phase of Chinese nationalism, the great tradition (Confucianism) became the focal centrality of renewed intellectual activity and the pivot around which intense intellectual mobilization took place among the literate strata of Chinese society. Tradition was thus intellectualized and politicized more than ever before, producing widespread social consciousness centred upon neo-traditionalism. In the final phase of the Chinese nationalism, the peasantry's innate land-hunger and sacred sense of territoriality were consistently and skilfully exploited by the Marxists in the context of the Japanese invasion (1937–45). While Chiang Kai-shek was more determined to 'exterminate' the communists than fight the Japanese aggressors, the communists consistently called for a united front to expel the foreign aggressors as the first and foremost task. As Mao Zedong declared in 1935, 'The first question to be settled is whether China's land will be owned by the Japanese or Chinese' (Wong 1973:16). The May 4th Movement generation and other nationalists in the urban areas agreed with Mao's sense of priority:

(a) fight Japan, not a civil war; (b) mobilize the masses and arm them to fight Japan (Mao 1965). Such nationalists in increasing numbers joined Mao's forces in the countryside, and the intelligentsia-peasant alliance was formed. The so-called Nationalists Party (Kuomintang-KMT) 'lost' China because it was more anti-communist than anti-imperialist; and the communists won it because they were anti-imperialist and therefore more genuinely nationalist under that situation.

The Chinese Marxist ideologues always argue that 'anti-imperialism' was the motive force of the Chinese Revolution (Hu 1981), and quite rightly so. But what is the implication of anti-imperialism to the Chinese folk culture so as to comprehend what it meant to the millions of peasants who actively involved themselves in the communist-led anti-Japanese war? Stripped of Leninist jargon, it meant in concrete terms to the Chinese peasants that the foreign invaders had no moral or legal right to occupy and usurp any part of the Chinese 'good earth' which belongs to the sons of the soil by birth and history. This slogan immensely appealed to the peasants because it struck a sympathetic and resonant chord in the little tradition whose core practice was ancestor worship. The folk belief is that the spirits of one's ancestors reside in the ancestral land where their dead bodies are buried, and that any Chinese dead body, no matter where he or she might have died, be buried under the Chinese 'good earth'. Hence, the early Chinese immigrants in the USA and South-East Asian countries used to send their parents or relatives' dead bodies to their respective ancestral land in China to be properly buried there, not in any alien land. Similarly, when the Marxist regime carried out land reforms in China, landlords and rich peasants showed most reluctance to lose their ancestral burial grounds, not obviously for economic but sentimental reasons.

This deep attachment to land was not confined to peasants alone. When the communists, during their Long March, passing from Eastern Tibet, reached the Chinese 'good earth', they could not hide their emotions. A participant in the Long March recalled,

I remember when we came out of the grasslands (Eastern Tibet) and broke through enemy lines into Kansu and saw Chinese peasants. They thought we were crazy. We touched their houses and the (Chinese) earth, we embraced them, and we danced and sang and cried.

(Wilson 1971:221)

Even a Chinese academic conceives of the British nineteenth century opium traffic in China as 'foreign mud on good earth' (Tan 1986:151-205). This deep relationship between land and man in Confucian thought is reflected in the Chinese ideogram for man: man is defined in terms of 'his strength in the field'.

According to Chinese mythology, heaven and earth were formed by the dead body of *Panku*, the primordial god signifying the sacred nature of Chinese territory. Thus in Imperial China there was a Temple of Earth where the emperor worshipped. In this sense, as also reflected in the peasants' ancestor worship, land was equated with divinity and descent.

It was this extreme sense of Chinese territoriality, bordering on the worship of land, that the Marxists, as declared champions of anti-imperialism, exploited as the most effective means of mobilizing the peasants in the anti-Japanese war. Territoriality was the underlying motive force of Chinese nationalism. The hypothesis is supported by the correlation we find between the Japanese aggressive moves and upsurges in Chinese nationalism: The Sino-Japanese war of 1895 leads to the Boxer Rebellion when the first signs of Chinese nationalism became visible; Japan's '21 Demands' in 1915 which would have reduced China to a Japanese colony, leads to the May 4th Movement, when students' nationalism began; with the full-scale Japanese invasion of China in 1937 'peasant nationalism' began and defeated Japanese forces. As Chalmers Johnson writes:

The politically illiterate masses of China were awakened by the Japanese invasion and its aftermath; wartime conditions made them receptive to a new kind of political appeal—namely the defense of the fatherland. The war presented the peasantry with challenge to its security of such immediacy that they could not ignore it.

(1962:2)

Why Japan became a more effective catalyst of Chinese nationalism than the western powers—calls for an explanation. It is true that western powers fought wars against, and imposed 'unequal' treaties on, China but they diplomatically left the legal ownership of their 'spheres of influence' in the Chinese hand, thereby saving the Chinese face, whereas Japan's was outright invasion of the Chinese 'good earth'. Second, the Chinese psychologically felt a much deeper sense of betrayal and humiliation in the case of Japanese aggression because Japan used to be an 'inferior' recipient of superior Chinese civilization and at times a subordinate to the Middle Kingdom.

The Chinese case indicates that the structure of a key symbol must be congruent with the structure of a collective conscience of the social group to be mobilized for optimal levels of mass mobilization. Second, a mere manipulation of even appropriate symbols may not result in mass mobilization, unless a national crisis situation exists which activates the interaction between the symbols and the masses. The function of crisis situations is to dramatize the meaning of symbolism. Third, symbolic manipulation is best performed by a charismatic leader who, in pre-literate cultures, lacking abstract ideas such as Africa, becomes the key symbol

himself; in other cases, the embodiment of popular aspirations and sentiments.

We have risked the danger of being condemned as 'deterministic' in singling out a key symbol in each significant case of Third World nationalism. This is necessary in order to indicate unambiguously that, given a set of ethnic variables that constitute the traditional component of nationalism, or national identity, which one critical variable may be emphasised more than others. The focal centrality of a key symbol depends upon the exigencies of mass mobilization: which symbol has the greatest resonance in a given folk culture so as to achieve optimal levels of social communication and mass mobilization? The key symbol must not only ring a bell in the structure of culture but also open the main door to a whole galaxy of emotions and sentiments which could be manipulated in order to motivate the masses to positively respond to the chief manipulator's symbols and signs.

We have tried to demonstrate how a key symbol becomes through skilful manipulation a major motivating factor and the mechanism by which mass mobilization is conducted on the arena of mass politics. The key symbol gives a basic orientation to mass behaviour during a nationalist movement as well as a defining characteristic to a particular nationalism. It was *territoriality* that characterized pre-1949 Chinese nationalism; *negritude* or race that characterized anti-colonial black nationalism in Africa; Hindu culture that characterized Indian nationalism; the 'true Muslim' myth that motivates Arab nationalism.

Our stress on the key symbols does not mean that there were no other symbols or ideals in operation either sequentially or simultaneously. There were secondary symbols which became minor currents of various nationalist movements in the Third World. They included 'Mr Science and Mr Democracy' in China (Chow 1969:59), freedom in India (Dalton 1982:29–204) and Africa (Kedourie 1970:478, 483), and Arabic language in the Middle East (Chalala 1987:20, 24, 34).

Common-sense sociology might suggest that freedom should have been a greater motivating factor than any others because after all most of the nationalist movements in the Third World were struggling for freedom from colonial domination. Freedom did have great appeal to the emerging modern educated classes, but it did not have much root in folk cultures, most of which were feudal in character. A factor of more emotive appeal rooted in culture was the sense of national identity which had been questioned and humiliated by western colonialism, creating national identity crisis in the colonized countries. Hence, our stress on key symbols which are the nerve centres of social identities. To be black means not to be white. To be Hindu meant not to be British. To be 'pure' Muslims means to be Arabs. This is

how masses of peasants perceived themselves subjectively, but may not be so simplistic in the case of Nehru, Nasser or Senghor. In fact most of the nationalist leaders in the Third World (except Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh), had good western education and yet they indulged in the politicization of tradition because that was the most effective means of mass mobilization and not necessarily because they personally believed in the symbols. The reason is essentially expediency. Buddhists, Christians, Hindus and Muslims spontaneously and enthusiastically celebrate Buddha Jayanti, Christmas, Diwali and Id respectively without any coaxing but very few of them would attend state functions like Independence Day or Republic Day even when the state organs publicly urge the masses to do so. For the religion-induced culture is much more deeply rooted in a given people's psyche and social consciousness than new political symbols; their sentiments and emotions are religious derivatives. Hence, politics, particularly mass politics, has to be routed through tradition.

PEASANT CULTURE AND MASS NATIONALISM

We have described the typical mechanism of mass mobilization as follows: the urban, educated classes' manipulation of a society's value and symbolic system by means of egalitarian politics or a combination of both as is the usual case; a prolonged process which tends to loosen up the hierarchical social structure, thereby creating society-wide solidarity, both mechanical and organic and horizontal comradeship. The most crucial problem to be explained in this picture of society in movement or crisis is the qualifying phrase: How exactly does the loosening up of social structure occur in any class society where class barriers normally vitiate any kind of society-wide solidarity? Hannah Arendt and others following her theory, including William Kornhauser, postulate a breakdown of class with the rise of mass politics occasioned by totalitarian movements. Arendt considers war as 'the great prelude to the breakdown of classes and their transformation into masses' (1967:329). Kornhauser echoes the same idea when he writes that 'mass theory looks to the breakdown of class identities as a critical process whereby people are freed to form new ties based on the commonly shared plight of mass men rather than the mutually exclusive plight of class men' (1959:81).

The total 'breakdown of classes' might be too strong a term to indicate a temporary suspension of social hierarchy that otherwise characterizes any complex society, agrarian or industrial. What really seems to happen is that the pre-mass movement sense of social hierarchy or class consciousness is temporarily suspended and it is subsequently subsumed by a society-wide, politicized social consciousness called nationalism. It should be noted that

such a suspension of class categories lasts as long as the nationalist or mass movement is in full swing with mass mobilization and social communication. But as soon as the movement is over, old classes reassert themselves as separate social categories which would not be true if the breakdown of the class system occurs as postulated by mass theorists.

Our idea of the temporary suspension of class barriers during a nationalist movement is congruent with the scientific finding of the social psychology of the mob or mass. As Kimball Young observes, 'There is a widespread stress on equality of wants and satisfaction among the masses...there is a marked increase in the irrational and emotional in thought and conduct' (1969:301). We suggest that the 'widespread stress on equality', and the 'marked increase in the irrational and the emotional' is brought about by the politicization of tradition which is minimally common to all members of a functioning social organization as well as by egalitarian politics which predominate most mass movements. Therefore, we hypothesize that the communal invocation of national tradition and common culture has a definite levelling effect upon social structure which automatically engenders mechanical solidarity and horizontal comradeship.

In other words this social levelling is brought about by stressing commonalities and minimizing differences such as local customs, linguistic dialects, factional loyalties, and so on. And the common denominator that binds all the members of a functioning society together, regardless of class or status, is its value system, which in our context may be traced to one of the world religions. Durkheim was right when he remarked that

in order for a thing to be the object of common sentiment, the first condition is that it be common, that is to say, that it be present in all consciences and that all can represent it in one and the same manner'.

(1964:127)

Such a widespread and near-spontaneous demonstration of mechanical solidarity, we suggest, is made possible only by the societal diffusion of a world religion in a particular social milieu. Only a religion-induced, pan-ethnic culture can become the object of common sentiments present in all consciences, and 'that all can represent it in one and the same manner'.

Now we must explain in more specific terms how this social levelling takes place during a nationalist movement in the Third World context. Our image of society, though primarily traditional and semi-industrial, is not one of romantic harmony, however much our stress on mechanical solidarity and social unity during a nationalist movement might suggest. We do acknowledge class contradictions, factional differences and minority problems like ethnic conflict in societies which have experienced nationalism. However, our point of departure has been that while such class contradictions and factional

differences at least temporarily sink in the ocean of nationalism that engulfs the entire society, minority problems like ethnic conflict cannot easily be ironed out because they do not share a most significant fact of social life, namely common culture with the dominant group. Apart from this, most social differences tend to subside under the levelling pressure of nationalism. We emphasize that this social levelling is not a permanent feature of any social structure. 'When the external danger disappears, internal differences re-assert themselves and the tribe collapses into constituent villages' (Lewis 1976:322). This is basically what happens to an even more complex society after the consummation of independence: the mobilized nation which acted like a single actor during the nationalist movement collapses into constituent classes and castes.

After having made the necessary qualification, we now come to the main point, namely, how the politicization of tradition tends to have a levelling effect upon the social structure of any complex society undergoing a nationalist movement. This, in the Third World context, means exploring the functional relationship between the great tradition and peasant culture because peasantry in any Third World nation that underwent a nationalist movement constituted—and still constitutes—the overwhelming majority of the total population. The question boils down to this: How did the nationalist party or leader manage to mobilize what Marx called 'the sack of potatoes'—segmented, autarkic, inward-looking and essentially apolitical peasants? If we closely compare the usual peasant interest and culture with the typical goals of nationalism, we get some clues that it is nationalism as defined in this essay that awakened the peasantry to visions of a new political order and national economy, inspired undoubtedly by the politicization of a 'glorious past'. The typical goals of most nationalist movements are a strong sense of territoriality and the preservation or glorification of tradition which together forms the traditional data component of nationalism; the acquisition or expansion of freedom and equality. The traditional data component of nationalism falls on fertile ground among the peasantry. As anthropological findings suggest, 'sedentary cultivation promotes, as one would expect, a strong emphasis on territoriality' (Lewis 1976:70). That is, the peasantry tends to exhibit a strong sense of territoriality and land-hunger which Leninist parties exploited to achieve their revolutionary victory in peasant societies that Marx would not have dreamt of. Second, the peasantry is the seedbed of tradition, no matter how belittled it is in contrast with the great traditions.

The last point calls for some explanations. In Chapter 6 we have argued that the essential difference between the great tradition, whose typical carriers are the priestly and aristocratic classes, and the little tradition, whose typical carriers are the peasantry, is a matter of social or philosophical sophistication

rather than in kind. Thus, Robert Redfield contrasts great tradition and little tradition of complex historical societies with the simple culture of the Andamanese, Trobrianders, the Aranda of Australia, and so on (1956:67). In other words, tradition as such is typically associated with that complex, even though traditional, society which has the propensity for national consciousness and political will. And the distinction between great and little tradition is this: 'The great tradition is cultivated in schools or temples; the little tradition works itself out and keeps itself going in the lives of the unlettered in their village communities' (ibid.: 38). While the former is written and largely philosophical, the latter is oral and truly traditional, namely, full of myths, symbols, rituals.

Now it is our contention that nationalist leadership or party politicizes more of the little tradition than the great tradition, because the former is more potent and rich in symbols and myths which can inspire the popular imagination. That is to say that Hindu nationalists, in their attempt at mass mobilization and social communication, did not go about preaching *Vedanta* philosophy but popular culture heroes, powerful Hindu myths and symbols. Similarly, the early Chinese nationalists did not go about preaching Confucian classics but invoking popular culture heroes, powerful Confucian or Taoist symbols and myths. Arab nationalists did not go about propounding Islamic Jurisprudence but preached popular Islam.

Thus, when a charismatic nationalist leader manipulates the psychic core of a particular tradition (key symbols), he is psychologically stimulating the emotive centres of the collective conscience of a social group that has been for centuries saturated by religious experience or socialized by popular tradition. The group mind, so to say, is easily stimulated by such manipulations because key symbols penetrate and arouse the nerve centres of social self-hood, self-interest and self-identity that have been deeply socialized by tradition. In this sense, key symbols perform three vital functions when reactivated during a crisis situation. Symbols are the reflection and representation of most cherished social values. They also sum up the most popular notions about self-hood and self-esteem embedded in the collective conscience of a social group. Lastly, symbols also function as 'historical' analogies with which illiterate masses can comprehend larger meanings of nationalism. Indeed, nationalism expresses itself best through familiar but inspiring cultural categories drawn from one's national tradition or history. Hence, symbols naturally become the most powerful stimulant for mass mobilization and the most emotive idiom of social communication during a nationalist movement.

Therefore we agree with Galjart's conclusion:

Peasant organizations cannot function solely on the basis of the interest,

the material reward of the members. Mechanical solidarity is required in the initial period, and as the differentiation of tasks and rewards within the organization increases so too does the need for organic solidarity.

(1976:105)

There is another aspect of peasant culture which is conducive to the production of nationalism. Peasants in general tend 'to approach the outside world with rough and ready dichotomic concepts as friend and enemy, ignoring, as it were, the more subtle nuances in attitude; a lack of tolerance for vagueness and ambiguity' (Galjart 1976:38). This description fits in perfectly with what really goes on during the heat of nationalism, the differentiation of the social self from the generalized other(s) as 'friend and enemy'. Indeed, the kind of dichotomic we/they differentiation that invariably accompanies a nationalist movement is the central dynamics of nationalism. Moreover, since nationalism represents perhaps the most intense state of social consciousness, it certainly has 'a lack of tolerance for vagueness and ambiguity'; like the peasant universe, the whole world must be approached in dichotomic terms, we/they or friend/foe lines. In particular, social communication and mass mobilization leaves no room for vagueness and ambiguity. Nationalism in this sense, as particularly applicable to the Third World situation, meant siding on a societal scale, and identification with, the ingroup in order to oppose or confront the outgroup(s), be it imperialism, colonialism or 'oppressing nations' and to establish a new political order conducive to varying degrees of self-rule.

9 Nationalism as social power: restructuring egalitarian systems

In Chapter 7 we have argued that what differentiates modern nationalism from its traditional predecessor is the modern ideological component, freedom and equality. However, Chapter 8 has shown that cultural symbols have been more effective than the modern ideology in the production of Third World nationalism. Then does the ideology of modern nationalism have any further role to play in the non-western world? In this chapter we suggest that since modern nationalism (which signifies a mass movement) has already exposed the society's collective conscience to various forms of egalitarian ideology, that revolutionized conscience would not be easily put to rest until and unless the post-colonial state makes an earnest attempt to realize nationalism's normative legacy, freedom and equality, in society. Current changes in Eurogenic former Leninist regimes in particular, and the Third World in general, are viewed from this perspective.

SOCIAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL POWER

In the final analysis, the rise of nationalism with which this study is primarily concerned, signifies the exudation of a hitherto untapped social power. Power in general refers to the ability of an actor to influence the decision of others which changes future events. National power is often measured in terms of armed forces, economic resources and technology at command. However, power emerging out of nationalism is a different kind; it is social power. This is not to rule out, altogether, its coercive dimension such as men-intensive forces (for example, guerrilla warfare) as a means to achieve its goals. However, on the whole the point still stands valid: social power emerges out of a people and it is power to the people in whatever manner and purpose they may choose to deploy it. For our purpose Hermann Heller's definition appears apt. He defines political power as 'the effort to develop and utilize organized social power' (1962:302).

We have traced in this study the social origins of political power in the

form of nationalism since the sixteenth century in Europe and since the early twentieth century in the Third World. Throughout the nationalist movement, political power as represented by a mobilized and fully-conscious nation or nationality retains its social basis. The nation legitimates the state after independence; social power-turned-political power is being institutionalized into the state which acts as the embodiment of social power. The institutionalization of political power entails the formation of certain routinized agents of political power such as centralized bureaucracy, the army, the police, the judiciary, and so on.

Even the institutionalized political power (state) bases itself on social power as the sole legitimate basis of its existence. For naked power without social basis borders on sheer force, like western absolutism, oriental despotism or Third World military dictatorships. Its survival is not secure without a binding force or social contract.

Social power then, springing as it does from the people, has certain salutary democratic implications. During a nationalist movement the democratic doctrine of national self-determination which is the compelling rationale for modern nationalism, seeks to redefine the destiny of a nationality, and reconstitute a government that is responsible and responsive to popular wishes. That is why even dictatorships, military or Leninist variants, have invoked the name of democracy ('People's Democracy' in the socialist world, 'Guided Democracy' in Indonesia and Pakistan, and so on) to justify their rule.

The tangible end result, observable by the mid-1980s, is the generation of an unprecedented social power, especially in the Third World. This social if not societal power, we have emphasized, originated from the social domain, and not from the state, at least initially. After independence the established state becomes the embodiment of social power in theory and to a lesser extent in practice as the ultimate source of legitimacy.

The case of successful nationalism producing social power is evident both in the east and west. In medieval Europe the emergence of an absolutist monarchy signified the rise of royal power, but the social sources of power remained untapped. The emergence of a nationalist bourgeoisie in England which included the enterprising aristocratic strata as well, generated great power disproportionate to a tiny island, giving rise to global capitalist expansionism. The rise of the third (intelligentsia) and fourth (commoners) estates in France signified the first known case of 'power to the people', and strangely enough resulted in unintended imperialism all over western Europe and Egypt.

Mahatma Gandhi's mass mobilization of South Asian peasantry generated undreamt of social power that influenced the British decision to quit India. Mao's mobilization of Chinese peasantry and guerrilla warfare generated

even greater social power that not only defeated Japanese militarism but also the KMT (Kuomintang). Fidel Castro and Che Guevara's mobilization of the Cuban people drove out the US multinational corporations from Cuba. The Algerian leaders' (Ben Bella, Ferhat Abbas, Guy Mollet) mass mobilization put an end to French colonialism in Algeria. Ho Chi Minh's mobilization of the Vietnamese peasantry generated unprecedented social power in the form of protracted guerrilla warfare that drove out the greatest contemporary power on earth—the USA.

Several charismatic leaders of nationalist movements had seen visions of social power before such movements could reach their take-off stage. Mao Zedong in his famous 'Report of an investigation into the peasant movement in Hunan' (1927) prophetically wrote:

In a very short time, several hundred million peasants in China's central, southern and northern provinces will rise like a tornado or tempest—a force so extraordinarily swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to suppress it. They will break through all the trammels that now bind them and push forward along the road to liberation. They will send all imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local bullies and evil gentry to their graves.

(Wakeman 1977:240)

The reason why such a social power cannot be crushed was provided by a pioneer ideologue of the Indian nationalist movement, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, who raised the slogan '*Bande Mataram*'—'Hail to the Motherland'. He wrote that a spiritual movement based on a spiritual value-system embedded in the people 'cannot be killed without killing the entire people among whom it takes its birth. A mere political revolt might easily be crushed by superior physical force or diplomatic cunning' (Mukerjee and Mukerjee 1957:93).

Gamal Abdul Nasser had a similar dream of social power in the Islamic world. He wrote

As I stood in front of the Kaaba and felt my sentiments wondering with every part of the world where Islam had extended, I found myself exclaiming, 'Our idea of the pilgrimage should change. Going to the Kaaba should never be a passport to heaven, after a lengthy life. Neither should it be a simple effort to buy indulgences after an eventful life. The pilgrimage should be a great political power.

(Haim 1976:231–2)

That is if the Arabs are as united in and devoted to common political pursuits as they are in their religious practice, they could produce enormous social power.

Social power then is that corporate power emanating from the active unity of a people or nationality mobilized and organized for social action. It presupposes, among other things, maximum mass mobilization and articulation of most popular aspirations. The end result of such a social action is necessarily societal revolt against the *status*, be it alien colonial system or feudal social order. It is the most modernized form of revolt. The non-cooperation movement in British India (*satyagrah*), withdrawal of the mandate of heaven or right to revolt in pre-revolution China, and a tradition of internal *jihad* among Shiites against rulers deviating from Islamic tenets—are some of the outstanding manifestations and means of social power. As an expression and exercise of power, it is essentially different from the usual form of power such as that of the state measured in terms of coercive forces. Social power is the power of the powerless. It is a normative power which masses enjoy in relation to their rulers who do not enjoy popular mandate.

Because of its broad-based nature which enjoys popular mandate, social power produced by nationalism has certain egalitarian impulses, which have led to the establishment of different egalitarian systems: capitalist, socialist and mixed economies. No matter how much these systems differ, they are all inspired by the twin political ideals of modern nationalism—freedom and equality. The socialist system considers equality more essential, and relegates freedom to a second priority. The capitalist system glorifies liberty and relegates equality, especially economic equality, to a second priority. The mixed economy represents a precarious *attempt* to resolve this invidious tension between liberty-and-equality system (capitalism) and equality-and-liberty system (socialism).

Viewed from this perspective, modern nationalism has yet to complete its egalitarian mission. Where there is systematic lack of liberty, there are bound to be more struggles for the expansion of liberty such as recently and currently evident in the socialist world. And where there is systematic lack of equality, there are bound to be more struggles for greater degrees of economic equality. In the latter case we must concede that the welfare state has been more sensitive and responsive to popular pressure than other types. But respond all of the economic systems must because nationalism has fully or partially awakened the hitherto sleeping or dormant population to great expectations. Thus, the revolutionary implications of nationalism to post-independence/revolution developments are clear: since nationalism necessitated the most inclusive form of mass mobilization, it has awakened the sleeping society (or sack of potatoes) and transformed it into a politically-conscious actor called the nation. Above all, modern nationalism has exposed the masses to the political ideals of freedom and equality. The unique beauty of such concepts is that they can be interpreted and applied both at the collective (national) and individual levels. They have been applied against


colonial or feudal rulers during the freedom movement; now the free citizens or even nationals would demand greater and greater degrees of liberty and equality in their everyday lives. This has been the historical trend the world over except in those countries where no mass mobilization as an instrument of nationalism has occurred such as Bhutan, Thailand and most Arab countries.

FASCIST TENDENCY IN THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONALISM: RACE

It is difficult to predict the future pattern of nationalism. However, certain trends—one dangerous and the other exemplary—are discernible, flowing directly from the structure of nationalism. That structure is specified in two essential components; (a) traditional component—religion, race, and region; (b) modern (egalitarian) component—freedom and equality. The former, especially race when emphasized by the leaders, the party and the state, in concert or severally drives nationalism towards a Fascist direction; and the latter, when accentuated by wise leadership and the state, towards democratic impulses (see Figure 5).

Examples of the first category include Fascism in pre-war Italy, Nazism

Figure 5 The components and variants of nationalism



in Germany and counterracial militarism in Japan during the years 1919–44. The French and American revolutions as well as the Indian Independence movement indicate the democratic uses to which nationalism may be fruitfully put. Even in the latter category, when egalitarian ideology is overemphasized as a mission, it leads to unintended imperialism, such as the Napoleonic campaigns following the French Revolution and the international communist movement following the Russian Revolution, especially as the ‘liberation’ of Eastern European nations indicates how an initially transnational act may be transformed into unintended imperialism.

Both Fascism and international communism raised the question of who is a citizen. Fascism is too exclusive and international communism too inclusive. The latter used to think in terms of world citizenship, especially the working class everywhere. The former felt the citizenship right ought to be extended only to the dominant racial group believing in a state religion. Thus, Hitler showed virulent hatred for the ‘inferior Slav and for Catholicism as un-German, above all for Judaism and Jews as non-Aryan’. This directly led to racism which is the defining characteristic of Fascism. Mussolini regarded Hitler’s ‘national Socialism’ as ‘one hundred per cent racism’ (H.K. 1974:185)

However, the question of who is a national or citizen continues to haunt most multinational states because the ideal concept of a nation-state presupposes cultural and linguistic homogeneity which by its general will legitimates such a national state. Where heterogeneous cultural and social elements are accepted as citizens in democratic multinational states, the accent is on a political principle—the constitution which confers equal rights to all its members regardless of colour or creed. But nationalism is a social phenomenon which cannot be regulated by legislative acts alone. Hence, the problems of ethnic conflict.

Fascism is the most racist ideology ever concocted in history. It was overtly anti-democratic and anti-communist. ‘The Italian slogan “to believe, to obey, to combat” was Fascism’s antithesis of “liberty, equality and fraternity”’ (H.K. 1974:183). Yet it borrowed heavily from the Leninist ideas of party organization, *sans* democratic centralism. The leader decided. Nazi Germany’s National Socialist Party was a highly-centralized political organization with cadre system. The SS admitted only the most dedicated and racially pure Germans. As in the case of nationalism, Fascism involved and applied intensified social communication and full-swing mass mobilization. All of these indoctrinated those masses for about twenty-five years (1919–44) in central, southern and eastern central Europe, spilling over such Fascist tendencies in Argentina, Brazil, Japan and South Africa. Race is the skeleton of myths, symbols and belief connected with the origin and evolution of a particular race which the Fascists exploited to the hilt for mass mobilization

purposes. But if human beings are genetically and culturally determined, then Fascism has little or no basis in terms of genetics or culture.

Fascism's objective relation to nationalism is as follows. We have emphasized in this study that the ascriptive traditional data component of nationalism forms its instinctual, irrational, emotional potency that no other 'isms' can match. Fascism singles out this component, especially race, and emphasizes it to the exclusion of nationalism's egalitarian ideology. The appeal of such a doctrine cannot be underestimated, especially under trying national crisis situations that occasioned the rise of Fascism in the west. In this context Gramsci was correct in asserting that without its social basis, Fascism could not have succeeded in mobilizing such huge masses of people in Italy and Germany (Davidson 1977:161).

The Fascist doctrine is characterized by an overwhelming degree of biological determinism. This determinism leads Fascists to conceive of their ideal nation-state as not only one which is racially homogeneous, but coterminous with a supreme race which is systematically glorified at the expense of all other races. In the case of an ideal nation-state racial homogeneity is assumed but not systematically asserted as in Fascism.

However the mere accent on the traditional data as a whole will not lead to Fascism, as the Indian independence movement clearly illustrates. Throughout the independence movement there was a tremendous emphasis on Hindu tradition but this did not produce Fascism, though Indian Marxists feared and suspected this. This was because the traditional data, especially religion, contains humanistic tendencies and teachings which negate the Fascist doctrine. Similarly, Islamic fundamentalism stresses mostly religion which is the heart and soul of tradition but it has not led to Fascism. Therefore, what distinguishes Fascism from traditional nationalism is its (Fascism) violent and systematic racism. While nationalism does take pride in one's race and in that race's associated achievement in history, it seldom degenerates into systematic racism. In Fascism, racism is systematically worked out in terms of policy and programme and in fact built into the very structure of the state. Fascism systematized racism into an ideology which is hardly the case with nationalism. In the latter category, race remains only one of the many ethnic variables.

NATIONALISM'S NORMATIVE LEGACY: FREEDOM AND EQUALITY

Since the world-wide trend has fortunately been a combination of traditional nationalism and egalitarian ideals, we must dwell at greater length on the relationship between the two sets we have observed in the context of the French Revolution's relation to nationalism. It was the objective congruence

between egalitarianism and nationalism. It was a case of convergence and congruence between the two social forces which have produced a synergistic effect on the nationalist movement ever since.

Egalitarian politics encourages political participation by the public and nationalism seeks to mobilize the masses to achieve or safeguard national independence. Nationalism is not unity *per se* but one of its usual manifestations is unity, and this unity is not for nothing; it invariably seeks to attain a set of socially-shared goals. Means may vary depending on the prevailing situations, but the ultimate aim is essentially the same everywhere: any nation or nationality attempts to achieve a community of interests which it embodies and envisions. Moreover, both democracy and nationalism involve mass mobilization and politicization of the same basic constituency, society/nation via social communication. This convergence of two theoretically-separate political movements reinforce and coalesce each other, thereby making modern nationalism one of the most powerful social forces in the modern world. For the nation has provided the necessary container (bottle) in which the grapes of Greece—freedom and equality—may season, mature and mellow.

It is, therefore, not surprising that historically even in 'a large part of Europe, liberal aspirations were so closely associated with national aspirations that could not be distinguished' (Droz 1967:143; Ketelbey 1976:162). Even more so with the Third World because here the conditions are not only feudal or semi-feudal, but colonial, which must be altered to suit popular aspirations for various types of egalitarian system. Modern nationalism is not contented, unlike its traditional predecessor, with the mere expulsion of the foreign invaders (that is, western colonialism/imperialism) or the overthrow of the absolute monarch. It seeks at the same time to restructure or overthrow the traditional social order and transform feudal/colonial economy. Unfortunately outcomes may not have been as promised, but most postcolonial developments in the Third World did begin with egalitarian ideals. The following revolutionary ideas serve as examples: *Ujamaa* in Tanzania (or African socialism), Latin American leftist populism, Ba'ath Party's Arab socialism, Mao's 'New Democracy', Nehru's 'Socialistic pattern of economy', and so on.

However, the emphasis during the nationalist movement has been primarily on fraternity in the form of the national unity, and on liberty and equality *vis-à-vis* the absolute monarch or colonial power. At home, the ideals of liberty and equality still remain unfulfilled in several parts of the Third World in spite of democratic constitutions. Even after independence the accent continues to be on fraternity in the sense of maintaining the territorial integrity and national unity of the reconstituted nation-state. Post-independence struggles are evident, and will be for liberty where liberty has constitutionally

been given a second priority, and for equality where equality is given a second priority.

With the achievement of independence, a radical reversal of emphasis on the two dimensions of nationalism takes place due to the changed political situation, especially in polyethnic social systems. Now to emphasize the traditional component of nationalism would be not only to exclude, but also to offend, the sentiments of minority ethnic groups. Nor is mass mobilization of the majority social groups any longer so urgent except perhaps in electoral politics. Two central post-colonial tasks in all polyethnic social systems in the Third World are national integration and economic development, both of which necessarily compel the leaders to change the accent from tradition to egalitarian politics. Thus, Nehru discarded after independence the Gandhian neo-traditionalism and charted India towards a 'socialistic pattern of economy'. Similarly Mao began to implement his various radical Marxist programmes only after 1949.

In short, tradition after independence is officially shelved away to be judiciously used when and if necessary; and egalitarian ideology, mediated by a given culture, begins to be emphasized and indeed demanded as the new popular morality. This chapter, therefore, conceptualizes nationalism as social power during the post-colonial period, demanding not the politicization of tradition, even though that unfortunately continues to occur in Islamic and Hindu societies, but the institutionalization and implementation of nationalism's normative legacy: freedom and equality. Whether such high ideals are in practice implemented or not is a different question, and the answer for most parts of the Third World is unfortunately negative. But there is no denying the fact that egalitarian ideology is the basic texture with which almost all the Third World constitutions are woven. One only has to glimpse through Peaslee's *Constitutions of Nations* (1970) to prove the point that freedom and equality or equality and freedom are believed to be the modern political religion of any nation state.

Historically, liberty and equality are associated with the two ascendant classes in modern history, namely, the bourgeoisie and proletariat. The bourgeoisie have been the champions of liberty and the proletariat of equality. But it is my contention that these twin ideals are free of any class association; they possess universal appeal to the human personality as such, and are of intrinsic value in and for themselves. As such there is no need for any elaborate justification for egalitarianism as laboured in recent western philosophical research. The intrinsic value and universal appeal of egalitarianism attracts mass followers like ducks to water.

The reason we suggest is rooted in human psychology and the personality development (Lana and Rosnow 1972:193–219). It is also written at large in the history of nationalism. It can be interpreted and applied both at the

collective and individual levels. Psychologically, equality means the human and humane desire for self-respect, personal worth and human dignity. Legally, equality means that every citizen is equal before the rule of law. Politically, equality means the human desire for similar status, power and participation in a given political system. Economically, equality means the very human desire for similar goods and services that the 'haves' enjoy. Practically there is no conscious individual who does not desire the benefits of equality and joy of freedom. It is an emancipated human desire which transcends class or national barriers.

Liberty is probably rooted in a person's state of true being. However, the development of personality flourishes better under the conditions of freedom. Psychologically, liberty means the right to self-expression, self-realization and self-being. At the grosser level, freedom means the right to do what one likes or is accustomed to do—what gods to worship, whom to marry, whom to fraternize with, what party to support, what occupation to pursue, and so on. Politically it means the human desire for emancipation from bondage of all sorts such as slavery, serfdom, dictatorships. Economically, freedom refers to the human desire to be free from poverty, dependency and exploitation. In this sense freedom is the minimal human right-oriented desire and demand; equality, the radical maximal. Again I repeat there is no emancipated individual who does not have such aspirations.

The question of priority whether equality comes before freedom or freedom before equality, poses certain practical as well as philosophical problems. We shall show briefly how these priorities are worked out in different economic settings. But we must note from the outset that freedom is not so easily counterposed to equality or vice versa. The centrality of freedom is the idea of choice, and without choice-promoting conditions freedom might become an empty formula for millions of people. Consequently, the characteristic conditions of freedom include not only the negative conditions of being not coerced or restricted, but also certain positive conditions. The political conditions include the practice of participatory democracy, the material conditions access to resources and the cultural conditions access to education. These choice-promoting conditions presuppose a certain degree of economic equality. For the question of

how free one is will depend not just on one's being able to make choices at all, but on one's scope for choice—on the range of meaningful choices open to one. This range will be a matter both of what options are as a matter of fact available, and of one's subjective ability to envisage and assess alternatives.

(Norman 1987:41)

Consequently, Marxist-Leninist rulers need to realize that equality without freedom is devaluation of precious human life. Freedom

is characteristically valued because of its connection with the exercise of the distinctively human faculties: perception, judgement, creativity. This is the experience which makes freedom a recurrently important political demand: freedom is required for that part of the fully human life whose vision John Mill shares with Karl Marx.

(Carling 1988:90)

In fact Marx has this to say on this vital human desire which has been practically denied by Leninist regimes:

Freedom is so much the essence of man that even its opponents realize it. No man fights freedom; he fights at most the freedom of others. Every kind of freedom has therefore existed, only at one time as a special privilege, another time as a universal right.

(Dunayevskaya 1982: epigraph)

Freedom is curtailed in socialist society, not because it is not on the Marxist agenda, but on the pretext of global anarchy and international reaction which threatens the security of the Marxist-Leninist regimes. Although it is most unlikely that the Leninist Party in the Third World would give up its monopoly of power, the recent reduction of tensions in the international system might persuade and encourage certain enlightened sections of the party leadership to expand the degrees of freedom in the socialist world.

In western Europe where egalitarianism came to be edified and entombed, the ideals of freedom and equality became the critical political principles of Renaissance derived from Greco-Roman civilization. They reached, as pointed out earlier (pp. 91–9), their culmination and encapsulation in the French revolutionary motto: *liberté, égalité, and fraternité*. Their systematic working-out into institutions since the French Revolution differed from nation to nation. In England, for example, liberty was much more emphasized; in France equality through various vicissitudes. But western European history as a whole indicates that the realization of liberty and equality, at least at the individual level depended upon property ownership and educational qualifications. And property and education are, of course, closely linked; without wealth hardly anyone could afford education until the emergence of the welfare state in the early twentieth century. Thus, for a long time (about 300–400 years) franchise was the privilege of the educated, propertied male even in western Europe.

However, gradually consensus reached or decision was made in most leading European states in favour of liberty first and equality later. This

historical sequence might seem to validate much of the conservative or capitalist theorizing that 'egalitarianism (that is to say the doctrine that all human beings have the right to equal respect and consideration) cannot satisfactorily bypass perfectionism, i.e. the conservative doctrine that some human beings are inherently or intrinsically superior to others' (Haksar 1979:2). The implication of this doctrine is that some such superior beings are more deserving of equality and freedom than others. Hence, equality was restricted to the inherently superior club, and freedom was largely necessitated in the initial stages by technological imperatives of capitalist economic development. As a by-product, the working class was able to enjoy a certain degree of freedom.

We have earlier asserted that freedom and equality have logical autonomy and intrinsic value appealing to all classes in any land. This must be slightly qualified in the interest of truth. The differential appeal of these twin ideals depends in practice to a large extent on culture and education. They would probably appeal more to a literate class than the illiterate masses. This would imply a certain degree of secularization and personalization,¹ moving towards human emancipation and enlightenment.

Where and why high literate culture formation takes place is a complicated question which need not detain us long here. It involves a complex process involving a presence or absence of a favourable configuration of conditions such as culture, ecology, economy, social structure,² and so on. If culture is, therefore, more-or-less a given factor which can help or inhibit any revolutionary change such as modernization, especially during the initial, critical stage, then education can be systematically engineered by the state or any academic institution. Modernization begins in school, just as modern nationalism began in Chinese and Indian schools or Latin American colleges and universities, or African nationalism in the Sorbonne and the SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies, London) or Arab nationalism in American missionary institutions.

In this respect we must recall the dual, if not conflicting functions performed by culture in relation to the differential impact of liberty and equality. Culture mediates and mitigates any high ideal. The best place to look for any indices of this intricate process is religion.

What are the implications of each world religion to the political ideals of freedom and equality? These revolutionary ideals have no exact equivalents in any religion; we can only draw their implications and various degrees of action consequence to the emergence of egalitarian ideology. Buddhism proclaims the potentiality of all human beings for enlightenment. But it conceives freedom in ultimatum and transcendental terms—*nirvana* (enlightenment). Christianity also proclaims equality of all humankind but later restricted it to the fellowship of believers. It conceives freedom in terms

of salvation, that is, to be with God. Confucianism presupposes the potential equality of all mankind and views liberty in terms of personal self-cultivation. Hinduism is the least favourable to the idea of equality but most accommodative to freedom. Should we misconstrue these implications as vacuous, theoretical exercises, we should recall some well-known phrases in language such as Islamic egalitarianism, Confucian self-cultivation, or such words as *Swaraj*, *swatantra*, *moksha* in Hindi, meaning freedom or liberty but having no exact term for equality (*samanta?*).

It is then clear that each traditional society enters the modern world with a given set of factors such as wise statesmanship or leadership, organizational ability and cultural resources. The presence or the absence of these three factors influence the relative success or failure with which modernization is conducted, and to a lesser extent how the twin political ideals of the French Revolution may be realized at the individual and institutional levels. An objective critical factor is the quality of a given culture as signified by a high literacy rate.

We have made no attempt to establish any direct correlation between religion and democratic development. But their correlative implications and the latter's working-out to differential degrees in different civilizational contexts are fairly clear. Democratic development in western Europe did not have much to do with any significant Christian contributions to liberty or even equality. Greek ideals did. On the other hand, India does possess some choice-promoting conditions for democratic development as exemplified by the sheer number of deities in the Hindu pantheon. So does China. Recall the relative ease with which the early Chinese intelligentsia embraced 'Mr Science' and 'Mr Democracy'. Notwithstanding the well-known Islamic egalitarianism, cultural inhibitions imposed by Islamic practice in relation to modernization and political development are dramatically clear in the case of the Arab countries (except Turkey) in particular and the Islamic world in general.

Therefore, throughout the history of modern political thought there has been a recurring tension between liberty and equality. Different nations both in the west and east have tried to resolve this tension constitutionally and to a lesser extent in practice. The way they have resolved this tension depended in the formative stages upon popular mandate, charismatic leaders' vision or Leninist party intervention. This is reflected to a large extent in the three different types of economic system that we find in the modern world.

Capitalist economy decided in favour of freedom first, and equality is restricted to the legal and political domains. Here the major social contradiction is between legal equality and material inequality, as expressed by recent civil rights movements in the USA and labour struggles in the west in general. Capitalism has tried to resolve this contradiction by means of the

Welfare State which renders social services in such spheres as education, employment, health, social security and housing. These are the ways in which liberalism has subverted Marx's prediction of the collapse of capitalism. The irony is that the subversion comes from the left (liberals), not from the right.

Socialist economy is the opposite case in which the dual tension is resolved in favour of economic equality; liberty is shelved away. In such societies the major post-class struggle movement, to the extent the Leninist Party permits, might be for liberty. Some early signs of this political trend are already evident in the Soviet dissident movement, the Labour Solidarity movement in Poland and the Chinese students' demand for 'Democracy', and so on. Such signs are not surprising. The idea of liberty is not absent in Marxian philosophy. As Marx wrote, human development would progress from the realm of necessity (economic satisfaction) to the realm of freedom (actualization of personality potentialities) (1906:955).

In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe economic necessity is more-or-less overcome, and popular hunger especially among the intellectuals seems to be for liberty. The major obstacle to such a struggle is paradoxically the organization that brought about revolutionary victory, the Leninist Party. Neither Marx nor Lenin ever conceived the Communist Party as a permanent instrument of rule which it has inadvertently become. Lenin considered the Party as an expeditious means to achieve revolutionary victory—seizure of state power. Since then it had become the ruling party in one-third of the world which completely monopolizes political power and permits no other parties to compete for power. Consequently one of the major social contradictions in any industrialized socialist society would be political power monopolized by the Communist Party, albeit on behalf of the proletariat, and popular urge for liberty. The same, however, cannot be said of Third World Leninist regimes.

Although freedom and equality offer intrinsically universal appeal to human dignity and personal growth, not all are situated under equally favourable conditions. Nor are they all fully conscious of their political rights due to lack of education. The assumption, as vindicated by the lack of political change in the Third World Leninist regimes, is that any republican quest for democratic ideals does not come naturally to all peoples; it is a product of secular education and political consciousness on a societal scale. Therefore, popular quests for democratic devolution in Leninist party-dominated societies can come about as a result of political maturity which may be measured in terms of high literacy rate and adequate standards of living. This assumes a large middle class as the backbone of any modern nation-state. For millions of illiterate and poverty-stricken peasants in China or Vietnam, their first priority, as 'rational peasants' must be the bare minimum

human needs for survival such as food, shelter and clothing, rather than liberty, even though they do value freedom in a loose, practical sense.

In this sense it is instructive to recall that the 1989 Tian'anmen Square 'democracy' was basically an urban 'middle'-class phenomenon, a post-revolution consciousness of an emerging new class which is politically literate and economically better-off than the peasant masses. That is why China, North Korea, Vietnam, and so on, have so far experienced no societal challenge to the Leninist party domination, unlike Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. The only exception is Mongolia³ but even there the Leninist party received seventy per cent of the total votes in 1990 in the first-ever free election held since 1922.

The moral, which may not be palatable to the idealist, is that the first human instinct may indeed be for physical survival, as Marx and Engels rightly emphasized. But this is where Marxian economic determinism ends. For once their physical necessities are somehow overcome, most human beings do not keep on accumulating or consuming goods for the sake of it, as gross Marxist materialism would have us believe. The reason is sociological:

Man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships. He does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values material goods only in so far as they serve this end.

(Polanyi 1957:46)

Communism, both Leninist and Maoist versions, deny the diverse uses of economics other than filling the stomach, and this is to deny human freedom. Marx designed his doctrine for affluent industrial societies but Marxism-Leninism as practised in the Third World has become the poor man's philosophy. But once the levels of literacy and economic conditions improve, human beings think of food for the mind too for which choice-promoting conditions are necessary. Future post-revolution struggles for liberty in socialist societies should be viewed from this perspective.

A mixed economy as best exemplified by India, Mexico, Brazil, and so on, represents a courageous *attempt* to resolve the fundamental contradictions apparent both in capitalism and socialism. Economic equality is ensured partly by halving the national economy into state capitalism and private enterprise. Through one-party rule (except in 1977-9 and 1990-91) since 1947, the kind of compromised democracy operative in India is remarkable for a developing country. A surprising degree of political freedom is evident in the judiciary, the press and electoral politics.

A mixed economy, however, poses two practical problems. Will India, for

example, continue to be the functioning anarchy that John Kenneth Galbraith found in the early 1960s? Second, uneven development whose social manifestation is regional conflict, characterizes a mixed economy. Both the private and public sectors make investments in target areas economically feasible and profitable. This pattern leaves large areas of underdevelopment.

Socially, the notion of uneven development implies that certain privileged strata of society have an initial advantage or head-start (upper castes) which is accentuated by the process of modernization. The Indian Constitution endeavours to mitigate this social contradiction by its special clause for scheduled (lower) castes, tribes and backward classes. But this clause is applicable only in the sphere of employment and education. The constitution offers no remedy for balanced development. This concerns the current debate about centre-state relations in India.

The mixed economy as exemplified by India indicates no clear lines of development. Democratic impulses towards the egalitarian ideals of liberty and equality are not fully worked out. Perhaps forty years of experiment is not adequate. Nor for that matter do we see any evidence of a full-blooded conception of Plato's Republic, or Marx's Utopia. Yet certain lines of development appear more evident in some parts of the world than in others. Swiss direct democracy involves less expenditure of money in elections than the western capitalist democracies. Swedish social democracy ensures more economic equality than a mixed economy. And Israel's *kibbutzim* facilitates a more communal living with less cash-nexus calculations, (which Marx detested so much) than Maoist communes in pre-1979 China.

Egalitarian ideology entails a certain degree of secularization because most of the world religions or rather religious traditions tend to sanctify, justify and legitimize existing social orders which have to be modified or demolished so that liberty and equality may prevail. Most sociologists and anthropologists would acknowledge the vital social functions performed by religion no matter how reactionary. This is particularly true in the case of maintaining social order which otherwise no amount of army or police can maintain. This then poses a gentle tension between religion and democracy which has to be reconciled and worked out.

In the democratic post-industrial society, literature has to a large extent replaced religion. Literature, especially in the modern classical sense, has become the secularized and individualized version of religion. It dwells on such pan-human themes as man and his place in the universe, love, suffering, mystery, heroism, and so on. England being probably the first modern democratic nation is a classic case where English has one of the richest literatures. But since literature cannot possibly fulfil all the fundamental human needs outlined earlier (pp. 66–70), the ideal ought to be a spiritual society and democratic polity.

In fact much of the legitimacy of new regimes might depend on the way in which they attempt in their various ways to resolve the social contradictions inherent in the freedom-or-equality-first dichotomy. Resolve they must, because nationalism has fully awakened the dormant society which might not rest assured until and unless post-independence goods are delivered in different degrees and in due course.

Indeed the rise of social power as a result of nationalism has certain implications to the legitimacy of nascent regimes in particular. For both nationalism and its end-product, social power are ideologically premised upon the idea of popular sovereignty. Once social consciousness is fully awakened by nationalism, no government could afford to ignore popular mandate in the long run. It appears that the political ideals unleashed by the French Revolution, *liberté, égalité* and *fraternité* which have formed the revolutionary component of modern nationalism must run their logico-normative course as an ideological compulsion in the modern world. Recent democratic developments in the Philippines, Korea, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma on the one hand, and reforms (*glasnost* and *perestroika*) in some socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, are indicative of the recent historical trends.

We have explained the normative appeal of freedom and equality as something rooted in the psychology of any emancipated people. This might sound like a normative assertion. The fact is, egalitarian ideology is more in congruence with the emerging new social structure of any developing economy in which bonded labour is replaced by the, *principle* of contract and equal opportunity. Indeed, the operation of any national state and economy is based upon legal equality and political freedom. Thus, egalitarian ideology becomes the ascendant legitimation principle for the new social stratification, just as it becomes a handy ideological weapon of the oppressed in their struggle for freedom or equality. In this way, freedom and equality become the political religion of modern man, necessitated by the new industrial social structure and reinforced by secular education. Neo-Confucian reformers in nineteenth century China might have been idealistic when they proposed that, while accepting western science and technology for application, China should retain its traditional value-system. For no modern economy can function *efficiently* without egalitarian ideology as its legitimation principle and operational code.

Thus, the modern nationalist or neo-nationalist leader with dictatorial tendencies in the world faces the same ironic dilemma that the absolutist monarch faced in Europe. The latter aroused national consciousness purely for the purpose of consolidating royal absolutism. But once he had awakened the sleeping society (nation), he could not declare the task done, and ask peasants and burghers to return home to their villages and boroughs. Even

more so with the Third World nations because here the rates of mass mobilization have been higher. Nationality as an awakened social actor makes it easier for the masses/public to make collective demands and claims that are of societal interest and concern. It gives organizational facilities to egalitarian aspirations which may be 'the fundamental instinct of society, the feeling of the group for itself (MacIver 1955:126).

STATE NATIONALISM AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

We have discussed nationalism's relation to social power, freedom and equality. But what is the unit for the realization of such ideals? Undoubtedly they are all of universal appeal. However, history shows they are *most effective* within certain perimeters, beyond which their effectiveness decreases. Tribes lived within certain compact territory with specified hunting grounds. Culture draws contours and circumferences but its symbols, beliefs and rituals in a particular local colouring are valid only within a certain naturally-endowed region which shapes a particular life-style. Polity germinates and its power is pursuant only within a well-defined territory. Nationalism in the classic sense emerges out of each such unit shaped by economy, culture, polity and history. This is true of most historical cases of nationalism, excluding new artificial states in Latin America and Africa where necessary boundaries are artificially and recently drawn.

The state ought to be, according to egalitarian ideology, co-extensive with and corresponding to such units as shaped by history, polity, culture and ecology. Neither liberty nor equality nor fraternity could be realized in a commune, global or otherwise, as the French and Russian revolutions have proved. The emergence of the nation-state suggests itself as the optimal structural unit within whose boundaries the political ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity may be optimally realized. As Sir Ernest Barker wrote

When once the state is based on the democratic principles of government by the will of its members, it must logically and necessarily be coextensive with the group in which men cherish a common tradition, develop common ideas, and attain a common will.

(1948:253)

It is in this sense that 'the nation has in fact become the body that legitimates the state' (Emerson 1962:96).

Because the nation legitimates the state, modern imperialism and international communism failed in the twentieth century with the rise of nationalism. Imperialism, being a single political system ruling over several nationalities and/or nations, conflicts with the popular national aspirations and a general will represented by a common culture. International

communism by definition sought to transcend and break the national boundaries erected by culture, history and polity. It was the traditional component of nationalism which resisted transnational communism. Communism as a Marxian ideal has been operative only within the structure of the nation-state; Marx's vision of a classless, stateless global commune is nowhere in sight.

Unfortunately, we see no end to nationalism. During the nationalist movement when nationalism is produced at the optimal level, appeal to nationalism is resorted to even by the declared antagonists of nationalism, Marxists. They have done so for two principal reasons. Neither class interest nor class solidarity has proved encompassing enough to achieve societal unity for strategic purposes; only nationalism encompasses the whole nation. Second, we/they differentiation which is the dynamics of nationalism reaches its optimal point during the nationalist movement that is invariably directed against an antagonistic generalized other, cutting across class or caste. That is why we have argued elsewhere that, with the possible exception of the Russian Revolution, no Marxist type of revolution has ever succeeded without resorting to anti-imperialist nationalism (Norbu 1982:98–540).

When the nationalist movement consummates with the creation of a nation-state or in the prior case of a state already in existence, nationalism is systematically produced by the state which may be called official nationalism. Law and government 'regulates social action in the light, and as the expression of a common set of ideas concerning the proper nature of social cohesion and conduct'. Religion had been for hundreds of years the source of 'a community of ideas and emotions'. Language and literature expresses the genius and character of a people. Education is a 'common system of training which unites the minds of the members of a nation' and 'quickens characters towards the pursuit of common ideals' (Barker 1948:4). These are the post-independence/revolution agents of nationalism in any historical and probably semi-industrial society also.

Now ironically enough industrial capitalism, which is universalistic in its drive, tends to accentuate atavistic tendencies inherent in a traditional society towards nationalism. The irony resides in the fact that capitalism, like its counterpart socialism, emerged out of the feudal conditions as a transnational developmental process crossing national boundaries; the contemporary multinational corporations are the logical manifestations of this universalistic tendency. However, there is a significant difference between capitalism and socialism in their respective propensities to accentuate atavistic tendencies towards nationalism. Capitalism, though possessing certain international features, is definitely set within the economic optima of the nation-state, if not the logic of the state, that is, national interest. Marxism, on the other hand, is premised upon a stateless, global commune. We know that classical

Marxism is no longer operative anywhere. However, we must remember that contemporary Marxists' formal objection to nationalism still remains as an article of faith.

Both capitalism and socialism share a common industrial base which directly influences the critical aspect of superstructure of the nation-state—nationalism, be it capitalist or socialist. This is where the 'convergence theory' might be apt though not in the evolution of similar political systems; their functional commonality resides in the uniform production of nationalism. The fact is industrial capitalism, either private enterprise or state capitalism type, is a vocational civilization, which necessitates learning and training. This learning and training is carried out by the modern education system. Such an education works best where a culture of learning already exists: respect for and love of learning. In other words it presupposes indirectly a relatively homogeneous culture since culture of learning is nothing but literate culture; language and literature is a major unifying force. It then automatically may be assumed that industrial capitalism operates efficiently under the conditions of a relatively homogeneous culture with education as the most efficacious agent of training and specialization.

Any successful industrial capitalism, capitalist or socialist type, therefore, necessitates modern education and common culture as necessary conditions. If this is so then the industrial state which increasingly monopolizes education and culture can further accentuate the traditional tendencies towards nationalism. Furthermore, industrial capitalism is economically a generalized commodity production, and ideologically a mass culture, both of which tend to facilitate and enhance further production of nationalism as Ernest Gellner has argued (1983:163–5). For instance, consumer psychology and mass media shape mass characters. In this context it is instructive to recall the various images of nationalism such as will, character, spirit, identity, and so on.

Finally, we must consider the international factor responsible for the production of official nationalism. So far we have found two types of dynamics of nationalism: (a) a conflictual situation when a nationalist movement is operative; (b) international politics under normal circumstances. The former is frequently referred to in the course of this essay. We shall briefly discuss here the role of international politics in the production and perpetuation of state nationalism.

The international political system is essentially an anarchical macro-political structure in which states as primary units strive to compete, co-operate and conflict with each other in their struggle for scarce resources or prestige issues. Thus, international politics is defined as 'politics in the absence of government' (Fox 1959:29–51) under anarchical conditions, which produce a certain predictable pattern of interaction among states that has its

own momentum. The pattern is one of ever-recurring rivalry, competition, conflict and seldom co-operation among like-units struggling for power and security in an anarchical situation. To be sure states have many concerns but, since they are invariably positioned in competition or conflict in relation to each other in an anarchical situation, their primary and perennial concern is security.

What are the implications of such a theory of international politics to the production of and perpetuation of nationalism? The state's paranoid preoccupation with national security leads it to emphasize national unity and prop up social power. Second, the pattern of international politics (that is, action ? reaction) constantly heightens the we/they differentiation which fuels the furnace of nationalism which otherwise may remain dormant. With the two-fold increase in the number of internationally-recognized actors (sovereign states) in the international system since the Second World War, cause as well as consequence of nationalism have enormously increased. Nationalism does not end with the consummation of independence; it continues under the dynamics of international politics. Moreover, the modern state needs nationalism to legitimate its continued existence, to maintain national unity and to defend the nation-state from external sources of threat or danger. To be sure state nationalism is less virulent than social nationalism we have discussed in some detail in this essay. At any rate there are both internal and external factors which encourage the continued production of nationalism.

We have argued that the technological imperatives of industrial economy encourage mass culture which tends to reinforce atavistic tendencies towards nationalism and also that the dynamics of international politics accentuates the continued production of state nationalism. We may now discuss whether these two tendencies propelling nationalism even after independence may be countered by regional integration that symbolizes transnationalism.

Will the nation-state as such become obsolete and be replaced by regional organizations emerging in the various parts of the world? We can discuss the future possibilities of regional organizations in terms of two critical variables of nationalism, cultural differentiation and political rationalization.

The state is functionally a complex political organization that has historically been used by various political systems regardless of ideologies to achieve public goals. To that extent the state also might be enlarged and used by a regional organization except that its sovereignty has historically been jealously guarded by and associated with a particular nation since the sixteenth century. Whether a nation-state, while becoming a member of a regional organization, would willingly surrender its sovereignty to the larger regional body remains problematic. The European Economic Community's (EEC) announced political integration by 1992 might indicate that member

states might be willing to gradually surrender their individual sovereignties under exceptional circumstances which we shall specify shortly.

But by far the greatest obstacle to regional integration comes from national identities which have been maintained solely by cultural differentiation from generalized others. Not merger but differentiation is the fundamental dynamic of national identities. Furthermore, such identities are deeply rooted in religious sects, language and literature, culture heroes, social organization, history, and so on, which have taken at least a thousand years in their formation, and have shaped a particular nation's character. The question of surrendering state sovereignties is a matter of political will but the merger of particular national identities with a regional one involves a complex social process of gradual assimilation which can hardly be legislated. It has to be an evolutionary process. The rise of ethnic nationalism in most multinational states is a poignant reminder of the fact that group identities once formed long ago cannot be easily dissolved in a given melting pot. The national identity is the culture heart of any self-differentiating social group which has divided the human race into distinct nations for thousands of years.

From the perspective of our essay, regional organizations appear essentially as economic rationalization designed to maximize economic benefits, and hardly as political rationalization to regulate social life, though in practice the two may overlap as a residual effect.

Therefore, any possibility of regional organizations replacing the nation-state structure in the Third World for the next fifty years is dim. There is not only a lack of political will to subordinate state sovereignties to regional organizations but the Third World national identities are much more particularistic than the European ones, which in contrast share several commonalities. Moreover, the possibilities of the nation-state are far from being exhausted in any part of the Third World, especially in terms of resource exploitation and general economic development within the framework of the nation. In fact, Thailand initiated the formation of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1965 as a regional security pact to ward off the communist threat from Vietnam and to neutralize Indonesia's hegemonic potential in the region (Simon 1982). Similarly, Bangladesh initiated the idea of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) in 1985 to neutralize India's hegemony in the region (Muni and Muni 1984). With such intentions, even regional economic co-operation has proved difficult and any political integration of highly nationalistic states is out of the question for a long time to come.

The EEC is a special case which might not repeat itself in the Third World, although its revolutionary demonstration effect may be felt elsewhere also. The formation of the EEC has to be seen in its proper historical perspective,

that is, after the loss of the European overseas colonies from which no European nations could any longer extract resources, and second, finding themselves politically impotent in the post-war international system dominated by two super powers. It is in such a context that the EEC becomes an economic rationalization designed to pool western European resources together and manage their collective economy much more efficiently. It makes economic sense given the limited economic resources available within western Europe itself and also given the post-industrial economic problems such as dwindling resources, uncertainties about investment in high technology industries, industrial pollution, and so on, which no single nation-state can handle by itself in the west.

Equally important is the political factor. In order to appreciate it we have to remember that western Europe led and dominated the modern world for nearly three hundred years, a fact most European leaders secretly cherish with pride. Contrast this recent imperial glory with the humbling situation in which the leading nations of Europe have found themselves since the end of the Second World War: a military and political appendage to the USA. The only one way to renew European political power in a world dominated by two super powers and rising regional powers in the Third World is political integration within the EEC framework, so that Europe can reassert its traditional role in world affairs.

The EEC's economic and political integration should be less problematic than Third World ones because European national identities, though distinctive, are less individualistic than, for example, Asian ones. Western Europe shares a surprising number of commonalities that can constitute a European identity: race (all Caucasian), religion (some denominations of Christianity), political institutions (all democratic), economy (all industrial), and so on. The principal means of differentiation in Europe has been traditionally language and literature which may be reduced by multilingual education and a transnational life-style.

Such favourable conditions are simply absent in most parts of the Third World. Here the state will continue to be the only valid authority at home and the sole actor in international politics. International relations among Third World nations will not be dominated by regional integration even along economic lines but by mini-nationalist struggles for greater degrees of congruency between political authority and ethnic constituencies.

In short, in the non-western world social mobilization for the creation of an autonomous state structure has not yet run its full course, and transnational political arrangements are out of the question for a long time to come. Meanwhile, nationalism will continue to be the major motivating force shaping foreign policy as well as propelling national economic development in the Third World.

NOTES

- 1 We avoid the term 'individualism' which is more applicable in the Western context. In the Third World personal ideals continue to be *character* or *personality*.
- 2 This is what I might call 'configuration mystery'. England and Japan are classic cases of how certain sets of favourable conditions led them to lead the modern world.
- 3 This may be explained as follows. Being entirely dependent on the Soviet Union for its national security and economic development, the Mongolian People's Republic has been following every change in the Soviet policy since the early 1920s. Indeed, Ulan Bator re-enacts every twist and turn in Moscow as a faithful follower (cf. Alan J.K.Saunders, *Mongolia: Politics, Economics and Society* (London, 1987) pp. 52–123).

10 The monoethnic state and polyethnic social system: the rise of ethnic nationalism

With the achievement of India's independence in 1947, the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and the subsequent decolonization process in other parts of the Third World, the active phase of large-scale nationalism as manifested by major ethnic groups is over. Indeed, the Vietnamese dramatic victory in 1975 may be considered the last episode in the history of large-scale nationalism in the twentieth century.

No sooner the dominant ethnic groups' nationalism is over than the era of ethnic nationalism began; it appeared in the late 1950s, like large-scale nationalism, first in industrially-advanced societies. Breton, Basque and Quebecois ethnic movements signified the beginning of ethnic nationalism. To-day over fifty-four countries are confronted with ethnic conflict,¹ which constitutes the most widespread, protracted, and violent form of 'domestic' conflict throughout the modern world.

In this chapter we consider the so-called ethnic conflict as the major manifestation of post-colonial nationalism. We do so by applying the basic concepts developed in this essay to an analysis of ethnic conflicts in the Third World.

ETHNIC GROUPS AND NATIONALISM

We may define ethnic nationalism as that politicized social consciousness centred upon an ethnic identity born out of shared commonalities, seeking to achieve unity, autonomy and group interest by mobilizing ethnic-based constituencies. Central to this definition is the notion of ethnic identity which may be defined as an aggregation of ethnic variables such as race, culture, language, society, and so on, by which the ethnic group differentiates itself from generalized others. Since the primary function of ethnic identity is differentiation *vis-à-vis* others who do not share that identity, the required differentiation may be achieved by emphasizing that ethnic variable which uniquely distinguishes a particular ethnic group from others around it.

Thus, each European nation differentiates itself from others on the continent by emphasizing its language variable because otherwise they all seem to share other variables. The critical variable in the Black Power's ethnic identity is colour because black colour is what unites all blacks together and differentiates them most critically from others. Given such a set of multiple ethnic variables constitutive of an ethnic identity, it all depends on the interethnic situation as to which aspect of the ethnic identity may be emphasized in order to achieve the greatest degree of differentiation from the generalized other in contact or conflict. It is analogous to a man with many hats; which hat should be put on is determined by the particular occasion, the purpose being to look distinguished.

In the light of large-scale nationalism with which this study is primarily concerned, it would appear that ethnic nationalism is not fundamentally different from ideal-type nationalism; it exhibits most of the essential characteristics of nationalism. The only significant difference is that ethnic nationalism is retarded, small-scale and limited in its goals, in comparison with large-scale nationalism for obvious reasons. These differences spring not from the logic of ethnic nationalism but from the specific historical situation in which it finds itself, that is, the multinational state whose power is captured by the dominant ethnic group. Had it not been for this fact, ethnic nationalism would have progressed logically and necessarily along the various stages of nationalism outlined in this essay. However, the powerful state apparatus dominated by the dominant ethnic group delimits the perimeters of ethnic nationalism, and prevents its full-throated expression. It is this retarded and incipient nature which differentiates it from large-scale nationalism.

Apart from such differences, both large-scale nationalism and ethnic nationalism are rooted in ethnicity or what we have called traditional component: 'Since culture is nothing but a way to describe human behaviour, it would follow that there are discrete groups of people, i.e. ethnic units, to correspond to each culture'. And if we choose 'to regard the culture-bearing aspect of ethnic groups as their primary characteristic' (Earth 1981:190, 200-1), this has far-reaching implications for our conception of nationalism. In the ultimate analysis every nationalism, large- or small-scale, is rooted and anchored in ethnicity which we, as social scientists, cannot ignore, though it might be ideologically undesirable in some quarters. Therefore, I have not hesitated to show how national identity may be rooted in a particular religious tradition, a pattern of social relations might have formed the basis of national unity, and how the ascriptive traditional component (ethnicity) as a whole might provide the driving force behind any nationalism. Such tendencies are often described by 'progressive' writers as irrational, instinctual and reactionary and must be dismissed as 'subjective'. Such a biased approach

puts premium on the objective understanding of nationalism and particularly ethnic nationalism as a crucial social force rooted in the value-system and social structure of any given society.

Since nationalism has a strong ethnic character that cannot be ignored, we must make a qualification on the careless characterization of the dominant ethnic groups' nationalism as 'Arab' 'British' 'Chinese', 'Indian', and so on. For the fact is that the so-called Arab nationalism did not include the Berbers, Copts, Druse, Alamites, Assyrians, Kurds, and so on. The so-called Chinese nationalism was in fact Han nationalism which failed to involve the Tibetans, Turks, Mongols, Manchus and Muslims (Hui). The so-called Indian nationalism was essentially Hindu nationalism which failed to unite the Muslims, Nagas, Mizos, Adivasis, Santhals, Gurkhas, and so on. The so-called British nationalism or social imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century excluded the Welsh, Irish and the Scots; its ethnic basis was Anglo-Saxon.

We can go on applying this ethnic criterion to even less known and smaller cases to pinpoint the ethnic character of each nationalism. Our point is clear: nationalism operates not along class lines within society nor along national boundaries but along ethnic lines in confrontation with the generalized other. It assumes essentially an ethnic character. The ethnic group is a discrete social organization vessel within which mass mobilization and social communication may be effective. And ethnicity provides the potent raw material for nationalism that makes sense to only the members of that ethnic group. Its primary function is to differentiate the group members from the generalized others. It, therefore, calls for an ethnicity specific approach to nationalism because each ethnic group corresponds to a specific culture through which nationalism is expressed.

Yet few scholars have diagnosed the essentially nationalist character of ethnic conflict, and even fewer have dared to call the spade a spade, namely ethnic nationalism. It is

too often superficially discerned as principally predicated upon language, religion, customs, economic inequality or some other tangible element. But what is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is the basic identity which manifests itself in the 'us-them' syndrome.

(Connor 1972:341)

which is the fundamental dynamics of nationalism.

Nationalism has become so much synonymous with the large-scale nationalism of the dominant ethnic groups that they believe any other manifestation of nationalism especially within their 'nation-states' is treason. They have not monopolized state power but also state nationalism, which condemns ethnic nationalism as 'anti-national'. State propaganda and the

dominant ethnic groups project ethnic conflict misleadingly as an inter-group conflict within society and tend to play down its nationalistic characteristics, which have dangerous implications to their nation-state. That it is 'a revolt against the state and its power structure at various levels' (Phadnis 1986:101) is seldom admitted. Instead, it is almost universally deprecated and labelled with such pejorative terms as 'parochialism', 'tribalism', 'communalism', 'splitism', 'separatism', 'particularism', 'primordialism', 'subnationalism', 'regionalism', 'ethnic revivalism', and so on. It is condemned 'almost universally' for two reasons. First, nearly 90 per cent of UN members are multinational states and therefore actual or potential cases of ethnic conflict. Second, most authors of ethnic conflict are from dominant ethnic groups who have a vested interest in not revealing the true nature of ethnic nationalism which strikes at the very foundation of state nationalism and questions the latter's political legitimacy.

Indeed, ethnic nationalism poses a serious threat to the territorial integrity and political legitimacy of multinational states. For what ethnic nationalists today demand is no less than what John Stuart Mill wrote at the age of European nationalism:

Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed.

(1905:286-7)

And the doctrine of nationalism declares that the valid optimal unit of democratic government ought to be a nation or nationality because such a social unit has 'the national culture, without which the general will was nothing but an empty formula' (Sabine 1971:594). The implication is that the multinational state under the control of the dominant ethnic group does not represent the non-dominant ethnic group, and that the latter desires to divorce itself from the polyethnic social system and form its own government. With such dangerous implications of ethnic nationalism, most social scientists find the term ethnicity or ethnic conflict more neutral than the controversial political concept, nationalism. Moreover, by now the academic popularity of *ethnic* studies and state interest almost everywhere have conspired to render ethnicity one of the most overused concepts that obfuscates the true nature of ethnic nationalism.

Having characterized ethnic conflict as ethnic nationalism, we now must make a qualification that differentiates it from large-scale nationalism of the anti-imperialist epoch. The main difference arises from the utterly disproportionate power of the antagonist (state) in an unequal relation to the protagonist (the ethnic group). The situation is no longer one of confronting

a colonial empire or *ancien régime* in decline. Ethnic nationalism confronts, on the contrary, a highly-centralized, scientifically-rationalized and coercively-empowered state structure with an impressive mandate of the dominant ethnic groups who constitute in most cases the overwhelming numerical majority. Apart from jealously maintaining 'the monopoly over the legitimate use of force' within its national boundary, the post-colonial state ensures cultural or ideological hegemony that totally bans any politics of nationalism that runs contrary to state nationalism. That is why we do not witness today much of the protracted ethnic mass mobilization that characterized large-scale nationalism; it is either banned or co-opted by the state. This drives the most desperate and determined elements of ethnic nationalism into acts of terrorism as evident in the Punjab, Sri Lanka, Kurdistan, Northern Ireland, and so on.

In the case of large-scale nationalism the colonial or feudal regime was not only militarily weak but at least conceded in many ways the democratic legitimacy of the nationalist demands. The multinational state, on the other hand, not only has far greater military capability to suppress any counter-nationalist movement launched by tiny minorities, but ideologically refuses to recognize even the democratic legitimacy of any ethnic nationalist demand because of the myth that even non-dominant ethnic groups form part of the 'nation-state', not an empire. Ethnic nationalism on the other hand views, for all practical purposes, the multinational state as an empire controlling various nationalities with no explicit or implicit mandate of the non-dominant ethnic groups as well. It, therefore, attempts, no matter how feebly, to create a true nation-state that reflects 'the political expression of the democratic will of the people' (Cobban 1944:6). This then is the crux of ethnic conflict.

Although minority ethnic groups aspire for the ultimate goal of any nationalist movement, namely independence, the ground situation is not conducive to such a positive outcome. There are three factors that militate against them. First, the state power under the control of the dominant ethnic group is much stronger than ever before; it is in a coercive position to suppress most ethnic conflicts as illustrated by cases like Biafra, Tibet, Mizoram, Nagaland, the Shan, and so on. Second, since nearly 90 per cent of the so-called nation-states are in fact multinational states and therefore potential or actual cases of ethnic conflict, the international community shares a vested interest in maintaining the territorial integrity of each other. Thus, India helped Sri Lanka to suppress the Tamil insurgency; some western nations helped Zaire to fight secessionist attempts especially in Shaba; the British and Canadian governments assured the Indian government that they would suppress any Sikh political activities. Third, being small-scale nationalism involving only minority communities, ethnic

nationalism cannot generate much social power, lacking public support from the dominant ethnic groups.

Even in Africa, where the post-colonial state is not as strong as in Asia, ethnic nationalist movements have been suppressed fiercely. The Ibos of Nigeria almost established a new sovereignty of Biafra but the Nigerian central government was able to prevent secession after a bitter war. Zaire has successfully beaten back numerous secession attempts. Ethiopia has so far maintained its military control over Eritreans and Somalis. The peaceful separation of Singapore from Malaysia is a rare exception, which unfortunately may not repeat itself. Bangladesh would not have become independent had it not been for the Indian armed intervention and Soviet backing. Similarly Namibia's independence was inconceivable without the Cuban armed intervention for fourteen years.

By the late 1980s the international situation has become even more unfavourable for ethnic nationalism. The cold war era which resulted in several proxy wars, and more opportune interference in each other's affairs, seems to have given way to an age of dialogue. A new consensus seems to be in the air between the two super powers and among regional powers that minimizes armed interventions (for example, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola) and that stresses on maintaining the international status quo, particularly the territorial integrity of multinational states. This new international situation coupled with the immensely-consolidated state power structure puts most ethnic nationalists in a situation in which they, especially the pragmatic leaders, have no other option but autonomy as a means to safeguard their unique identities and promote their economic interests. But this compromise solution should not distract us from the nationalistic intentions with which almost all ethnic conflicts began. Subhas Ghising called his organization 'Gurkha *National* Liberation Front', the Shan tribes, 'Shan State *Independence* Army'; the Karen tribes, 'Karen *National* Defence Organization' (Burma); the Muslims in Thailand, '*National* Front for the Liberation of Pattani Republic', the Muslim rebels in the Philippines, 'Moro *National* Liberation Front'.

Perhaps the following facts might reveal the acute sense of dilemma in which most minority ethnic groups find themselves in the contemporary tightly-organized state system: of the nationalities at war against multinational states, about 60 per cent seek an autonomous territorial and political relationship with the dominating state; 15 per cent are divided between autonomy and independence, and 25 per cent want independence (*Utne Reader* 1972:341). The majority's option for autonomy is not because they do not, in their heart of hearts, desire independence, but because they realize the utter impossibility of it under the present national and international situation.

ETHNIC IDENTITY AND THE MONOETHNIC STATE

The term ethnic group is generally understood in anthropological literature from which its current usage is derived to designate

a population which: a) is largely biologically self-perpetuating; b) shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms; c) makes up a field of communication and interaction; d) has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.

(Barth 1981:200)

In concrete terms, Frederik Barth's definition includes race, culture, language and society, all of which, as a functioning system, rejects or discriminates against the generalized others around them. It should be recalled that we have also considered all of these factors but our point of departure has been to indicate with a certain degree of precision: (a) the processes by which each of these factors evolved in particular civilizational contexts; (b) the functional relation of each to the other and to the aggregate as a whole. Such developmental phases are discernible in the case of large-scale nationalism; they may or may not be so in the case of ethnic conflict because it entails only small-scale nationalism involving much smaller units and shorter duration of operation. For ethnic nationalism is small-scale nationalism of a nationality, not of a nation.

Because the in-depth working-out of any world religion in most ethnic societies is not as thorough-going as in large complex historical societies such as China, Egypt, India, Iran, and so on, we may not be able to trace the roots of ethnic identity to particular religious traditions. Thus, most students of ethnicity define ethnic identity as an aggregation of ethnic variables that constitute an ethnic group and by which the group in question may differentiate itself from others. It is 'the result of membership in a specific group based on a number of criteria including culture, history, language, religion, and geographic location' (Hall 1979:3). Tribe, caste, language groups, region or state 'all have features that make them potentially adequate primary ethnic identity for group reference' (Barth 1981:223).

Yet the centrality of culture in the formation of ethnic identity cannot be ignored. Frederik Barth observes that 'ethnic identity is associated with a culturally specific set of value standards' (1981:214). Raymond Hall writes that 'ethnicity and ethnic identity signify group cohesion centred on traditions, symbols, and psychological phenomena not shared by others with whom the group is in contact' (1979:xx). Anthony Smith concludes,

Ethnic movements make their claims in virtue of an alleged 'community of culture', in which the members are both united with each other by a

shared culture and differentiated from others by the possession of that culture.

(1981:13)

With such definitions of ethnic groups and their respective identities, it is only natural that such social groups maintain their ethnic boundaries that demarcate them off from their popular perceptions of generalized others. Ethnic boundaries are erected upon racial difference, cultural difference, social separation and language barriers, 'spontaneous and organized enmity' (Earth 1981:200). In tribal societies the maintenance of ethnic boundaries 'is accomplished by signs, icons, totems and other markings of limited scale, their only function being to distinguish the group in question from other ethnic groups bound spatially and temporarily' (Hall 1979:13). Under normal, namely non-conflictual, situations, the dichotomization of others

as strangers, as members of another ethnic group implies as recognition of limitations on shared understanding, differences in criteria for judgment of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest.

(Earth 1981:206)

The function of ethnic boundary maintenance is primarily to preserve ethnic identity, but under the conditions of an ethnic conflict, ethnic identity becomes not only more aggressively asserted and more acutely differentiated national identity, it also marks the critical turning-point in the transformation of ethnicity into ethnic nationalism. The transformation is brought about by the politics of mass mobilization and social communication. As we have remarked in the context of the evolutionary stages of proto-nationalism, when *ethnos* engages itself in politics, that *ethnos* transforms itself into a nationality which is a political category. Politics makes *ethnos*, which had hitherto remained a sack of potatoes, into some sort of actor in history. As Max Weber observed, 'It is primarily the political community no matter how artificially organized, that inspired belief in common ethnicity' (1978:389). For ethnic conflict by definition involves 'a dimension of politics resting at least in part on such traditional bases for political association as culture, language, territory, and ethnicity rather than on class or functional interests' (Thompson and Rohen 1986:26). And ethnic nationalism 'strives to turn the ethnic group into that more abstract and politicized category, the "nation", and then to establish the latter as the sole criterion of statehood' (Smith 1981:xi). In short what we are dealing with is 'the transformation of passive, often isolated and politically excluded communities into potential or actual "nations", active participant and self-conscious in their historic identities' (ibid.: 24).

If the preceding discussion demonstrates remarkable similarities that ethnic nationalism shares with large-scale nationalism, there are certain differences also which we must not preclude. Differences centre largely on the scale of mobilization and the quality of leadership. When we study ethnic conflicts, we observe that there is practically no intellectual mobilization that preceded and accompanied most large-scale nationalisms. The reasons are primarily two. First, being small-scale, resource-poor peripheral economies, ethnic communities have seldom been the target of western colonialism which otherwise might have produced protracted contradiction between tradition and modernity involving intensive intellectual mobilization as happened in China, India and Egypt. Second, since ethnic communities are less stratified than large, complex societies, they tend to lack that critical bilingual strata that spearheaded large-scale nationalisms. Thus, the Gurkhas have been led by an ex-soldier (Subhas Ghesing); the Nagas by an ex-soldier (Angami Fizo); the Kurds by a poet (Haji Qadir); and the Tibetans by a priest (the Dalai Lama). As a result ethnic nationalism bypasses the intellectual mobilization phase and moves straight into mass mobilization attempts. However, in the west we witness 'a renewal of nineteenth century ethnic nationalisms which were also largely led by those strata most heavily involved in the production and distribution of knowledge and information' (Smith 1981:176).

Nor is mass mobilization during ethnic conflict as protracted as in the case of large-scale nationalism. This has largely to do with the political situation in which most ethnic nationalists find themselves in the contemporary polyethnic social systems, namely, powerful state apparatus captured by the dominant ethnic group. This was not the case when most of the major ethnic groups were waging their war for independence or revolution. The ancient regime in question was facing an international war or crisis which greatly weakened the state power and dwindled economic resources. The Maoist victory in China would have been far more problematic without the Japanese aggression which greatly weakened Kuomintang state power. India's independence would have been far more difficult without the two world wars which greatly weakened the British imperial power. The Russian Revolution would have been far more arduous without the international war in which the Tsarist regime was engaged. We mention some of the 'ifs' of modern world history to point out the significant role of what might be called the international factor in facilitating the dominant ethnic groups' seizure of state power when the weakest links of domination prevailed.

Not only the international factor but also the state power structure in most post-independence/revolution societies is heavily against ethnic nationalism. The post-colonial development is characterized not so much by nation-building as is commonly assumed, as by state-building. We only need to

glance at the ever-increasing defence expenditure of most multinational states to confirm this assertion: fifty-three sample states in the Third World spend 25.72 per cent of their national budget on 'defence' (See Table 5). The strengthening of state power is justified, not only to ward off possible external sources of threat or danger, but in many cases to defend the dominant ethnic group's state power monopoly. Historically, nationalist movements either during or immediately after independence were invariably accompanied by protracted international warfare which sensitized the revolutionary elites to the necessity of strong state power. Seen from this perspective, 'social revolutions are less about class struggle or modernization than state building' (Skocpol 1988:150).

Such greatly empowered and highly-centralized state power almost everywhere is captured, maintained if not monopolized, by the upper classes or castes of the dominant ethnic group; minority ethnic groups are systematically excluded from the crucial top-level decision-making process, no matter what social class they may belong to in the overall stratification system of the polyethnic social system.

State power is an abstraction; we need to be specific in our allegation. Concerning the ultimate substance of state power, there is fundamental consensus both on the left and right. Marx defined the state as that organized force used to resolve class contradictions in a class society. And Weber defined it as the monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a given territory. Applied to our inquiry, it means that we must specify the particular ethnic background of the elites who have the monopoly over the 'legitimate' exercise of power in the crucial top-level decision-making process. It is invariably Han revolutionary leaders in China, upper caste Hindus in India, white Leninists in Russia, white elites in the USA. That power always tends to be monopolized by the dominant ethnic group in question. This general tendency is necessarily dictated by a statist imperative: the cult of secrecy which implies that the minority ethnic groups cannot be trusted with top state secrets. Hence most crucial appointments in the higher echelon of the state apparatus is preceded by a modern ceremony: the oath of office and secrecy. The implication is an equally secret recognition by the dominant ethnic group that their state does not enjoy the mandate of minority ethnic groups. For the doctrine of a nation-state is that the state is consensually congruent with the nation, which is not the case with polyethnic social systems.

Typically, in any contemporary multinational state, top posts in the following state agencies are reserved for the upper class or caste of the dominant ethnic group: (a) top bureaucratic and ministerial posts with crucial decision-making power; (b) top army posts; (c) top police posts; (d) and almost entire staffing of intelligence offices. Up to this day we seldom see any elite from the minority ethnic groups in any polyethnic society

Table 5 State building in the Third World as indicated by percentage of national budget for military expenditure in 1974

<i>Nation</i>	<i>National budget (US\$ m)</i>	<i>Military expenditure (US\$ m)</i>	<i>Percentage of national budget for military expenditure</i>
Afghanistan	189.3	42.8	22.6
Argentina (1972)	4699.2	694.8	14.8
Bolivia	261.2	39.4	15.1
Brazil	7875.7	1198.6	15.2
Burma (1972)	394.4	107.6	27.3
Burundi	33.4	8.1	24.0
Cameroon	335.3	39.7	11.8
Chad	90.0	22.7	25.2
Chile (1973)	848.2	450.4	53.1
Congo	118.0	19.3	16.4
Cyprus	107.1	20.1	18.8
Ecuador	473.8	70.5	14.9
El Salvador	197.2	26.1	13.2
Ethiopia	372.4	65.7	17.6
Gabon	79.7	10.7	13.4
Ghana	642.2	67.8	10.6
Haiti	33.3	8.5	25.4
Honduras	147.6	16.7	11.3
India	10273.3	2539.6	24.7
Indonesia	2805.5	857.8	30.6
Iran	10819.9	4730.8	43.7
Iraq (1975)	12303.2	1884.2	15.3
Israel	6166.3	4624.0	75.0
Jordan	515.2	137.8	26.8
Korea, South	2547.4	712.0	27.9
Kuwait	1135.7	631.6	55.6
Laos	47.4	25.1	53.0
Lebanon	532.6	129.4	24.3
Libya	3545.8	1030.4	29.1
Malaysia	2322.2	311.3	13.4
Mali	62.2	8.9	14.2
Mauritania	70.3	8.9	12.7
Morocco	1966.0	196.4	10.0
Nigeria (1973)	2156.0	380.0	17.6
Oman (1975)	1466.1	730.0	49.8
Pakistan	1709.0	567.0	33.2
Paraguay	115.5	21.1	18.3
Philippines	842.2	356.3	19.3
Rwanda	40.5	7.9	19.4
Saudi Arabia	6425.4	1671.0	26.0
Singapore	912.3	243.7	26.7

continued . . .

Table 5 continued

<i>Nation</i>	<i>National budget (US\$ m)</i>	<i>Military expenditure (US\$ m)</i>	<i>Percentage of national budget for military expenditure</i>
Somalia (1973)	62.9	16.1	25.5
Sudan	639.6	114.6	17.9
Syria	1300.0	554.0	42.6
Taiwan	2269.7	855.3	37.7
Thailand	1700.4	361.9	21.3
Uganda (1973)	318.0	51.3	16.1
United Arab Emirates	424.9	72.0	17.0
Upper Volta	52.8	7.0	13.2
Yemen	73.5	49.2	66.9
Yemen Democratic	65.8	36.8	55.9
Zaire (1973)	729.2	130.0	17.8
Zambia	677.5	96.5	14.2

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1978, pp. 136–7.

occupying any of the above-mentioned top posts. They are usually given ceremonial posts in societies where egalitarian ideology is the reigning orthodoxy. Thus, the Panchen Lama can be appointed as a vice-chairman of the National People's Congress in China; Muslim public figures in India can become the President of the Republic but not its prime minister; Buriats can staff entirely the Soviet Union's international Buddhist Association (ABCP) but certainly not the CPSU, or the state apparatus.

We therefore suggest the dominant ethnic groups' monopoly over the exercise of state power is fairly universal. Some might say that the situation is more complex in democratic societies. Let us take the United States and India which might falsify our generalization. It is true that in the USA there is the much-advertised practice of 'equal opportunity' but up to this day we don't see any black people occupying any of the top positions in the state apparatus. The only avenue most freely open to the blacks which might lead to some degree of public recognition is the Church. The rise of Martin Luther King Jr and Jesse Jackson should be seen in this context. India declares 'secularism' which means equal treatment of all religious groups in the country. But up to this day we don't see any Muslim elite appointed to any of the above-mentioned top positions. This has gradually driven most educated Muslims towards the academic profession as the only open avenue with some respect.²

Criteria for discrimination varies from polyethnic society to polyethnic society. They depend upon those ascriptive ethnic variables which most

critically differentiate the dominant ethnic group from minority ethnic groups, and thus maintain the informal political boundary that separates the superordinate from the subordinate. In China the criterion is not language because most minority ethnic elites have mastered that language. Nor is it race *per se* because racially China has a fairly homogeneous population excluding the Turks. It is essentially Han ethnicity and party membership. In India the criterion for political discrimination is not race because racially the whole subcontinent except the north-east shares considerable racial homogeneity. Nor is it language because the Indian Constitution recognizes fifteen official languages. It is essentially Hindu identity which critically differentiates the dominant ethnic group from the minority ethnic groups especially the Muslims. In the USA the criteria for political discrimination again differs. It is not language because almost every American can speak English. Nor is it religion because blacks are even more devout Christians. It is race which critically differentiates the dominant whites from blacks and others. In the Soviet Union it is not language because by now most of 'minority' ethnic groups have learnt Russian. It is essentially Great Russian ethnicity and party membership. Ethnicity and party membership are unobtrusively but closely interconnected: top party positions are monopolized by the dominant ethnic elites, Great Russians or Han.

There is no one universal criterion for differentiation and discrimination; it depends on the constellation of correlation of ethnic variables. Political boundaries are maintained by singling out those features that most critically differentiate the dominant ethnic group from the minority ethnic groups as illustrated earlier. Those examples also serve to substantiate the typical mechanism by which ethnic identities are enforced and maintained for utilitarian purposes.

Our observations do not lend much ground to the primordial theory of ethnic identity. Given a set of ethnic variables which are, to be sure, ascriptive in nature, it all depends on the situation confronted by an ethnic group as to which of its given ethnic variables (or which aspect of the ethnic identity) may be emphasized in order to most critically differentiate the ethnic group in question from generalized others around it. Ethnic identity is more a function of socialization, learning and enforcement processes than a mere given set of primordial sentiments, which are more acquired through socialization than born with. The accident of birth does not so much determine one's ethnic identity as the society into which one is born and brought up does.

Apart from the statist imperative—security and secrecy—which necessitates the monopoly of state power by the dominant ethnic group, electoral democracy as a number game tends to legitimate the majority ethnic group's continued political domination of polyethnic social systems. In

China Hans constitute about 93 per cent of the total population; in the Philippines 92 per cent of the population are Christians; in India Hindus are about 82 per cent of the total population; in the USA nearly 85 per cent are whites. In Indonesia the Malays comprise 96 per cent of the total population. In such cases the general attitude is expressed either in a democratic idiom of head-counting which amounts to the tyranny of the majority or strange ethnic doctrines such as *bhumiputra* (sons of the soil) in Malaysia, Brunei, Fiji, and so on, which are propounded in order to ensure the political supremacy of the presumed dominant ethnic group. In the USA the continued white monopoly of state power is justified by some sophisticated academic 'theories', namely, 'the culture of poverty', 'benign neglect', and soon.

With such overwhelming numbers, the majority and therefore dominant ethnic group feel that it is their axiomatic and natural right to dominate the state power structure simply because electoral politics or egalitarian ideology legitimates majority decision as final. What such a democratic assumption fails to appreciate is the fact that most ethnic groups are not subsocieties or subcultures in the sense of being mere extensions of the dominant ethnic groups (little tradition). More often than not they constitute altogether independent categories of society, culture and communication systems. This means that the dominant ethnic groups, no matter in what majority, cannot actually claim to represent or express the general will of a multinational state without the consensus of minority ethnic groups because sociologically only a shared culture, language, and so on, expresses its own corresponding general will independent of the dominant group's.

There is another aspect of ethnic conflict in which the dominant groups (and leftist writers) show a surprising lack of understanding. Because they are secure in most respects within the system of their creation, the dominant ethnic groups fail to comprehend why the ethnic identity should form the core of an ethnic conflict. What is there in a name? they ask. Just as we care for our name and reputation, so does an ethnic group for its identity. For an ethnic identity is nothing but a shorthand for an ethnic group's most cherished values, most sacred symbols and most deeply-held sentiments which constitute its very sense of self-hood. It corresponds to our notion of good name which we defend and protect at all cost. With the erosion—and worse—negation of an ethnic identity, the ethnic group, it seems, suffers death in life. That is why minority ethnic groups show crisis behaviour in polyethnic systems because the political domination and cultural hegemony by the dominant groups create a crisis situation. Minority identities are in jeopardy of extinction.

To suggest that post-independence/revolution political development has unmistakably progressed more along ethnic lines than class lines does not

mean we reject the Marxian concept of class analysis. It, however, calls for restriction of class analysis to intra-ethnic relations. In a situation of inter-ethnic relations or conflict, ethnic identity takes the place of class. That is to say that representative elites from *all* the significant 'nationalities' in the Soviet Union or China did not constitute the state power structure; representatives from all the 'communities' in India did not constitute the core state power structure; representative elites from *all* the 'races' in Britain did not constitute the core state power structure. But it is true in each case that only the *elites* from the dominant ethnic groups have captured and continue to monopolize state power in the name of the 'nation'.

And it would be absurd to suggest that *all* the members of the dominant ethnic group exercise political hegemony over the entire polyethnic social system. Only the elite can and does it with a certain degree of legitimacy derived mostly from the respective ethnic group to which that elite belongs. In such a situation of intra-ethnic relations class analysis might work, but not in cases of inter-ethnic relations. Just as workers of the world never united in their class struggle, so the elites of all ethnic groups have never united to form a representative government in multinational state systems. Reasons are rooted as much in the statist imperative as in the ethnicity of the dominant ethnic group. Here is a vicious circle in which reason and sentiment are irretrievably interlocked, reinforcing each other to perpetuate the *political status quo*: the monoethnic character of the state.

The mechanism by which elites from dominant ethnic groups monopolize the crucial sectors of state power structure is complex, and it takes decades to recognize the true nature of that political domination. It is more subtle than classical colonialism in that it is to all appearances legitimated by egalitarian ideology or electoral politics in which the will of dominant ethnic groups naturally triumphs over minority groups. Objectively the process of political marginalization of minority ethnic groups is reinforced by the statist imperative of secrecy.

We emphasize that the essential character of the dominant ethnic group's hegemony is political, though political power once assumed has other implications too. This is particularly true of the plural society which is a polyethnic social system, integrated in the market-place but under the control of a state system dominated by the dominant ethnic group which leaves non-political power sectors open, namely religion, culture, social and economic spheres. Thus, the blacks in America can enter the Church, excel in sports and pop music; the Chinese in South-East Asia can enter business, even though they are not *bhumiputra*; the educated Muslims in India can join the academic profession just as Parsees like Tata can dominate private enterprises, but not state power even in the so-called plural society. That is the preserve of the dominant ethnic group.

NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE RISE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM

The seizure and continued domination, if not monopoly of state power by the dominant ethnic group in any polyethnic social system can largely explain the probable causes as well as negative consequences of ethnic nationalism. For once they seize state power, the political elite from the dominant ethnic group can not only determine the allocation of scarce resources, but also essentially shape the multinational state in their image by various means and to varying degrees. Hence the Leninists stress so much upon the seizure of state power as the crux of revolution, because once that is accomplished, then social revolution can be virtually engineered by using state power at one's disposal.

To be sure, the quantum of changes affecting the ethnic identity and political autonomy of minority ethnic groups depend, in principle, upon the specific constitutional provisions of each political system. India, Mexico and Yugoslavia enacted legislative provisions for safeguarding the cultural and regional rights of ethnic minorities on the Swiss model. But even in these plural societies, increasing attempts are made through gradualist methods to impose the language and culture of the dominant ethnic groups upon the minority ethnic groups as the official language and 'national' culture. Because of its internal and inherent logic, the modern state always seeks to create its political and social base, the nation which legitimates its existence. Where the state and nation are not congruent to each other such as in a polyethnic social system, the state seeks to 'integrate' the non-dominant ethnic groups into the cultural fabric of the dominant ethnic group so as to create the necessary myth of a nation-state. So assimilation goes on either as an official state policy such as in Burma, Bhutan, Thailand, Malaysia, and so on, or by encouraging those social forces through economic incentives that drive the minority ethnic groups towards at least the language and culture of the dominant ethnic groups as the efficacious means of better education and employment as in China, India, Russia, Mexico, Yugoslavia, and so on.

Indeed the nation-state in the true sense of the term meaning one *ethnos* under the rule of its own state, is a rare phenomenon in the modern world. We can count such genuine nation-states on our finger tips: Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Malta, Germany, Norway, Japan and Korea. Most of the so-called nation-states are in fact multinational states. In a survey conducted in 1972, Walker Connor found a 'remarkable lack of co-incidence that exists between ethnic and political border': of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 12 (9.1 per cent) are essentially homogeneous; 25 states (18.9 per cent) contain an ethnic group accounting for over 90 per cent of the state's total population;

and in another 25 states the largest element accounts for between 75 and 80 per cent of the population. But in 31 states (23.5 per cent of the total) the largest ethnic element represents only 50 to 74 per cent of the population, and in 39 cases (29.5 per cent of all states) the largest group fails to account for even half of the state's population (Connor 1972:320).

Thus, only about twelve states are free from any ethnic conflict, and the rest are facing or will face ethnic conflict of various magnitudes. Given the polyethnic character of most 'nation-states', we can predict that the future trend of nationalism will be ethnic nationalism. For ethnic conflict is a political contradiction between the monoethnic character of the state power structure and the polyethnic social system, a socio-cultural cleavage that cuts along ethnic lines, producing small-scale nationalism. It also signifies a legitimization crisis of the monoethnic state's right to rule polyethnic social systems.

Therefore, when we analyse the etiology of any ethnic conflict, we should consider the following causal factors: (a) the basic contradiction between the monoethnic state and polyethnic social system; (b) the incessant state nationalism that negates and denies particular ethnic identities; (c) the postcolonial state's nation-building activities that tend to dislocate indigenous authority structures in peripheral ethnic societies.

Unlike its predecessor, the *ancien régime*, which was merely contented with the collection of taxes and maintaining law and order, the modern state by definition is an activist one. Its expanding power penetrates almost every vital sphere of social life including education, culture and mass media, which are directly relevant to the production of state nationalism. This is particularly true of the nascent Third World multinational states which actively seek to promote state nationalism in order to maintain the integrity of polyethnic social systems. This state nationalism causes 'clashes between absolutist ideologies, admitting of no compromise: the imperative of state nationalism confronting the imperative of ethnic nationalism' (Brown 1988:51). State nationalism appears to the non-dominant ethnic groups as revolution from above with which they cannot psychologically identify and which they cannot accept as legitimately their own. They feel strongly that they have their own ethnic identity capable of producing their own version of nationalism compatible with their ethnic interest. But state nationalism negates ethnic identities of minority groups, and ethnonationalism is an assertive reaction to this negation.

Typically the modern interventionist state in a polyethnic situation embarks upon what is called 'nation-building', 'national reconstruction', 'national developmental activities'. They entail two simultaneous processes: political centralization and national unification. Political centralization essentially means the establishment of direct control over minority ethnic groups who

usually, though not always, reside in peripheral regions, by creating new or strengthening old networks of centralized administration. This disrupts, if not displaces, indigenous authority structures, thereby producing a legitimization crisis. Given the monoethnic character of the state, its centralization attempts are often perceived by concerned minority ethnic groups as alien encroachment if not outright invasion. This was the case when the Hindu power elite tried to 'integrate' the Nagas and Mizos after 1947; when the Burmese military elite established direct control over the Sawbwas in the Shan State after 1948; when the Han army 'liberated' the Tibetans in 1950; when the Nigerian central government attempted to integrate the Ibos in the 1960s, and so on. Such, nationalistic reactions become understandable when we recall that the relations between a core power at the centre and peripheral communities during the pre-modern era were tenuous; the latter tended to enjoy an amazing degree of autonomy whatever their legal relations to the centre.

The proposition that the monoethnic character of the state and its nation-building activities largely provoked ethnic nationalism is tellingly illustrated by the Kurdish case. Kurds are found on the frontiers of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Syria and the Soviet Union, but most persistent Kurdish nationalism is operative in Iraq 'the state which owes most to western imposition and definition' (Smith 1981:145). Hence more active with nation-building activities. The demonstration effect is immediate. If the Iraqis can create their own independent state, so can and should the Kurds who possess all the properties of nationhood except an independent state.

National unification is often carried out under the rubric of 'national integration' after the establishment of centralized political control. It acknowledges the multinational character of the nation-state and consequently envisages that such a polyethnic social system can be politically and socially held together if the minority ethnic groups can be persuaded or forced to accept at least the national identity, language and general culture of the dominant ethnic group. 'The privileged position of the Great Russian, the Russian language, and Russian cultural norms has, in truth, kept alive and frequently enough sharpened the ethnic animosities inherited by the Soviet regime from its Tsarist predecessors' (Sterling 1979:421). A similar case can be made against Han-dominated China: the Han race has been projected as *the* revolutionary model *par excellence*; the Chinese language is the official lingua franca; and Chinese culture under the auspices of Maoist socialism was imposed upon the minority ethnic groups as disguised blessings of Han civilization, at least right up to Mao's death in 1976 (Dreyer 1976:173-6).

The situation may be better in India but even here there is sufficient evidence of progressive Sanskritization in many spheres of social life.

Despite their claims about 'unity in diversity', 'composite culture', and so on, the Hindu elite always tends to draw their ideas and inspiration in naming places (for example, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh), or naming their scientific achievements like missiles (Agni, Prithvi), and so on, from their classical language, Sanskrit, and never from Arabic, even though the Muslim minority number is considerable. Above all, Hindi is increasingly projected as the 'national' language in most political platforms and government-run media.

We should not get the wrong impression that the process of Russification, Sinofication, Sanskritization are confined only to the big nation-states; the small ones have been doing the same just as well, and perhaps even more effectively because of their small size. Hugh Tinker noted in 1959 'Burman public men behaving towards their frontier colleagues like a "master race" insisting that the only true Burmese is a Burman Buddhist', and 'government policy aims at emphasizing the unity of Burma through an extension of Buddhism, the Burman language, Burman dress and other cultural modes amongst the frontier peoples' like the Shans and Karens (1967:76).

The Christian-dominated Philippines' government pursues similar policies toward the Muslim minorities (Moros) so that

in time they will be 'integrated', that is, they will resemble the Christian Filipinos. This philosophy is really a philosophy of assimilation, reflecting a basic contempt for the religious, cultural and historical factors upon which they (the Moros) anchor their psychological and social identity.

(Gowing 1979:210)

Hence, the Moros perceive the Filipino state as 'an alien and threatening Christian agency' (Brown 1988:60).

The Muslim minorities in Thailand faced a similar assimilationist policy which included the imposition of the Thai language and the teaching of Buddhist ethics in schools. 'The wearing of sarongs, the use of Malay names and the Malay language, the use of Sharia Law and instruction in Islam—all were banned' (Brown 1988:61).

The point is sufficiently clear: the monoethnic character of the state necessarily ensures that the measures it takes in the name of political centralization and national integration are hardly ethnically neutral. (Even socialist societies like the Soviet Union and China, where a new vision of man which was inculcated during the revolutionary period, only resulted in the imposition of the language and culture of the dominant ethnic groups upon reluctant minorities). Such centralizing and integrative policies inevitably entailed the introduction if not outright imposition of the dominant ethnic group's language, culture, institutions, and identity upon minority ethnic groups who cherish and possess their own language, culture, institutions

and identity. No matter how gradual, such processes and policies inherently had a humiliating implication to the minorities' ethnic identity: it meant that the values of the latter were in some ways inferior, and that only by adopting the more advanced culture of the dominant ethnic group could the minority ethnic groups gain full entry into the nation-state. This hurts their popular sentiments and leads them to search for the discovery of their own ethnic identity.

In this connection we should remember that most, though not all, minority ethnic groups tend to occupy a definite niche in the regional environment, a territorial entity beside their other attributes of a nationality. To mention a few well-known examples: the Scots in the Scottish Highlands, the Kurds in the Kurdish mountain ranges, the Tibetans on the Tibetan Plateau, the Nagas in the Naga Hills, the Shans on the Shan Plateau, and so on. In relation to dominant ethnic groups, minority ethnic groups tend to reside at the peripheries. In the pre-modern era such a geographical location ensured an autonomous historical development which sustains ethnic identity. In fact some of the minority ethnic groups such as the Scots, the Tibetans, the Sikhs and several nationalities in the Soviet Union had their independent states during certain periods of their history. Given such attributes of nationhood which a great number of ethnic groups appear to possess, according to Frederick Barth's definition of ethnic groups, it is not surprising that they invariably perceive the post-colonial state's attempt at political centralization as alien and threatening encroachment upon 'their' territories; and national integration as an affront to their ethnic identities. This is functionally analogous to the situation when large-scale nationalism confronted colonialism/imperialism which produced the we/they differentiation syndrome.

THE 'MODERNIZATION' OF ETHNICITY

The demonstration effect of large-scale nationalism upon ethnic nationalism cannot be underestimated, as several writers have noted. Anthony Smith writes that ethnic revival is 'closely bound up with the rise of nationalism' (1981:23). Richard Sterling also notes that 'it is nationalism that shaped the politics of separatism in the modern world' (1979:414). Nationalism's precise appeal to ethnic nationalists is self-evident in the monoethnic character and power of the modern state. For any politicized ethnic group can protect and promote its culture, can advance and defend its economic interest, only if it has its own independent state, as the dominant ethnic group's hegemony so clearly demonstrates.

The post-colonial state, unlike its immediate predecessor which was more interested in profit maximization than national integration *per se*, must engage

in various centralizing and integrative activities so as to justify its *raison d'être* as a nation-state, not an empire. However, most multinational states technically resemble empires in two important respects: (a) a single centralized state controlling various nationalities or even nations; (b) lack of legitimacy that characterizes such polyethnic systems because one nation, *ethnos* in our sense, legitimates the state of its own creation. By definition each *ethnos* seeks to create its own protective political shell, the state. This is hardly the case and ethnic nationalism in essence is an attempt to remedy that incongruent situation. Being aware of deep-rooted discrepancies that challenge the myth of nation-state, the modern state, under the control of a dominant ethnic group, schemes to dilute, if not destroy, the polyethnic character of its social system by insidiously or systematically casting all minority ethnic groups in the essential mould of the dominant group. Its intention only underscores the chasm between myth and reality: the so-called nation-states are in fact multination-states lacking legitimacy from their non-dominant ethnic groups who were forcefully incorporated into the dominant ethnic group's state. Ethnic nationalism is the conflict between internal imperialism and incipient nationalism.

The kind of development, therefore, that the post-colonial state typically promotes in the peripheral regions indicates that its first priority is not any basic industrial development for the minority groups; it is more concerned with the establishment of communication networks which would facilitate the tasks of political centralization and national integration. The setting up of Radio and TV stations must precede any official effort to build factories. Motorable roads are built if the peripheral region is strategically located. Through these official communication networks the state propagates its own version of national identity and state nationalism so as to foster the loyalty of minority ethnic groups to the newly-formed multinational state. The language and culture of the dominant ethnic group is propagated as the required ingredients of national identity, while others attempt to forge new identities such as 'The American Dream', 'The Great Motherland' in China, 'The Socialist Fatherland' in the USSR, 'Democratic, Non-Aligned, Secular Bharat' in India, and so on. But such symbols, old or new, are alien to the non-dominant ethnic groups who possess and cherish their own ethnic identities.

The outcome of state-sponsored mass communication in most cases is the unintended consequence of ethnic nationalism. The state's intention in using mass communication is to forge a new identity relevant to its conception of nation-building, but the result is almost the opposite: it awakens dormant, isolated ethnic groups to their own sense of ethnic identities. As history shows, individuals may change their cultural identities out of conviction, and counter-culture movements in the west is a classic

example of this phenomenon. But societies in mass seldom change their identities and belief-systems except perhaps through *jihad* or social revolution. Minority ethnic groups can neither accept nor identify with new national identities and symbols imposed by the dominant ethnic group because they have their own deeply-rooted ethnic identities that characterize them as Sikhs, Gurkhas, Tibetans, Mongols, Scots, Welsh, Kurds, and so on. Instead, the advances in communication, transportation and literacy tend to increase the cultural and political awareness of minority ethnic groups. This invariably leads them to search for the roots of their ethnic identities that increasingly differentiate them from generalized others, especially the dominant group.

We should not in practice conceive of a mass communication system as neutral in the sense you can input any information you like. There are serious limits beyond which intended messages may lose their appeal, relevance and even validity. Such limitations to new messages are set up by religion, folklore, literature, common myths and symbols, all of which through centuries of social usage have determined the structure of social communication in any traditional society. Given such culturally-predetermined patterns of social communication, we can guess what types of information may be effectively transmitted and reach the intended target. Any material or message pertaining to their ethnic identity and, of course, ethnic nationalism, travels much more easily than state nationalism through the given channels of social communication in a remote peripheral region where an *ethnos* may reside in splendid isolation. That is why we witness today more instances of ethnic conflict in the Third World where the post-colonial state is bent on disrupting the social and cultural fabric of ethnic solidarity.

We must add that it is not only the traditional component of nationalism (ethnicity) that is easily transmitted through the channels of mass communication. Ethnic nationalists tend to pick up certain new ideas and values that enhance or reinforce ethnic nationalism, and substantiate or support their claims to ethnic nationhood. We refer specifically to the egalitarian ideology of modern nationalism—freedom, equality and fraternity—whose total impact on ethnic nationalism cannot be denied. Yet this modern aspect of ethnic nationalism is usually ignored because ethnicity as a subdiscipline has been dominated by anthropologists whose natural focus of interest is on traditional culture rather than modern ideas. In order to appreciate the irresistible appeal and considerable impact of such radical ideas on the formation of ethnic nationalism, we need to recall two points mentioned earlier: (a) the monoethnic character of the state; (b) the definition of an ethnic group which corresponds to the political status of a nationality if not a nation.

The monoethnic character of the state confirms beyond doubt that, as long as they do not control state power, no non-dominant ethnic group can be, in practice, either equal to or free from the dominant ethnic group's domination, no matter how liberal the constitution of a polyethnic social system may be. This political domination necessarily flows from the statist imperative of a given state power structure, legitimated by electoral politics. Under these political circumstances, non-dominant ethnic groups realize that they cannot preserve and prevail their culture except under a given cultural or ideological hegemony; they cannot ensure the development of a national economy except under the terms and conditions set by the dominant ethnic group; they cannot meaningfully participate in crucial decision-making processes without accepting the inevitable political domination by the dominant ethnic group.

These conditions generate political contradictions between declared freedom and equality on the one hand, and factual unfreedom and inequality on the other, cutting along distinct ethnic lines. The ensuing situation in most polyethnic social systems is very much analogous to the one confronted against imperialism and colonialism in this sense: loyalty to the ethnic group is not compatible with the loyalty to the state. The result is a serious legitimation crisis that the monoethnic state faces in a polyethnic social system because there is an 'indissociable relationship between ethnicity and political legitimacy' (Connor 1973:2). In those cases in which the nation and the state essentially coincide, the two loyalties tend to mesh rather than conflict, but this is not the case in nearly 90 per cent of sovereign states.

It is in this light that we must proceed next with a brief discussion of the impact of egalitarian ideology and nationalism on ethnic nationalism. We should remember that such egalitarian ideas and ideals are widely and frequently circulated by the mass media and electoral politics which penetrates even the remote peripheral regions.

Democracy is an abstract universal doctrine which does not specify the necessary conditions, especially the appropriate unit within which its ideals may be realized in practice. For it is clear from the history of the French and Russian Revolutions that no matter which way democracy is defined, it cannot be realized on a global or transnational scale. It is in such a context that nationalism claims, among other things, to be an ideal unit for the realization of democracy because a nation or nationality has a national culture that can express the general will, a common language that constitutes a comprehensive social communication system, a social organization that forms the structural framework for socio-political life and occupies a definite niche in nature that constitutes its homeland. Democracy in other words became realizable when nationalism appeared on the scene.

The central doctrine of nationalism is that political participation is the

birthright of all whose ethnicity constitutes the nation. This doctrine in particular declares war on the elite rule of the traditional state, thereby giving birth to the ideological connection between democracy and nationalism. The central tenet of democracy is power to the people, and that of nationalism power to the nation. Apart from semantic differences, the terms nation and people are nowadays interchangeably used because both refer to the same political constituency, namely the politicized society. The only critical difference between democratic and nationalist doctrines is that whereas democracy demands for an end to elite rule everywhere, nationalism demands for an end to elite rule in a specific single nation. Nationalism delimits the perimeters of democracy, and this renders the latter operational.

In general parlance, a democratic government is one that is 'of the people, by the people and for the people'. It is explicitly expressed by the doctrine of national self-determination which has great appeal to any non-dominant ethnic group. In its pristine form the doctrine 'makes ethnicity the ultimate measure of political legitimacy, by holding that any self-differentiating people, simply because it is a people, has the right, should it so desire, to rule itself (Connor 1972:331). For the definition of national self-determination is 'the right of a group of people who consider themselves separate and distinct from others to determine for themselves the state in which they will live and the form of government it will have' (Piano and Olton 1969:121).

The term 'people' is a vague political one. However, the United Nations' usage and popular currency suggest that it is coterminous with a nation or nationality. If this is so, can we consider an ethnic group as a nation or at least a nationality? Walker Connor thinks that 'what we have thus been calling self-differentiating ethnic groups are in fact nations' (1972:334). It is in this context that he warns that the term

ethnic group should not be confused with its current usage on the domestic American scene. Ethnic group is derived from 'ethnos', the Greek word for nation in the sense of a distinctive ethnic group. As such, there was until quite recently general agreement that an ethnic group referred to a basic human category (that is, not a subgroup) characterized by unity of race and culture.

(Ibid.: 2)

At any rate until the explosion of ethnic literature from the mid-1960s 'the terms "nationality", "national groupings" and "minority" have been used in rough reference to the same phenomenon to which the term ethnicity is applied' (Thompson and Rohen 1986:1). It is fundamentally in this sense that we have used the term ethnic group in the context of our discourse. An ethnic group may have historically and sociologically attained the status of a nationality, but usually not that of a nation. The distinction between the two

is simple. A nationality may have all the cultural, social and historical prerequisites of a nation but not usually a state which the latter alone controls. Hence the myth of a nation-state is congruent to each other. In the absence of a state the nationality lacks a vital centralizing agency and above all control over its collective destiny. That is why the primary goal of every nationalist movement is the historic struggle to establish an independent state by the concerned nationality.

SOCIAL PREREQUISITES OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM

While describing most ethnic groups as nationalities, we reluctantly exclude simple tribal societies out of our consideration. This is not to suggest that tribes do not have the right to self-determination, but that they typically lack most of the essential prerequisites for any type of nationalism, large- or small-scale. The fact is that nationalism, despite some of its undesirable consequences, is definitely an advanced political consciousness indicating the optimal unit of integrated social life. Its prerequisites, as suggested by our study, include the following: (a) a complex yet unfragmented society that provides the social basis for national unity: (b) socially-shared fundamental cultural values that form the psychological basis of general will: (c) a common language or system-wide symbols that facilitate social communication: (d) considerable stratification and literacy rate so that nationalist leadership may emerge: (e) a pan-ethnic identity that transcends tribal or other particularistic identities.

It is in such a complicated context that we find Walker Connor's definition of an ethnic group as a 'self-differentiating people' too inclusive and simplistic. Any tribe can differentiate itself from the next tribe or other categories, as any anthropologist will tell us. But there are qualitative differences which cannot be measured in terms of functionalist cultural relativism; simpler tribes have simply not reached that level of historical development whereby they can possess even most of the prerequisites for national consciousness; they do not have the necessary propensity for nationalism. They are too fragmented to enjoy social unity. They lack system-wide symbols that can facilitate social communication. Their societies suffer from a lack of social stratification and literacy that cannot produce necessary leadership. Their identities are operative only within each tribe. That is why the Eskimos in North America, the Lapps in Scandinavia, the Australian aboriginals, the Maoris in New Zealand, the native Indians in South and North America, and so on, do not exhibit any signs of national consciousness, even though they have been under white domination for centuries; their main quarrel with their respective dominant ethnic groups is over property rights. In a similar vein I would argue why

the nation-building process in Africa is more problematic than in any other continent. The main historical reason is the lack of all-encompassing cultural influence of a world religion.

The impact of any world religion on the course of national development of any given society can be neither ignored nor underestimated. Earlier we have traced the origins of any historical case of national development to the introduction of a world religion to a particular social milieu, and its unintended consequences to the evolution of nationalism in due course. It is true that no religion teaches nationalism; it teaches explicitly only pan-humanistic values. But we have demonstrated how the mere introduction of a world religion into a particular society necessarily entails certain degrees of social development in crucial spheres of social life which indirectly but effectively facilitate the growth of national consciousness when conditions are ripe. For example, it sets up a fairly centralized organization (Church, Mosque, Temple, Monastery); inculcates a new pan-ethnic solidarity (fellowship), and invents a written language, if none existed, in order to propagate its gospel, thereby creating a system-wide social communication system.

The objective impact of these developments especially in a tribal society cannot be underestimated; they indirectly produce most of the prerequisites for national consciousness. Thus the Nagas, and the Mizos in India, the Karens in Burma and many more tribes in Africa began to show manifest national consciousness only after they had been Christianized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This is not because Christianity teaches nationalism, but because its propagation necessitated certain social developments which inadvertently prepared the necessary infrastructure for the growth of national unity, national identity and nationalism. The importance of world religion in the formation of culture and subsequently national development cannot be underestimated.

Our comparative analysis of large-scale nationalism and ethnic conflict indicates that ethnic nationalism reveals almost all the essential characteristics of modern nationalism precisely because all the five ((a)-(e)) prerequisites of nationhood are inherent within the structure of most ethnic groups. Therefore, within the framework of our analysis, ethnic groups in conflict with the monoethnic state power may be called nationalities meaning nations-in-the-making as defined at the beginning of this essay. Whether they might achieve the status of nationhood or not is academically immaterial, and we have already predicted that outcome as most unlikely given the power of the state in most cases; but the sociologically relevant point is that they exhibit almost all the properties of that transitional situation and we as students of ethnic conflict should endeavour to capture all the dynamics of that ambivalent movement. Nationalism is a key to such an understanding.

Finally, we must consider the role of economic factors in ethnic nationalism in particular and large-scale nationalism in general. However, since our primary emphasis has been deliberately on the traditional component of nationalism which was underestimated by theorists of revolution and modernization alike, our comment here will be brief.

Ever since its publication in 1975, Michael Hatcher's 'internal colonialism' thesis has been an influential paradigm to explain the economic causation of ethnic conflicts. He concluded, 'Nationalism has re-emerged in the Celtic periphery largely as a reaction to this failure of regional development' (1975:265). There is a great deal of plausibility in the thesis since most ethnic communities are generally located in remote or peripheral regions whose growth rates are lower than those of their neighbours or the core areas. But it does not explain why ethnic nationalism began to manifest itself in the Celtic periphery only in the early 1960s, whereas uneven development preceded more than a century earlier. Nor does it explain the cases in which the economic conditions of ethnic communities are much better or the same as the core areas, such as the Basque provinces, Catalonia, the Punjab, the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, and so on.

Thus, the causes of ethnic conflict are more complex than a simple monocausal economic determinism would suggest. 'There are no absolute and objective criteria to evaluate the degree of deprivation or discrimination' (Muni 1986:10). Economic factors 'may strengthen or may help to awaken this fellow-feeling, but they are not a substitute for it' (Segal 1979:10). They 'are likely to come in a poor second when competing with the emotionalism of ethnic nationalism' (Connor 1972:334). Existing data suggest that 'political and status deprivation' are more closely related to ethnic nationalism than economic or service wants (Smith 1981:28).

However, the critical question is not so much economic factors versus cultural ones. Such dichotomization is a function of ideological commitment which is unfortunately superimposed upon recalcitrant subjects. Nor is there much gain in saying that both sets of factors are important. The natural history of nationalism suggests that cultural and economic factors appear in sequences rather than dichotomously, and it is our task to determine at what stages of nationalism each set gains salience over others. Our study of large-scale nationalisms indicates the following hypothesis: nationalism commences with cultural symbols as a principal means of mass mobilization, then crystallizes into national identity as the locus of nationhood but consummates with economic matters, particularly national interest as the *raison d'être* of the nascent nation-state.

That nationalism does not begin with economics but with cultural symbols has hopefully been made clear in Chapter 8.

Smaller political units exhibit similar culture-influenced political

behaviour in the context of nationalism. When the French armed men first invaded Vietnam in the nineteenth century, the first reaction of the Vietnamese court was not how to protect the national wealth but the sacred person of the king who symbolized their nation. When the Chinese People's Liberation Army 'liberated' Tibet in 1950, the first reaction of the Lhasa government was not how to defend the territorial integrity of Tibet or how to protect natural resources but the sacred person of the Dalai Lama who symbolized Tibetan culture.

We mention these examples to underline a methodological pitfall into which the study of nationalism has generally fallen. Western scholars tend to view Third World nationalism in terms of the western European experience, namely, 'liberal nationalism', and in any other which does not fit, this model is usually dismissed as 'culturalism' or cultural nationalism. They need to remember that the role of culture in the formation of even European nationalism is considerable, especially in its early formative stages. In most Third World countries where the reigning academic orthodoxy is invariably some variation of Marxism, any scholarly pursuit which does not propound an economic causality is lightly dismissed as 'subjective'. Such scholars tend to impute political economy causes where none existed; nationalism is such a case (Amin 1983; Bai 1982; Chandra 1979, and so on). They need to be cautioned that nationalism must be understood in its proper context and correct time-frame; we must not be swayed by current intellectual fashion or state nationalism, and superimpose our ideological views upon recalcitrant subjects. The phenomenon of nationalism ought to be objectively understood as it was when it was boiling.

This is not to deny the role of political economy in nationalism but only to suggest that economics begins where social nationalism ends and where state nationalism begins. This is the main current of nationalism almost all over the Third World. However, as a minor current, economic nationalism in the form of anti-imperialism began to emerge after the establishment of communist parties by the Comintern in early 1920s. Even then the Marxian appeal to economic interest was no match for the all-encompassing emotionalism of nationalism. The fact is that class interest may be sufficient to cause a strike but it is inadequate to bring about mass mobilization on a societal scale. Marxists in China, Vietnam and Cuba suspended class struggle during their 'revolutions' and instead resorted to manipulating nationalist slogans and symbols for effective mass mobilization. In any case, the class-formation in the categorical ways in which it took shape in the west had simply not taken place in the Third World; here masses mostly meant peasantry who responded more to familiar cultural symbols than to class struggle.

In a critical sense nationalism is a form of crisis behaviour concerned

with collective survival. Just as a man in crisis sacrifices all his earthly possession to save his life, so do the nationalists relegate economic interest to a secondary position during their nationalist struggle. But once their national identity is secure and protected by an autonomous state, then and only then do economics predominate over all national activities; we have largely left economics to economists who have succeeded in making their discipline a science. This study as a whole is primarily concerned with the exploration of the relation between culture and nationalism.

NOTES

- 1 Multinational states where ethnic conflict is going on include the following countries: Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Britain, Brunei, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Congo, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Malagasy, Malaysia, Mauritius, New Caledonia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, the United States of America, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.
- 2 At the time of writing (1988) the vice-chancellors of all the three universities in Delhi are Muslims. This is not sheer coincidence. Most well-known Muslim public figures in India, like Dr Zakir Hussain, Professor Nurul Hassan, Humayun Kabir, and so on, are of academic background, suggesting thereby that the only respectable avenue open to minority elites is education, even though the Muslim community in India has a lower literacy rate than Hindus.

11 Conclusion: cultural differentiation and political rationalization

Although theory-building requires considerable simplification, we have so far tried to do justice to the complexity of nationalism. However, if conclusion warrants further simplification, we may state two sets of tentative generalizations that flow from the body of our analysis. As nationalism works itself through history, we observe two fundamental tendencies, sometimes active, sometimes dormant but quite evident especially in modern political development: cultural differentiation and political rationalization. They are the dialectical motions in national development.

The first section of this concluding chapter explains the historical significance of these two tendencies to national identity assertion and optimal group formation. The second section assembles the major parts already dissected and analysed in the preceding chapters, and constructs a paradigm of Third World nationalism that may be tested. In other words, we shall delineate the two social tendencies in the history of nationalism that are easily prone to politicization. We shall also demonstrate the typical mechanism by which those two historical tendencies have been accelerated in the Third World by voluntaristic means, primarily by mass politics.

Politics arises from the social nature of *homo sapiens*. That is, a group of people are somehow grouped together without much effort, who realize, either through historical experience or sudden demonstration effect, that one of the meaningful and effective ways to achieve group interest is by group action. Nationalism in the modern epoch is a classic example of macro-politics on a societal scale. We mention all this even in our conclusion because ours is not a structural theory but deliberately a voluntaristic one in which the role of mass politics cannot be underestimated.

DUAL TENDENCIES IN NATIONALISM

From a long historical perspective, the evolution of nationalism from simple tribalism represents two fundamental tendencies in history: (a) increasing

cultural differentiation from generalized others leading to social self-hood and national identity of a social group; (b) progressive political rationalization of its social life by creating appropriate forms of political organization. These two tendencies are functionally related to each other, though analytically separable. The end result of these two tendencies is the formation of an optimal social group that seeks to rationalize its social life by political means—the state.

Cultural differentiation which leads to cultural individuality refers to that ever-sharpening sense of social self-hood embedded in the superstructure of a particular society that differentiates in most significant ways, both subjectively and objectively, an *ethnos* or nationality from generalized others of the same social category. This process culminates with the formation of a national identity that entails the maintenance of ethnic boundaries by ethnic variables.

The political rationalization of social life, on the other hand, refers to that group tendency to form appropriate organizations to protect and advance collective interests, both material and cultural. This process culminates in the formation of an independent state structure as the optimal level of political rationalization of social life. A true nation-state, therefore, is a socio-political system whose political and cultural boundaries coincide, cohesively meshing each other. If national identity signifies self-hood of a people, the state is the rationalization of self-rule.

Whereas political rationalization connotes some form of rationality as we shall see shortly, cultural differentiation does not. From a purely economic point of view, cultural differentiation may be termed a powerful non-rational group impulse inherent in any social group that seeks to maintain its identity by means of differentiation. Its chief functions, as it works through any national history, is to *differentiate* a particular social group from generalized others so as to create and maintain ethnic or national identity by means of differentiation.

Differentiation signifies higher forms of functionality which principally serves the functions of identity assertion and maintenance. Cultural differentiation, as used in this essay, refers to that dynamic psycho-cultural phenomenon within whose womb the seeds of collective conscience may reside. It is self-consciousness of a social group that seeks to assert its identity amidst turbulent historical development. A continuous process of differentiation over a long period of time (50–100 years) has the tendency to revolutionize and externalize the collective conscience through the active assertion of national identity as the locus of nationalism and the central meaning of historical development. It manifests itself as society-wide expansion of self-cognition, self-confidence and self-consciousness on a societal scale. It may be analogous to the individuating process of an adult

leading to self-knowledge and self-identity, but of course we mean the collective individuation of a social collectivity cemented by shared values, social structure and common idiom.

Although this differentiating tendency is probably inherent in any social group that preceded nation formation, it has been accentuated and very much activated by modern conditions as outlined on pages 102–7 and Chapter 7. This tendency reaches perhaps its optimal point and logical culmination in nation formation in which the ideal political unit is limited by shared culture in the broadest sense of culture. It is here that we see the other function of cultural differentiation: to map the cultural perimeters of political rationalization, namely state formation within a specific culture—area. If and when the cultural and political units are congruent to each other, then an ideal nation-state is formed.

The members of any complex society tend to have multiple identities, which must be differentiated from an over-arching national identity. In this context it is possible to speak of two different types of differentiation, external and internal. Internal differentiation occurs in order to establish multiple secondary identities based on professional roles, generational traits, social ties which signify membership of associations, subcultures, or local communities. Such secondary identities are generally used in order to differentiate the members of an ingroup among themselves, and as such become effective only in the context of intragroup relations and ‘domestic conflicts’. Culturally they are the still persisting residue of particularistic, little, local traditions that make up complex, historical societies.

External differentiation occurs in order to establish a pan-ethnic or nationwide identity that differentiates the said ingroup from generalized others around it. As such a national identity gains salience over multiple, secondary identities typically in the context of international conflict or societal encounter engendering sometimes identity crisis. An Arab proverb expresses well the ordering principle of internal and external differentiation: ‘Myself against my brother; my brother and I against my cousin; my cousin and I against the outsider’.

Identity-formation is a complex process involving multiple variables that inform the sense of social self-hood and which critically differentiate it from generalized others. ‘In fact, the whole interplay between the psychological and the social, the developmental and historical, for which identity formation is of prototypical significance, could be conceptualized as a kind of psychological relativity’ (Erikson 1968:23). Thus, we have defined national identity as an aggregation of ethnic variables such as culture and social organizations, language and literature, race and territoriality, select history and political symbols (King), and so on, depending upon a given intergroup situation or the nature of generalized others from whom a self-centred

differentiation has to be achieved. Any of these variables considered particularly apt may be emphasized as constitutive of the national myth, which is then projected as the national identity.

In the leading Third World nations a consensus emerged among the nationalist leaders during the anti-imperialist nationalist movements as to the kind of ethnic variable that should be emphasized in order to achieve maximum mass mobilization. It was invariably religion-induced culture that constituted the cultural hegemony of a given society which should be skilfully exploited and manipulated for a most effective form of mass mobilization and social communication as shown in Chapter 8. Thus, at least during its formative stages, the core of any national identity is cultural, though it might have a modern ideological dimension too.

Since the core of any national identity in the Third World is religion-induced culture, we can trace its origins to a world religion or a national tradition of it as indicated in Chapter 5. There are two types, indigenous and exogenous. The indigenous cases refer to those countries or culture areas where world religions developed; their examples include the Arab Middle East, Han China, Hindu India, Jewish Palestine. In such cases the sense of national identity is perhaps the strongest because almost all the ethnic variables are organically related to each other, forming a cohesive whole.

The exogenous cases refer to those countries where world religions were introduced from elsewhere but where national versions called national tradition emerged in due course of historical development. We have argued that in the course of a world religion's adoption to a new social milieu, it characteristically develops literature and national 'churches' with which the natives can easily and proudly identify. This is typically so except in the case of Islam. Hence, non-Arab Muslims everywhere in the modern age of nationalism face an identity crisis. Otherwise the sense of national identity even in such secondary cases is quite strong because of the development of national culture heroes, national sacred literature and national 'churches', which have inadvertently provided the non-economic but necessary infrastructure for national development. We predict a weak sense of national identity in those cases in which no world religion-induced culture exists such as simple, pre-literate societies which lack a pan-ethnic identity, pan-ethnic social communication system and social unity due to ethnic fragmentation.

But what about new cases in which a world religion has been introduced during the last hundred years? The Christianization of tribal areas in various parts of the Third World indicates that such delayed cases might exhibit a certain amount of national consciousness, but their sense of national identity is weaker than historical secondary cases in which national culture formation has taken at least 500 years. For the core of national identity must be rooted

and anchored in the crucible of history and civilization which can mature only with the passage of time. Only such a crucible can ensure the cultural sameness and historical continuity that characterizes any enduring national identity.

Identity is a universal feature of any social collectivity. It is the seat of social consciousness as well as a membership card. But national identity radically differs from all previously known forms of identity in its assertion and comprehensiveness. It is true tribesmen identified with their symbolic totems, the medieval men with their religion *per se*, but they all generally lacked the image and sense of national culture that constitutes social selfhood, as Gellner writes. And culture which forms the core of nationalism in the Third World means not just functional literacy but includes culture heroes that inspire succeeding generations, sacred and secular literature that expresses the genius of a people, select history that signifies continued historical achievement of a nation, political institutions that reflect the general will to community life, and so on.

The formation of a national identity is a combined work of both cultural evolution and technological revolution. The cultural evolution includes a process by which a world religion adapts itself to the special needs, idiom and temperament of a given social milieu where it is introduced, producing various manifestations of a religion-induced national culture. It marks the gradual transformation of a dogmatic or 'pure' faith into a socially-relevant culture that permeates all vital spheres of social life. The notable change is from one of spiritual abstraction to social reality.

National identity is objectified and manifested by rising social consciousness that is increasingly politicized and transformed into national consciousness. To that extent the history of nationalism is a history of rising social consciousness. But that type of social consciousness has to be sharply differentiated from class consciousness which is focused upon class interest and ideology. This is where those who associate nationalism with industrial capitalism and indirectly with bourgeois society (Arendt, Gellner, Kedourie) go wrong. The nearest equivalent to the scope of social consciousness we have in mind is that caused by salvationist religions in late ancient and early medieval times. But religious consciousness, especially in the initial stages, is otherworldly and universalistic in orientation, whereas national consciousness is 'intramundane and anthrocentric' (Smith 1983:xxvi).

However, the idiom and structure of human consciousness is largely determined by religious experience. That is why most nationalist leaders in the Third World envisaged mass mobilization along deep lines drawn by a world religion, in using the existing cultural resources. In short, nationalism is neither xenophobia nor millennialism. It is a goal-oriented, purposeful politicized cultural consciousness bent upon the production of social power

to achieve public goals, including the creation of a new political community, regulated internally by a government and defended externally by a state. Such a consciousness reflects high levels of cultural and political development in human evolution.

In a structural sense nationalism raises two fundamental questions that touch the nerve centre of political life in any complex society. What ought to be the state's area of domination? What is the proper or legitimate relationship between the ruler or ruling class and the ruled? As a minimum programme, nationalism preaches the doctrine of 'one state, one culture'. That is one specific culture legitimates the existence of a state that is coextensive of the said culture area. It is on this ground that nationalism appears as the antithesis of imperialism and colonialism. The logic of nationalism stems from ethnicity and culture specificity, and knows no other logic. It says in effect, 'Bad Filipino is better than good American'; 'The inefficient Indian Government is better than an efficient British one'; 'The reactionary Tibetan ruler is better than the revolutionary Chinese Communist Party', and so on.

As a minimum programme, which may be considered a domestic matter, nationalism prompted by modern egalitarian ideology declares that the relationship between the ruler or ruling class and the ruled be not only founded upon shared culture but also upon popular mandate. That is, the ruler or ruling class not only belongs to the same culture as the ruled but the former must be elected by the latter. It was in this way the absolute monarchs in Europe had to consent to popular pressure or struggle, and introduce various forms of democratic government, ranging from constitutional monarchy to parliamentary democracy.

The technical implications of the minimum and maximum programmes of nationalism are the following. First, externally nationalism tolerates no other ruler or ruling class than the one which shares the culture of the ruled. Second, internally it is also concerned with the nature and type of government to set up which reflects the vision of a charismatic leader or party, and therefore perhaps the popular wishes at a particular juncture of history. In this sense nationalism is nothing but a popular struggle for the seizure of state power which would, among other things, enable the new ruling class to shape a new political system.

The common culture that the ruler or ruling class is expected to share with the ruled eases problems of domination that the state entails. It implies an unwritten yet popularly understood political consensus between the ruler and the ruled to prevail if both sides share a common culture. Psychologically the common culture facilitates a near-spontaneous identification of the masses with the ruler, and therefore the willing obedience of the many to the will of the few. Without a social consensus-producing common culture, nationalism

necessitates in principle a daily plebiscite, as Renan thought. Therefore, we should not underestimate the function of culture in the context of Third World nationalism as its social basis, political pivot and transactional crucible.

A generation ago writers, heavily influenced by legal concepts, concluded that the essence and logic of nationalism was the popular struggle for national self-determination and popular sovereignty. The conclusion is legally correct but fails to demonstrate the sociological process by which such a conclusion culminates as the major goal of any nationalism. That is, if a plebiscite is held to determine national self-determination, the result is likely to run along cultural and ethnic lines because culture reflects social consensus and therefore general will on such vital subjects as what constitutes legitimate government, standards of value judgement, and so on. In other words since plebiscite in practice is seldom permitted, a nationalist movement operates largely on the assumption of a shared common culture that mirrors the general will of a society. Culture in this sense is not only a system of values and ideas that influence behaviour pattern but also a social barometer that mirrors social consensus on fundamental issues facing a given society.

The prototypes of social organizations known to us, based implicitly upon the nationalist principle of 'one state, one culture' include chiefdoms and city-states. Tribes are like city-states in most respects except that they lack the urbanism and great legal force that characterize city-states. But both chiefdoms and city-states did not survive the modern era because of certain institutional weaknesses which the modern nation-state attempts to rectify while maintaining the same nationalist principle that governs the unwritten understanding between the ruler and the ruled. 'Either the city-state became the nucleus of an empire (as Rome did) and so became subject to the ills of empire, or it remained small, militarily weak, sooner or later the victim of conquest' (Strayer 1970:11).

Tribes too faced the problems of small-scale which subjected them to conquest and colonialization by some greater 'foreign' tribal power. Internally they faced the political problem of institutionalization of freedom and equality which they tried to enjoy in a state of nature, and the result was a constant political instability. Anthropological studies of the political culture of

resolutely uncentralized peoples show clearly that political inequalities are no novelty to them. Their acute sensitivity to the slightest and subtlest differences in power drives their members to struggle so hard to maintain equality...In this Hobbesian maelstrom everyone is his own Leviathan, and the populist diffusion of power diffuses its intrinsic potential for stratification and inequality—at least it almost does but not completely.

(Lewis 1976:347)

The modern nation-state through its nation-wide impersonal institutions, attempts not only to redress the structural weaknesses that ruined chiefdoms but also overcome the problem of viable size that confronted both tribes and city-states. However, certain potent tribal elements are still preserved in the subjective conception of the nation. This is well expressed by an Arab nationalist leader. Nationalism is 'the very feeling that binds the individual to his family, because the fatherland is only a large household, and the nation a large family' (Smith 1983:xxv). Similar sentiments are implicit in the Chinese Communist conception of 'the family of the great motherland', the Indian conception of Bharat Mata and the Soviet conception of the 'socialist fatherland', and so on. Nationalism tries to retain from its tribal antecedency the warmth, intimacy and horizontal comradeship that only kinship ties can render. But the size of most nation-states makes mockery of such sentiments.

The principle of 'one state, one culture' assumes a number of shared commonalities that make community life possible. For example, the same racial looks establish easy identification; a common language easily opens up channels of social communication and interaction; a shared value-system promotes deeper mutual understanding; belonging to the same social organization makes community life possible. These are some tangible bases for the extended kinship conception of the nation that animates or is made to animate contemporary political life, especially in the Third World. It is also in this context of socially shared-commonalities which facilitate social life and therefore which seriously question Anderson's conception of nation as an imagined community. The members of such a society may not know each other by name but their shared commonalities facilitate social life and ensure collective entity. It is not work of imagination but of society that creates nation.

The question of the viable size of a culture area depends not only upon its size but also upon the strength of its corresponding state that is capable of defending the said culture area from possible foreign conquests. The primitive tendency among more powerful tribes to conquer and absorb weaker surrounding tribes has continued right up to modern times, albeit under more sophisticated pretexts, historical or ideological. Recent examples include China's takeover of Tibet, India's Sikkim, Iraq's Kuwait. Such conquests and subsequent integration face less resistance if such actions do not violate the nationalist principle of 'one state, one culture'.

This principle has been the general historical trend and popular aspiration but hardly the law among nations. That is why more than 85 per cent of the world's 168 states are composed of more than one nation (Utne Reader 1988:89) thereby violating the nationalist principle of 'one state, one culture'. This explains the ubiquity of ethnic conflict in the contemporary world.

The world-wide modern political development is characterized by political

centralization and cultural unification. In 1500 there were nearly 500 political units in Europe; by 1900 those were centralized into 20 odd states. Similarly, before 1947 there were over 565 political units (Maharajas) in the Indian subcontinent; by 1971 those were centralized into three independent states. The South Asian case clearly shows that as long as political centralization and national integration covers the same ground of ethnicity and religion-induced culture, the process is not so problematic.

In the ultimate analysis, it is either state power or social power generated by a mass political party that can determine the successful outcome of the nationalist principle of 'one state, one culture'. The existence of empires and multinational states indicates the strength of imperial states to control non-dominant nationalities by sheer force, and the failure of the latter to generate proportionate social power to secede and create their own autonomous states.

The state in a technical sense is a value-neutral political structure with system-wide impersonal, differentiated institutions that can be used by any type of political community, regardless of its ideological colouring.

Whether we can appropriately employ the term state or not in the case of simple tribes is a matter of debate, but 'all societies must have some form of political organization' (Schusky 1975:89). The reasoning is largely functionalist and it runs as follows. Whatever the specific public goals, all political systems tend to have two functions. First, the society must be organized in such a way as to perpetuate the goals and values of its members. The public processes that control the internal cohesion and stability of a society are largely political, though its value-system in the form of religion minimizes the use of political forces to maintain social order. Second, a society must have some coercive means to protect its territory and regulate relations with outsiders. Therefore, all societies must have some organization for internal control and external relations. Such an organization focuses power to pursue public goals, and it is essentially political in nature (Swartz *et al.*: 1966).

An elementary political organization is represented by some hunting and gathering societies such as the Eskimos and the Bushmen of Southern Africa. All adult men of such a band are intimately involved in making decisions or focusing power on public goals. There is a rough political division of labour among the members but 'there is no rough position of leader nor any political office' (Schusky 1975:89). That is, they lack 'impersonal, relatively permanent political institutions' (Strayer 1970:11) which can survive changes in leadership and fluctuations in the degrees of co-operation among subgroups, and which allows a certain degree of specialization in political affairs and thus increases the efficiency of the political process, and institutions which strengthen the sense of group identity.

The next level in political evolution is government represented by a chiefdom. It focuses power on an institution signified by the chief, and his government consists of simply differentiated bodies with specialized statutes for regulating the achievement of public goals which are mostly symbolic and ritualistic in nature. The most distinguishing feature of a chiefdom is that its government is patrimonial. That is, the government, both in theory and practice, is the extension of the royal household, and it is palace politics that predominate in the political process. This is not an antiquarian rarity; in some parts of the Third World (for example, the Himalayas and the Arab Middle East) the chiefdom still persists. However, on the whole, the modern nation-state has freed itself from patrimonialism. Thus, even neo-Marxist writers concede 'the relative autonomy of the state' from the ruling class and others. It has become in most cases a body of relatively autonomous, functionally differentiated yet co-ordinate, nation-wide, impersonal institutions that create conditions for public co-operation and control social conflicts. It is a system of institutions for the protection, domination and governance of the entire human and territorial complex, call it chiefdom, society or nation.

The chiefdom is typically a product of feudal conditions characterized by the absence of a centralized state. When the political hierarchy becomes the only source of power and is able to focus that power regularly, it is described as a state. And the state is characterized by the concentration of power in a single centre which holds the monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a given society as well as outside it in the case of war. But above all it is a nation-wide authority which 'controls the population occupying a defined territory' (Tilly 1973:70) with the following features: (a) it is a combination of centralized coercive power and legitimate authority that the public fear and respect; (b) it is not only differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory but superordinate to the latter; (c) its institutions are nation-wide but formally co-ordinate with one another; (d) its purpose is to create conditions for co-operation and frame rules for conflict resolution; (e) it enjoys a relative autonomy even from the ruling class, and external interference.

The above-mentioned characteristics indicate the ways and means by which the modern state structure has rectified, overcome and perfected the structural weaknesses inherent in the pre-modern political structures such as the hunting band, chiefdom, and patrimonial government.

While in the ancient polis subjectivity was subsumed under the unmediated universality of the political, in feudalism the particular will managed to subsume the universal, the state; only the modern state succeeds in synthesizing these two moments with its differentiated structure.

(Avineri 1972:180)

The modern state, in short, represents in Hegelian terms the culmination of rationalizing tendency and rising social consciousness that accompanies any significant social development. It becomes the most effective and complex organization yet known for enabling the masses of people 'to realize social good on the largest possible scale' (Laski 1970:25) that embraces an entire society. It may not reflect the will of everyone but does embody the majority or dominant will; it may not aim at the good of everyone but tries to achieve the greatest good of the greatest number; it may not be the ideal organization but a most functioning one capable of defending and promoting majority interest.

The early state formation in any historical area tends to conform to the nationalist pattern of one state within one culture area. Otto Hintz observed, 'The formation of a state seems to rest originally on social groups related by ties of blood and sharing a spatial habitat' (1973:1954–5). Joseph Strayer expresses a similar view: 'Only by living and working together in a given area for many generations can a group of people develop the patterns of organization which are essential for state-building' (1970:5). Robert Carneiro also generalizes that the 'factors of resource concentration and social circumscription may, by intensifying war and redirecting it toward the taking of land, give a strong impetus to political development' (1970:737). All of them, in different words, assume three common factors as essential for early state formation: (a) racially self-perpetuating group; (b) who occupies a roughly-defined area; (c) both of which imply a shared culture operative, sooner or later, within that territorial orbit.

The modern nation-state in the nationalist sense has its antecedency in the post-primitive communism period, but since then political evolution has not followed a straight line; it was marked by political distortions for long periods. For chiefdoms were succeeded by kingdoms, and kingdoms by empires, and empires by multinational states.

Both chiefdom and kingdom met the nationalist minimal demand that the ruler and the ruled share a common culture, but they failed to satisfy the maximal demand that the ruling be based on popular mandate. The first condition is sufficient in ruling or reigning pre-industrial societies untouched by egalitarian ideology, but both conditions are necessary for governing semi-industrial or post-industrial societies. Empires by definition lack both common culture and popular mandate, and their legitimacy runs thin on the face of rising nationalism.

Many multinational states, particularly those of the Soviet Union and China, are technically similar to empires in that a single political system controls various nationalities or even nations, but are ideologically different. They are generally premised upon an egalitarian principle or the notion of citizenship. In other words, they pretend to meet the maximal criterion without

having the necessary first one at hand: shared culture. Such an ideological arrangement without culture-generated consensus portends problems of ethnic nationalism.

We cannot always predict on the basis of historical trends because of serious intervening factors which deflect the natural course of things. However, two historical tendencies are discernible and unmistakable in their continued manifestations: first, a kind of cultural individuation among almost every complex social group characterized by cultural unification and consolidation through progressive differentiation from generalized others as the principal means of self-hood and self-identity; second, progressive political rationalization of complex social life through equally complex yet co-ordinated political institutions designed for the creation of favourable conditions for public co-operation and rules for conflict resolution, promotion and protection of national interest, both material and cultural. The first process culminates in the formation of a national identity, and the second in that of a state. Nationalism in its uncompromisingly pristine form means that the state (political rationalization) and the nation (cultural differentiation) takes place coextensively within the context of a specific, inherited territory which is not only the necessary space that a society occupies but also the principal basis of its production in the Third World.

THE PARADIGM AND PREDICTION

When we discuss the role of ideas in social action and sociological theory, we refer only to those specific behaviour-orienting idea-systems with action consequences, and not just any ideas that cross one's mind or fill up philosophy books. Such a sociological specificity might be spelled out in the course of field observations that underline the particular ideas actually orienting behaviour patterns, and consequently shaping the structure of social action of a given social group. The 'proof' of such behavioural enterprises lies not so much in statistical measurement which in the Third World context would be practically impossible. It lies in the consistent demonstration of the typical mechanism by which some specific ideas determine behaviour and action to a high degree of internal consistency, and the plausible correlation that emerges between the march of such ideas and the observable pattern of events. Not all ideas but certain ideas do have action consequences in the process of historical development, and it is the duty of a behavioural scientist to specify those ideas in systematic operation in the field of his inquiry.

An idea-system as used in this essay refers to all those ideas and values from both religion-induced culture and egalitarian ideology which form a relatively coherent but syncretized idea-system, performing essential

functions of nationalism. It includes such ideas and values that re-echo or reinforce and enhance the structure and functions, processes and purposes of nationalism such as national identity and unity, mass mobilization and independence. In the past religious ideas are often called belief-systems. We maintain that in order for such ideas to become belief-systems, they must necessarily be idea-systems in the first place because social beings derive beliefs or convictions from their understanding of certain meanings which come from an idea-system. Because most world religions are coherent and convincing idea-systems in their own rights and at certain epochs, they have become belief-systems in due course.

Our study shows that the production and reproduction of Third World nationalism is a function of an intensified intersocietal process of dialectical interaction between a traditional culture that is literate and fairly complex on the one hand, and egalitarian ideology and rational techniques on the other, in a typical context of crisis or movement situation. That recusant interaction over a period of time has tended to generate creative tensions between tradition and modernity, resulting in an identity crisis of the traditional self and a legitimation crisis of the modernized other's right to rule. Out of these crises Third World nationalism emerged as a set of consensual answers to practical questions of national existence.

Even though our interactive model implies that we should pay equal attention to both traditional culture and modern ideas or techniques, we have found out in the course of this study that religion-induced culture has been the critical variable in the initiation and production of Third World nationalism up to independence or revolution. That culture has direct bearing upon the quality of leadership, national identity assertion, forging appropriate organizations and recharging communication networks, all of which are crucial to the production of mass nationalism. As we have endeavoured to show in this essay, culture is not an abstraction in the mind of intellectuals; it manifests itself in practice as a compact set of diverse corporate mental resources which a community of culture consumers can and do use to devise appropriate strategies to solve practical problems of social existence, especially in a crisis situation.

Thus, throughout the nationalist movement, religion-induced culture establishes a quasi-ideological hegemony, and there are serious structural limits to the intake of new ideas and rational techniques. Under such circumstances the function of modern ideas and rational techniques was not to directly replace tradition, because that would worsen the identity crisis. It was to compel tradition to reformulate its ideas and values, and to rationalize its traditional techniques suited to the process and production of mass nationalism. Modernity in the hand of western colonialism bestowed upon the colonized its positive demonstration effect, and it worked in most cases.

At least during the nationalist movement, neither the replacement of tradition by modernity, as so much speculated by theorists of revolution and modernization, nor a neat synthesis as ardently hoped by some nationalist thinkers, had occurred. Some modern political values and rational techniques were, however, absorbed on an elective basis of 'thin' rational choice which reveals the following considerations: elective affinity, instrumental utility and exigential necessities. Any social group with a deep-rooted literate culture seldom changes *en masse* its value-system and opts for a new set because that traditional value-system constitutes the structure of social self-hood and identity system. If such a group accepts new values at all, it does so on the basis of elective affinity with the belief that those new ideals reecho the group's forgotten values long enshrined in religion. That is why Hindu nationalists felt the idea of freedom was inherent in Hinduism; the Muslims the idea of equality in Islam. Leninist party organizational techniques were found useful under the exigencies of nationalist movement. And science and technology, though of western origin, are now universally accepted and applied as the most efficacious instrument of progress and plenty.

In general, modern ideology and rational techniques have tended to make what has been implicit in tradition more explicit, what was random, more systematic. There is no brand new idea in most revolutions. This suggests any national revolution proceeds not so much along radically new ideas but radical reformulation of existing ideas and values. This suggests serious structural limitations of all kinds to revolution. It succeeds at best on the dual principle of elective affinity and exigential necessity.

Our discussion on the role of behaviour-orienting ideas in the mass production of Third World nationalism inevitably brings in the question of human factor. After all it has always been some manifestation of human ingenuity that creates ideas and leadership, communication skills and organizational techniques which, when used in a correct combination, can bring about significant discontinuities in the historical process. In the conception of our study man can orient the course of history mainly under one condition: he not only formulates or reformulates certain behaviour-orienting ideas but, more importantly, organizes and uses a rational instrument (organization) to translate those ideas into social action. Thus, man figures in historical development to the extent that he is able to form a purposeful organization that embodies and implements popular ideas and values. Otherwise his ideas would be a cry in the wilderness or at best fill up dusty bookshelves, with no action consequence in the world.

We have concentrated in this essay primarily on those idea-systems responsible for the production of nationalism because they are relatively more complicated and usually neglected. But this does not mean that organizations are less important; we have emphasized in Chapter 7 the

historical significance of the founding of political parties in the course of Third World nationalism (pp. 108–11). No nationalist movement in the Third World ever succeeded without a mass mobilizing organization behind it. Even the wide diffusion of world religions such as Buddhism, Christianity and Islam would have been less successful without their respective organizational instruments of diffusion—the Sangha, the Church, the Caliphate. It is interesting to note Hinduism lacked such a general organization, apart from its caste system, and therefore did not spread beyond South Asia. In the context of nationalism a mass-mobilizing organization may represent not only the general will; it is, above all, a relatively rational instrument to translate nationalist ideals and ideas into purposeful social action. Its crucial role becomes clearer when placed in its functioning context, namely the crisis or movement situation.

If we were to conceptualize that multifaceted, religion-induced culture as the critical variable, and modern ideas and techniques as the dependent variable, we have to consider a crisis-situation as an important contingent factor which facilitates the maturation of Third World nationalism. It is the fire that ignites a dormant culture, setting in motion a complex series of chain reactions leading to the discovery of society, national identity assertion, recharging social communication networks and restructuring organizations—all in the service of nationalism. Such a protracted crisis situation performs two social psychological functions: the polarization of social forces into ingroup (we) and outgroup (they), as well as the crystallization of two rival national identities seeking to differentiate from each other. In so doing, it intensifies the national identity crisis of the traditional self and legitimization crisis of the modernized other. Above all, it was only life-threatening situations such as Egypt in 1918, India in 1919, China in 1937, Vietnam in 1945 that compelled peasants (who usually prize security and hate risk-taking) to take part in mass politics.

Such a nationalism-facilitating crisis situation should not be confused with peasant *jacqueries* or street riots. It is a purposeful, protracted revolutionary process expanding over thirty-five years as an average for the four cases earlier mentioned. Its starting-point is not to be traced to remote causalities, as historians do, but to the dramatic beginning of mass involvement in nationalist politics. And in each case we find that peasant masses had reached a rough consensual point which said, 'We can't take it any more', and acted. This means that as far as peasants are concerned, there is a limit to exploitation or illegitimate domination, and when that popularly-perceived limit is crossed, they tend to resort to political action and become the 'rational peasant' (Popkin 1979:28), who has earthy 'common sense' (Salamini 1981:83), a 'crude' notion of justice (Moore 1973:497) and 'thin rationality' (Elster 1983:3). But we emphasize that all these good senses are activated

and heightened by a protracted national crisis situation that also increases peasant social solidarity, and compels him to participate in social action such as nationalism. Needless to say, the prime purpose of this prolonged revolutionary process is to weaken the structure of external or illegitimate domination.

To sum up, there are two subjective preconditions ((a) and (b)) and two objective conditions ((c) and (d)) for any enduring nationalist movement that might result in the formation of a nation-state: (a) wide prevalence of a complex, literate culture; (b) free access to egalitarian ideas and rational techniques; (c) a rationally-structured mass mobilizing organization; (d) weakest links in the structure of external or illegitimate domination.

When any of those necessary conditions is absent or lacking, no successful outcome may be predicted. In Central Asia there used to be more than eleven different political entities (Sinor 1990) all of whom, though affected by world religions, did not survive the modern era because they lacked any access to modern ideas and rational techniques. African states gained independence mainly due to adequate demonstration effects of modern ideas and rational techniques, and due to the weakest links in colonial domination. But their nation-building is problematic because they lack an adequate cultural and social basis which, in the oriental context, world religions had provided for centuries. Ethnic nationalisms in various parts of the world are the unfulfilled versions of the first category. Though the first three conditions are present in retarded forms, no weakest link in illegitimate domination exists.

In the ultimate analysis, nationalism marks the emergence of a cohesive social group out of its ethnic womb into the modern political arena. If its political revolution is successful, it becomes the nation in charge of the state: if not, an ethnic group. Nationalism in the Third World has run neither along territorial boundaries engineered by colonial powers, nor along constitutional principles drawn by founding fathers; it has invisibly and inevitably operated, for all practical purposes, along deep ethnic lines nurtured by centuries of cultural development in a given society. In this sense nationalism is culture-specific whose objective laws of efficient operation are governed by these sociological imperatives of social life.

It begins with certain concerned intellectuals' conscious discovery of the inner unity of society linked by shared symbols, familiar social structure and common communication system. This social unity represents the irreducible social unit of life as well as the optimal size of social organization as it had spontaneously evolved over the centuries of historical development in accordance with the sociological imperatives of social life. Such a social unit symbolized the ideal as well as empirical structure of a potential nationhood; and national consciousness is that politicized social

consciousness of this social fact as an entity in and for itself in the world of nations. This social consciousness about shared commonalities shades into historical consciousness that vindicates its political quest for state formation, and finally embraces political consciousness, that evinces the implacable logic of political action: the logic of techniques of acquiring and preserving power for the group itself.

Now who joins in a nationalist movement, who identifies with its symbols and who participates in its mass politics are, by and large, ethnically determined by the sociological imperatives of that irreducible social life unit. That everybody has his or her interest is obvious, but the critical question of who can *entrust* his or her interest in a social collectivity that ventures into mass politics and makes political promises, is largely determined by the sociological imperatives of social life. For shared values deepen mutual understanding and trust; common culture reflects general will and social consensus; social structure engenders social unity and political stability; a common communication system makes social transactions less problematic, all of which make social life possible.

Nationalism is a political revolution with ethnic content. It does involve itself with certain socially-significant political issues such as new conceptions of legitimacy and political order, social conception of economy and the international status of the 'new' nation, and so on. But even a rough consensus on these vital issues could be reached, mostly among the members of a culturally-dominant ethnic group such as the Slavs in Russia and Mestizos in Latin American countries, or among the members of a majority ethnic group such as Hans in China and Hindus in India. In this sense such common terms as 'Chinese', 'Indian' or 'Russian' nationalisms are misnomers; nationalism is ethnic-specific. A successful nationalism results in the disguised seizure of state power structure by a dominant or majority ethnic group which subsequently establishes its ethnically-determined cultural or ideological hegemony on a polyethnic social system.

We have seen time and again in the course of this essay that the genes and germs of nationalism were developed in a historically-evolved ethnic womb but brought forth into modern political life by mass politics. Hence, the history of Third World nationalism is not so much a history of the imitation of western models; rather it is a history of progressive politicization of a majority or dominant ethnic group which regains its social consciousness, asserts its identity, articulates its basic interest, and which forms its organization as a collective rational instrument to realize its socially-shared interests. The whole process represents a political revolution in human history, but its character is neither class based (even though the upper class or caste of the social group predominates its leadership) nor polyethnic as the dominant ethnic leaders claim. It is ethnic-specific.

When such an organized majority or dominant ethnic group successfully seizes state power structure, it invariably establishes its ethno-domination over minority ethnic groups within a certain territorial unit, and projects itself as 'the nation', either covertly or overtly. The secrets of its political ascent are, as we have argued throughout this essay, its ability to organize, articulate and to assert its collective interest; such social abilities are largely inherited from that ethnic group's accumulated cultural resources. In this sense culture is not a relic of the past; it is a powerful living force invisibly shaping not only a people's behaviour pattern but also their general ability to function in the modern world.

Epilogue: the rise of Slavic nationalisms and the collapse of transnational ideocracy

Since the completion of the first draft of this essay in 1989, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have undergone fundamental changes in their economy and polity, resulting in the complete de-Sovietization of the Slavic world. In this epilogue, I briefly examine the evidences for a cultural theory of non-Western nationalism as applied to Slavic variations that, to a large extent, brought about the collapse of transnational ideocracy and the re-emergence of nation-states in its place.

THE COLLAPSE OF TRANSNATIONAL IDEOCRACY

The current phase of active assertion of particular and often conflicting nationalisms in the Slavic world may be traced roughly to June 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev initiated his three-pronged programme to transform the stagnant Soviet economy.

Perestroika meant essentially economic decentralization, to be implemented along the lines of national/republican and autonomous/regional units. However, local elites increasingly came to act 'as if they believed that their unit of governance should be sovereign and its interests paramount, and by acting as if they were nationalists, they became nationalists in spite of themselves' (Motyl 1989:167). Such oblique nationalist tendencies had been the historical trend in the Soviet federal structure whenever there had been a loosening of central control over the republics. The New Economic Policy in the 1920s which entailed decentralization tended to encourage nationalist behaviour and produce 'national communism'. In the 1950s de-Stalinization had a similar effect both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, where three countries witnessed nationalist rebellions.

Since Gorbachev's unintended de-Sovietization resulted in an unprecedented de-centralization of central authority and power, local units, fifteen of which were already recognized by the Soviet Constitution as nations, began to assert their particular national interests and differentiated national

identities. Likewise, the Eastern European satellite states lost no opportunity to reclaim their individual nationhood and reject the transnational ideocracy that legitimated their subordination to Moscow. Between July and December 1989, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania ousted Communist rulers. Unlike in 1956, Moscow did not intervene this time because of the rising nationalism within the Soviet Union itself, deteriorating economic conditions at home and the general weakness of the Soviet international position. COMECON (the Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation), by which the Communist states used to barter with each other under Soviet leadership, was dissolved on 28 June 1991 and the Warsaw Pact met the same fate on 1 July 1991.

It appears that Gorbachev was basically reconciled to the fact that even though the Eastern European 'dependencies' of the over-stretched Soviet empire had to be given up, he could still save the integrity of the Soviet Union through persuasion. But by August 1991 it became clear that the forces of nationalism and conflicting national interests on the Eurasian landmass proved to be stronger than Gorbachev's power of persuasion at 'empire-saving' by peaceful means. For what the Soviet President endeavoured till the end was to save the Soviet state, as *Soviet Land* put it, to 'preserve a single armed forces and single control of nuclear weapons' (November 1991:9). Even in his resignation speech on 25 December Gorbachev bemoaned 'the collapse of Statehood', and concluded that 'I am concerned that the citizens of this country are ceasing to live in a great power' (Weir 1991:1). This was tantamount to the retention of the coercive core of the Russian-dominated Soviet system, despite having granted full economic and political 'sovereignty' to the republics. It envisaged supreme or super (Russian or Slavic) state discreetly overseeing the less equal but supposedly sovereign states on the Eurasian landmass. This was a clever device of Russian transnational ideology but by 1991 Marxism-Leninism had lost its legitimating authority and appeal. More educated republics such as the Baltic states, Georgia, Moldavia, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia realized that such a Soviet state, no matter how decentralized in its relations with individual sovereign republics, was not only a constitutional contradiction but posed a definite potential danger to their independence and sovereignty. They refused to sign the Union Treaty. Nationalism thus tested the ultimate political limits of *perestroika*.

Viewed from this perspective the differences between Gorbachev and the August coup leaders were more on the means rather than the end of empire-saving. Gorbachev was, as we have seen, determined to save the Soviet state by peaceful means while granting economic and political sovereignty but not independence to the republics. The coup leaders were also determined to save the Soviet state and preserve the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union

(in short, empire), but by coercive means if necessary. The fact that the coup took place on 19 August 1991, the day before some Soviet republics were due to sign a new union treaty, meant that the hardliners in the Party, armed forces and the KGB were apprehensive that Gorbachev might concede too much power to the republics. Hence, on 19 August, Soviet land and sea forces swiftly moved to seize key sites in the Baltic states which had been demanding independence. That the coup leaders were not against *perestroika* and *glasnost per se* but more concerned with the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union was made clear when Gennady Yanayev, at a press conference in the afternoon of 19 August, declared that the 'emergency committee' remained committed to democratic and market reforms. (Reuters, 21 August 1991). Rather the coup was dedicated to the task of overcoming the 'profound and comprehensive crisis, political, ethnic and civil strife, chaos and anarchy that threaten the lives and security of the Soviet Union's citizens and its *sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom and independence*' (Tass, 19 August 1991)

Therefore, if Mikhail Gorbachev appears to be a liberal 'imperialist' and the coup leaders integral imperialists, Boris Yeltsin is a Russian nationalist. He secretly believes that Russian dominance could be better achieved by making Russia into a compact superpower on the Eurasian landmass rather than by clinging to the carcass of the Soviet Empire and by wasting Russian resources on the non-Russian republics. And, since the formation of a Eurasian Commonwealth on 8 December 1991, Yeltsin has been successful in ensuring that the political patrimony of the former Soviet Union is inherited by Russia. He received Soviet nuclear secrets; the seat on the UN Security Council is inherited by Russia; the Russian legislature is declared to be the direct successor to the Soviet legislature; former Soviet missions abroad will function as Russian embassies; and, of course, most of the industrial and nuclear power, science and technology, economic might and trained manpower that made the Soviet Union a superpower, are concentrated mostly in Russia. Previously, Russian dominance in the erstwhile Soviet Union was camouflaged by a transnational ideology; now Russia demonstrates its power in more frank national terms. Ideologically, the transition in Russia is from transnational Marxism that resulted in unintended Russian social imperialism to Russian nationalism that would compete for power among legally equal but politically unequal nations.

The August coup accelerated the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union. In September 1991 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia declared themselves and soon became, independent nation-states. The Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia, Azerbaijan and Armenia refused to be parties to a new treaty of a union of sovereign states in mid-November. By early December it was clear that almost all the more educated Eurogenic republics were not contented with sovereign

status in a loose confederation but demanded independence from the Soviet state. And the formation of a Slavic-dominated commonwealth of Russia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia underlined the essential nature of Slavic nationalism, cutting along racial, linguistic and cultural lines. It discarded the ideological bondage. As a Russian nationalist, Boris Yeltsin understood the deep-seated cultural and racial basis of Slavic nationalism and acted accordingly, while Gorbachev desperately continued to cling to the ideological skeletons that bonded the Soviet empire for over seventy years. Marxism-Leninism, that legitimated the over-stretched Soviet ideocracy, became rapidly discredited during the course of *perestroika* (1985–91); and Slavic nationalism, which was forcefully kept under an iron-lid for over seventy years, actively reasserted itself as the ‘new’ organizing principle reshaping the Soviet Union. As a Ukrainian writer stated ‘After the failure of ideology and proletarian internationalism, only the nation can provide the foundation for and justification of morality and moral behaviour’ (Simon 1991:286).

By initiating a commonwealth, the three Slavic states with the dissolution of the Soviet state candidly declared themselves to be the core power on the Eurasian continent. Other former republics, including those of Central Asia, can join and orbit around the Slavic power. Although the idea of a Eurasian commonwealth may be more enduring than Gorbachev’s ‘new union of sovereign states’ because it is based on the logic of power and dynamics of nationalism, it is not, of course, without obstacles. If *independence* basically satisfies the nationalistic urges of the fifteen former republics, will not the 30 odd ‘autonomous regions’ struggle for the same status as premised upon the logic of nationalism? Will the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan, where nuclear installations are also located, agree to Russia’s monopoly over the use of nuclear weapons or power? We can speculate further but our principal concern is an academic question of *how* and *why* the earth-shaking events surveyed above have taken place during the last five or six years, and above all to reveal the critical role played by nationalism in that historic process.

THE NATURE OF SLAVIC NATIONALISM

The mode of production of post-Communist nationalism was in its early stages a reflection of the political and ideological conditions of Communist society that forbade any public expression of nationalisms as such. Hence, Slavic and Central Asian nationalisms had to channel their nationalistic activities through ‘proper channels’ sanctioned by the Communist Party such as the Church or Mosque, Writers Unions, Trade Unions, Clubs, etc. However, as *perestroika*, came to be widely propagated by the late 1980s, it became a handy instrument of expressing nationalist aspirations that Gorbachev found difficult to control. The Lithuanian ‘Democratic Movement to Support

Perestroika' and the Estonian 'People's Front in support of *Perestroika*' in 1988 are classic cases in which the reforms were used as a pretext to express nationalist aspirations by Lithuanians and Estonians. In this oblique way, unofficial clubs sprang up under the pretext of *perestroika*, 'often devoted to historical, cultural, political issues. In non-Russian republics such clubs inevitably take on a nationalist colouring' (Lieven 1988:22). Since post-Communist nationalism could not develop freely under open conditions, it cautiously and gradually evolved its own peculiar strategies of articulation, mobilization and communication. It began as a legitimate concern with the national language by intellectuals, then mobilized public support for cultural and political autonomy. Finally, when the central authority was at its weakest point, independence was declared.

Nationalism in Communist societies has to find expression in such oblique ways because of two main reasons. The Communist revolutions had destroyed most of the traditional social structures, organizations or even associations that might, in any way, compete with the Communist Party monopoly. Nor did the Communist regime allow the formation of any new organizations independent of the Communist Party. That is why neo-nationalists had to use all the existing auxiliary organizations sanctioned by the Party or the state, ones which were originally and intentionally meant for Communist activities but now 'misused' by neo-nationalists for their own nationalistic purposes.

In other words when Mikhail Gorbachev proclaimed political pluralism, there emerged not alternative pan-Soviet political parties but a mushrooming of ethnically-based nationalistic groups, asserting their ethnic identities and fighting for their national interests as they saw them. Gorbachev's reforms unchained nationalists who had been chained for over seventy years. On 9 and 15 May, 1985 anti-Russian riots erupted in Latvia's capital, Riga. On 17–18 December 1986 massive anti-Russian demonstrations rocked Kazakhstan's capital, Alma-Ata, in protest against a Russian replacing a Kazakh as First Secretary of the Party. Again in Riga anti-Russian demonstrations took place in late December 1986 and early January 1987. On 10–13 February 1987 Jews staged a protest in Moscow. In May Pamyat, a Russian nationalist group, staged anti-Semitic demonstrations. In July Crimean Tartars besieged Moscow, demanding the right to return to their ancestral homeland in the Crimea. On 23 August, the day the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had been signed, nationalists demonstrations erupted in the Baltic capitals. In February 1988 thousands of Armenians demonstrated, demanding that Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-populated enclave in Azerbaijan, be annexed to Armenia. Finally, the August 1991 coup accelerated the process of post-Communist nationalism: between August and November of that year all the republics declared their independence through referendums.

Although the revolutions of 1989 and 1991 were nationalist in character and goal-orientation, most commentators have preferred to describe them as 'transition to democracy' downplaying the critical role of nationalism. This is propagated especially in liberal societies because, as Ernst Kux writes, 'With the collapse of communism, nationalism is seen as the new enemy-image and the new cause for alarm' (1991:10). This is in sharp contrast with the pre-1989 Western writings on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 1983 Gail Lapidus observed that 'the nationality problem...has become a central preoccupation, if not virtual obsession in Western analyses of the Soviet system' (1983-4:557). In other words, Western liberals recognized and assigned a crucial role to be played by nationalism in overthrowing the Communist system but wished away its continuing presence in the post-Communist scheme of things because it could be 'the new cause for alarm'. Instead they desired that the post-Stalinist societies better engage themselves in the noble task of 'transition to democracy'. Such pious projections are wishful thinking. Social forces or historical processes cannot be controlled by push-button mechanisms. Nationalism in the Slavic world is likely to run its full course.

As we have argued in Chapter 6, egalitarian ideology, especially freedom, is an integral part of modern nationalism. To that extent freedom has played a significant role in the production of Slavic nationalism, almost analogous to anti-colonial nationalism in the former European colonies. For the Stalinist structures of domination were cases of first ideological, then political, colonization of the Eurasian continent and Eastern Europe. As such to describe the national revolutions of 1989 and 1991 as cases of 'transition to democracy' is to simplify the complexities of democracy and the difficulties of democracy-building out of the social ravages of Stalinist destruction of civil society. They are more accurately the expressions of nationalism which includes collective freedom from Soviet domination as well. Nationalism in the Slavic world signifies the following features: societal struggle for collective freedom and national independence from Russian domination; reassertion of national identities that were denied by the transnational ideology; articulation of national interests that used to be subordinate to Soviet interests; and the quest for social unity that had been destroyed by the Communist Party rule.

Those scholars with the intimate knowledge of the Slavic world have not failed to observe the tenacity of Slavic nationalism. Zbigniew Brzezinski observed in 1989 'the rising tide of nationalism in Eastern Europe and especially in the Soviet Union itself (1989-90:1). Randovan Vukadinovic noted in 1991, 'nationalisms raging through Eastern Europe' (1991:1). Much earlier Gerhard Simon wrote, 'In the Soviet Union, national consciousness is growing among both Russians and non-Russians' (1991:278). Valery Tishkov concurs,

The basis for mass movements and political demarcation in most Union republics of the USSR after the abortive Putsch was the national idea and ethnic nationalism in its pro-communist or anti-communist forms professed respectively by the old or new political elites of dominant ethnic groups. The main vector of political struggle was directed vertically 'upwards' against the Russian-speaking centre and 'downwards' against ethnic minorities or the so-called non-autonomous sections of population. (1991:10)

A German scholar writing on the 1989 revolutions argues that Communism which had shown little understanding for nationalism from Marx to Gorbachev and had tried to replace it with pseudo-proletarian internationalism 'proved unable to suppress national feelings. National identity was at the core of individual and group self-confidence and became the seed from which resistance to communism grew' (Kux 1991:10). Ernest Gellner concluded prophetically in 1990, 'The nationalism whose emergence has been made possible by *perestroika* also constitutes its greatest menace' (1990:293).

The nature of Slavic nationalism appears to share greater affinity with the kind of Third World nationalism we have analysed in this book than with European or Western nationalism. Slavic nationalism, like non-Western nationalism, lays greater stress on retrieved tradition and culture, pre-Communist literature and history than on egalitarian ideology. Symbolically the overthrow of Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe was popularly enacted by the resurrection of tradition. 'Communist symbols—red flags, hammers and sickles, statues of Lenin were torn down and replaced by traditional emblems from national history and culture' (Kux 1991:1). Similar symbolic enactment took place in Russia: the events of 19–21 August 1991 rendered the words 'Russia' and 'Russia's citizens' to acquire 'a special significance and clearness. It was then that Russia's self-awareness regained its national (not ethnic) symbols: the Parliament, the flag, the Guards, the sacrifices and the altar' (1991:10). A British anthropologist, travelling through the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, was struck by 'the potency of tradition, long-standing social habits, deep-seated religious beliefs, often linked to passionate sentiments of nationality' (Gellner 1990:279). For almost all ethnic groups possessing Soviet Socialist Republics, with the partial exception of the Byelorussians, remained sharply distinct throughout the Communist period. 'National cultures, traditions and religions were adhered to strongly' (Lieven 1988:7).

It was this strong component of tradition and collective sense of freedom that characterizes Slavic nationalism, and not democracy *per se*. This is why even Brzezinski is amazed at the 'historical immaturity of Eastern Europe's nationalisms' which tend to be 'more volatile, more emotional and more intense than those in the East' (1989–90:4). Such manifestations of tradition-

oriented nationalism are closer to Indian or Arab nationalism than British or French ones based on clear-cut conceptions of national interest and popular sovereignty.

TRADITION IN THE FAMILY

The nature of post-Communist Slavic nationalism raises two questions. How did tradition, in the broad sense of the term, manage to keep itself alive for over 70 years in the Soviet Union and for over 40 years in Eastern Europe, despite the fact that the Communist Party and state unceasingly sought to eliminate it by all means? How could such passionate nationalism emerge out of socialist structures that were supposedly built upon the principle of transnationalism and more importantly which severely punished any expression of nationalism as a matter of ideology and policy?

Comparative analysis of communist revolutions (Norbu 1982) suggest that such revolutions succeeded in destroying traditional social structures but somehow failed to eliminate the traditional value systems accompanying such social structures. When the Communist Party dictatorship became operative it monopolized public space resulting in virtual disappearance of civil society; traditional culture including religious beliefs and ritual practices escaped to the family cell. Tradition, which was public by definition before the Communist era, now became privatized and clandestinely confined to the family cell. There it remained relatively safe and alive because it was practically impossible for the party to post a commissar or policeman on every doorstep.

Revolution failed to penetrate the inner recesses of the family structure wherein tradition sought refuge when it was being persecuted by the Party and the state. Once the massive iron-lid that crushed civil society to its elementary unit of the family was lifted up in 1986, tradition came out of its hiding-place, the family cell, and made its public appearance characterized by cultural revivalism throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

There is considerable evidence to substantiate our hypothesis. Anthropological findings suggest that 'without the family there could be no preservation of the species and culture' (Majundar and Madan 1987:78). Ernest Gellner (1990) found how potent are pre-Communist traditions, social norms, religious beliefs and kinship ties within family circles in the Soviet Union, especially in Byelorussia, Georgia and Estonia. Gerhard Simon observes that in the Soviet Union, 'national consciousness often manifested itself in the *private sector*. Professional life, however, is dominated by all-Soviet standards and behavioral expectations' (1991:280–1). Thus, Rakowska-Harmstone concluded that 60 years of Soviet power, economic development and integrationist policies could not destroy a sense of ethnic consciousness in the USSR (1974:22).

Adam Michnik, the Polish philosopher, may be speaking for the Slavic race under Communism when he wrote, 'We are children of a certain tradition. And we know that this tradition does not permit us to renounce our Judeo-Christian culture' (1991:14). For at least sections of society the totalizing ideology and practices of the Communist state 'were alien and worked against the grain of the cultural tradition' (Schopflin 1991:241). Thus, even for 'intellectuals in Central Asia, as for their counterparts in other Soviet republics, the search for national traditions inevitably leads back to religious motifs' (Ro'i 1990:55).

RUSSOFICATION AND NON-RUSSIAN IDENTITIES

While Communists kept on destroying civil society with the ideological hope of creating a 'new' society, they greatly strengthened and, in fact, created where necessary—for example, in Central Asia—complex state structures both at the Kremlin and republican levels. Sanctioned by Lenin in his *The State and Revolution* (1917), state-building was justified to defend the socialist fatherland from the hostile international environment and very much necessitated by the progressive bureaucratization of economic development. As such developments gained their own momentum, the transnational ideocracy tended to gradually dig its own grave. The biggest contradiction the Soviet structure created was this: it not only constitutionally recognized *nations* (15 republics) and *nationalities* (30 autonomous regions) in the sense we have defined in this essay but actually created corresponding state structures for them; yet it forbade any expression of nationalism or national interest by the individual nations. That is, the structure and legitimacy of *nationhood* was legally recognized but nationalism, which is the concomitant manifestation of such nationhood, was squarely denied. Herein lies the central contradiction out of which post-Communist nationalism arose as the inevitable public expression of nationhood.

The Kremlin's masters knew that any expressions of nationalism by individual republics would wreck the transnational ideocracy and accordingly they severely punished non-Russian nationalists. They thought that their transnational ideocracy could be held together by 'proletarian internationalism' which became for all practical purposes the Russification of non-Russian 'minorities' since Lenin's death in 1924. This function of pseudo-internationalism or Russification was to generate tensions between the dominant Russian nation and subordinate non-Russian nations and nationalities. Such tension reinforced the 'otherness' of non-Russians, thereby solidifying individual national identities which automatically began to assert themselves once the iron-lid was lifted up.

The Leninist-Stalinist approach to the so-called Nationality Question may be viewed historically in the specific context of Eurasian political conditions

during the period 1917–21. It was a product of the confrontation between ‘a Russian-led Communist Party largely based in Russian cities as well as the working class and a variety of non-Russian nationalist forces drawing on the non-Russian countryside for support. The Bolsheviks eventually won, largely because of their ability to win non-Russian allies by promising them the “right to self-determination up to separation”’ (Motyl 1989:150). Although secession was declared ‘counterrevolutionary’ once the ‘proletarian dictatorship’ had been established and the organizational basis of nationalism in non-Russian areas eliminated, the political necessity and ideological imperative of granting the non-Russians a considerable degree of self-rule and cultural autonomy continued. A federal system of fifteen ethnically-designated republics and over thirty autonomous regions was created and survived structurally unchanged until December 1991. Each of these republics (nations) had its own Party organization, government (Council of Ministers), legislative (Supreme Soviet), constitution, national flag, national anthem and capital city (Motyl 1989:150; Lieven 1988:2).

Thus, the republics, in due course and to varying degrees, became ‘focuses for local patriotism and loyalty’ (Lieven 1988:3). For it was ‘the proclivity of the non-Russians to define their own interests and to go their own way whenever Moscow permits them to do so by relinquishing some central control’ (Motyl 1989:151). Such nationalistic tendencies were reinforced by the ethnically-designated areas of economic development which created republic-specific elites and large, literate working classes. Sudden changes in central policies also tended to unintentionally encourage nationalism. Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization encouraged greater non-Russian representation in central and republican Party and State organs. Similarly Leonid Brezhnev’s policy of ‘stability of cadres’ tended to create pockets of local power outside Moscow. Under such favourable conditions the non-Russian republican leaders had managed to consolidate their local power by establishing their own ethnic networks within a republic.

Thus, when the conditions were ripe, ethnic nationalism could ‘unite all segments of a population against Moscow and even supply leadership in the form of the existing republican institutions and elites, established by the Soviet constitution itself and legitimated by decades of propaganda’ (Lieven 1988:8). Yet from 1917 to 1989, whether in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, any evidence of nationalism in policy, programme or attitude among the non-Russians and Russians alike was ruthlessly suppressed as a cardinal principle of Soviet policy. Veli Ibragimov, Chairman of the Crimean CEC received a ‘death sentence for nationalism’ in 1928. In the same year Kasymov, Chairman of the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan, was ‘tried and sentenced for nationalism’ (Simon 1991:78, 80). In 1959 the Latvian First Secretary was dismissed, and in 1972 the Ukrainian First Secretary for ideological crimes of nationalism (Lieven 1988:5).

There is an element of truth in the conclusion of the nationality policy debate that raged in Moscow between 1917 and 1937: 'In so far as the remnants of nationalism are a special way of defence against Great Russian chauvinism, the determined fight against Great Russian chauvinism is the surest way to overcome these remnants of nationalism' (Simon 1991:73). But it was incorrect to characterize the problem as merely an attitudinal change on the part of Great Russians rather than changes in their political monopoly and cultural hegemony that went on in the name of socialism and proletarian internationalism. As Richard Pipes writes:

Although nominally a federation of free and equal nations, it was all along a unitary state governed by the Moscow-based and Russian-dominated Communist Party through its bureaucracy, army and security police. The national aspiration of the minorities who make up nearly half the Soviet population were assuaged by powerless institutions and meaningless rituals while any genuine nationalistic expressions were suppressed. Beneath the tranquil facade of a happy comity of nations simmered ethnic animosities aggravated by competition over consumer goods, jobs and housing. It required only a loosening of central authority for these animosities to rise to the surface.

(1991:76)

Dominic Lieven has a similar comment:

Centralization, which inevitably meant Russianization was imposed in the cultural and linguistic spheres, while non-Russians were forced to learn crudely distorted versions of their people's histories and were in some cases cut off from direct access to their cultural heritage and pushed into the Russian cultural orbit by the imposition of Cyrillic alphabets.

(1988:4)

Revolution took place historically in Russia and any attempt by Russians to export that revolution to non-Russian areas could not be culturally neutral, as the diffusion of world religions indicate. Along with Marxism—or worse the Russian version of it, Marxism-Leninism—were propagated Russian language, culture and values. This objective process had gradually resulted in the Russofication of non-Russians in the Soviet Union in particular and in Eastern Europe in general. 'As a result, where the authorities and the Russians see only the propagation and inculcation of ethnically neutral Soviet values, or Sovietization, non-Russians see a threat to their ethnic identity—they see Russofication' (Motyl 1989:155). Russofication generated an identity crisis among the non-Russians; and Russian monopolization of central state power structure, that according to ideology should have been equally shared among all the nations and nationalities, engendered an accumulated legitimation crisis. These two crises conspired to overthrow the transnational ideocracy in December 1991.

The rise of nationalism in the Communist world has confirmed the sheer tenacity and potency of tradition against which the whole Communist system had fought a *jihad* for over seventy years but without success. During those difficult years, tradition was sustained by the institution it had created since the dawn of human civilization, the family. When it became relatively safe for tradition to re-emerge in public, most householders in the Slavic world and Central Asia began to march through the streets, proclaiming 'We the People', united and inspired by their national traditions and hopes of freedom.

The collapse of Communist ideocracy may not be in the immediate sense a victory for democracy, no matter how desirable that should be, because as George Schopflin demonstrates, in the wasteland left behind by communism the institutionalization of democracy would take longer than we anticipate (1991:238). Rather it signifies the resurrection of tradition in irreligious systems for good or bad. Through elections and referendums people reaffirmed the place of tradition in the structure of nationhood and nationalism, and almost unanimously rejected Marxian 'solutions' to nationalism: that the unit of social life is not a transnational ideocracy but the nation; that the inherent sense of national unity springs not from proletarian or class unity but from shared culture; that national identity cannot be denied on the pretext of proletarian cosmopolitanism; nor that national interest, both material and spiritual, can be denied on any pretext. Independence or freedom is viewed as the necessary and sufficient recondition for the realization of all these dimensions of national life. Ultimately, the fight was really between received tradition and manipulated Marxism as the most effective way to dominate mind and society.

Initially, and by intention of the founding fathers such as Lenin and Trotsky, the Soviet Union was neither a nation-state (for it was profusely multinational) nor an empire, the concept of which went against ideology, though it progressively resulted in unintended Russian social imperialism in non-Russian areas. Strictly speaking, it was supposed to be a transnational ideocracy premised upon the Utopian concepts of proletarian internationalism that conflicted with the embedded sense of national identity and proletarian class interest that clashed with the received tradition of social co-operation that makes most societies cohesive. It may be described, for want of a better term, ideocracy-turned-empire which collapsed with the rising tide of nationalism as defined in this essay. A rough historical analogy of this twentieth century ideocracy may be the pan-European medieval theocracy that ignored and subsumed the structure of particular nations as subordinate to a higher transnational principle. Marxian transnationalism failed because it underestimated the invisible forces of tradition and because it caused too much strain upon human nature. Nationalism appears to be more in congruence with given cultural patterns and group mentalities.

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I have indicated whatever edition of a book I could locate in Indian libraries which unfortunately may not be, in several cases, the desirable original edition.

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